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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C) No.322 of 2025
Sri Santanu Biswas,
S/o Late Santosh Chandra Biswas,
Resident of village & PO-Gangachara,
PS-Kakraban, Sub-division-Udaipur,
District-Gomati Tripura, PIN-799125,
aged about 41 years.
---- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1. The State of Tripura,
Represented by the Secretary,
Department of Family Welfare &
Preventive Medicine, Government of Tripura,
having his office at New Secretariat Complex,
Agartala, PO-Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
2. The Secretary,
Family Welfare & Preventive Medicine,
Government of Tripura, having his office
at New Secretariat Complex, Agartala,
PO-Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
3. The Secretary,
Department of health & Family Welfare,
Government of Tripura, having his office
at New Secretariat Complex, Agartala,
PO-Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
4. The Director,
Department of Family Welfare & Preventive Medicine,
Government of Tripura, having his office at Pandit
Nehru Office Complex, Gurkhabasti, PO-Kunjaban,
PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-Division-Agartala,
District-West Tripura.
5. The food Safety Commissioner & Secretary,
Department of Health & Family Welfare,
Government of Tripura, having his office
at New Secretariat Complex, Agartala,
PO-Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
---- Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Pannalal Debbarma, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Dipankar Sarma, Addl. GA.
Date of hearing
:
01.12.2025.
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
08.12.2025
Whether fit for
reporting
:
YES
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking the
following reliefs:-
2.
Heard Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Somik Deb, assisted
by Mr. Pannalal Debbarma, Learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner and also heard Mr. Dipankar Sarma,
Learned Addl. GA appearing on behalf of the State-respondents.
3.
Taking part in the hearing, Learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioner first of all drawn the attention of the Court that
the present petitioner was appointed to the post of Chemist
vide memorandum dated 04.01.2011 issued by the authority
(Annexure-1). Thereafter, he submitted his joining report to the
authority which was duly accepted by the authority (Annexure3). Later on, his appointment to the said post was further
extended by order dated 14.06.2011 (Annexure-4) issued by
the respective authority.
4.
Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that by virtue of
Notification dated 03.03.2011 (Annexure-5) issued by the
Health & Family Welfare Department, Government of Tripura,
the Public Analyst was appointed as Food Analyst for the
purpose of sub-section 01 of Section 45 of the Food Safety &
Standards Act, 2006 (in short FSS Act, 2006).
5.
After that, the petitioner applied to the authority for his
deputation to the Government of India, but the authority by
Memorandum dated 14.03.2016 (Annexure-6) regretted his
prayer. In the meantime, on 29.09.2016 the authority of the
petitioner issued working certificate (Annexure-7).
6.
After that, the petitioner approached the authority for
appearing in the 5th Food Analyst Examination, 2018 which was
allowed by Memorandum dated 01.09.2018 issued by the
authority (Annexure-8) and the present petitioner qualified in
the
said
examination
and
accordingly
the
Food
Analyst
Examination Board issued certificate that the petitioner was
qualified to be appointed as Food Analyst in accordance with
sub-rule 1(ii) of Rule 2.1.4 of the Food Safety and Standards
Act, 2011 (Annexure-9).
7.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the
petitioner
sought
permission
from
the
department
for
permitting him to appear in the TCS/TPS Grade-II Examination
which was also regretted by the department by memorandum
dated 25.03.2019 (Annexure-10). But on 20.07.2019 the
authority of the petitioner i.e. the Health & Family Welfare
Department, Government of Tripura by a notification officiated
the petitioner as Food Analyst on interim basis in addition to his
normal duties (Annexure-11) which was continued from time to
time by subsequent Notification dated 17.08.2019 (Annexure12), Notification dated 01.11.2019 (Annexure-13) and by
another Notification dated 27.01.2021 (Annexure-14), the
petitioner was further assigned with the duties of Chief
Executive & Head of Laboratory in addition to his normal duties.
8.
After that, in the year 2022, the petitioner was
promoted to the post of Senior Chemist vide notification dated
28.04.2022 (Annexure -15) and his joining was duly accepted
by the authority as Senior Chemist (Annexure -16).
9.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that for
better opportunity the petitioner thereafter, approached to the
authority on 19.01.2023 (Annexure-17) and thereafter, again
on
01.02.2023
(Annexure-18)
for
issuing
No
Objection
Certificate to enable him to appear in the examination for the
post of Food Analyst(Group-A) under the Government of
Madhya Pradesh (Annexure-17) but the authority of the
petitioner
did
not
accept
his
representation
and
by
memorandum dated 04.02.2023 (Annexure-19) regretted his
proposal for issuing No Objection Certificate.
10.
Learned Senior Counsel again submitted that as the
petitioner had requisite qualification for the post of Food Analyst
and he was not allowed to appear for examination in other state
for the said post of Public Analyst, so thereafter, the petitioner
relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Gauhati High Court,
Agartala Bench in similarly situated situation in Civil Rule 180 of
1998 dated 01.06.2006 titled as Dr. Karunamay Nath vs. The
State of Tripura approached the authority for appointing him
as the Food Analyst on regular basis based upon the notification
dated 20.07.2019 issued by the authority which was not
considered
by
the
authority
and
under
compelling
circumstances the petitioner has approached this Court for
directing the respondent authority to promote him to the post
of Food Analyst.
11.
In support of his contention, Learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioner first of all drawn the attention of the Court
referring Section 45 of the FSS Act, 2006 and submitted that
under the said provision there is a provision for appointing Food
Analyst by the authority having the prescribed qualification and
the present petitioner has got the requisite qualification but in
spite of having the requisite qualification the authority did not
consider his matter. Learned Senior Counsel also drawn the
attention of this Court referring the qualification in respect of
appointment of Food Analyst provided under Rule 2.1.4 of the
Food Safety and Standards Rules, 2011 and submitted that the
qualification as mentioned in the aforesaid Rule matches with
the qualification of the present petitioner but the respondent
authority in their counter affidavit took the plea that the
petitioner does not have experience of five years as per the
Rules framed by the State Authority and as such, he was not
eligible for the said post.
12.
Learned Senior Counsel in support of his contention
also draw the attention of the Court referring Section 91 of FSS
Act, 2006 wherein in sub-section 2(e) power is given to the
Central Government to make rules and referring Section 94 of
the said Act, Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that
although power is given to the State Government to make rules
but by the said provision no power is given to the State
Government to appoint and to determine the qualification of
Food Analyst as referred under Section 45 of the said Act which
is only given to the Central Government.
13.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in view
of Article 246(2) of the Constitution of India although power is
vested with the Parliament and the legislature of the State to
frame
clause
in
respect
of
the
matters
enumerated
in
Concurrent Lists as mentioned in the Seventh Schedule of
Constitution
of
India.
But
in
view
of
Article
254(2)
of
Constitution of India if the law made by the legislature of a
State is repugnant to the Central law, in that case, the law
made by the Parliament would prevail.
14.
Referring the present case, Learned Counsel submitted
that in the FSS Act, 2006 and the corresponding Rules
regarding appointment of the Food Analyst, nothing is provided
by the Central Government that for appointment to the post of
Public Analyst a person should have minimum five years of
service experience. In such a situation, there was no scope on
the part of the State authority to make a subordinate legislation
prescribing the minimum period of five years experience for
appointment to the said post of Public Analyst and as such,
according to Learned Senior Counsel the Rules framed by the
State authority is ultra vires, inoperative and not binding upon
the petitioner.
15.
So, Learned Senior Counsel urged for setting aside the
Public
Analyst,
Health
&
Family
Welfare
Department
Recruitment Rules, 2009 specifically the column No.11 of
Schedule III of the said Rules and further submitted that since
the petitioner has got requisite qualification for the post of
Public Analyst as such, by framing subordinate legislation, the
Rule made by the State Authority cannot debar the present
petitioner from applying for the said post. It was further
submitted that the State authority also cannot debar itself from
promoting the petitioner to the said post and therefore Learned
Counsel asked for issuing necessary directions.
16.
In support of his contentions, Learned Senior Counsel
relied upon the citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
reported in (2011) 3 SCC 139 [titled as Offshore Holdings
Private Limited vs. Bangalore Development Authority &
Ors.] wherein in para No. 63, 67-76 the Hon’ble Apex court
observed as under:“63. As this was the principal argument vehemently
addressed by the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, let us examine the ambit and scope of
these entries and its impact on the validity of law so
enacted. Article-246 of the Constitution of India
provides the subject-matters on which laws can be
enacted by Parliament or by the State Legislatures,
as the case may be. In terms of Article 246(1) of the
Constitution, Parliament has the exclusive power to
make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List I of Schedule VII, referred to as
“the
Union
List”.
Article
246(2)
empowers
Parliament and the State Legislature, subject to
Article 246(1), to make laws on any of the matters
enumerated in List III of Schedule VII, termed as
“the Concurrent List”. Subject to clauses (1) and (2)
of Article 246, the State has exclusive powers to
make laws for such State, or any part thereof, with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III
of Schedule VII, termed as State List under Article
246(3). Article 246(4) gives power to Parliament to
make laws with respect to any matter for any part
of the territory of India not included in a “State”
and notwithstanding that such matter is a matter
enumerated in the State List.
67. The entries in the legislative lists are not the
source of powers for the legislative constituents but
they merely demarcate the fields of legislation. It is
by now well-settled law that these entries are to be
construed liberally and widely so as to attain the
purpose for which they have been enacted. Narrow
interpretation of the entries is likely to defeat their
object as it is not always possible to write these
entries with such precision that they cover all
possible topics and without any overlapping.
68. We may refer to some of the judgments which
have
enunciated
these
principles
over
a
considerable period. While interpreting the entries
in the constitutional lists a seven-Judge Bench of
this Court in Union of India v. Harbhajan Singh
Dhillon: (1971) 2 SCC 779 held as under: (SCC p.
792, paras 22-24)
“22. It must be remembered that the function
of the Lists is not to confer powers; they
merely demarcate the legislative field. The
Federal
Court,
while
interpreting
the
Government of India Act in Governor-Generalin-Council v. Releigh Investment Co: 1944
FCR 229 observed:
(FCR p. 261)
*... It would not be right to derive the
power to legislate on this topic merely
from the reference to it in the List,
because the purpose of the Lists was
not to create or confer powers, but only
to distribute between the Federal and
the Provincial Legislatures the powers
which had been conferred by Sections
99 and 100 of the Act.‟
23. In Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v.
Union
of
India:
(1969)
SCC
Ramaswami, J., speaking on behalf of the
Court, while dealing with the Gold (Control)
Act (45 of 1968), observed: (SCC p. 174, para
8)
“8. Before construing these entries it is
useful to notice some of the wellsettled rules of interpretation laid down
by the Federal Court and by this Court
in the matter of construing the entries.
The power to legislate is given to the
appropriate legislatures by Article 246
of the Constitution. The entries in the
three Lists are only legislative heads or
fields of legislation; they demarcate the
area over which the appropriate
legislatures can operate.‟
24. We are compelled to give full effect to
Article 248 because we know of no principle
of construction by which we can cut down the
wide words of a substantive article like Article
248 by the wording of entry in Schedule VII.
If the argument of the respondent is
accepted, Article 248 would have to be
redrafted as follows:
„Parliament has exclusive power to
make any law with respect to any
matter not mentioned in the Concurrent
List or State List, provided it has not
been mentioned by way of exclusion in
any entry in List I.‟
We simply have not the power to add a
proviso like this to Article 248.”
69. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Ujagar
Prints (2) v. Union of India: (1989) 3 SCC 488
described these entries and also stated the
principles which would help in interpretation of
these entries. While enunciating these principles,
this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 512-13, para 48)
“48. Entries to the legislative lists, it must be
recalled, are not sources of the legislative
power but are merely topics or fields of
legislation and must receive a liberal
construction inspired by a broad and
generous spirit and not in a narrow pedantic
sense. The expression „with respect to‟ in
Article 246 brings in the doctrine of „pith and
substance‟ in the understanding of the
exertion of the legislative power and
wherever
the
question
of
legislative
competence is raised the test is whether the
legislation, looked at as a whole, is
substantially „with respect to‟ the particular
topic of legislation. If the legislation has a
substantial and not merely a remote
connection with the entry, the matter may
well be taken to be legislation on the topic.”
70. This Court, while referring to the principles of
interpretation of entries in the legislative lists,
expanded the application to all ancillary or
subsidiary matters in Jijubhai Nanabhai Kachar v.
State of Gujarat : 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 and held
as under: (SCC p. 609, para 7)
“7. It is settled law of interpretation that
entries in the Seventh Schedule are not
powers
but
fields
of
legislation.
The
legislature derives its power from Article 246
and other related articles of the Constitution.
Therefore, the power to make the Amendment
Act is derived not from the respective entries
but under Article 246 of the Constitution. The
language of the respective entries should be
given the widest scope of their meaning,
fairly capable to meet the machinery of the
Government settled by the Constitution. Each
general word should extend to all ancillary or
subsidiary matters which can fairly and
reasonably be comprehended in it. When the
vires of an enactment is impugned, there is
an initial presumption of its constitutionality
and if there is any difficulty in ascertaining
the limits of the legislative power, the
difficulty must be resolved, as far as possible
in favour of the legislature putting the most
liberal construction upon the legislative entry
so that it may have the widest amplitude.”
This line of interpretation had been stated in
Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar:
(1983) 4 SCC 45 and followed in different
judgments of this Court including the judgments
cited above.
71. The courts have taken a consistent view and it is
well-settled law that various entries in the three
Lists are not powers of legislation but are fields of
legislation. The power to legislate flows, amongst
others, from Article 246 of the Constitution. Article
246(2), being the source of power incorporates the
non obstante clause, “Notwithstanding anything in
clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1),
the legislature of any State” have power to make
laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated
in List III. Article 246 clearly demarcates the fields
of legislative power of the two legislative
constituents. It clearly states on what field, with
reference to the relevant constitutional lists and
which of the legislative constituents has power to
legislate in terms of Article 246 of the Constitution.
While the States would have exclusive power to
legislate under Article 246(2) of the Constitution in
relation to List II; the Concurrent List keeps the
field open for enactment of laws by either of the
legislative constituents.
72. In the event the field is covered by the Central
legislation, the State Legislature is not expected to
enact a law contrary to or in conflict with the law
framed by Parliament on the same subject. In that
event, it is likely to be hit by the rule of repugnancy
and it would be a stillborn or invalid law on that
ground. Exceptions are not unknown to the rule of
repugnancy/covered
field.
They
are
the
constitutional exceptions under Article 254(2) and
the judge enunciated law where the courts declare
that both the laws can coexist and operate without
conflict. The repugnancy generally relates to the
matters enumerated in List III of the Constitution.
73. The Court has to keep in mind that it is
construing a Federal Constitution. It is the essence
of a Federal Constitution that there should be a
distribution of legislative powers between the
Centre and the Provinces. In a Federal Constitution
unlike a legally omnipotent legislature like British
Parliament, the constitutionality of a law turns upon
the construction of entries in the legislative lists. If
a legislature with limited or qualified jurisdiction
transgresses its powers, such transgression may be
open, direct or overt, or disguised, indirect or covert
and it may encroach upon a field prohibited to it.
Wherever legislative powers are so distributed,
situation may arise where two legislative fields
might apparently overlap, it is then the duty of the
courts, however, difficult it may be, to ascertain to
what degree and to what extent, the Authority to
deal with the matters falling within these classes of
subjects exist in each legislature and to define, in
the particular case before them, the limits of
respective powers. It could not have been the
intention that a conflict should exist; and, in order
to prevent such a result the two provisions must be
read together, and the language of one interpreted,
and, where necessary modified by that of the other.
(Refer A.S. Krishna v. Madras State: AIR 1957 SC
297 and Federation of Hotels and Restaurants v.
Union of India: (1989) 3 SCC 634)
74. Keeping these principles in mind and applying
different doctrines, as already referred, different
Benches of this Court had the occasion to deal with
the BDA Act. In Munithimmaiah” (2002) 4SCC 326
the Court had taken the view that the BDA Act was a
self-contained code enacted with reference to Entry
5 of List II and the provisions of Central Act 68 of
1984 cannot form an integral part of the BDA Act.
75. This two-Judge Bench judgment was reiterated
with approval by a three-Judge Bench of this Court
in Bondu Ramaswamy: (2010) 7 SCC 129 and while
referring to the entries in the constitutional lists the
Court rejected the contention that the law enacted
under the BDA Act was referable to Entry 42 of List
III of Schedule VII and held as under: (SCC pp. 17375, paras 90 & 92)
“90. The second contention urged by the
appellants is as follows: a development
authority is a city improvement trust referred
to in Entry 5 of the State List (List II of the
Seventh Schedule). „Acquisition of property‟ is
a matter enumerated in Entry 42 in the
Concurrent List (List III of the Seventh
Schedule). The LA Act relating to acquisition
of property, is an existing law with respect to
a matter (Entry 42) enumerated in the
Concurrent List. The BDA Act providing for
acquisition of property is a law made by the
State Legislature under Entry 42 of the
Concurrent
List.
Article
of
the
Constitution provides that if there is any
repugnancy between a law made by the State
Legislature (the BDA Act) and an existing
Central law in regard to a matter enumerated
in the Concurrent List (the LA Act), then
subject to the provisions of clause (2)
thereof, the existing Central law shall prevail
and the State law, to the extent of
repugnancy, shall be void. Clause (2) of
Article 254 provides that if the law made by
the State Legislature in regard to any matter
enumerated in the Concurrent List, contains
any provision repugnant to an existing law
with respect to that matter, then, the law so
made by the State Legislature, if it had been
reserved for the consideration of the
President and has received his assent, shall
prevail in that State. It is contended that the
provisions of Section 19 of the BDA Act are
repugnant to the provisions of Section 6 of
the LA Act; and as the BDA Act has not been
reserved for consideration of the President
and has not received his assent, Section 6 of
the LA Act will prevail over Section 19 of the
BDA Act. This contention also has no merit.
*
*
*
92. Where the law covered by an entry in the
State List made by the State Legislature
contains a provision which directly and
substantially relates to a matter enumerated
in the Concurrent List and is repugnant to the
provisions of any existing law with respect to
that matter in the Concurrent List, then the
repugnant provision in the State List may be
void unless it can coexist and operate without
repugnancy to the provisions of the existing
law. This Court in Munithimmaiah v. State of
Karnataka: (2002) 4 SCC 326 has held that
the BDA Act is an Act to provide for the
establishment of a development authority to
facilitate and ensure planned growth and
development of the city of Bangalore and
areas adjacent thereto, and that acquisition
of any lands, for such development, is merely
incidental to the main object of the Act, that
is, development of Bangalore Metropolitan
Area. This Court held that in pith and
substance, the BDA Act is one which squarely
falls under Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule and is not a law for acquisition of
land like the LA Act, traceable to Entry 42 of
List III of the Seventh Schedule, the field in
respect of which is already occupied by the
Central Act, as amended from time to time.
This Court held that if at all, the BDA Act, so
far
as
acquisition
of
land
for
its
developmental activities is concerned, in
substance and effect will constitute a special
law providing for acquisition for the special
purposes of BDA and the same will not be
considered to be a part of the LA Act. The
fallacy in the contention of the appellants is
that it assumes, erroneously, that the BDA
Act is a law referable to Entry 42 of List III,
while it is a law referable to Entry 5 of List II.
Hence the question of repugnancy and
Section 6 of the LA Act prevailing over Section
19 of the BDA Act would not at all arise.”
76. Once we analyse the abovestated principle, it is
obvious that entries in the constitutional lists play a
significant role in examining the legislative field
taking its source of power from Article 246 of the
Constitution. The BDA Act is an Act which provides
for formulation and implementation of schemes
relating
to
development
of
Bangalore
City.
Acquisition of land is neither its purpose nor its
object and is merely an incidental consequence of
principal purpose of development of land. Planned
development under the scheme is a very wide
concept
and
the
Authorities
concerned
are
accordingly vested with amplified functions and
powers.”
Referring the same Learned Senior Counsel submitted
that in view of Article 254 of the Constitution of India the law
made by the Parliament would prevail over the law made by the
State Legislature. So in the present case the rule framed by the
authority in the year 2019 imposing a condition of five years
experience cannot be applied in the present case for according
promotion to the present petitioner.
17.
Reliance was placed on another judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.R. Yadav & Another vs. R. K.
Singh & Another reported in (2003) 7 SCC 110 wherein in
para Nos.11, 20-21 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
“11. It is not in dispute that two different rules
relating to determination of seniority were
operating in the field; one being a general rule
known as “the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants
Seniority Rules, 1991”; the other being the special
rules known as “the U.P. Development Authorities
Centralised Services Rules, 1985” framed by the
State of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of its powers
conferred under Section 55 of the Uttar Pradesh
Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 read
with Section 5-A thereof.
20. The 1991 Rules were framed by the Governor of
Uttar Pradesh in exercise of his power conferred
under the proviso appended to Article 309 of the
Constitution of India. The proviso appended to
Article 309 of the Constitution reads thus:
“Provided that it shall be competent for the
President or such person as he may direct in
the case of services and posts in connection
with the affairs of the Union, and for the
Governor of a State or such person as he may
direct in the case of services and posts in
connection with the affairs of the State, to
make rules regulating the recruitment, and
the
conditions
of
service
of
persons
appointed, to such services and posts until
provision in that behalf is made by or under
an Act of the appropriate legislature under
this Article, and any rules so made shall have
effect subject to the provisions of any such
Act.”
21. On a plain reading of the said provision, there
cannot be any doubt whatsoever that rules framed
thereunder would apply so long as a statute or
statutory rules or any other subordinate legislation
governing the conditions of service are not enacted
or made or not otherwise operating in the field. In
other words, rules made under the proviso to Article
309 of the Constitution are for a transitory period
and the same would give way to the special rules
once framed. However, if a statute or rules made
thereunder was/were already operating in the field,
the general rules made under the proviso to Article
309 would not apply to the services created
thereunder.”
Referring the same Learned Senior Counsel submitted
that this present case is squarely covered by the said judgment.
18.
Learned
Senior
Counsel
further
referred
another
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court of India reported in (2011)
8 SCC 708 [titled as Rajiv Sarin & Another vs. State of
Uttarakhand & Others] wherein para Nos. 51(11-12), 52 &
53 Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“51. Further, in Govt. of A.P. v. J.B. Educational
Society: (2005) 3 SCC 212 this Court while
explaining the scope of Articles 246 and 254 of the
Constitution and considering the proposition laid
down by this Court in M. Karunanidhi case: (1979) 3
SCC 431 with respect to the situations in which
repugnancy would arise, held as follows at pp. 21920: (J.B. Educational Society case (supra), SCC
paras 9-11)
“11. With respect to matters enumerated in
List III (Concurrent List), both Parliament
and the State Legislature have equal
competence to legislate. Here again, the
courts are charged with the duty of
interpreting the enactments of Parliament
and the State Legislature in such manner as
to avoid a conflict. If the conflict becomes
unavoidable, then Article 245 indicates the
manner of resolution of such a conflict.”
“12. ... First, where the legislations, though
enacted with respect to matters in their
allotted sphere, overlap and conflict. Second,
where the two legislations are with respect to
matters in the Concurrent List and there is a
conflict. In both the situations, parliamentary
legislation will predominate, in the first, by
virtue of the non obstante clause in Article
246(1), in the second, by reason of Article
254(1). Clause (2) of Article 254 deals with a
situation where the State legislation having
been reserved and having obtained the
President‟s assent, prevails in that State; this
again is subject to the proviso that Parliament
can again bring a legislation to override even
such State legislation.”
52. The aforesaid position makes it quite clear that
even if both the legislations are relatable to List III
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the test
for repugnancy is whether the two legislations
“exercise their power over the same subjectmatter...” and secondly, whether the law of
Parliament was intended “to be exhaustive to cover
the entire field”. The answer to both these
questions in the instant case is in the negative, as
the Forest Act, 1927 deals with the law relating to
forest transit, forest levy and forest produce,
whereas the KUZALR Act deals with the land and
agrarian reforms.
53. In respect of the Concurrent List under the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, by definition
both the legislatures viz. Parliament and the State
Legislatures are competent to enact a law. Thus, the
only way in which the doctrine of pith and
substance can and is utilised in determining the
question of repugnancy is to find out whether in
pith and substance the two laws operate and relate
to the same matter or not. This can be either in the
context of the same entry in List III or different
entries in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution. In other words, what has to be
examined is whether the two Acts deal with the
same field in the sense of the same subject-matter
or deal with different matters.”
Referring the same Learned Senior Counsel submitted
that although the State has framed a Rule in exercise of the
powers under Article 309 of Constitution of India in the year
2009 but that would not debar the respondent authority to
consider the promotion of the present petitioner to the post of
Public Analyst.
19.
Finally, Learned Senior Counsel relied upon another
citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in
(2016) 3 SCC 643 [titled as Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling
Mills vs. Commissioner Of Central Excise And Another]
wherein in para Nos.25, 28, 29 the Hon’ble Apex Court
observed as under:“ 25. However, Shri Aggarwal has also argued that in
this appeal as well as in Civil Appeals Nos. 4281 and
4282 of 2007, the rule providing for payment of
interest would itself be ultra vires inasmuch as
Section 3-A of the Act does not itself provide for the
payment of interest. He argued that despite the fact
that this point was not raised before any of the
authorities below he ought to be allowed to raise it
for the first time in this Court not only as it is a pure
question of law but also because, according to him,
this Court has held that rules which are ultra vires
ought to be ignored by the courts even if there is no
substantive challenge to them.
28. Shri Aggarwal in order to buttress his
submission that he ought to be allowed to raise a
pure question of law going to the very jurisdiction
to levy interest, cited before us the judgment in
Bharthidasan University v. All-India Council for
Technical Education: (2001) 8 SCC 676 and in
particular para 14 thereof which reads as follow:
(SCC pp. 688-89)
“14. The fact that the Regulations may have
the force of law or when made have to be laid
down before the legislature concerned does
not confer any more sanctity or immunity as
though
they
are
statutory
provisions
themselves. Consequently, when the power to
make Regulations is confined to certain limits
and made to flow in a well-defined canal
within stipulated banks, those actually made
or shown and found to be not made within its
confines but outside them, the courts are
bound to ignore them when the question of
their enforcement arises and the mere fact
that there was no specific relief sought for to
strike down or declare them ultra vires,
particularly when the party in sufferance is a
respondent to the lis or proceedings cannot
confer any further sanctity or authority and
validity
which it is shown and found to obviously and
patently lack. It would, therefore, be a myth
to state that the Regulations made under
Section 23 of the Act have „constitutional‟ and
legal status, even unmindful of the fact that
any one or more of them are found to be not
consistent with specific provisions of the Act
itself. Thus, the Regulations in question,
which AICTE could not have made so as to
bind universities/UGC within the confines of
the powers conferred upon it, cannot be
enforced against or bind a university in the
matter of any necessity to seek prior approval
to commence a new department or course
and programme in technical education in any
university or any of its departments and
constituent institutions.”
29. It would be seen that Shri Aggarwal is on firm
ground because this Court has specifically stated
that rules or regulations which are in the nature of
subordinate legislation which are ultra vires are
bound to be ignored by the courts when the
question of their enforcement arises and the mere
fact that there is no specific relief sought for to
strike down or declare them ultra vires would not
stand in the court‟s way of not enforcing them. We
also feel that since this is a question of the very
jurisdiction to levy interest and is otherwise covered
by a Constitution Bench decision of this Court, it
would be a travesty of justice if we would not allow
Shri Aggarwal to make this submission.”
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted
that in view of the existence of the Rule framed by the
respondent authority there will be no bar for the State authority
to consider appointment and promotion of the petitioner to the
post of Public Analyst and asked for allowing this writ petition.
20.
On the contrary, Learned Addl. GA appearing on
behalf of the State-respondents has drawn the attention of the
Court that the State respondents have filed their counter
affidavit wherein at para No. 10 it has been clearly mentioned
that the present petitioner has not completed the minimum
experience of five years in the grade of Senior Chemist, as
such, this present petition is not maintainable. It is further
submitted by Learned Addl. GA that it is the prerogative of the
State Legislature/State Executive to consider promotion of any
person to a particular post subject to requirement/need and in
this regard, there is very limited scope on the part of this Court
to direct the State authority to promote the petitioner to the
post he is approaching.
21.
In support of his contention, Learned Addl. GA relied
upon one citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
reported in (2024) 11 SCC 424 [titled as Ravikumar
Dhansukhlal Maheta And Another vs. High Court of
Gujarat And Others] wherein in para No.81 the Hon’ble Apex
Court observed as under:“81. This Court in its decision in State of Kerala v.
N.M. Thomas: (1976) 2 SCC 310 held that policies
pertaining to promotions can be said to broadly fall
within two distinct categories being: (i) promotions
which are based on the principle of “merit-cumseniority” and, (ii) promotions which are based on
the principle of “seniority-cum-merit”. It further
held that when it comes to promotions based on
principle of “seniority-cum-merit”, a senior who has
the minimum requisite merit shall be entitled to
promotion even though there might be others who
are more meritorious. The relevant observations
read as under: (SCC p. 335, para 38)
“38. The principle of equality is applicable to
employment at all stages and in all respects,
namely,
initial
recruitment,
promotion,
retirement, payment of pension and gratuity.
With regard to promotion the normal
principles are either merit-cum-seniority or
seniority-cum-merit,
seniority-cum-merit
means that given the minimum necessary
merit
requisite
for
efficiency
of
administration, the senior though the less
meritorious shall have priority. This will not
violate Articles 14, 16(1) and 16(2). A rule
which provides that given the necessary
requisite merit, a member of the backward
class shall get priority to ensure adequate
representation will not similarly violate
Article 14 or Articles 16(1) and (2).”
(emphasis supplied)”
Referring the same he submitted that no government
servant can claim for promotion as a matter of right rather it is
the prerogative of the legislature or the executive to formulate
the method for filling vacancies on promotion based on the
nature of employment and functions. Since in the case of the
present
petitioner
there
is
a
requirement
of
five
years
experience as a Senior Chemist to be eligible for the post of
Public Analyst and the petitioner does not have the said
experience as such, he is not entitled to claim for the said
promotional post and the Court cannot direct the state
executive to consider promotion of the petitioner to the said
post and asked for dismissal of this writ petition.
22.
Reference was further placed in another judgment of a
Division Bench of this High Court in WP(C) No.105/2024
dated 09.09.2024 particularly para No.12, wherein this High
Court has observed as under:“[12]
While considering the submissions of
both the sides, we are of the view that it is always
within the competency of the employer to change
the service rules or to alter and to amend the same
regarding avenues of promotion necessitated by
administrative exigencies and there is no right
conferred upon any employee to claim that rules
governing condition of the service should be kept
unaltered forever. Reference in this regard may also
be made to a decision of the Apex Court in case of
P.U Joshi and others vs. Accountant General,
Ahmedabad & Ors, (2003) 2 SCC 632 and the
relevant Para-10 of the said decision is gainfully
extracted hereunder:
“10. We have carefully considered the
submissions made on behalf of both parties.
Questions
relating
to
the
constitution,
pattern, nomenclature of posts, cadres,
categories,
their
creation/abolition,
prescription of qualifications and other
conditions of service including avenues of
promotions and criteria to be fulfilled for such
promotions pertain to the field of policy is
within
the
exclusive
discretion
and
jurisdiction of the State, subject, of course, to
the limitations or restrictions envisaged in the
Constitution of India and it is not for the
statutory tribunals, at any rate, to direct the
Government to have a particular method of
recruitment or eligibility criteria or avenues
of promotion or impose itself by substituting
its views for that of the State. Similarly, it is
well open and within the competency of the
State to change the rules relating to a service
and
alter
or
amend
and
vary
by
addition/substraction
the
qualifications,
eligibility criteria and other conditions of
service including avenues of promotion, from
time to time, as the administrative exigencies
may need or necessitate. Likewise, the State
by
appropriate
rules
is
entitled
to
amalgamate
departments
or
bifurcate
departments
into
more
and
constitute
different categories of posts or cadres by
undertaking further classification, bifurcation
or amalgamation as well as reconstitute and
restructure the pattern and cadres/categories
of service, as may be required from time to
time by abolishing the existing cadres/posts
and creating new cadres/posts. There is no
right in any employee of the State to claim
that rules governing conditions of his service
should be forever the same as the one when
he entered service for all purposes and except
for ensuring or safeguarding rights or
benefits already earned, acquired or accrued
at a particular point of time, a government
servant has no right to challenge the
authority of the State to amend, alter and
bring into force new rules relating to even an
existing service.”
So, it is well within the competency of the State to
amend the Rules by way of incorporating Havildar
(Engine Fitters) in the feeder post. Moreso,
maximum numbers of posts of Naib Subedar
(Supervisor Grade-II Technical) have been kept for
filling up from the post of Havildar (Radio
Technicians).”
Referring
the
same
he
also
submitted
that
the
observation made by the Division Bench of this High Court
squarely covers the present petition and as such, the present
petitioner is not entitled to get any relief in this writ petition,
and urged for dismissal of the writ petition with costs.
23.
After hearing both the sides the salient point for
consideration in this writ petition is:
(i) Whether this court in exercise of the power confer
under
Article
of
the
Constitution
direct
the
respondent-state authority to consider promotion of the
present petitioner to the post of Public Analyst ignoring
the Recruitment Rule framed by the state authority.
24.
I have heard both the sides at length and perused the
writ petition, counter affidavit and documents submitted by
both the sides to determine this writ petition.
25.
Since
the
petitioner
approached
this
Court
for
promotion to the post of Public Analyst which comes under the
purview of Section 45 of Food Safety & Standards Act, 2006. In
this regard, in 7th Schedule (Article 246) in List III of the
Concurrent List, item No.18 deals about “Adulteration of
foodstuffs and other goods”. From the aforesaid concurrent list,
it appears that the present subject matter comes under
concurrent list.
26.
Now for the sake of convenience let us narrate
hereinbelow the relevant provision of Section 45 of the Food
Safety & Standards Act, 2006 which provides as under:
“45. Food Analysts- The Commissioner of Food
Safety may, by notification, appoint such persons as
he thinks fit, having the qualifications prescribed by
the Central Government, to be Food Analysts for
such local areas as may be assigned to them by the
Commissioner of Food Safety:
Provided that no person, who has any
financial interest in the manufacture or sale of any
article of food shall be appointed to be a Food
Analyst under this section:
Provided further that different Food Analysts may
be appointed for different articles of food.”
From the aforesaid provision, it appears that Food
Analyst may be appointed by the Commissioner of Food Safety
by notification in the official gazette for such areas as may be
assigned to them by the Commissioner of Food Safety.
27.
Section 91 of the FSS Act, 2006 provides power of the
Central Government to make rules. Sub-rule-2(e) of Rule 91 of
the said Act provides as under:
“91. Power of Central government to make Rules2. In particular, and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing power, such rules may
provide for all or any of the following matters,
namely:(e) Qualifications of Food Analysts under
Section 45;”
From the aforesaid provision it appears that in sub-rule
(e) of Rule 2 of Section 91, the power is given to the Central
Government to make rules in respect of qualifications of the
Food Analyst as provided under Section 45 of the Food Safety
and Standards Act, 2006.
28.
In the said Act, power is also given to the State
Government to make rules under Section 94. For the sake of
convenience let us reproduce hereinbelow the relevant provision
of Section 94 which provides as under:“94. Power of State Government to make rules:(1) Subject to the power of the Central Government
and the Food Authority to make rules and
regulations respectively, the State Government may,
after previous publication and with the previous
approval of the Food Authority, by notification in the
Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the
functions and duties assigned to the State
Government and the State Commissioner of Food
Safety under this Act and the rules and regulations
made thereunder.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing power, such rules may
provide for all or any of the following matters,
namely:(a) other functions of the Commissioner of
Food Safety under clause (f) of sub-section
(2) of Section 30;
(b) earmarking a fund and the manner in
which reward shall be paid to a person
rendering assistance in detection of offence
or apprehension of offender under Section 95;
and
(c) any other matter which is required to be,
or may be prescribed or in respect of which
provision is to be made by rules by the State
Government.
(3) Every rule made by the State Government under
this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is
made, before each House of the State Legislature
where it consists of two Houses or where such State
Legislature consists of one House, before that
House.”
From the aforesaid provision it appears that the
legislature in Section 94 did not endorse any power to the State
Government to determine qualification for the post of Food
Analyst which power is exclusively given to the Central
Government. Since by the aforesaid Act, no power is vested to
the State Government to frame rules, it is surprising as to how
the State Government in exercise of the powers provided under
Article 309 of the Constitution of India, has framed recruitment
rules for the post of Public Analyst which is only given to the
Central Government. Admittedly, in this case the petitioner has
not challenged the said recruitment rules framed by the State
authority.
29.
I have also gone through the citation referred by the
Learned Counsel for the State. As already stated, it is the
settled position of law that a government servant cannot claim
promotion as a matter of right because our Constitution does
not prescribe such criteria. It is the legislature or the executive
who may decide the method for filling up vacancies to
promotional posts.
30.
It is also on record that the judgment referred and
relied upon by the petitioner in respect of Dr. Karunamoy Nath
has attained finality and the Government has implemented the
direction of the High Court and by notification dated 31.08.2016
the State appointed said Dr. Karunamay Nath to the post of
Public Analyst.
31.
In
this
case
admittedly
the
petitioner
has
not
challenged the recruitment rules framed by the State executive
for the post of Public Analyst. So until and unless the rules are
challenged there is no scope to make any observation in this
regard that the said rules are ultra vires, inoperative and not
binding upon for petitioner. But considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case and in view of the settled
legal position, imposition of five years experience for the post of
Senior Chemist would definitely create an embargo to the
petitioner for claiming the post of Public Analyst inspite of
having requisite qualification to be appointed as a Public
Analyst.
32.
In the result, after hearing both the sides it appears to
this Court that the present petitioner is not entitled to get any
relief in this instant writ petition without challenging the
existing
recruitment rules by the State authority although he
has got the requisite qualifications to be appointed as Public
Analyst.
33.
In view of the above observations the present writ
petition stands disposed of.
No order as to costs.
Pending applications if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
signed by SATABDI DUTTA
SATABDI DUTTA Digitally
Date: 2025.12.08 16:49:19 +05'30'
Satabdi
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