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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
W.P.(C) No.4 of 2025
Sri Soumitra Chakma,
Son of Late Bijal Behari Chakma,
Aged about 55 years,
Resident of Ujan Abhoynagar Bazaar,
P.O. Abhoynagar, P.S. New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division: Agartala, District: West Tripura
PIN:799 005
----Petitioner (s)
Versus
1. The State of Tripura ,
Represented by the Special Secretary,
General Administration (AR) Department,
Government of Tripura, New Capital Complex,
P.O. Kunjaban, PS New Capital Complex,
Agartala, District: West Tripura
2. The Special Secretary,
Department of Finance,
General Administration (AR) Department,
Government of Tripura, New Capital Complex,
P.O. Kunjaban, PS New Capital Complex,
Agartala, District: West Tripura
3. The Secretary,
General Administration (P & T) Department,
Government of Tripura, New Capital Complex,
P.O. New Secretariat, P.S. New Capital Complex,
Agartala, District: West Tripura, PIN:799 006
4. The Deputy Secretary,
General Administration (P & T) Department,
Government of Tripura, New Capital Complex,
P.O. New Secretariat, P.S. New Capital Complex,
Agartala, District: West Tripura, PIN:799 006
5. The Commissioner of Departmental Inquiries,
Pandit Nehru Complex, Gorkhabasti,
P.O. Kunjaban-799006, P.S. New Capital Complex,
Agartala, District: West Tripura, PIN: 799 006
6. The Chief Secretary,
Government of Tripura,
New Capital Complex, P.O. Kunjaban,
P.S. New Capital Complex, Agartala,
District: West Tripura (Appellate Authority)
7. Tripura Public Service Commission,
Represented by its Secretary, A.K. Road,
Near Fire Service Chowhmani, P.S. West Agartala,
District: West Tripura, PIN:799 001
8. The Secretary,
Tripura Public Service Commission,
A. K. Road, Near Fire Service Chowhmani,
P.S. West Agartala,District: West Tripura,
PIN:799 001
---- Respondents (s)
For Petitioner(s)
For Respondent(s)
G.A.
:
Mr. Sankar Lodh, Adv.
:
Mr. Subham Majumder, Adv.
Mr. Kohinoor N Bhattacharya,
Date of Hearing
:
Date of delivery of
Judgment and Order :
Whether fit for
Reporting
:
Mr. Raju Datta, Adv.
14.07.2025
06.08.2025
YES
HON‘BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This present writ petition is filed by the petitioner
challenging
the
memo
No.F.11(2)-GA(AR)/2022/752-55
dated 02.05.2022 [Annexure-7 to this writ petition], inquiry
report dated 28.03.2024 [Annexure-19 to this writ petition],
impugned order dated 04.06.2024 [Annexure-25 to this writ
petition]
and
the
appellate
order
dated
23.09.2024
[Annexure-26 to this writ petition].
02.
Heard Learned Counsel Mr. S. Lodh along with
Learned Counsel
Mr. S. Majumder appearing for the
petitioner and Mr. Kohinoor N Bhattacharya, Learned G.A.
appearing for the State-respondents and also heard Learned
Counsel Mr. R. Datta appearing for the TPSC-respondents.
03.
The factual background of the case is that by a
memorandum vide No. F.11(2)-GA(AR)/2022/752-55 dated
02.05.2022 [Annexure-7] the petitioner was imputed by the
Principal Secretary to the Government of Tripura being the
disciplinary authority on the charge of misconduct and it
was
proposed
that
under
the
said
memorandum
departmental proceeding under Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA)
Rules, 1965 will be carried out against him on the following
charges:
"ARTICLE – I
Shri Soumitra Chakma, during his incumbency period
from 11-08-2020 to 30-6-2021 as Land Acquisition
Collector has failed to maintain absolute integrity and
devotion to duty as he has made arbitrary and
unreasonable assessment for compensation of the land
and also for compensation of the damage cost of the
trees etc. which was found as highly excessive and not in
conformity of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1984.
Shri Chakma was asked to make correct assessment of
the damage in conformity with the judgment of Hon'ble
High Court in case No. WP(C)1381/2016. A total land
measuring 24.08 acres were acquired for construction of
IBB fencing at Murticherra Mouja under Kailashahar SubDivision vide notification No. F.9(5)-REV/ACQ/II/2005
dated 30th August, 2005. Out of total land measuring
24.08 acres, jote land was 19.14 acres and khas land was
4.94 acres. But the LAC, Unakoti has submitted the
assessment cost for compensation of land measuring
225.80 acres covering the entire land from zero line to
IBB fencing beyond the area of acquisition, which is only
24.08 acres. Further, LAC has also proposed for
compensation of damage cost of trees fallen within said
225.80 acres of land.
The market value of land has to be determined as per
crucial date of publication of the Notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984. But there is
no such indication found in the report of LAC vide letter
No. DM/LA/KAI/05/2005/2086-90 dated 25-03-2021.
Every case must be dealt with on its own fact based on
real assessment keeping in mind all these factors that lie
in the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 as a prudent purchase
or a compensation assessment authority.
Shri Soumitra Chakma, TCS Gr-I while working as a Land
Acquisition Collector, Unakoti w.e.f. 11-8-2020 to 30-62021 has miserably failed to exercise his statutory power
to cause survey by technically sound person to determine
the land which has been severed for construction of IBB
fencing and also failed to exercise his statutory power as
Land Acquisition Collector (LAC) for determining damage
etc.
The compensation calculated is highly excessive and
contrary to the prevailing settled norms of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1984. Furthermore, LAC had given a copy
of the damage assessment report to the party of writ
petitioners, that is, MS Fortuna Agro Plantations Ltd. and
others, without obtaining approval of the competent
authority of the State Government in contravention of the
provisions of established norms.
By the above acts, Shri Soumitra Chakma, TCS Gr-I, ExLAC, O/o the DM & Collector, Unakoti District has
committed gross misconduct, which is quite unbecoming
of a Government servant and thus, he has violated the
provisions of Rule 3 of the TCS (Conduct) Rules, 1988.
ARTICLE II
Shri Soumitra Chakma, TCS while working in the capacity
of Land Acquisition Collector, Unakoti district, without
taking
any
Government
approval
arbitrarily
and
unreasonably sent a requisition of Rs. 235.00 crore to
NBCC for making payment of compensation in L.A Case
No.7/Kai/2005 against the award passed in compliance
of judgment and order dated 5-1-2021 in W.P No.1381 of
2016 filed by M/s Fortuna Agro Plantation Ltd. in
violation of Rule-19 of DFPRT, 2019.
By the above act, the then LAC, Shri Soumitra Chakma,
TCS has miserably failed, to exercise his statutory power
and violated the provisions of Rule 3 of TCS (Conduct)
Rules, 1988 which is unbecoming of a Government
servant.
ARTICLE – III
During the aforesaid period and while functioning as Land
Acquisition Collector, Shri Soumitra Chakma, TCS illegally
made payment of huge LA compensation amounting to
Rs. 58,28,476/- to a middleman of Natingcherra Tea
Garden in defiance of all settled norms.
By the above act, the then LAC Shri Soumitra Chakma,
TCS Gr-I has violated the provisions of Rule 3 of TCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1988 which is unbecoming of a
Government servant."
04.
The statement of imputation of misconduct and
misbehavior in support of said Articles of charge by the said
memorandum dated 02.05.2022 along with the enclosures
were communicated to the petitioner asking him to submit
his written statement of defence within a period of fifteen
days.
05.
Succinctly,
the
petitioner
during
period
the
charge
of
postulates
his
that
the
incumbency
from
11.08.2020 to 30.06.2021 as LA Collector, Unakoti District
failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion of duty as
he
made
arbitrary
and
unreasonable
assessment
for
compensation of the land and also for compensation of the
damaged cost of trees which was found to be highly
excessive not in conformity with the LA Act and by a
judgment
dated
05.01.2021
of
this
High
Court
in
WP(C)1381 of 2016 the petitioner was asked to make
correct assessment of the damage because total land
measuring
24.08
acres
of
land
were
acquired
for
construction of IBB fencing of Murticherra mouja under
Kailashahar
Sub-Division
by
notification
No.F.9(5)-
REV/ACQ/II/2005 dated 30.08.2005 and out of total land
measuring 24.08 acres jote land was 19.14 acres and khas
land was 4.94 acres but the petitioner as LA Collector
submitted
assessment
cost
for
compensation
of
land
measuring 225.80 acre covering the entire land from zero
line to IBB fencing beyond the area of acquisition which was
only 24.08 acres but the petitioner proposed compensation
of damaged cost of trees fallen within said 225.80 acres.
Further as a LA Collector the petitioner failed to exercise his
statutory power to cause survey by technically sound person
to
determine
the
land
which
has
been
severed
for
construction of IBB fencing and proposed compensation for
excessive amount contrary to the prevailing settled norms
of the LA Act and further the petitioner was charged with
sending requisition of Rs.235.000 crore to NBCC without
taking any approval of the Government authority for making
payment of compensation in LA Case No.7/Kai/2005 against
the award passed in compliance of the judgment and order
dated 05.01.2021 in WP(C)No.1381 of 2016 filed by M/S
Fortuna Agro Plantation Ltd. violating Rule 19 of DFPRT
Rules, 2019. Thus the petitioner violated the provision of
Rule 3 of the TCS(Conduct) Rules, 1988. It was further
impugned that as LA Collector the petitioner illegally made
payment of LA compensation amounting to Rs.58,28,476/to a middleman of Natingcherra Tea Garden in defiance of
all settled norms violating Rule 3 of the TCS (Conduct)
Rules, 1988. The petitioner denied the charges filed against
him as per Articles of charge No.I, II and III. Since the
disciplinary authority was not convinced by the defence
submitted by the petitioner so disciplinary proceeding was
continued against him. Aditi Majumder, Commissioner of
Departmental Inquiries was appointed to conduct the
inquiry after conducting full-fledged inquiry submitted report
on the basis of oral and documentary evidence adduced on
behalf of contesting parties and held that the charges were
proved against the petitioner-accused Officer and the
inquiring authority hold that the prosecution successfully
established the charges against the petitioner. The inquiring
authority in her detailed inquiry report against the articles of
charges framed, formulated the following points for decision
(a)(b)(c) and gave separate observation against each of the
points. The observation of the inquiring authority in respect
of point No.6(a) was as follows:
―From the above analysis, it is found that the AO has
indeed failed to justify, within the scope of reasonability,
his arbitrary and unreasonable and faulty assessment for
compensation of land and damage of botanical assets,
which were not in conformity with the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and was calculated without
any proper basis. And, as such from the material
evidences produced and the examination of the
depositions as well as the arguments of both the AO and
the PO, and also the analysis recorded here, it is found
that the Prosecution has been able to establish the
charge in Article-I against the AO, and thus the decision
of Point no.6.(a) is given in favour of the Prosecution and
against the defence.‖
The
inquiring
authority
further
made
the
following observation in respect of point No.6(b):
―As the above analysis shows the violation of the
provisions of Rule 19 of DFPRT, 2019 as well as the
instructions/guidelines of the Revenue Department
issued by Memorandum No.F.30(13)-REV/ACQ/09 dated
05.01.2020, by the AO beyond doubt, as such, it is found
that the Prosecution had been able to establish
satisfactorily the charge brought against the AO in Article
II and hence the decision for Point No.6(b) is given in
favour of the Prosecution and against the Defence.‖
Again
the
inquiring
authority
after
considering
oral/documentary evidence of the contesting parties made
the following observation in respect of point No.6(c):
―From the above analysis based on materials and
evidences,
produced
and
adduced
by
both
the
Prosecution and the Defence along with the analysis of
the written brief of arguments submitted by both the PO
and AO, and viewed in the above perspective of the
analysis, employing the standards of preponderance of
probability, I find and hold that the Prosecution has been
able to successfully establish the charges brought against
the AO namely Sri Soumitra Chakma, the then Land
Acquisition Collector, and hence the decision for the same
is accordingly given as ―guilty.‖
06.
After submission of report [Annecxure-19] by the
inquiring authority to the disciplinary authority, the Charge
Officer was served with a copy of the report/findings by a
memorandum dated 08.04.2024 issued by the Secretary to
the
Government
of
Tripura
(Disciplinary
Authority)
[Annexure-20] and he was asked to submit his written
representation, if any, against the findings of the inquiring
authority within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the
memorandum. The Charged Officer furnished his written
representation
within
the
stipulated
period
of
time.
Thereafter the Disciplinary Authority, after consideration of
his representation provisionally decided to impose major
punishment upon the petitioner.
07.
Thereafter in consultation with the Tripura Public
Service Commission in terms of Rule-15(4) of the CCS(CCA)
Rule, 1965 and further considering all aspects of the matter
the disciplinary authority by memo dated 17.05.2024 vide
No.F.11(2)-GA(AR)/2022/449-50 [Annexure-22] informed
the petitioner that the Government has been provisionally
decided to impose a major penalty of (dismissal from
service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future
employment under the Government) as per Rule 11(ix) of
the CCS(CCA) Rule, 1965 and the petitioner was further
asked to submit his written representation, if any, within
fifteen days from the date of receipt of the memorandum
and thereafter after considering the representation of the
petitioner the competent authority found the same had no
substance by memo dated 04.06.2024 agreed with the
findings
of the
petitioner-accused
inquiring authority
officer
and
in respect
imposed
the
of the
following
punishment “dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be
a
disqualification
for
future
employment
under
the
Government under Rule-11(ix) of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965
and closed the proceedings against him.
08.
The petitioner against the said order of major
penalty
filed
departmental
appeal
before
the
Chief
Secretary, Government of Tripura (Appellate Authority) by
filing a memorandum of appeal on 17.08.2024 on the
following grounds:
―(i) During the entire process of enquiry, it has been
repeatedly brought to the notice of the respected
Authority for providing/producing original copies of
documents as listed in Annexure-III of the Charge Sheet,
but could not be provided/produced during the entire
course of Inquiry.
As a citation listed document Annexure-III, SI. No.16 &
17 had been relied on by me as photo copies during my
officiating as CALA/LAC. The Inquiry Authority has also
relied on the identical photo copies. The Soul difference is
that myself has been penalized on basis of reliance on
these photocopies whereas the Ld Inquiring Authority
has considered the same as evidence.
(ii) In defending Article I and II of the Charge Sheet, it is
humbly submitted:
(a)
There
is
no
allegation
of
any
financial
misappropriation by self.
(b) No financial transaction from Government exchequer
has actually happened.
(c)
Following official procedure, in concurrence with
the D.M. & Collector of Unakoti District, and Assessment
Committee was constituted. As per records, without any
intervention from self the Committee submitted a report.
Consequently, the official concerned of the D.M. Office
(L.A. Section) processed the same, based on that report.
There was no personal involvement of self and action was
taken by me maintaining official procedure.
(iii) In defending Article III, I do fervently request to
consider the fact that the Plots which were given
compensation were never a part of the proposal of the
retention withdrawal proposal.
(a) It is also submitted that following official
recommendation from SDM Kumarghat and official
process of issuance of Notice etc. the compensation was
allowed.
(b) It is also implicit to mention here that award amount
was given to such Party which as per record had been
paying land revenue for more than 15 years & Labour
EPF. Beside there is no complain from any aggrieved
regarding such award.‖
The appellate authority thereafter by an order
dated 23.09.2024 was pleased to dismiss the appeal
upholding the findings of the disciplinary authority with the
following observations:
―(i) The Annexure-III of the charge sheet includes as
many as 22 (twenty-two) documents, of which five
documents are not in exclusive possession of the
Government as these are available in public domain.
Moreover, all the Annexure-III documents were the
copies made from the original documents involving
mechanical processes which in themselves ensured the
accuracy of the copy. These copies were duly
authenticated by an officer of the rank of Under Secretary
under her stamp and seal and that may not be doubted or
the authenticity of the same may not be questioned,
despite the fact that the concerned Under Secretary,
Revenue deposed before the IA that she could not
recollect at that point of time. Failure to recollect does
not dilute the authenticity/genuinity of the documents.
(ii) It is painfully observed that Appellant has not
approached the Appellate Authority with clean hands as
the IA in the findings has clearly mentioned that during
the paper works/ file works, relating to the awarding of
the compensation amount, the official staff of the LA
section had raised the issue on the file note by referring
to the existing proposal for withdrawal of retention order,
as deposed by the Prosecution Witnesses (PW-3, PW-4
and PW-5), and the relevant notes of the award file
(which were exhibited as S/4 during inquiry), the AO had
still preferred to go ahead with awarding of the
compensation amount in spite of so many red flags at a
time which also indicates his non-judicious/imprudent
exercise of his statutory power. His act of awarding the
payment of such huge compensation amount of
Rs.58,28,476/-, on the grounds of the SDM Kumarghat's
report dated 18-02-2021 and drawing reference to earlier
payment of award to the same party around 10 years
back
by
his
predecessor
are
insufficient
and
unsatisfactory.
It is clearly revealed by way of undisputed
documentary evidences that the Appellant as LAC had
made the award and communicated the same to NBCC
Ltd asking for placement of fund with copy to the
claimant without even taking previous approval of the
Government as statutorily required under proviso to
Section 11 of Land Acquisition Act, 1984. Besides that,
the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) through their letter
dated
15-07-2021
has
also
expressed
utter
dissatisfaction on the unreasonable awarded value of Rs.
235.00 crore.
(iii) The appellant has made wrong assessment of the
damages in violation of High Court's order and further
sent the faulty requisition to the funding agency i.e. NBCC
bypassing the State Government.
(iv) The SDM, Kumarghat had clearly mentioned in the
report dated 18-02-2021 that the Sunshine Tea
processing Company Ltd. got a NOC vide No. RTCL/200910/104 dated 21-12-2009 from the Director, Ranibari Tea
Company Ltd. and that the said company had been paying
Land Revenue as a possessor since 2010 and in spite of
the same, the SDM, Kumarghat had concluded that the
said NOC may be verified by the District Authority. It is
surprising that the AO relied upon the said document,
exhibited as D/2. However, the very basis on which the
Sunshine Tea Processing Company Ltd. had approached
the LAC i.e. the NOC issued in 2009, has been
recommended by the SDM, Kumarghat for verification by
the District Authority which is clearly evident from the
fact that the genuinity/authencity of the said NOC was
held suspect by the SDM, Kumarghat and the appellant
had conveniently chosen to overlook the same and
proceeded with the awarding of the compensation
amount to the said company.
In consideration of the facts and circumstances it
could be asserted that the departmental inquiry was
conducted by a competent officer, rules of natural justice
were duly complied and the findings arrived at by the
Inquiry Officer were based on sufficient evidence.
Charges against the Appellant had been proved in a
properly conducted departmental inquiry, after giving a
reasonable opportunity to the Appellant to defend
himself.
Therefore, the Appellate Authority having adjudged
the facts & evidence of the case in totality has decided to
uphold the penalty imposed upon Shri Soumitra Chakma
vide order No.F.11(2)-GA(AR)/2022/502-04 dated 0406-2024.
The instant appeal thus stands disposed of.
09.
Being dissatisfied with the said order of the
departmental authority the present petitioner has filed this
writ petition claiming the following relief/reliefs:
(i) Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and
each one of them, to show cause as to why a Writ
of Certiorari and/or in the nature thereof, shall not
be issued, for calling for the records, lying with the
respondents,
for
rendering
substantial
and
conscionable justice to the petitioner, and for
quashing/setting
aside
the
impugned
Memorandum
No.F.11(2)-GA(AR)/2022/352-55,
dated 02.05.2022 (Annexure-7 supra), the Inquiry
Report vide case No.23/INQ/DP/GA (AR)/2022,
dated 28.03.2024 (Annexure-19 supra), the
impugned Order No.F.11(2)-GA(AR)/2022/502-04,
dated 04.06.2024 (Annexure-25 supra) and the
Appellate Order dated 23.09.2024 (Annexure-26
supra);
(ii) Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and
each one of them, to show cause as to why a Writ
of Mandamus and/or in the nature thereof, shall
not be issued, for mandating/directing the
respondents to revoke/rescind the impugned
Memorandum
No.F.11(2)-GA(AR)/2022/352-55,
dated
02.05.2022
(Annexure-7
supra),
the
impugned Order No.F.11(2)-GA(AR)/2022/502-04,
dated 04.06.2024 (Annexure-25 supra) and the
Appellate Order dated 23.09.2024 (Annexure-26
supra), and thereafter, reinstate him in service and
pay all the consequential pecuniary benefits
including pay and allowances during suspension
period;
(iii) Call for the records, appertaining to this
petition;
(iv) After hearing the parties, be pleased to make
the rule absolute in terms of i. & ii. above;
(v) Costs of and incidental to this proceeding;
(f) Any other relief(s) as to this Hon‘ble High Court
may deem fit and proper;
10.
The
State-respondents
have
filed
counter-
affidavit to resist the petition filed by the petitioner and
submitted that the petitioner acted beyond his jurisdiction
as a LA Collector and committed mis-conduct and failed to
maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and made
arbitrary and unreasonable compensation of land and also
for compensation of damaged cost of the trees which were
found highly excessive not in conformity with the provisions
of LA Act. It was further submitted as per judgment of the
High Court dated 05.01.2021 in WP(C)No.1381 of 2016 the
petitioner had to make a correct assessment of the damage
of the acquired piece of land but the LA Collector submitted
assessment
cost
for compensation of land measuring
225.80 acres covering the entire land from zero line to IBB
fencing beyond the area of acquisition which was only 24.08
acres. It was the further plea of the State-respondents that
the petitioner as L.A. Collector without taking any approval
of the Government arbitrarily and unreasonably had sent
direct requisition for Rs.235 crore to NBCC for making
payment of compensation in connection with LA Case
No.7/Kai/2005 and further the petitioner illegally made
payment
of
huge
amount
of
Rs.58,28,476/-
as
L.A.
compensation to a middleman of Nattingcherra Tea Garden
in defiance of all the settled norms and finally submitted
that after considering oral/documentary evidence on record
and after affording full opportunity the inquiring authority
submitted report against the petitioner which was accepted
by the disciplinary authority and the appeal preferred by the
petitioner was also duly considered by the Departmental
Appellate Authority and the said appeal preferred by the
present petitioner was also rejected by the Departmental
Appellate Authority by a detailed and reasoned order.
11.
Learned Counsel Mr. S. Lodh appearing for the
petitioner at the time of hearing of argument submitted that
the entire proceeding initiated against the petitioner was
unlawful, unjustified and misconceived. The charges levelled
against him had no basis because the petitioner as per
direction of the Court passed in connection with Case
No.WP(C)1381 of 2016 dated 05.01.2021 proceeded with
the subject matter constituted a team. Thus there was no
abuse of power by the petitioner and he only acted as par
jurisdiction. Learned Counsel further submitted that since
the entire action was taken in compliance of the direction of
Hon’ble High Court so the question of notification under
Section-4 of the LA Act was totally baseless. Learned
Counsel at the time of hearing further drawn the attention
of the Court referring Section-23 of the LA Act and
submitted that the petitioner has complied with the said
provision and furthermore referring Annexure-3 i.e. the
communication of Deputy Secretary, Government of Tripura
dated
22.03.2021
Department
to
it
was
informed
by
the
Revenue
D.M.
&
Collector,
Unakoti
District,
Kailashahar to take necessary action as per direction of the
Hon’ble
High
Court.
Learned
Counsel
again
referred
Annexure-4 i.e. the inquiry report of SDM, Kailashahar
dated 18.03.2021 sent to L.A. Collector for assessment of
loss suffered by M/S Fortuna Agro Plantation Limited and
also referred Annexure-5 i.e. the report of the S.D.F.O.
Kailashahar Forest Sub-Division addressing to the Land
Acquisition Collector dated 19.03.2021 in pursuance of
direction of the High Court. It was further submitted by the
Learned Counsel for the petitioner that the said judgment
was not challenged by the State-respondents to any other
forum. Thus the same has been attained finality. Learned
Counsel also submitted that after receipt of the reports of
the
constituted
team
the
petitioner
assessed
the
compensation following the mandate of LA Act and passed
the award which was routed through different tables and
the same award was countersigned by one TCS Grade-II LA
Officer and after that the petitioner vide communication
dated 25.03.2021 communicated the award to the Deputy
Secretary, Government of Tripura, Revenue Department
supplying copy to D.M. & Collector, Deputy Project Manager,
NBCC, M/S Fortuna Agro Plantation Ltd. and Dilkhusha Tea
Co. Ltd. and also the petitioner supplied the copy of award
to the Fortuna Agro Plantation Limited as there was clear
direction from the High Court to pass the award within four
months.
Learned
Counsel
further
submitted
that
the
inquiring authority without affording full opportunity and
without proper recording the evidence of the petitioner
made findings against the petitioner which was totally
illegal, unjustified and beyond the principles of natural
justice. It was further submitted by Learned Counsel
appearing for the petitioner that as alleged by the Staterespondents the petitioner did not violate Rule-19 of DFPRT
Rules, 2019 and there is also no evidence on record in this
regard. Thereafter Learned Counsel referred the findings of
the inquiring authority and submitted that on the basis of
the evidence on record there was no scope on the part of
the inquiring authority to held the petitioner to be guilty of
charges. Thus the inquiring authority failed to appreciate
the evidence on record properly and furthermore the
evidence of the petitioner as accused officer was also not
properly recorded by the inquiring authority. Thus there was
gross violation of principles of natural justice in recording
evidence on record. It was also submitted that regarding
Article-III
the
Ranibari
Tea
Estate
did
not
challenge
anything regarding payment of award to a middleman of
Nattingcherra
Tea
Garden.
To
support
his
contention
Learned Counsel also referred some other documents
annexed with the writ petition and submitted that petitioner
never acted beyond jurisdiction and referring the Office
Note No.55 and 56 Learned Counsel submitted that based
on documentary evidence on record award was made in
favour of the actual party. Finally Learned Counsel for the
petitioner submitted that the proceeding drawn up was
misconceived and the inquiring authority failed to appreciate
the evidence on record properly and found the petitioner to
be guilty of charges causing serious prejudice to the
petitioner and on the basis of misconceived proceeding the
disciplinary authority imposed major penalty which has been
upheld by the appellate authority of the department and the
findings of the appellate authority was nothing but the
replica of the findings of the inquiring authority and urged
before this Court for setting aside the orders of the inquiring
authority,
appellate
authority
and
other
connected
memorandums.
12.
In support of his contention Learned Counsel
appearing for the petitioner relied upon one citation of the
Hon’ble
Apex
Court
in
United
Bank
of
India
vs.
Biswanath Bhattacharjee reported in (2022) 13 SCC
329 wherein in para Nos.17,18, 19,20 and 21 Hon’ble the
Apex Court observed as under:
―17. In one of the earliest decisions of Union of India v.
H.C.
Goel:1963
SCC
OnLine
SC
16 relating
to
departmental proceedings, this court observed that
where a public servant is punished for misconduct after a
departmental enquiry is conducted, a clear case where
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is
warranted is when there is no evidence to establish the
official‘s guilt.
―22.… The two infirmities are separate and distinct
though, conceivably, in some cases both may be
present. There may be cases of no evidence even
where the Government is acting bona fide; the said
infirmity may also exist where the Government is
acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of
the Government not supported by any evidence
may be the result of mala fides but that does not
mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence
to support the conclusion of the Government, a
writ of certiorari will not issue without further
proof of mala fides. That is why we are not
prepared to accept the learned Attorney General's
argument that since no mala fides are alleged
against the appellant in the present case, no writ
of certiorari can be issued in favour of the
respondent.
23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's
contention that the conclusion of the appellant that
the third charge framed against the respondent
had been proved, is based on no evidence. The
learned Attorney General has stressed before us
that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear
in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with
the determination to root out corruption, and so, if
it is shown that the view taken by the appellant is
a reasonably possible view this Court should not sit
in appeal over that decision and seek to decide
whether this Court would have taken the same
view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely
sound. The only test which we can legitimately
apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's
case is, is there any evidence on which a finding
can be made against the respondent that Charge 3
was proved against him? In exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the
High Court cannot consider the question about the
sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a
particular conclusion. That is a matter which is
within the competence of the authority which deals
with the question; but the High Court can and must
enquire whether there is any evidence at all in
support of the impugned conclusion. In other
words, if the whole of the evidence led in the
enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion
follow that the charge in question is proved
against the respondent? This approach will avoid
weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as
it stands and only examine whether on that
evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows
or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold
that the respondent's grievance is well founded,
because, in our opinion, the finding which is
implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the
respondent that Charge 3 is proved against him is
based on no evidence.‖
18. Apart from cases of ―no evidence‖, this court has also
indicated that judicial review can be resorted to.
However, the scope of judicial review in such cases is
limited:(2006) 2 SCC 255. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India:(1995) 6 SCC 749 a three-judge bench of this court
ruled that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is made.
It is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which
the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of
the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial
review does not act as an appellate authority; it does not
re-appreciate the evidence. The court held that:
―12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which the
decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant
to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion
which the authority reaches is necessarily correct
in the eye of the court. When an enquiry is
conducted on charges of misconduct by a public
servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry was held by a
competent officer or whether rules of natural
justice are complied with. Whether the findings or
conclusions are based on some evidence, the
authority entrusted with the power to hold enquiry
has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a
finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must
be based on some evidence. Neither the technical
rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or
evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary
proceeding. When the authority accepts that
evidence
and
conclusion
receives
support
therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to
hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the
charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial
review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent
findings
on
the
evidence. The
Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority
held the proceedings against the delinquent officer
in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing
the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or
finding reached by the disciplinary authority is
based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding
be such as no reasonable person would have ever
reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the
conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so
as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate
authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate
the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not
relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed
before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C.
Goel (supra) this Court held at P.728 that if the
conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse
or suffers from patent error on the face of the
record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued.‖
19. Other decisions have ruled that being a proceeding
before a domestic tribunal, strict rules of evidence, or
adherence to the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 are
inessential. However, the procedure has to be fair and
reasonable, and the charged employee has to be given
reasonable opportunity to defend himself (ref: Bank of
India v. Degala Suryanarayana:(1999) 5 SCC 762 a
decision followed later in Punjab & Sind Bank v. Daya
Singh: (2010) 11 SCC 233). In Moni Shankar v. Union of
India:(2008) 3 SCC 484 this court outlined what judicial
review entails in respect of orders made by disciplinary
authorities:
―17. The departmental proceeding is a quasijudicial
one.
Although
the
provisions
of
the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said
proceeding, principles of natural justice are
required to be complied with. The courts exercising
power of judicial review are entitled to consider as
to
whether
while
inferring
commission
of
misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer
relevant piece of evidence has been taken into
consideration and irrelevant facts have been
excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be
based on evidence which meet the requirements of
legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to
arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that
the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it
is taken on its face value to be correct in its
entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof,
namely, preponderance of probability. If on such
evidence, the test of the doctrine of proportionality
has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its
domain to interfere.‖
20.This court struck a similar note, in State Bank of Bikaner and
Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya: (2011) 4 SCC 584, where it was
observed that:
―7….If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and
the findings are based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the
findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will
not interfere with findings of fact recorded in
departmental enquiries, except where such findings are
based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse.
The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal
acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion
or finding, on the material on record‖.
21. The bank is correct, when it contends that an appellate
review of the materials and findings cannot ordinarily be
undertaken,
in
proceedings
under Article
226 of
the
Constitution. Yet, from H.C. Goel onwards, this court has
consistently ruled that where the findings of the disciplinary
authority are not based on evidence, or based on a
consideration of irrelevant material, or ignoring relevant
material, are mala fide, or where the findings are perverse or
such that they could not have been rendered by any reasonable
person placed in like circumstances, the remedies under Article
226 of the Constitution are available, and intervention,
warranted. For any court to ascertain if any findings were
beyond the record (i.e., no evidence) or based on any irrelevant
or extraneous factors, or by ignoring material evidence,
necessarily some amount of scrutiny is necessary. A finding of
―no evidence‖ or perversity, cannot be rendered sans such
basic scrutiny of the materials, and the findings of the
disciplinary authority. However, the margin of appreciation of
the court under Article 226 of the Constitution would be
different; it is not appellate in character.‖
He also relied upon another citation of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Ram Lal vs. State of
Rajasthan and Others reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175
wherein in para No.32 and 34 Hon’ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
―32. This issue need not detain us any further because it is not
the case of department that the appellant sought employment
based on 10th standard marksheet. It is their positive case that
the appellant sought employment on the basis of his 8th
standard marksheet. Shravan Lal, PW-4 in the departmental
enquiry had also furnished the 10th standard marksheet
procured from the Secondary Education Board, Ajmer. In crossexamination, on being asked, he admitted that the appellant
was recruited on the basis of 8th standard marksheet, and he
admitted that there was no alteration in the 8th standard
marksheet.
34. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the D.B. Special
Appeal (Writ) No.484/2011 dated 05.09.2018. We direct that
the appellant shall be reinstated with all consequential benefits
including seniority, notional promotions, fitment of salary and
all other benefits. As far as backwages are concerned, we are
inclined to award the appellant 50% of the backwages. The
directions be complied with within a period of four weeks from
today.‖
Referring those citations Learned Counsel Mr.
Lodh urged for allowing this writ petition by setting aside
the impugned orders mentioned in the prayer portion of the
writ petition.
13.
On the other hand, Learned G.A. Mr. Kohinoor N
Bhattacharya appearing on behalf of the State-respondents
submitted that there was no illegality or infirmity in the
findings of the inquiring authority as well as the appellate
authority because the present petitioner in this case could
not project any violation of principles of natural justice. He
also drawn the attention of the Court referring the entire
proceedings and submitted that if the entire proceeding is
meticulously examined it would be clear that in the entire
proceeding the petitioner was given all opportunities to
support his defence not only that he was given the
opportunity
to
defend
the
charges
by
adducing
oral/documentary evidence on record. So the finding of the
inquiring authority was justified, rational and based on oral
and documentary evidence on record. The petitioner in this
writ petition according to Learned G.A. could not raise any
ground to interfere with the findings of the disciplinary
authority as well as the appellate authority. It was further
submitted that admittedly there was direction from the side
of the Hon’ble High Court in WP(C)No.1381 of 2016 dated
05.01.2021. But the petitioner acted beyond the direction of
the Hon’ble High Court and violated the notification issued
under Section-4 of the LA Act dated 30.08.2005 and by the
said notification only 24.08 acres of land were shown to be
acquired out of that jote land was 19.14 acres and khas
land was 4.94 acres. Learned G.A. further submitted that
inquiring authority in departmental proceeding recorded the
evidence on record of the witnesses properly and after
elaborate discussions of the evidence on record observed
that the Article of charges levelled against the petitioner
were proved beyond doubt and accordingly found the
petitioner to be guilty. It was further submitted that the
petitioner as LA Collector ignoring the report of SDM and
violating and ignoring the Office Note No.55 illegally made
payment to a middleman of Natingcherra Tea Estate and
ignoring the notification dated 30.08.2025 proceeded to
make payment of award/compensation for land measuring
225.80 acres. It was also submitted by Learned G.A. that in
a writ petition there is very least scope to re-appreciate the
evidence on record and the present petitioner in the entire
proceeding failed to show any procedural irregularities or
lapses to be interfered with. It was further submitted that
the petitioner awarded compensation for 225.80 acres of
land whereas only 24.08 was actually acquired as per
notification dated 30.08.2005 of the Revenue Department
and furthermore the petitioner acted beyond jurisdiction and
misinterpreted the direction of the High Court and violating
the financial rules of the Government sent requisition for an
amount of Rs.235 crores to NBCC without obtaining prior
approval of the State Government and not only that the
petitioner
also
violated
the
Revenue
Department’s
notification dated 13.03.1991 and 05.10.2010. Further the
petitioner also made payment of Rs.58,28,476/- to the
Sunshine Tea Co. Ltd. processing Private Limited who were
claiming the lawful occupiers of the land but there was
dispute regarding ownership and the SDM Kumarghat also
recommended verification of the 2009 NOC produced by
Sunshine Tea. Furthermore the petitioner also ignored the
Official Note No.55 and proceeded for payment based on
unverified and unregistered documents. Thus according to
Learned G.A. the petitioner acted in violation of Rule 3 of
the TCS (Conduct) Rules, 1988 which shows non-judicious
and imprudent use of statutory power. Learned G.A. also
submitted that Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
India wrote a letter to the State Government on 15.07.2021
expressing their dissatisfaction over the excessive award
and also intimated the Government that such compensation
may set a dangerous precedent across India in other border
fencing projects and the action of the petitioner threatened
to open a ‘Pandora’s Box’ for future claims. Further Learned
G.A. submitted that although office note was prepared by
the other staff but the entire responsibility lies upon the
petitioner as LA Collector because it was his duty to verify
ownership, obey financial rules and ensure reasonableness
in making award and to obtain the approval of the Stateauthority. It was further submitted that the findings of the
appellate authority also was justified which shows that the
petitioner proceeded despite several red flags and the
petitioner proceeded to make award based on selective and
unverified materials. Finally Learned G.A. submitted that the
entire
process
of
disciplinary
proceeding
was
fair,
reasonable and there was sufficient evidence against the
petitioner
with
the
punishment
imposed
proportionate
and
alleged
by
imputation
the
considering
as
authority
the
such
was
the
lawful,
seriousness
of
misconduct, financial irregularity and breach of public duty.
Learned G.A. in support of his contention submitted that
there is no scope on the part of this Court at this stage to
reassess/appreciate the evidence on record. In support of
his contention he relied upon one citation of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Pravin Kumar vs. Union of
India and Others reported in (2020) 9 SCC 471 wherein
in para Nos.25, 26 and 27 Hon’ble the Apex Court observed
as under:
“I. Scope of Judicial Review in Service Matters
25. The learned counsel for the appellant spent
considerable time taking us through the various
evidences on record with the intention of highlighting
lacunas and contradictions. We feel that such an exercise
was in vain, as the threshold of interference in the
present proceedings is quite high. The power of judicial
review discharged by Constitutional Courts under Article
226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is
distinct from the appellate power exercised by a
departmental appellate authority. It would be gainsaid
that judicial review is an evaluation of the decision-
making process, and not the merits of the decision itself.
Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and
not fairness of conclusion. It ought to be used to correct
manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result
in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross
unreasonableness of outcome:(2006)2 SCC 373.
26. These principles are succinctly elucidated by a three-judge
Bench of this Court in BC Chaturvedi v. Union of India: (1995) 6
SCC 749 in the following extract:
―12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a
review of the manner in which the decision is made.
Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that
the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily
correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is
conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant,
the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether
the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether
rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the
findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the
authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has
jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on
some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence
Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein,
apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority
accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support
therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The
Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not
act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence
and to arrive at its own independent findings on the
evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the delinquent
officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the
mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding
reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no
evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no
reasonable person would have ever reached, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the
finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate
to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.
Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has
coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the
nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict
proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are
not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4
SCR 718] this Court held at SCR PP. 728-29 that if the
conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached
by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from
patent error on the face of the record or based on no
evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.‖
27. These parameters have been consistently reiterated by this
Court in a catena of decisions, including:
(i) State of Tamil Nadu v. S Subramaniam, (1996) 7 SCC
509.
(ii) Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank, (2003) 3 SCC 583.
(iii) Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd v.
Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768.‖
14.
Learned G.A. further referred the provision of
Section-11 of the L.A. Act and relied upon one citation of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of U.P. and
Others vs. Rajiv Gupta and Another reported in (1994)
5 SCC 686 wherein in para No.6 Hon’ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
―6. Section 11 postulates of conducting an enquiry and
making the award by the Collector. The first proviso
envisages that "no award shall be made by the Collector
under sub-section without the previous approval of the
appropriate Government or of such officer as the
appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf ". It
is common knowledge that exercising the power under
the first proviso, the appropriate Government made rules
or statutory orders or instructions whatever be the
nomenclature, they have statutory operation giving
authorisation to the Land Acquisition Collector to make
an award up to a particular pecuniary limit without prior
approval either of the appropriate Government or an
officer authorised by the appropriate Government in that
behalf. If the award exceeds the limit, prior approval of
the State Governments or authorised officer is
mandatory. Any award made in violation thereof, renders
the award non est and void as it hinges upon the
jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Collector or Officer.
No doubt, Mr Markandeya is right that the State had not
produced before us rules or orders issued under the first
proviso to Section 11 that the Land Acquisition Officer
shall not make an award exceeding one crore of rupees
without prior approval of the Commissioner, namely,
Commissioner, Board of Revenue. But nonetheless, there
is a statutory inhibition by first proviso to Section 11 that
the prior approval either of the appropriate Government
or of an officer which the appropriate Government
authorises in that behalf, is mandatory for making an
award. It is a condition precedent. Obviously, for this
reason, the Collector in his letter dated 20- 12-1992,
addressed to the Commissioner, seeking prior approval
thus:
"Proposed award
*
*
*
Thus the proposed lands are disputed lands, and
therefore, it has been mentioned in the proposed
award that payment of compensation shall be
made after obtaining the final report of the enquiry
officer and the final judgment passed in the cases
pending in different courts. Since, in the present
case, the award is to be made up to 21-12-1992
only, it is to request you to kindly give your prior
approval on the proposed award."
Its bare reading clearly indicates that the conscience that
he is required to make the award on or before 21-121992 and to seek prior approval and accordingly he
requested the Commissioner to grant him prior approval
as is enjoined in the first proviso to Section 11 to make
the proposed award. The heading of the award itself
clearly indicates working of his mind that it is only a
proposed award and after prior approval is given, he is
enjoined to make the award under Section 11 of the Act.
Since prior approval was not given before the expiry of
21-12-1992, there is no award made by the Land
Acquisition Officer. In the eye of law the proposed award
of the Collector under Section 11 of the Act is not the
award. As seen, Section 11-A is mandatory and on expiry
of two years from the date of publication of declaration,
i.e., on 21-12-1992, the entire proceedings under the Act
stood lapsed. We are not concerned in this case with the
proviso to Section 11-A. The High Court was, therefore,
not right in its construction that there was an award
made by the Collector on 20-12-1992 and the direction to
take further steps in that behalf are clearly illegal. The
review petition is accordingly allowed. The order dated
10-12-1993 of the High Court is set aside and the appeal
is allowed. The writ petition stands dismissed but in the
circumstances parties are directed to bear their own
costs.‖
He also referred another citation of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in State of Rajasthan vs. B.K.
Meena and Others reported in (1996) 6 SCC 417
wherein in para No.17 Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
―17. There is yet another reason. The approach and the
objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary
proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the
disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the
respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his
removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case
may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question
is whether offences registered against him under
the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Indian Penal
Code, if any) are established and, if established, what
sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of
proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the
enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct
and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending
criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be matter of
course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one
stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the
criminal case gets unduly delayed.‖
15.
Learned G.A. further referred another citation of
Supreme Court of India in M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India
and Others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 wherein in para
No.25 Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
―25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial
review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however,
being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some
evidences to prove the charge. Although the charges in a
departmental proceedings are not required to be proved
like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we
cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer
performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing
the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had
been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges
on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he
cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He
cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot
shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant
testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises
and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations
with which the delinquent officer had not been charged
with.‖
Referring those citations Learned G.A. drawn the
attention of the Court that the principles of said citations are
very much relevant for decision of this petition because
there is no scope on the part of this Court at this stage to
act as a judicial review and to re-appreciate the evidence on
record and furthermore according to Learned G.A. since the
petitioner in course of hearing of argument failed to satisfy
the Court by showing any cogent grounds to interfere with
the findings of the disciplinary authority as well as the
appellate authority. So Learned G.A. urged for dismissal of
this writ petition with heavy costs.
16.
Learned Counsel Mr. Raju Datta appearing on
behalf of the TPSC-respondents submitted that the role of
TPSC was very limited. TPSC acted as consulting authority
for imposition of punishment upon the petitioner. However
in support of his contention he relied upon one citation in
State Bank of India and Another vs. K.S. Vishwanath
reported in (2022)15 SCC 190 wherein in para Nos.17-21
Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
17. From the impugned judgment and order:2021 SCC
OnLine Kar 15232 passed by the High Court it appears
that the High Court has dealt with and considered the
writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
of
India
challenging
the
decision
of
the
Bank/Management dismissing the delinquent officer as if
the High Court was exercising the powers of the
Appellate Authority. The High Court in exercise of powers
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has
reappreciated the evidence on record which otherwise is
not permissible as held by this Court in a catena of
decisions.
18. Recently in N. Gangaraj:(2020) 3 SCC 423 after
considering other decisions of this Court on judicial
review and the power of the High Court in a departmental
enquiry and interference with the findings recorded in
the departmental enquiry, it is observed and held that
the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision
of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against
a public servant. It is further observed and held that the
High Court is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf,
and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf,
and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
It is further observed that if there is some evidence, that
the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry
has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High
Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India to review/reappreciate the evidence and to arrive
at an independent finding on the evidence.
19. In paras 9 to 14, this Court had considered other
decisions on the power of the High Court on judicial
review on the decisions taken by the Disciplinary
Authority as under:
―9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of
A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723] , a
three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the
High Court is not a court of appeal over the
decision of the authorities holding a departmental
enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and according
to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. The Court held as under: (AIR pp. 1726
27, para 7)
7. … The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding
under Article
226 of
the
Constitution a court of appeal over the
decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public
servant : it is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf, and according to
the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty
to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of
the High Court in a petition for a writ
under Article 226 to review the evidence and
to arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence.‖
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India:(1995) 6
SCC 749 again a three-Judge Bench of this Court
has held that power of judicial review is not an
appeal from a decision but a review of the manner
in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual
receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the
conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The
court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does
not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate
the evidence and to arrive at its own independent
findings on the evidence. It was held as under:
(SCC pp. 75960, paras 1213)
―12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which
the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual
receives fair treatment and not to ensure
that the conclusion which the authority
reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of
the court. When an inquiry is conducted on
charges of misconduct by a public servant,
the
Court/Tribunal
is
concerned
to
determine whether the inquiry was held by a
competent officer or whether rules of
natural justice are complied with. Whether
the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence, the authority entrusted with
the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction,
power and authority to reach a finding of
fact or conclusion. But that finding must be
based on some evidence. Neither the
technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of
proof of fact or evidence as defined therein,
apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the
authority
accepts
that
evidence
and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the
disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that
the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge.
The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial
review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its
own independent findings on the evidence.
The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the
delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent
with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of statutory rules prescribing the
mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or
finding reached by the disciplinary authority
is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person
would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal
may interfere with the conclusion or the
finding, and mould the relief so as to make it
appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole
judge of facts. Where appeal is presented,
the appellate authority has coextensive
power to reappreciate the evidence or the
nature of punishment. In a disciplinary
inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and
findings on that evidence are not relevant.
Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be
canvassed
before
the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C.
Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4
SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] , this Court held
at SCR P.728, that if the conclusion, upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers
from patent error on the face of the record
or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued.‖
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil
[High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil
(2000) 1 SCC 416, this Court held that interference
with the decision of departmental authorities is
permitted if such authority had held proceedings in
violation of the principles of natural justice or in
violation of statutory regulations prescribing the
mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held
as under:
―16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil
v. High Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine
Bom 97 : (2000) 1 LLN 160] of the High
Court seems to have approached the case as
though it was an appeal against the order of
the administrative/disciplinary authority of
the High Court. Interference with the
decision of departmental authorities can be
permitted, while exercising jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution if such
authority had held proceedings in violation
of the principles of natural justice or in
violation of statutory regulations prescribing
the mode of such enquiry or if the decision
of the authority is vitiated by considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the
case, or if the conclusion made by the
authority, on the very face of it, is wholly
arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable
person could have arrived at such a
conclusion, or grounds very similar to the
above. But we cannot overlook that the
departmental authority (in this case the
Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is
the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has
been properly conducted. The settled legal
position is that if there is some legal
evidence on which the findings can be
based, then adequacy or even reliability of
that evidence is not a matter for canvassing
before the High Court in a writ petition filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution.‖
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi
Chand Nalwaya [State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v.
Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584, this Court
held that the courts will not act as an appellate
court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
another view is possible on the material on record.
If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held
and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the
reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground
for interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. The Court held as under:
―7. It is now well settled that the
courts will not act as an appellate
court and reassess the evidence led in
the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on
the ground that another view is
possible on the material on record. If
the enquiry has been fairly and
properly held and the findings are
based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of the evidence or the
reliable nature of the evidence will not
be grounds for interfering with the
findings in departmental enquiries.
Therefore, courts will not interfere
with findings of fact recorded in
departmental enquiries, except where
such findings are based on no
evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out
perversity is to see whether a tribunal
acting reasonably could have arrived
at such conclusion or finding, on the
material on record. The courts will
however interfere with the findings in
disciplinary matters, if principles of
natural
justice
or
statutory
regulations have been violated or if
the order is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, mala fide or based on
extraneous considerations.
10. The fact that the criminal court
subsequently
acquitted
the
respondent by giving him the benefit
of doubt, will not in any way render a
completed
disciplinary
proceeding
invalid nor affect the validity of the
finding of guilt or consequential
punishment. The standard of proof
required in criminal proceedings being
different from the standard of proof
required in departmental enquiries,
the same charges and evidence may
lead to different results in the two
proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in
departmental proceedings and an
acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in
the criminal proceedings. This is more
so
when
the
departmental
proceedings are more proximate to
the incident, in point of time, when
compared to the criminal proceedings.
The findings by the criminal court will
have
no
effect
on
previously
concluded
domestic
enquiry.
An
employee who allows the findings in
the enquiry and the punishment by
the disciplinary authority to attain
finality by non challenge, cannot after
several years, challenge the decision
on the ground that subsequently, the
criminal court has acquitted him.‖
13. In another judgment reported as Union
of India v. P. Gunasekaran [Union of India v.
P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015)
1 SCC (L&S) 554] , this Court held that while
reappreciating evidence the High Court
cannot act as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the
parameters as to when the High Court shall
not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings
: (SCC p. 617, para 13)
―13. Under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, the High Court
shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in
the enquiry, in case the same has
been conducted in accordance with
law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the
evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the
evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal
evidence on which findings can be
based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however
grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of
punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.‖
14. On the other hand the learned counsel
for the respondent relies upon the judgment
reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna
Narayan Tewari: [Allahabad Bank v. Krishna
Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017)
1 SCC (L&S) 335] , wherein this Court held
that if the disciplinary authority records a
finding that is not supported by any
evidence whatsoever or a finding which is
unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could
interfere with the finding of the disciplinary
proceedings. We do not find that even on
touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the
High Court could interfere with the findings
recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is
not the case of no evidence or that the
findings are perverse. The finding that the
respondent is guilty of misconduct has been
interfered with only on the ground that there
are discrepancies in the evidence of the
Department. The discrepancies in the
evidence will not make it a case of no
evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated
the evidence and returned a finding that the
respondent is guilty of misconduct.‖
20. That thereafter this Court has observed and held in
paragraph 7, 8 and 15 as under: (N. Gangaraj case(2020)
3 SCC 423.
―7. The disciplinary authority has taken into
consideration the evidence led before the IO to
return a finding that the charges levelled against
the respondent stand proved.
8. We find that the interference in the order of
punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed:2011 SCC
Online Kar 4510 by the High Court suffers from
patent error. The power of judicial review is
confined to the decision-making process. The
power of judicial review conferred on the
constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that
of an appellate authority.
*
*
*
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the
findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an
order of punishment. An appeal before the State
Government was also dismissed. Once the
evidence has been accepted by the departmental
authority, in exercise of power of judicial review,
the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere
with
the
findings
of
facts
recorded
by
reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the
appellate authority. We may notice that the said
judgment has not noticed the larger Bench
judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S.
Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723] and B.C.
Chaturvedi [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India,
(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] as
mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by
the Tribunal and the High Court:2011 SCC OnLine
Kar 4510 suffer from patent illegality and thus
cannot be sustained in law.‖
21. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we
are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a
grave error in interfering with the order passed by the
disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent –
delinquent officer from service. The High Court has erred
in reappreciating the entire evidence on record and
thereafter interfering with the findings of fact recorded
by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the disciplinary
authority. By interfering with the findings recorded by
the Enquiry Officer which as such were on appreciation of
evidence on record, the order passed by the High Court
suffers from patent illegality. From the findings recorded
by the Enquiry Officer recorded hereinabove, it cannot be
said that there was no evidence at all which may
reasonably support the conclusion that the Delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge.‖
Referring the same Learned Counsel Mr. Datta
drawn the attention of this Court that at this stage there is
no scope to reappriciate the evidence on record recorded by
the inquiring authority and in this proceeding the petitioner
could not show any satisfactory grounds to interfere with
the findings alleging that principles of natural justice were
violated and finally urged for dismissal of this case.
17.
I have heard both the sides at length and
examined the case of the petitioner within the parameters
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment as
referred above and after going through the writ petition
supported by the annexures as well as the counter-affidavits
supported by the annexures it appears that on the basis of
Articles of charges framed against the present petitioner
inquiry was conducted by the inquiring authority and before
the inquiring authority both the parties have adduced the
oral/documentary evidence on record. It was the case of the
petitioner that based on the direction of the Hon’ble High
Court dated 05.01.2021 in WP(C)No.1381 of 2016 the
petitioner proceeded with the subject matter of acquisition
and after formation of team based on the report of survey
team he proceeded to determine compensation and passed
an award showing acquisition of land measuring 225.80
acres in place of 24.08 acres as per notification dated
30.08.2005
issued
by
the
Revenue
Department,
Government of Tripura and further it appears that the
petitioner as LA Collector failed to obtain approval of the
authority of the State Government before sending the
requisition to NBCC for an amount of Rs.235 crores and also
in respect of Articles of Charge No.3 the petitioner passed
an order for making payment to an unauthorized person
ignoring the norms without confirmation of the ownership
and entitlement of the right person. Thus as a public
servant he was found to be guilty of mis-conduct under
Rule-14 of the CCS(CCA)Rules, 1965 and also the violation
of Rule-3 of the TCS(Conduct) Rules, 1988. It is the settled
position of law that there is very limited scope on the part of
this Court at this stage to reappreciate/reassess the
evidence on record of the departmental proceeding. The
petitioner in course of hearing of argument could not show
any justified grounds in support of his contention that the
principles of natural justice were violated against him.
Furthermore as alleged by the petitioner that the inquiring
authority failed to consider his defence is also not true
because after perusal of the evidence on record it transpires
that huge opportunity was given to the petitioner to
establish his defence properly and furthermore the standard
of
proof
required
in
a
disciplinary
proceeding
is
a
preponderance probability. In this regard Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in Indian Oil Corporation and Others vs.
Ajit Kumar Singh and Another reported in (2023) 19
SCC 102 in para Nos.10-12 observed as under:
―10. The facts of the case leading to the issuance of
chargesheet, initiation of departmental inquiry, the
report of the inquiry officer and the punishment inflicted
upon respondent no.1 have already been narrated in the
preceding paragraphs. It is not in dispute that during the
course of inquiry, fair opportunity of hearing was
afforded to the respondent no.1 at every stage. This was
even found by the learned Single Judge while dismissing
the writ petition challenging the punishment inflicted
upon him. The judgment 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 3395
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court shows
that matter was dealt with in a manner as if it was the
first stage of the case, namely, the inquiry was being
conducted and inquiry report was being prepared, which
is not the scope in judicial review.
11. The views expressed by this Court on the scope of
judicial review in SBI (Appellate Authority) vs. Ajai
Kumar Srivastava:(2021) 2 SCC 612, are extracted
below:
―24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial
review, of the constitutional courts, is evaluation
of the decision-making process and not the merits
of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in
treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion.
The
court/tribunal
may
interfere
in
the
proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in
any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
authority is based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable
person would have ever reached or where the
conclusions upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse
or suffer from patent error on the face of record or
based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari
could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial
review cannot be extended to the examination of
correctness or reasonableness of a decision of
authority as a matter of fact.
25-27
*
*
*
28. The constitutional court while exercising its
jurisdiction
of
judicial
review
under Article
226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not
interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the
departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case
of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no
evidence to support a finding or where a finding is
such that no man acting reasonably and with
objectivity could have arrived at those findings and
so long as there is some evidence to support
the conclusion arrived at by the departmental
authority, the same has to be sustained.‖
(emphasis supplied)
Similar view was expressed in the later judgment
of this Court in Mukesh Kumar Raigar vs. Union of
India:(2023)11 SCC 159.
12. If the facts of the case are examined in the light of
the settled principles of law in scope of judicial review,
we find that the Division Bench of the High Court
proceeded to reappreciate the entire evidence as if
conviction in a criminal trial was being re-examined by
the next higher court. The stand taken by the respondent
no.1 was that he was on leave and there was no question
of his tampering with any document. His contention was
that merely because he had the duplicate key of the
drawer where the documents were kept, he cannot be
made responsible for any tampering. However, there was
no answer to the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer
in the Inquiry Report, namely, that the changed form of
quotation of M/s. Laxmi Singh contained original
signature of respondent no.1. The fact that this ―Form of
quotation‖ was changed is not in dispute. When the
changed form of quotation also contained signature of
respondent no.1, it clearly established his involvement in
the tampering of document. This fact has not even been
noticed by the Division Bench of the High Court.‖
Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan
and Others vs. Bhupendra Singh reported in 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 1908 in para Nos.21-28 observed as under:
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
21. Having considered the matter, the Court finds that
the Impugned Judgment cannot be sustained. On a
prefatory note, we would begin by quoting what the
Division Bench has noted on page No.7:
‗It is well settled preposition (sic) of law that
courts will not act as an Appellate Court and reassess the evidence led in domestic enquiry, nor
interfere on the ground that another view was
possible on the material on record. If the enquiry
has been fairly and properly held and findings are
based on evidence, the question of adequacy of
evidence or reliable nature of the evidence will be
no ground for interfering with the finding in
departmental enquiry. However, when the finding
of fact recorded in departmental enquiry is based
on no evidence or where it is clearly perverse then
it will invite the intervention of the court.‘
22. The learned Single Judge held that the findings
returned in the enquiry were without evidence, contrary
to the record, and as the Removal Order based on the
same was not reasoned, proceeded to quash the same.
This course of action adopted by the learned Single Judge
has been affirmed by the Division Bench. Surprisingly,
despite noticing the aforesaid position in law relating to
non-interference by the Appellate Court to re-assess the
evidence led in an enquiry or to interfere on the ground
that another view was possible on the material on record,
the Division Bench went on to record that the learned
Single Judge had rightly held that the enquiry
proceedings were vitiated as they were based on no
evidence and were perverse, without giving any reasons
of its own as to how the learned Single Judge had arrived
at such a conclusion, namely, that the enquiry was based
on no evidence and the findings rendered therein were
perverse. Upon detailed assistance from both sides on
the factual prism, coupled with the materials on record,
we are of the considered opinion that the judgments
delivered by the learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench are unsustainable.
23. The scope of examination and interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter
referred to as the ‗Constitution‘) in a case of the present
nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra
Pradesh v S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3Judge Bench stated:
‗7. … The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a
Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant : it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed
in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Where there is some
evidence, which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it
is not the function of the High Court in a petition
for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence
and to arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly
interfere where the departmental authorities have
held the proceedings against the delinquent in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities
have
disabled
themselves
from
reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the
case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion
on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever
have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar
grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if
the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole
judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence
on which their findings can be based, the adequacy
or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which
can be permitted to be canvassed before the High
Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article
226 of the Constitution.‘
(emphasis supplied)
24 The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength
in State Bank of India v Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC
249. Three learned Judges of this Court stated as under
in State of Andhra Pradesh v Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975)
2 SCC 557:
‗21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before this
Court. Two propositions were laid down by this
Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR
1963 SC 1723:(1964) 3 SCR 25: (1964) 2 LLJ 150].
First, there is no warrant for the view that in
considering whether a public officer is guilty of
misconduct charged against him, the rule followed
in criminal trials that an offence is not established
unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be
applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic
tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution is not
competent to declare the order of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High
Court is not a court of appeal under Article
226 over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant. The
Court is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf and according to the procedure prescribed
in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Second, where there is
some evidence which the authority entrusted with
the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and
which evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of
the charge, it is not the function of the High Court
to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High
Court may interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules
of natural justice or in violation of the statutory
rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities
have
disabled
themselves
from
reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the
case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion
on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever
have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly
held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some
legal evidence on which their findings can be
based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence
is not a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding
for a writ under Article 226.
xxx
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The
Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The
findings of fact reached by an inferior court or
tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence
are
not
reopened
or
questioned
in
writ
proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on
the face of the record can be corrected by a writ,
but not an error of fact, however grave it may
appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact
recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is
shown that in recording the said finding, the
tribunal had erroneously refused to admit
admissible
and
material
evidence,
or
had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which
has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would
be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on
the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or
inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the
inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribunal.
See Syed
Yakoob
v.
K.S.
Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477: (1964) 5 SCR
64].
24. The High Court in the present case assessed
the entire evidence and came to its own
conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do
so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does
not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the
evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence
in the present case which was considered by the
Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to
justify the conclusion that there is no evidence
which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that
the respondent did not make the journey. The
Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not
possible for the High Court to say that
no reasonable person could have arrived at these
conclusions. The High Court reviewed the
evidence, reassessed the evidence and then
rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is
precisely what the High Court in exercising
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not
do.
xxx
26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the
High Court was wrong in setting aside the
dismissal order by reviewing and reassessing the
evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of
the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and
bear their own costs.‘
(emphasis supplied)
25. In State Bank of India v S K Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC
364, two learned Judges of this Court held:
‗28. The decisions cited above make one thing
clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be
reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in
Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109: 65
TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles
cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability
depends upon the context and the facts and
circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh
Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405:
(1978) 2 SCR 272]) The objective is to ensure a
fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights
are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of
India [(1982) 1 SCC 271: 1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and
Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1
SCC 664].) As pointed out by this Court in A.K.
Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] , the
dividing line between quasi-judicial function and
administrative function (affecting the rights of a
party) has become quite thin and almost
indistinguishable — a fact also emphasised by
House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 :
(1984) 3 WLR 1174 : 1985 AC 374, HL] where the
principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were
treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is
from the standpoint of fair hearing — applying the
test of prejudice, as it may be called — that any
and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi
alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there
may be situations where observance of the
requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat
the very proceeding — which may result in grave
prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason
that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a
sufficient compliance with natural justice was
evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills
v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may
also be cases where the public interest or the
interests of the security of State or other similar
considerations may make it inadvisable to observe
the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in
the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b)
and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to
disclose the material on which a particular action
is being taken. There may indeed be any number of
varying situations which it is not possible for
anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the
principles emerging from the decided cases can be
stated in the following terms in relation to the
disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction
ought to be made between violation of the
principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as
such and violation of a facet of the said principle.
In other words, distinction is between ―no
notice‖/―no hearing‖ and ―no adequate hearing‖ or
to put it in different words, ―no opportunity‖ and
―no adequate opportunity‖. To illustrate — take a
case where the person is dismissed from service
without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v.
Baldwin [1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66: (1963) 2
WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the
first category and the order of dismissal would be
invalid — or void, if one chooses to use that
expression (Calvin v. Carr [1980 AC 574: (1979) 2
All ER 440: (1979) 2 WLR 755, PC]). But where the
person is dismissed from service, say, without
supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report
(Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993)
4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC
704]) or without affording him a due opportunity
of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi [(1984)
1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62] ) it would be a case
falling in the latter category — violation of a facet
of the said rule of natural justice — in which case,
the validity of the order has to be tested on the
touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the
person concerned did or did not have a fair
hearing. It would not be correct — in the light of
the above decisions to say that for any and every
violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule
incorporating such facet, the order passed is
altogether void and ought to be set aside without
further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and
test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 :
1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] should
govern all cases where the complaint is not that
there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity
and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper
hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of
violation of a procedural rule or requirement
governing the enquiry; the complaint should be
examined on the touchstone of prejudice as
aforesaid.‘
26. In Union of India v K G Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794, it was
opined:
‗14. The common thread running through in all
these decisions is that the court should not
interfere with the administrator's decision unless it
was
illogical
or
suffers
from
procedural
impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of
the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of
logic or moral standards. In view of what has been
stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948)
1 KB 223: (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court
would not go into the correctness of the choice
made by the administrator open to him and the
court should not substitute its decision to that of
the administrator. The scope of judicial review is
limited to the deficiency in the decision-making
process and not the decision.
15. To put it differently, unless the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority or the
Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the
court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference.
Further, to shorten litigations it may, in
exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment by recording cogent reasons in
support thereof. In the normal course if the
punishment
imposed
is
shockingly
disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct
the disciplinary authority or the Appellate
Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.‘
(emphasis supplied)
27. The legal position was restated by two learned
Judges in State of Uttar Pradesh v Man Mohan Nath
Sinha, (2009) 8 SCC 310:
‗15. The legal position is well settled that the
power of judicial review is not directed against the
decision but is confined to the decision-making
process. The court does not sit in judgment on
merits of the decision. It is not open to the High
Court to reappreciate and reappraise the evidence
led before the inquiry officer and examine the
findings recorded by the inquiry officer as a court
of appeal and reach its own conclusions. In the
instant case, the High Court fell into grave error in
scanning the evidence as if it was a court of
appeal. The approach of the High Court in
consideration of the matter suffers from manifest
error and, in our thoughtful consideration, the
matter requires fresh consideration by the High
Court in accordance with law. On this short
ground, we send the matter back to the High
Court.‘
28. Turning our gaze back to the facts herein, we find
that the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
acted as Courts of Appeal and went on to re-appreciate
the evidence, which the above- enumerated authorities
caution against. The present coram, in Bharti Airtel
Limited v A S Raghavendra, (2024) 6 SCC 418, has laid
down:
‗29. As regards the power of the High Court to
reappraise the facts, it cannot be said that the
same is completely impermissible under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution. However, there
must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary in
a tribunal's order, which is facing judicial scrutiny
before the High Court, to justify interference. We
do not think such a situation prevailed in the
present facts. Further, the ratio of the judgments
relied upon by the respondent in support of his
contentions, would not apply in the facts at hand.‘
(emphasis supplied)
As already stated, to prove the charges before the
inquiring authority the prosecution in total adduced 9 nos.
of witnesses and relied upon some documents which were
marked as Exhibits S1 to S10 and in order to prove the
defence the petitioner was examined as DW-1 and relied
upon some documents which were marked as Exhibit.D1 to
D-23 and at the time of determination of the charges the
inquiring authority framed three separate points as narrated
earlier and in respect of point No.6(a) it was the observation
of the inquiring authority that the petitioner failed to justify
his unreasonable and faulty assessment for compensation of
land and damage of botanical assets which were not in
conformity of the provision of Land Acquisition Act and
calculated the assessment without any basis ignoring the
actual quantum of land acquired for compensation and in
respect of point No.6(b) it appears that the inquiring
authority observed that the petitioner at the time of making
of award violated the provision of Rule-19 of DFPRT Rules,
2019 without obtaining approval of the State Government
and also violated the guidelines/instructions of the Revenue
Department vide memo No.F.30(13)-REV/ACQ/09 dated
05.01.2010 and in respect of point No.6(c) the inquiring
authority came to the observation that during the relevant
period as LA Collector the petitioner illegally made payment
of huge amount of Rs.58,28,476/- as LA compensation to a
middleman of Nottingcherra Tea Garden being defiance of
all the settled norms and after going through the aforesaid
principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
aforenoted cases it appears that there is no scope to
reappreciate the evidence on record as alleged by the
petitioner because after going through the proceedings and
also after hearing Learned Counsel for the petitioner it
appears that the petitioner as LA Collector acted beyond his
jurisdiction and in the entire proceeding all opportunities
were given to the petitioner to defend the charges levelled
against
him. But the petitioner failed to inspire the
confidence of the inquiring authority to exonerate him from
the charges. Situated thus, after going through the entire
record it appears that the disciplinary authority after
examining the entire evidence recorded by the inquiring
authority agreed with the findings of the inquiring authority
and found the petitioner to be guilty of charges framed
which has been affirmed by the appellate authority after
affording reasonable opportunity to him. As such, I find no
merit in the writ petition to interfere with the findings of the
inquiring authority affirmed by the disciplinary authority and
subsequent findings of the appellate authority of the
department as the petitioner has failed to satisfy the Court
by showing any cogent grounds to interfere with the
proceedings.
In the result, the writ petition filed by the petitioner
stands dismissed being devoid of merit.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
Return back the departmental records to Learned G.A.
after observing all formalities.
JUDGE
MOUMITA
DATTA
Moumita
MOUMITA DATTA
Date: 2025.08.08 04:16:28
+05'30'
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