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IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
W.P.(C) No.10 of 2023
Subrata Debbarma,
son of late Nikhil Chandra Debbarma,
resident of Palace Compound, Akashbani
Gali, P.O. Agartala, P.S. East Agartala,
District- West Triprua,
……… Petitioner(s)
1.
–Versus–
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited,
Represented by its Asset Manager, ONGC,
O/o
Director
(Onshore),
5th
Floor,
Deendayal Urja Bhavan, 5 Nelson Mandela
Marg, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi-110070
2.
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited,
Represented by its Asset Manager,
ONGC, Badharghat, ONGC Complex,
Tripura Asset, P.O. ONGC Colony, P.S.
Amtali, West Tripura
3.
ED-Asset Manager,
ONGC, Tripura Asset, Agartala, the
Disciplinary Authority, ONGC Limited,
Badharghat, Agartala
[The
Disciplinary
Authority,
ONGC
Limited, BAdharghat, Agartala]
4.
The Director,
ONGC, the Appellate Authority, O/o Director
(Onshore), 5th Floor, Deendayal Urja
Bhavan, 5 Nelson Mandela Marg, Vasant
Kunj, New Delhi-110070
…….. Respondent(s)
For the Petitioner (s)
:
Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Adv.
Mr. K. Nath, Adv.
For the Respondent (s)
:
Mr. S. Deb, Sr. Adv.
Mr. A.L. Saha, Adv.
Date of hearing
:
16.01.2025
Date of delivery of
Judgment & order
:
07.05.2025
Whether fit for reporting
:
YES
NO
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.D. PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER
This petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing
the order dated 09.10.2018 issued by the ED, Asset Manager, ONGC
and the order dated 01.11.2022 issued by the Director (Onshore),
ONGC [Annexures-6 & 10 respectively], whereby the penalty of
‘removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future
employment under the Government or the Corporation/Company
owned or controlled by the Government’ was imposed upon the
petitioner which was confirmed by the appellate authority vide order
dated 01.11.2022.
[2]
The petitioner being initially appointed as Technical
Assistant, Grade-III (Chemistry) under the ONGC, joined in the
service on 02.09.1992. Thereafter, he was promoted three times
and lastly, he was holding the post of Assistant Superintendant
(Chemistry) w.e.f. 01.01.2015. On 27.06.2017, he was placed under
suspension contemplating a departmental proceeding. Then with the
grievance that no subsistence allowance was being provided to him,
he filed the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.657 of 2017 in this High
Court which was disposed of by an order dated 24.08.2017 directing
the respondents to pay the subsistence allowance to him.
[3]
Thereafter,
vide
memorandum
dated
25.09.2017,
a
departmental proceeding was initiated against him under Rule 36 of
ONGC Conduct, Discipline Appeal Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred
to as ‘the Rules of 1994’) under the following three articles of
charges:
“1. He is habitually irregular in attendance, wilfully and
habitually absents himself from duty without leave and
absents himself from his place of work after signing the
attendance register whereby he remains absent from his
appointed place of work without permission or sufficient
cause. Latest example of his unauthorised absence is from
02.01.2017 to 30.04.2017.
2. He has neglected his duty and on various occasions,
refused to perform his official assignments/jobs and thereby
has disobeyed the lawful orders of his superiors and shown
insubordination.
3. He has exhibited threatening, intimidating behaviour and
has abused his superiors on being asked to perform his duty
or when asked to submit leave applications to regularise his
leave. He has also exhibited similar threatening, intimidating
behaviour and has abused other regular/contractual
employees of ONGC by using insolent, impertinent and
unparliamentarily language.”
[4]
In the statement of imputation in support of such article
of charges, the details of his unauthorized absence in respect of
article of charge no.1, disobedience to the lawful orders of his
superiors and shown insubordination in respect of charge No.2 and
also the details of threatening, exhibiting intimidating behaviour and
abusing of his seniors etc. regarding charge No.3 were mentioned in
Annexure-II of the said memorandum dated 25.09.2017 alongwith
reference of several documents.
[5]
Mr. S.K Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents-ONGC has placed the file of departmental proceeding
which shows that such memorandum, article of charges, statement
of imputation of misconduct, list of documents, list of witnesses and
the documents as stated in the list (30 documents in 34 pages) etc.
were received by the petitioner under his own signature on
03.10.2017. In the list of witnesses, the departmental authority
cited 5[five] Nos. of witnesses to be examined in the proceeding.
The Enquiry Officer, after recording the evidence of witnesses and
also considering the related documents, finally submitted the report
on 08.05.2018, arriving at the following conclusions:
“On careful consideration of evidence adduced during
enquiry and on perusal of documents on the record of the
enquiry, it is evident that Shri Subrata DebBarma, Asstt.
Supdt. (Chem.) is a habitual absentee, shirked his
responsibility neglected his duty. He has also disobeyed the
lawful orders of his superior officers. He has exhibited
threatening, intimidating behavior and has abused his
superiors on being asked to perform his duties or when
asked to submit leave application to regularize his absence.
He also tried to assault Shri SP Dewan, DGM(Chem.) for his
perceived grievances. The CO has also behaved indecently
with doctors of Medical section of ONGC, Agartala. He has
also abused and threatened other regular/contractual
employees of ONGC. He is therefore liable for disciplinary
action for misconduct under the provisions of Rule 4 (1) (a),
(b)&(c), 4(2)(c), 5(2) read with Sl. no. 1,5,9(ii), 16,17,30,32
& 37 of Schedule II to Rule 3 (j) of ONGC CDA Rules,
1994(amended 2011).
Therefore the charges framed against Shri Subrata
DebBarma, Asstt. Supdt. (Chem.), CPF No.78138 mentioned
in the Article of Charges at Sl. No. 1, 2, and 3 annexed to
Memorandum No. AGT/HR-ER/SD/2017 dated 25.09.2017
stand established.”
[6]
On consideration of the said enquiry report, finally the
disciplinary authority passed the impugned order on 09.10.2018,
imposing penalty of removal from service which would not be a
disqualification for future employment under the Government or the
corporation/company owned or controlled by the Government. It
appears from the records that the said enquiry report was provided
to the petitioner vide memorandum dated 17.08.2018 (received by
him on 29.08.2018) but as stated, he did not submit any
representation against the same.
[7]
Thereafter, challenging the order of penalty as imposed
upon him, the petitioner without filing any departmental appeal,
preferred W.P(C) No.1192 of 2018 and a Coordinate Bench of this
Court vide judgment dated 21.11.2019, disposed of the matter in
the following terms:
“17. While considering the inquiry report [part of Annexure4 to the writ petition] this court did not find that the
adequate materials were disclosed to the petitioner at the
time of forming articles of charge 2 and 3 [as emphasized]
even though some witnesses have come to prove the
abusive conduct of the petitioner, but those conducts having
not specified or not disclosed in the memorandum of charge
enabling the petitioner to represent against it cannot be
made basis of any disciplinary action. Those charges are
vague, unspecified and instrumental to put the delinquent
officer in quandary. If the charge is formed in that manner
those cannot be sustained on the ground of vagueness and
incomprehensiveness. This court therefore by brushing aside
the technical objection of maintainability for not filing the
appeal, despite the specific rules accommodating the
adequate provision for filing the appeal, would interfere the
charges (2) and (3) in the memorandum dated 25.09.2017
[Annexure-B to the reply filed by the respondents].
Accordingly, the articles of charges (2) and (3) are set aside
and quashed. But this court finds sufficient materials to hold
the article of charge (1) on absenteeism or neglecting the
duties well substantiated. But the penalty on that charge
appears to be shockingly disproportionate. Hence, the order
of penalty is interfered with and set aside. The disciplinary
authority shall pass the fresh order of penalty after taking
the
proportionality
vis-a-vis
the
mis-conduct
in
consideration. At the time of passing the order of penalty in
terms of this direction the authority shall consider the long
twenty five years of service as rendered by the petitioner. It
is made abundantly clear that the disciplinary authority may
impose any penalty lesser than the penalty of removal or
dismissal. Such order shall invariably be based within a
period of two months from the day of receipt of a copy of
this order in accordance with the rules, subject to what has
been observed as above.”
[8]
The learned Writ Court thereby quashed the article of
charges No.2 & 3 but found sufficient materials in respect of article
of charge No.1 regarding absenteeism or neglecting the duties and
expressed the opinion that the penalty of removal from service on
that charge appeared to be shockingly disproportionate. Therefore,
the order of penalty was interfered with. The disciplinary authority
was directed to impose any other lesser penalty under said charge
no.1. The learned Bench also directed the disciplinary authority to
consider the long twenty five years of service as rendered by the
petitioner while reconsidering the matter of penalty.
[9]
Challenging the said order, the respondents preferred the
Writ Appeal No.184 of 2020 and a Division Bench of this Court
disposed of the matter vide judgment dated 12.08.2022 in the
following terms:
“13. Accordingly, the same stands remitted and the
petitioner is directed to submit representation before the
departmental Appellate Authority. The said Appellate
Authority shall decide the representation made by the
petitioner without being influenced by any of the
observations made here-in-above by this court. But the
observation of the learned Single Judge that the penalty of
removal of the petitioner from service passed by the
Disciplinary Authority is quite disproportionate to the charge
brought against him must be taken into consideration by the
Appellate Authority particularly when the penalty of removal
from service appears to be in contra to the relevant
provision of ONGC (Conduct) Rules as the articles of charges
do not relate to any financial irregularities. As such, the
Appellate Authority should proceed in accordance with law
keeping in mind the above observation made by this court. It
is made clear that the Appellate Authority shall be at liberty
to examine the findings of the Disciplinary Authority on all
the charges.
14. As a sequel, the judgment and order passed by the
learned Single Judge as aforestated, stands set aside and
quashed. It is directed that the petitioner shall submit his
representation within a period of two weeks from today and
the Appellate Authority after receipt of the representation,
shall dispose of the same with a reasoned order within a
period of four weeks thereafter.”
[10]
Thus, practically by the said judgment, the Division Bench
of this Court upset the findings of the learned Writ Court and the
decision on the charge nos. 2 & 3 were left with the appellate
authority.
However,
simultaneously
the
Division
Bench
also
conceded with the observation of the Ld. Single Judge that penalty
of removal of the petitioner from service was quite disproportionate
and therefore, direction was given to the appellate authority for
taking such observation into consideration while deciding the
appeal/representation.
[11]
In terms of the direction of the Division Bench, the
petitioner submitted his appeal on 24.08.2022 and the appellate
authority vide impugned order dated 01.11.2022 dismissed the said
appeal by affirming the penalty of removal from service as was
imposed by the disciplinary authority.
[12]
Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel appearing for
the petitioner submits that the petitioner was not furnished with the
copy of charges and he learnt the contents of the charges from the
enquiry report. Referring to the previous judgment passed in
W.P.(C) No.1192 of 2018, Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel submits
that already the Writ Court had held that the charge Nos.2 & 3 were
vague and the said finding was not disturbed by the Division Bench
of this Court. Learned senior counsel continues to submit that the
documents as relied on by the department in the departmental
proceeding were furnished during the inquiry but not at the initial
stage of the proceeding. According to Mr. Roy Barman, learned
senior counsel, the authority took into consideration some instances
of absence of the petitioner from duty which were very remote in
time and after those absences also, the petitioner was given
promotions one after another taking into account his outstanding
nature of service rendered towards the department. Mr. Roy
Barman, learned senior counsel further submits that the inquiring
authority
as
well
as
the
departmental
authority
took
into
consideration several materials which were beyond the charges but
the appellate authority failed to consider the same.
[13]
Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel contends that all
the points as raised by the petitioner in the appeal were not
discussed and considered by the appellate authority and even going
beyond the decision of the Division Bench, again affirmed the
punishment of removal from service of the petitioner. In this
context, Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel also relies on Rule
51 of sub-Rule 2 of Rules of 1994 stating that the appellate authority
failed to act in accordance with the provisions of said rule. For
reference, said sub-Rule 2 of Rule 51 is extracted hereunder:
“51. (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing
any of the penalties specified in Rule 34 or enhancing or
reducing a penalty imposed under the said Rule, the
Appellate Authority shall consider:
(a) whether the procedure herein prescribed in these
Rules had been complied with and the principles of
natural justice observed.
(b) whether the findings of Disciplinary Authority are
warranted by the evidence on the record; and
(c) Whether the penalty or the enhanced or reduced
penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe; and
pass orders:
(i) setting aside, reducing confirming or enhancing
the penalty; or
(ii) remitting the case to the authority which
imposed or enhanced or reduced the penalty or to
any other authority with such direction as it may
deem fit in the circumstances of the case.
Provided that:
(a) the Appellate Authority shall not impose any enhanced
penalty which neither such authority nor the authority which
made the order appealed against is competent in the case to
impose:
(b) no order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be passed
unless the appellant is given a reasonable opportunity of
making any representation which he may wish to make
against such enhanced penalty; and
(c) if the enhanced penalty which the Appellate Authority
proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clause
(vii) to (xi) of Rule 34 and inquiry under Rule 36 has not
already been held in the case, the Appellate Authority shall,
subject to the provisions of Rule 41, itself hold such inquiry
or direct that such inquiry be held and thereafter on
consideration of the proceeding of such inquiry and after
giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of making any
representation which he may wish to make against such
penalty, pass such orders as it may deem fit.”
[14]
Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel further submits
that the age of the petitioner is now 54 years and has already
completed 25 years of service but the said facts were also not
considered by the appellate authority. Finally, Mr. Roy Barman,
learned senior counsel relies on 2[two] decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court rendered in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India & Ors.,
(1995) 6
SCC 749 and Union of India & Anr. Vs. G.
Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463.
[15]
In B.C. Chaturvedi’s case it was observed that the
judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the
manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is
meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not
to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the court. It was also further
observed therein that the High Court has the jurisdiction to modify
the punishment/penalty by moulding the relief, which power is
undoubtedly as in of the long line of decisions of the Apex Court. It
was further observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the mere fact
that there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High
Courts, can be no ground to think that they have not to do complete
justice, and if, moulding of relief would do complete justice between
the parties, the same cannot be ordered.
[16]
In Ganayutham’s case, the proposition of proportionality
in the administrative law was discussed in the following lines:
31. ****
(4) (a) The position in our country, in administrative law,
where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is
that the Courts/Tribunals will only play a secondary role
while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will
remain with the executive or administrative authority. The
secondary judgment of the Court is to be based on
Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene
and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or
administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his
decision as the primary authority.
(4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive
action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our
country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and
assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an
appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend
fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to decide
whether the Courts will have a primary role only if the
freedoms under Article 19, 21 etc. are involve and not
for Article 14.
[17]
Mr. S.K. Deb, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents
strongly
argues that
the petitioner
has adopted
falsehood inasmuch as he had received the copy of the charges in
due time and also gave a reply against the same but now he is
denying the same before the Court. By placing the file of
departmental proceeding, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel also tries
to show that the petitioner received the documents on 03.10.2017,
whereas an inquiry officer was appointed on 10.11.2017. Mr. Deb,
learned senior counsel further argues that in the departmental
proceeding, the petitioner did not adduce any evidence and even
declined to cross-examine some of the witnesses of the prosecution.
Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel also contends that the scope for
submission of the due representation against the enquiry report was
also provided to the petitioner but he denied to submit any
representation. Therefore, there was no procedural lapses requiring
any judicial interference.
[18]
According to Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel, the Division
Bench’s decision nowhere prevented the appellate authority from
imposing penalty of removal. In respect of challenge asto the
vagueness of charges, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel submits that
in the written statement, the petitioner never raised the issue that
the charges were vague and even in his appeal also, he never tried
to show as to how the charges were vague. Referring to Rule 34 of
Rules 1994, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel contend that nowhere it
prevents the departmental or appellate authority from imposing
penalty of removal from service in any case other than the case of
disproportionate assets. According to Mr. Deb, learned senior
counsel now at this stage, considering the background facts as
surfaced, the judicial scrutiny is now confined only to consider the
proportionality of the penalty imposed and nothing more than that.
Learned senior counsel also submits that the petitioner has claimed
only infringement of a legal right but not a fundamental right and
therefore, the writ petition is also not maintainable.
[19]
Finally, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel refers the
following decisions which would be discussed in the next paragraph
of the judgment:
(i)
Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. vs.
Wednesbury Corporation, 1947 (2) ALL ER 680.
(ii)
Council of Civil Service Unions and others vs.
Minister for the Civil Service., 1984(3) All ER 935.
(iii) R vs. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Daly, 2001 (3) All ER 433.
(iv) OM Kumar & Others vs. Union of India, (2001) 2
SCC 386.
(v) Chairman and Managing Director, United
Commercial Bank & others vs. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4
SCC 364.
(vi) State of U.P. vs. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava &
others, (2006) 3 SCC 276.
(vii) State Bank of India & others vs. Ramesh Dinkar
Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212.
(viii) Prestige Lights Ltd. vs. State Bank of India,
(2007) 8 SCC 449.
(ix) Biplab Kr. Ghosh vs. Union of India, (2014) 1
TLR 245.
[20]
In the above said Wednesbury Corporation’s case
basically the principle of Wednesbury rule was originated. It was
observed by Lord Greene that the exercise of ‘discretion’ by the
executive must be a real exercise of the discretion. If, in the statute
conferring the discretion, there is to be found, expressly or by
implication, matters to which the authority exercising the discretion
ought to have regard, then, in exercising the discretion, they must
have regard to those matters. When a decision by an executive
authority on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the court can
interfere. It was also observed that the court may very well have
different views from those of an executive body on matters of high
public policy, but Court is not to act as an arbiter of the correctness
of one view of another.
[21]
In Council of Civil Service Unions case, Lord Diplock
has observed that to qualify a subject for judicial review the decision
must have consequences which affect some person (or body of
persons) other than the decision-maker, although it may affect him
too. It must affect such other persons either (a) by altering rights or
obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in
private law or (b) by depriving him some benefits or advantage
which either (i) he has in the past been permitted by the decisionmaker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted
to continue to do until there has been communicated to him some
rational ground for withdrawing it on which he has been given an
opportunity to comment or (ii) he has received assurance from the
decision-maker will not be withdrawn without giving him first an
opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should
not be withdrawn.
It was also further observed that under three
heads the grounds on which administrative action is subjected to
control
by the
judicial
review are illegality, irrationality
and
procedural impropriety. His Lordship also expressed the view of
possible adoption of the principle of proportionality in English Law in
future which was already recognised in the administrative law of
European Economic Community.
[22]
In
R
vs.
Secretary
of
State
for
the
Home
Department’s case, Lord Steyn further discussed the principle of
proportionality with the words that the intensity of review is
somewhat greater under the proportionality approach and the
doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess
the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely
whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions and
also that the proportionality test may go further than the traditional
grounds of review inasmuch as it may require attention to be
directed
to
the
relative
considerations. The said
weight
accorded
to
interests
and
principle of proportionality was also
explained by the Apex Court in OM Kumar’s case in the following
lines:
“28. By 'proportionality', we mean the question whether,
while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the
appropriate or least-restrictive choice of measures has been
made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve
the object of the legislation or the purpose of the
administrative order, as the case may be. Under the
principle, the Court will see that the legislature and the
administrative authority 'maintain a proper balance between
the adverse effects which the legislation or the
administrative order may have on the rights, liberties or
interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they
were intended to serve'. The legislature and the
administrative authority are, however, given an area of
discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice
made infringes the rights excessively or not is for the court.
That is what is meant by proportionality.”
[23]
Further, in Paras-66 & 67, the followings were also
observed in said case regarding the zone of judicial review in India
when an administrative actions are challenged:
“66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where
administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being
discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are
treated equally, the question is for the Constitutional Courts
as primary reviewing Courts to consider correctness of the
level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive
and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be
achieved by the administrator. Here the Court deals with the
merits of the balancing action of the administrator and is, in
essence, applying 'proportionality' and is a primary
reviewing authority.
67. But where, an administrative action is challenged as
'arbitrary' under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa : (1974)
4 SCC 3 (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases
are challenged), the question will be whether the
administrative order is 'rational' or 'reasonable' and the test
then is the Wednesbury test. The courts would then be
confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see
whether the administrator has done well in his primary role,
whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant
factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors
into consideration or whether his view is one which no
reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not
satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary.”
[24]
In P.C. Kakkar’s case, the Apex Court held that the
Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it
was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking
to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of
logic or moral standards. It was further observed that unless the
punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate
Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no
scope for interference. It is also held that to shorten litigations, the
Court may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a
normal course if the punishment imposed is found disproportionate
it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the
Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
[25]
In the similar line, the Apex Court in above said Sheo
Shanker Lal Srivastava’s case also reiterated that doctrine of
proportionality can be invoked only under certain situations and that
the High Court shall be very slow in interfering with the quantum of
punishment, unless it is found to be shocking to one's conscience.
[26]
In Ramesh Dinkar Punde’s case the principle that High
Court should not act as the appellate authority while exercising the
judicial review, was reiterated.
[27]
The other two decisions i.e. Prestige Lights Ltd. case
and Biplab Kr. Ghosh’s case, as relied on by Ld. Senior Counsel
Mr. Deb, it was observed that when a party approaches the High
Court, he must place all the facts before the court without any
reservation or suppression and to avoid placing of twisted facts,
otherwise same may disentitle the justice seeker from any relief
from the court.
[28]
It is established principle of law that the power of the
court in the judicial review is narrower than that of the power of an
appellate authority. In case of a judicial review in the matter of
disciplinary action taken by the administrative authority, the court
cannot sit as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence
and to replace the findings of the disciplinary authority by it’s own
findings. However, the court can interfere the same on the
touchstone of Wednesbury’s principle of law or on the principle of
proportionality as discussed in the earlier paragraphs. Where the
administrative act appears to be illogical or it suffers from
procedural impropriety or is shocking towards the conscience of the
Court, or is in defiance of logic or moral standards, the Court can
interfere and mould the relief accordingly.
[29]
Now, coming to the case in hand, it appears that the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.1192 of 2018 dealt
with the allegation of vagueness of charges and other attending
facts and circumstances that were raised before the court by the
petitioner and finally, observed that the articles of charge Nos.2 & 3
were vague and consequently, those were set aside. The Coordinate
Bench also found sufficient materials to hold the article of charge
No.1 established but the penalty on that charge appeared to the
court to be shockingly disproportionate and therefore, it was
interfered with and set aside. Other challenges of the petitioner on
the factual issues of said departmental proceeding, such as nonfurnishing of copy of article of charges, non-furnishing of copies of
documents in time etc. are concerned, the proper stage for agitating
the same was when the said W.P.(C) No.1192 of 2018 in the first
round was filed. There is no scope for the petitioner to reopen all
these issues again, when he accepted the judgment of said writ
petition and also the subsequent judgment passed by the Division
Bench of this Court in W.A. No.184 of 2020 without any challenge.
The normal inference would be that either he had raised all these
issues in the said writ petition and after considering the same, the
writ petition and the subsequent appeal were decided. I agree with
the submission of Ld. Senior Counsel, Mr. Deb that now only the
matter of challenge asto the penalty as imposed is left for
consideration.
[30]
As stated above, in said W.P.(C) No.1192 of 2018, the
Coordinate Bench held that the charge Nos.2 & 3 were vague and
therefore, those were set aside, with further observation that the
penalty
that
was
imposed
on
charge
No.1
was
shockingly
disproportionate. It was also further observed that while passing the
order of penalty, the authority shall consider the long 25 years of
service of the petitioner and it was also made clear that the
disciplinary authority may impose such penalty lesser than the
penalty of removal or dismissal.
[31]
In the appeal, the Division Bench, however considering all
aspects while upsetting the order of the Writ Court directed the
petitioner to submit representation before the appellate authority
and
the
appellate
authority
was
directed
to
decide
the
representation without being influenced by any observation made by
the Division Bench in the judgment but simultaneously it was also
categorically directed that the observation of the learned Single
Judge that the penalty for removal of petitioner from the service
passed by the disciplinary authority was quite disproportionate to
the charge brought against him, must be (emphasis laid) taken into
consideration by the appellate authority. It was also made clear that
the appellate authority shall be at liberty to examine the findings of
the disciplinary authority on all the charges. Thus, the contention of
the petitioner that the charge Nos.2 & 3 were vague, was not
accepted by the Division Bench and therefore, now it is permissible
for the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority to impose
penalty on above said 2(two) charges too. None of the parties had
challenged the said decision of the Division Bench of this Court in
the higher forum and therefore, the same is undoubtedly binding on
them.
[32]
While disposing the representation submitted by the
petitioner before the appellate authority, ultimately said authority
affirmed the penalty of removal from service as was imposed by the
disciplinary authority. The relevant paragraph of the observations
and decision of the appellate authority upholding such quantum and
nature of penalty is extracted hereunder:
11. As per directions of the Division Bench of the Hon'ble
High Court, I have given much thought and attention to the
question as to whether the penalty imposed vide Order
dated 09.10.2018 on the Charged Officer/ Appellant is harsh
and disproportionate to his acts of misconducts. I have
dispassionately considered this issue. The service record of
the Charged Officer makes it clear to me that the Charged
Officer/ Appellant is not worthy to be in the service of a
Government Company like ONGC. Habitual absence from
duty; neglect of duty; refusal to perform duty; cheating the
Company by signing the attendance register but not
attending the office; frequently remaining absent from office
without any information and permission; refusing to apply
for leave even after joining duty; misbehaving and using
abusive language; threatening and intimidating colleagues
and seniors; these are all acts of grave misconducts even in
isolation.
The
worst
part
is
that
the
Charged
Officer/Appellant habitually and repeatedly displayed this
behaviour continuously for years and did not heed to any
advice/ warning from seniors/authorities. I have also
perused his Performance Appraisal Reports for the period
2013 onwards. The comments of his controlling officers also
substantiate that the Charged Officer/ Appellant was a
habitual offender and non-performer. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, I fully agree with the findings of
the Disciplinary Authority and see no reason to interfere
with penalty imposed by him vide Order dated 09.10.2018.
In fact, considering the habitual and persistent acts of
misconducts of the Appellant, I feel that any penalty less
than the penalty of removal from service as provided under
Rule 34 (x) of the ONGC CDA Rules, 1994 (amended 2011)
would be inadequate and would send wrong message in the
organization and would be detrimental to the interests of the
organisation. Hence, I am of the view that the penalty of
removal from service as imposed by the Disciplinary
authority vide order dated 09.10.2018 is just, proper, and
not disproportionate to the acts of misconducts committed
by the Appellant/ Charged Officer.
[33]
The appellate authority also came to the conclusion that
all the procedures prescribed in the Rules of 1994 were complied
with in this case and the principle of natural justice was also
observed during the departmental proceeding and the petitioner was
given full opportunity to defend himself at each stage but he did not
produce any oral or documentary evidence during such inquiry and
failed to refute the charges levelled against him. The appellate
authority has also discussed and gave findings on article of charge
Nos.1, 2 & 3. According to the appellate authority, the conclusion
arrived by the inquiry officer was just and based on the evidence
produced during inquiry proceeding. However, what is noticed by the
court is that despite a specific direction of the Division Bench that
the observation of the learned Single Judge that penalty of removal
of the petitioner from service was quite disproportionate to the
charge brought against him must be taken into consideration by the
appellate authority, it was not given due consideration by the
appellate authority.
[34]
To say it in other words, the learned Division Bench of
this Court affirmed the observation of the learned Single Judge that
the penalty of removal from service was quite disproportionate in
the present case and as already discussed, none of the parties
challenged the said judgment, it became now obligatory for the
appellate authority to give due weightage to such observation. The
appellate authority failed to appreciate the basic spirit and import of
the said direction of the Division Bench of this Court. The words
‘must be taken into consideration’ cannot and should not be
understood and interpreted with such laxity and elasticity so as to
enable the appellate authority to sit over such observation and to
affirm the penalty as was imposed by the disciplinary authority, on
the same set of facts based on which such observations were made
by both the Ld. Single Judge and then by the Division Bench. The
appellate authority should not subscribe its own view over the view
of the Court on consideration of the same materials which were also
under consideration of the court while passing such observations
and direction. Such grave departure by the appellate authority from
the observation and direction of the courts regarding proportionality
of the penalty in the manner as discussed above, itself manifests
arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the authority while affirming
the penalty as imposed upon the petitioner. Therefore, the penalty
as imposed upon the petitioner is interfered with.
[35]
In view of the above, the impugned order dated
01.11.2022 passed by the appellate authority is hereby quashed so
far as it relates to the affirmation of the penalty imposed upon the
petitioner. The appellate authority is directed to decide the matter of
challenge of the petitioner asto the nature and quantum of penalty
afresh strictly in terms of the observation and direction made by the
Division Bench in said Writ Appeal no. 184 of 2020 as indicated in
foregoing paragraphs and also taking note of the observations made
by this Court hereinabove, more specifically in paragraph no.34 of
the judgment. The appellate authority will decide the matter within
4[four] weeks on receipt of the copy of this judgment.
With such observation and direction, the writ petition is
disposed of.
Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
JUDGE
signed by SUJAY GHOSH
SUJAY GHOSH Digitally
Date: 2025.05.07 15:52:42 +05'30'
Sujay
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