Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page No.# 1/14
GAHC040008192017
2026:GAU-AP:445
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.Petn./71/2017
SRI YUMLAM TANI
S/O SRI YUMLAM SOLUNG, RESIDENT CHIMPU, PO R.K MISSION, PS
ITANAGAR, PAPUM PARE, AP.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF A.P.
Through its Public Prosecutor
Linked Case : Crl.Petn./73/2017
SRI BIRI JAMES
Age: 0
Occupation :
Address:S/OO SRI BIRI HANYA
RESIDENT OF CHIMPU
PO R.K MISSION
PS ITANAGAR
PAPUM PARE
DIST. AP.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF A.P.
Age: 0
Occupation :
Address:THROUGH ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
------------
Page No.# 2/14
Linked Case : Crl.Petn./72/2017
SRI TANIA PUNUNG
Age: 0
Occupation :
Address:S/O SRHI TANIA YOI
RESIDENT OF CHIMPU
PO R.K MISSION
PS ITANAGAR
PAPUM PARE
DIST. AP. MOBILE NO. 8104756604
VERSUS
THE STATE OF A.P.
Age: 0
Occupation :
Address:THROUGH ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
------------
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BUDI HABUNG
Advocate for the petitioners
: Mr. U. Bori, ld. Adv.
Advocate for the Respondents
: T. Ete, ld. Addl. P.P.
Date on which Judgment is reserved
: 30.03.2026
Date of Hearing
: 24.03.2026 & 30.03.2026
Date of Judgment and Order
: 08.05.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the Operative part of the Judgment? :No
Whether the full Judgment has been pronounced ? : Yes
Page No.# 3/14
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(CAV)
Heard Mr. U. Bori, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. T.
Ete, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent.
2.
These
criminal petitions filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
[corresponding to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023]
are directed against the order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Yupia [in short ‘learned JMFC’] and the order dated
20.09.2017, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia. As all three petitions
arise out of the same police station case, being ITA P.S. Case No. 243/2011
under Sections 341/323/384/34 of the IPC, and are directed against a common
order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned
JMFC, Yupia, whereby
Miscellaneous Application Nos. 09/2017, 10/2017 and 11/2017 filed by the
petitioners under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. was rejected by a common order,
and as the said order has been further affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge,
Yupia, by separate but analogous orders dated 20.09.2017 in Criminal Revision
Nos. 02/2017 (YPA), 03/2017 (YPA), and 04/2017 (YPA), respectively and also
as the issues involved pertain to identical facts and common questions of law, all
three petitions are taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by
this common judgment to avoid repetition and multiplicity of proceedings.
3.
The case of the petitioners is that, based on a written FIR lodged by one
Sri Tapi Mra on 22.09.2011, a case, being Itanagar P.S. Case No. 243/2011, was
registered under Sections 341/323/384/34 of the IPC. Upon completion of the
investigation, the Investigating Officer filed a charge-sheet on dated 09.10.2014
against four accused persons, including the present three petitioners, for
Page No.# 4/14
offences punishable under Sections 341/323/384/34 of the IPC. A corresponding
G.R. case, then was registered, and on the basis of the charge-sheet so filed; by
order dated 04.03.2016, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate [in
short ‘learned CJM’], Yupia, the case was endorsed to the Court of the learned
JMFC, Yupia, for further proceedings and disposal.
4.
Accordingly, by an order dated 09.03.2016, the learned JMFC, Yupia, took
cognizance of the offences in G.R. Case No. 405/2011 and issued summons to
the petitioners and the other accused persons. Thereafter, on 18.01.2017, the
present petitioners filed three separate Miscellaneous Applications, being Nos.
09/2017, 10/2017, and 11/2017, under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., praying for
discharge from G.R. Case No. 405/2011 on the common ground that, in the
instant case, the charge-sheet was filed 17 days (actually 18 days) beyond the
period of limitation, i.e., from 22.09.2011 to 21.09.2014, and as such, the Trial
Court was barred from taking cognizance of the offences.
5.
Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., being relevant, is reproduced below:
“Section 468 – Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of
limitation
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take
cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry
of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be—
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding
one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year but not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences
which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which
is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most
Page No.# 5/14
severe punishment.”
6.
A plain reading of the above provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. shows that
the law prescribes a time limit for taking cognizance of certain offences,
depending on the nature and seriousness of the offence. The object of this
provision is to ensure that criminal proceedings are initiated within a reasonable
time and to prevent undue delay in prosecution. If the case is not instituted
within the prescribed period, the court is ordinarily barred from taking
cognizance unless the delay is condoned in accordance with law.
7.
However, as projected by the petitioners, by an order dated 18.01.2017,
the learned JMFC, Yupia, on an erroneous understanding of law with regard to
the
application
of
limitation,
rejected
the
applications
filed
by
the
petitioners/appellants therein. The learned JMFC, Yupia held that, as the
informant had lodged the FIR on the same day of the incident, there was no
delay and it was well within limitation; hence, there was no bar to take
cognizance of the offence.
8.
The contention of the petitioners is that, being aggrieved by the aforesaid
order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia, the petitioners
preferred separate criminal revisions before the learned Sessions Court, Yupia,
being Criminal Revision Nos. 02/2017 (YPA), 03/2017 (YPA), and 04/2017
(YPA); however, the Sessions Court, by separate but analogous order dated
20.09.2017, upheld/affirmed the order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned
JMFC, Yupia.
9.
Being highly aggrieved by the order dated 18.01.2017 passed by the
learned JMFC, Yupia, and the order dated 20.09.2017 passed by the learned
Sessions Judge, Yupia, in Criminal Revision Nos. 02/2017 (YPA), 03/2017 (YPA),
and 04/2017 (YPA), the petitioners has filed the present criminal petitions
Page No.# 6/14
separately, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 528 of the
BNSS), seeking quashing of the aforesaid orders.
10. The contention of the petitioners is that the said orders are illegal and
perverse, being contrary to the provisions of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. The
learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the relevant period of
limitation is not to be reckoned from the date of the incident till the filing of the
FIR, but from the date of lodging of the FIR/incident, as the case may be, to the
date of filing of the charge-sheet or taking cognizance of the offence, as
applicable. He further submits that if a charge-sheet is not filed within the
period of limitation, the court cannot take cognizance unless the delay is
properly condoned under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C.
11. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners placed
reliance on the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Sarah Mathew vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Disease by its
Director Dr. K. M. Cherian & Ors., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 62, wherein
Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure was explained in detail. In the
said judgment, the Constitution Bench held that “… for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., the relevant
date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of
prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance ...”
12. The learned counsel for the petitioners also relies on the decision in
Baccarose Perfumes and Beauty Products Private Limited vs. Central
Bureau of Investigation & Anr., reported in (2025) 1 SCC 384, wherein,
while reiterating and strengthening the principle laid down in Sarah Mathew
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if a charge-sheet is filed after the
period of limitation, the court cannot take cognizance unless the delay is
Page No.# 7/14
properly condoned under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that, in the instant case,
the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on a charge-sheet that was filed
beyond the period of limitation by 17 days (actually 18 days), without proper
consideration of condonation of delay under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C., and as
such, the same is legally unsustainable. The learned counsel for the petitioners
further submitted that while rejecting the application filed by the petitioners on
the ground of limitation, the learned Magistrate wrongly held that the informant
had lodged the FIR on the same day of the incident, i.e., on 22.09.2011, and
therefore concluded that it was within the limitation period of three years.
14. Per contra, Mr. Ete, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, submitted that
there is no infirmity in the impugned orders passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia,
dismissing the applications filed under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., as well as the
order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia, in criminal revisions filed by
the petitioners upholding the said dismissal. He submitted that the period of
limitation runs from the date of the incident up to the date of filing of the
FIR/complaint, as the case may be. In the present case, the incident occurred
on 22.09.2011 and, on the same date, an FIR was lodged; thus, it was well
within the limitation period. Therefore, the question of being barred by
limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. does not arise.
15. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor also relied on the decision in
Amritlal vs. Shantilal Sony & Ors., reported in (2022) SCC OnLine SC
266, wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the relevant date for
computing limitation is the date of filing of the complaint/charge-sheet and not
the date of taking cognizance of the offence. The said decision is a reaffirmation
Page No.# 8/14
of the principle laid down in Sarah Mathew (supra). In Amritlal (supra), the
delay was treated as condonable and not fatal; hence, the proceedings were
allowed to continue.
16. In support of his submission, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor
relied on the decision in Ghanshyam Soni vs. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi) & Anr., reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1301. However, it appears
that the reliance placed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is misplaced.
In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not hold that limitation under
Section 468 of Cr.P.C. is to be computed from the date of offence till lodging of
FIR. On the contrary, following the Constitution Bench’s decision in Sarah
Mathew case (supra) it was reiterated that the relevant date for computation
of limitation is the date of institution of prosecution, namely the filing of
complain or charge-sheet, as the case may be and not the date of taking
cognizance by the magistrate.
17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the issue involved in the
present case is whether the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate on
09.03.2016 is barred by the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 of
the Cr.P.C., which prescribes the maximum time limit for taking cognizance of
certain offences based on the severity of punishment.
18. As per Section 469 of the Cr.P.C., the period of limitation for taking
cognizance commences from the date on which the offence is committed.
Section 469 of the Cr.P.C., being relevant, is reproduced herein below:
“Commencement of the period of limitation-
(1)
The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence—
Page No.# 9/14
(a)
on the date of the offence; or
(b)
where the commission of the offence was not known, from the first day on
which such offence comes to the knowledge of the police officer or to the person
aggrieved by the offence, whichever is earlier; or
(c)
where the identity of the offender is not known, from the first day on which the
identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved or to the police officer
investigating the offence, whichever is earlier.
(2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be
computed shall be excluded.”
19. In the present case, the offence took place on 22.09.2011. The offences
alleged against the petitioners are punishable under Sections 341/323/384/34 of
the IPC. The maximum punishment for the aforesaid offence under Section 384
IPC is imprisonment for a term which may extend up to three years, thereby
attracting a limitation period of three years under Section 468(c) of the Cr.P.C.
The incident occurred and the FIR was lodged on the same date, i.e.,
22.09.2011. Thus, the prescribed limitation period expired on 21.09.2014.
20. In Sarah Mathew (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, while considering Sections 468 and 469 of the Cr.P.C.,
emphasized in paragraphs 24 and 25 that the object of limitation is to prevent
delay in prosecution. Further, in paragraph 47, it was categorically held that the
relevant date for computing limitation is the date of filing of the complaint or
charge-sheet and not the date of taking cognizance. The said principle was
conclusively affirmed in paragraph 51, wherein it was held that limitation must
be computed up to the date of institution of prosecution. The relevant
paragraphs 24, 25, 47, and 51 of Sarah Mathew (supra), decided by the
Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, being relevant, are
reproduced below:
“24. Read in the background of the Law Commission’s Report and the Report of the
JPC, it is clear that the object of Chapter XXXVI inserted in the Cr.P.C. was to quicken
Page No.# 10/14
the prosecutions of complaints and to rid the criminal justice system of inconsequential
cases displaying extreme lethargy, inertia or indolence. The effort was to make the
criminal justice system more orderly, efficient and just by providing period of limitation
for certain offences. In Sarwan Singh, this Court stated the object of Cr.P.C in putting a
bar of limitation as follows:
“The object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on
prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a
result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the
process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of
the offence. The object which the statutes seek to sub-serve is clearly in consonance
with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the
State or a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the
prosecution failing on the ground of limitation.”
25. It is equally clear however that the law makers did not want cause of justice to
suffer in genuine cases. Law Commission recommended provisions for exclusion of
time and those provisions were made part of Chapter XXXVI. We, therefore, find in
Chapter XXXVI provisions for exclusion of time in certain cases (Section 470), for
exclusion of date on which the Court is closed (Section 471), for continuing offences
(Section 472) and for extension of period of limitation in certain cases (Section 473).
Section 473 is crucial. It empowers the court to take cognizance of an offence after
the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is
necessary to do so in the interest of justice. Therefore, Chapter XXXVI is not loaded
against the complainant. It is true that the accused has a right to have a speedy trial
and this right is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C.
does not undermine this right of the accused. While it encourages diligence by
providing for limitation it does not want all prosecutions to be thrown overboard on
the ground of delay. It strikes a balance between the interest of the complainant and
the interest of the accused. It must be mentioned here that where the legislature
wanted to treat certain offences differently, it provided for limitation in the section
itself, for instance, Section 198(6) and 199(5) of the Cr.P.C. However, it chose to make
general provisions for limitation for certain types of offences for the first time and
incorporated them in Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C.
47.
So far ‘heading’ of the chapter is concerned, it is well settled that ‘heading’ or
‘title’ prefixed to sections or group of sections have a limited role to play in the
construction of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators or
the nature of the subject matter dealt with thereunder but they do not control the
Page No.# 11/14
meaning of the sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading the
section in proper perspective along with other provisions. In M/s. Frick India Ltd. v.
Union of India & Ors.[42], this Court has observed as under:
“It is well settled that the headings prefixed to sections or entries cannot control the
plain words of the provisions; they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of
construing the provision when the words used in the provision are clear and
unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting down the plain meaning of the words
in the provision. Only, in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or sub-heading
may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even in such a case it
could not be used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words used in the
provision.”
51.
In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of
limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. the relevant date is the date of filing of the
complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the
Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale which is followed in
Japani Sahoo lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its
own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the
relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468
of the Cr.P.C.”
21. Thus, it is a well-settled principle that, for the purpose of computing the
period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., the relevant and decisive
date is the date on which the charge-sheet or police report under Section 173 of
the Cr.P.C. is actually filed before the competent court, and not the subsequent
date on which the court formally takes cognizance of the offence.
22. The period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. commences from
the date of the offence in terms of Section 469 of the Cr.P.C. The limitation
continues to run until the institution of prosecution. The expression “institution
of prosecution,” as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew
(supra), refers to the stage when criminal proceedings are formally initiated
before the court. In a complaint case, it means the date on which the complaint
is filed before the Magistrate, whereas in a police case, it means the date on
Page No.# 12/14
which the charge-sheet is filed under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. It does not refer
to the date of lodging of the FIR or the date of taking cognizance. Therefore,
limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. is to be computed up to the date of
filing of the complaint or charge-sheet, as the case may be, and not the date of
taking cognizance.
23. In the present case, the incident took place on 22.09.2011. The FIR was
lodged on the same day, i.e., 22.09.2011. The period of three years expired on
21.09.2014. However, the charge-sheet was filed thereafter on 09.10.2014,
which is patently beyond the expiry of the three-year limitation period by 18
days, rendering the initiation of proceedings time-barred on the face of it. As
held in Sarah Mathew (supra), the relevant date is the date of filing of the
charge-sheet and not the date of cognizance. This principle has been reiterated
in Amritlal (supra), wherein it has been held that delay on the part of the court
in taking cognizance does not vitiate the proceedings.
24. In simple terms, the limitation runs from the date of the offence and ends
with the institution of prosecution, i.e., filing of the complaint or charge-sheet,
irrespective of the date of cognizance.
25. There is absolutely no material on record, including the charge-sheet,
court orders, or any accompanying documents, to demonstrate that for the
aforesaid delay of 18 days, the prosecution had filed any application seeking
condonation, nor was such delay ever condoned by the learned Magistrate by
invoking the beneficial provisions of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. Section 473 of the
Cr.P.C. reads as under:
“473.
Extension
of
period
of
limitation
in
certain
cases.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any
Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if
Page No.# 13/14
it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been
properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice”
26. Thus, Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to extend the period
of limitation if it is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained or if it is
necessary to do so in the interest of justice, on account of any exceptional
circumstances. However, in the instant case, no such application appears to
have been moved, no proper explanation for the delay has been furnished, and
more importantly, no reasons whatsoever have been assigned or recorded by
the Court for extending the limitation period in the interest of justice.
27. In the complete absence of any condonation of delay under Section 473 of
the Cr.P.C., the learned Magistrate was barred by law from taking cognizance of
the offences after the lapse of the mandatory limitation period. The impugned
order dated 18.01.2017, passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia, rejecting the
petitioners’ plea of limitation without addressing this vital aspect, and the order
dated 20.09.2017, passed by the learned Sessions Court, Yupia, affirming the
rejection order, thus suffer from a patent legal infirmity and absent of proper
application of mind, warranting interference in the exercise of inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
28. Accordingly, these three criminal petitions, being Nos. 71/2017, 72/2017,
and 73/2017 filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., stands allowed.
29. Consequently, the order of cognizance dated 09.03.2016, the order dated
18.01.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia dismissing the Miscellaneous
Applications being Nos. 09/2017, 10/2017, and 11/2017 under Section 468 of
the Cr.P.C. seeking discharge from G.R. Case No. 405/2011, and the order dated
20.09.2017 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Yupia in Criminal Revision
Nos. 02/2017 (YPA), 03/2017 (YPA), and 04/2017 (YPA) affirming the order
Page No.# 14/14
dated 18.01.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Yupia in the said Miscellaneous
Applications, along with all consequential proceedings arising out of G.R. Case
No. 405/2011 pending before the learned JMFC, Yupia, are hereby quashed and
set aside. As a result, the learned Trial Court shall not proceed further with the
matter.
30. However, before parting with the record, this Court deems it appropriate
to observe that the delay in filing the charge-sheet appears to have occurred
during the course of investigation, which has ultimately resulted in vitiating the
prosecution on the ground of limitation. Such delay defeats the very object of
timely criminal justice. Accordingly, the Superintendent of Police, Capital
Complex, Itanagar is directed to examine the matter and take appropriate
administrative action in accordance with law against the erring officers, if lapses
or negligence are found, and to ensure that such lapses do not occur in future.
31. Let a copy of this judgment also be made available to the Director General
of
Police
(DGP),
Arunachal
Pradesh,
for
onward
circulation
Superintendents of Police of the Districts in Arunachal Pradesh.
32. With the above observations, these petitions stand disposed of.
33. The Trial Court Record be sent back.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
to
all
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review