Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C) No.236 of 2022
Sri Sankarsan Majumder,
S/O Late Sukesh Bandhu Majumder,
Resident of Vill-Chinaihani
P.O. Agartala Airport, P.S. Airport
Dist:- West Tripura,
PIN-799009
….Petitioner(s)
Versus
1. The State of Tripura
Represented by the Principal Secretary,
Information Technology,
Government of Tripura,
New Secretariat Building,
P.O. & P.S. New Capital Complex,
Agartala, West Tripura.
2. The State of Tripura,
Represented by the Secretary to the
Government of Tripura,
Finance Department,
Agartala.
3. The Director,
Department of Information Technology,
I.T. Bhaban,
ITI Road, Indranagar,
P.O. Kunjaban, PIN-799006
For the Petitioner(s)
For the Respondent(s)
Date of hearing and
delivery of
judgment & order
Whether fit for reporting
:
:
….Respondent(s)
Mr. B. Banerjee, Advocate
Mr. D. Bhattacharya, GA
Mr. Soumyadeep Saha, Advocate
10/04/2023
:
:
Yes
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
Judgment and Order (Oral)
By means of filing the present writ petition, the petitioner has
prayed for following reliefs:
“(i) Admit the petition of the petitioner;
(ii) Call for records from the custody of the Respondents;
(iii) A Writ in the nature of Certioari directing the Respondents
and each of them to set aside, quash and/or cancel the Order
No.F.2(6)DIT/Estt/2009/976-80 dated 07.05.2005 and Order
No.F2(6)/DIT/Estt/2000/924-29 Dated 13.04.2006 forthwith and in
no time.
(iv) A Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the Respondents to
restore the regular pay scale of Rs.3300-7100 for the period w.e.f.
02.02.2005 to 01.02.2011 with all financial and service benefits.
(v) Pass such further order or orders, direction or directions as the
Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper having regards to the
circumstances of the case;”
2.
Heard Mr. B. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner. Also heard Mr. D. Bhattacharya, learned GA assisted by Mr.
Soumyadeep Saha, learned counsel appearing for respondents-State.
3.
Briefly stated, the petitioner was first appointed to the post of
Lower Division Clerk(LDC) under the respondents on contract basis for
2(two) years with certain conditions vide order dated 24 th January,
2001(Annexure-1 to the writ petition). Thereafter, the Director,
Information Technology, Govt. of Tripura issued an order dated 23 rd/24th
December, 2002 providing him pay scale of Rs.3,300-7,100/- prescribed
for regularly/permanently appointed LDCs and extended his contract
service period for further 2(two) years from the date of completion of
2(two) years of service. Vide order dated 7th May, 2005, the service of the
petitioner on contract basis was again extended for a further period of
1(one) year w.e.f 2nd February, 2005. Thereafter, under an order dated
13th April, 2006 issued by Director, Information Technology, Govt. of
Tripura, the petitioner was again appointed to the post of LDC on fixed
pay of Rs.2,345/- only per month w.e.f 2nd February, 2006 on certain
terms and conditions. On completion of 5(five) years of service on fixed
pay basis, the Director, Information Technology, Govt. of Tripura
regularized his service and provided him regular scale of pay of PB-2
Rs.5,310-24,000/- with Grade Pay Rs.1,800/- along with other allowances
as admissible under rules with effect from 02.02.2011 with D.N.I.
01.07.2012.
4.
The petitioner submitted a representation on 6th June, 2015 raising
his grievance about the fixation of his pay scale with effect from
02.02.2006 till 01.02.2011, that is the period for which he was appointed
on fixed pay basis with a fixed remuneration, but, that representation was
not responded to. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the permanent
Lok Adalat through proper channel on 23.08.2021(Annexure-7 to the writ
petition). The permanent Lok Adalat after hearing the parties disposed of
the application directing the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum
vide order dated 28.11.2021 in case no.164, 165 and 168 of 2021.
5.
According to the petitioner, the direction passed by the Lok Adalat
had given rise the cause of action to challenge the order dated 7th May,
2005(Annexure-3 to the writ petition) and 13th April, 2006(Annexure-4 to
the writ petition).
6.
On the aforesaid background facts, firstly, Mr. Banerjee, learned
counsel would contend that though the petitioner was appointed on
contract basis, but, his service was regularized when he was given the pay
scale prescribed for the post of LDC vide order dated 23rd/24th December,
2002 by the Director, Information Technology. Secondly, learned counsel
for the petitioner has challenged the extension of the contract period of
service of the petitioner vide order dated 7th May, 2005 on the ground that
once the petitioner was treated as regular employee his status and nature
of employment cannot be altered, which is evident from the order dated
7th May, 2005. Thirdly, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the appointment of the petitioner on fixed pay basis at
Rs.2,345/- vide order dated 13th April, 2006 is arbitrary and is liable to be
set aside and quashed and he is entitled to regular pay scale w.e.f. 2 nd
February, 2005 to 1st February, 2011.
7.
To resist the aforesaid submissions of learned counsel for the
petitioner, Mr. Bhattacharya, learned GA has contended that the instant
writ petition is absolutely barred by delay and laches. Learned GA has
further contended that the petitioner was allowed the pay scale of LDC
when he was under contractual service following the doctrine of equal
pay for equal work. The service of the petitioner was regularized, but, put
on fixed pay basis in conformity with the policy decision of the
government that each and every new appointee would serve as fixed pay
employee with fixed remuneration for first 5(five) years. It is further
contended that this order of changing his nature of service on fixed pay
basis has not been challenged by the petitioner within a reasonable period
of time. He accepted the salary on fixed pay basis for almost 7(seven)
years though regular pay scale was provided to him w.e.f. the date of
completion of 5(five) years i.e. w.e.f. 01.02.2011 as per the policy of the
government. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned GA has further submitted that
there was no illegality or arbitrariness in fixing the pay scale of the
petitioner by the respondents.
8.
I have considered the submission advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the parties. It is true that though the petitioner was initially
engaged on contract basis in the post of LDC, but, he was allowed to
enjoy minimum basic pay of LDC. Here, I find force in the submission of
learned GA that regular pay of LDC was allowed to the petitioner
following the doctrine of equal pay for equal work because he was
performing his duties and responsibilities as that of a regular LDC under
the respondents. Thereafter, his nature of service on contract basis had
been changed to regular service and virtually permanently absorbed as
LDC, but on fixed pay basis with the condition that he would be entitled
for regular pay scale after completion of 5(five) years service as LDC as
per the policy decision of the Government applicable to all new
appointees under the Government.
9.
I find certain terms and conditions in the order dated 13 th April,
2006. The appointment of the petitioner was purely on temporary basis
and would not confer any title to permanent employment. The petitioner
was also placed on probation for a period of 2(two) years. It was further
stipulated that the appointment could be terminated by the appointing
authority without assigning any reasons. The above order was also issued
with an approval of the Finance Department.
10.
In my opinion, the petitioner accepted the terms and conditions of
his appointment on fixed pay basis and he served in that capacity for
almost 7(seven) years without challenging the terms of his appointment.
It is only on 6th June, 2015, he submitted representation to allow him
regular pay scale for the period he was given pay of Rs.2,345/- treating
him as fixed pay employee. Having found no response, the petitioner
filed a case before the permanent Lok Adalat in the year 2021 and on the
basis of a direction passed by the Lok Adalat, the petitioner has
approached this court in the year 2022.
11.
I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid facts as
well as the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for
the parties. I find no force in the submission of Mr. Banerjee, learned
counsel that once the petitioner was allowed the pay scale, his service
ought to have been treated as permanent employment in the post of LDC.
12.
According to me, allowing minimum basic scale prescribed for a
particular post would not mean that the contractual character of the
employment is changed and such employee acquires the status of
permanent employee. An employee may be entitled to the minimum basic
scale of pay for discharging his duties and responsibilities in a regular
post alike other permanent employees in the same post discharging
similar and identical nature of works, even he is appointed on contract
basis. The appointing authority may consider the nature of works a
contractual employee performs and if he finds that such employee
executes similar and identical duties to those permanent employees, then,
he may grant at least the basic pay prescribed for the post such employee
holds. But, providing him the pay scale of a regular employee does not
confer a right upon him to be treated as permanent employee. Thus, I do
not find any illegality or arbitrariness in the order dated 7 th May, 2005
wherein the service tenure of the petitioner was extended without altering
his initial status of employment as contractual employee.
13.
Next question posed to this Court which is necessarily to be
answered is that whether the petitioner is entitled to regular pay scale for
the period he was appointed and paid salary on fixed pay basis. It is clear
that the petitioner was appointed on fixed pay basis w.e.f. 02.02.2006
vide order dated 13th April, 2006. Here, the conduct of the petitioner is
required to be noticed. It comes to fore that after the receipt of the order
dated 13th April, 2006, the petitioner did not raise any objection to such
appointment and only on 6th June, 2015 he submitted a representation,
though, his service was regularized with regular pay scale including all
other admissible allowances w.e.f. 2nd February, 2011. In the opinion of
this Court, the conduct of the petitioner aptly suggests that he accepted
the condition of his appointment on fixed pay basis.
14.
To deal with the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner
that non-granting of pay scale during the tenure of his service on fixed
pay is a „continuing wrong‟ giving rise to a fresh cause of action in every
month when he is paid his salary, in my opinion, the present case is not a
case of „continuing wrong‟.
The concept of „continuing wrong‟ emerges from Section 22 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under:
“22. Continuing breaches and torts.– In the case of a continuing
breach of contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period
of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during
which the breach or tort, as the case may be, continues.”
The object of this section is to enable one to be brought for all loss
suffered during the whole period the breach continued. A „continuing‟
cause of action is one arising from the repetition of acts or omissions
similar to those in respect of which an action is brought. The test in
applying Section 22 is not whether the right is a continuing right but
whether the wrong is a continuing wrong. A „continuing wrong‟ creates a
continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible
and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act
causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even
though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a
wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself
continues then the act constitutes a continuing wrong.
In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the
injury caused by the wrongful act and the effect of the said injury. Where
the injury complained of is complete on a certain date there is no
“continuing wrong” even though the damage caused by the injury may
continue. In such a case, the cause of action arises once and for all, at the
time when the injury is inflicted. If, however, the act is such that the
injury itself is continuous, then, there is a “continuing wrong”.
It is made clear that where the act of wrong is complete, Section 22
of the limitation Act, 1963 is of no application.
15.
In the case in hand, the foundation of claiming the pay scale of
Rs.3,300-7,100/- arose out of the order dated 23rd/24th December, 2002
when the nature of his appointment of the petitioner was on contract basis
for a certain period. This contract period was ultimately ended on 1 st
February, 2006, when the nature of his appointment was altered to fixed
pay basis. In my considered view, with the end of contractual period the
source of granting pay scale prescribed for permanent employee
following the doctrine of equal pay for equal work was also ended and his
character of service was given a new face, that is, as fixed pay employee
w.e.f. 2nd February, 2006.
16.
Here, even if, for argument sake, it is said that the petitioner was
wrongly appointed as permanent employee in the post of LDC on fixed
pay basis, that wrong was completed when he accepted the order dated
13th April, 2006 appointing him on fixed pay basis vis-a-vis with the
expiry of 5(five) years on 01.02.2011. Since the injury, even if he
suffered, that injury being completed on 01.02.2011, in no way be said to
be a „continuing wrong‟.
17.
That apart, with the end of contractual period, the petitioner was
appointed as permanent employee, but on fixed pay basis as per prevalent
policy of the government that all appointments would be made on fixed
pay basis for first 5(five) years due to financial constraints. This policy
has never been put to challenge and till today, it stands good as confirmed
by learned GA appearing for State-respondents.
18.
It is not case of the petitioner that any of the employees appointed
on fixed pay basis has been provided with regular pay scale within the
tenure of their 5(five) years‟ service on fixed pay.
19.
In the background facts of the present case, there was no wrong at
all; to say the least, a “continuing wrong”. There is no breach of rules
relating to service conditions of the petitioner. At the cost of repetition, it
is pertinent to mention that initially his service was on contract basis,
which was ended on 1st February, 2006. During certain periods of such
contractual service, the respondents provided him the basic pay scale to
the petitioner prescribed for the post of LDC, which was stopped with the
completion of contractual period of service. Thereafter, the petitioner was
appointed as permanent employee on fixed pay basis for 5(five) years,
and after expiry of 5(five) years the petitioner was provided the regular
pay scale and other admissible allowances prescribed for LDCs as per the
terms and conditions of appointment. This is not a case where the Court
finds breach of any service conditions or rules or administrative
decisions. Further, this is not the case that the respondents fail to address
any statutory obligation relating to the service condition of the petitioner.
In this perspective, none of the acts and administrative decisions relating
to the service of the petitioner can be said to be the foundation of
continuing wrong which creates a continuing source of injury.
In Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare and Ors. vs. Shree
Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan and Ors, reported in AIR 1959 SC 798
had explained the concept of „continuing wrong‟ in the context of Section
23 of the Limitation Act, 1908, corresponding to Section 22 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, which is as under:
“31. … It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act
which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the
act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the
wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing
wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If,
however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by
it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this
connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury
caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of
the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly
characterised as continuing wrongs that S. 23 can be invoked. Thus
considered it is difficult to hold that the trustees' act in denying
altogether the alleged rights of the Guravs as hereditary , worshippers
and in claiming and obtaining possession from them by their suit in
1922 was a continuing wrong. The decree obtained by the trustees in the
said litigation had injured effectively and completely the appellants'
rights though the damage caused by the said decree subsequently
continued. Can it be said that, after the appellants were evicted from the
temple in execution of the said decree, the continuance of their
dispossession was due to a recurring act of tort committed by the
trustees from moment to moment? As soon as the decree was passed and
the appellants were dispossessed in execution proceedings, their rights
had been completely injured, and though their dispossession continued,
it cannot be said that the trustees were committing wrongful acts or acts
of tort from moment to moment so as to give the appellants a cause of
action de die in diem. We think there can be no doubt that where the
wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster, the resulting injury to the
right is complete at the date of the ouster and so there would be no
scope for the application of S. 23 in such a case. That is the view which
the High Court has taken and we see no reason to differ from it.
20.
Again, the present case is not a case where wrong salary is being
paid due to wrong computation made contrary to pay rules giving rise to
fresh cause of action in each and every month. [Ref.- M.R. Gupta v.
Union of India & Ors, (1995) 5SCC 628.]
21.
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors vs. Tarsem
Singh, (2008) 8SCC 648 held that a „continuing wrong‟ refers to a single
wrongful act which causes a continuing injury, which is not the case here,
as I observed in the preceding paragraphs.
22.
In the case on hand, the petitioner seeks mandamus to direct the
respondents to restore the pay scale he was provided during the tenure of
his contract period service w.e.f. 02.02.2006 i.e. from the date of his
appointment as permanent employee on fixed pay basis, which claim,
according to this Court, is absolutely barred by the doctrine of delay and
laches since such administrative order was issued in conformity with the
policy decision of the government and was applied uniformly in all cases
of new appointment in permanent posts. Therefore, this administrative
order of the respondents cannot be described as a source of „continuing
wrong‟ to give rise the cause of action in the year 2022 to throw out an
administrative action that occurred on 13th April, 2006 and in this
situation, since this Court is Court of equity, doctrine of laches will surely
come into play to refuse a stale claim.
23.
In view of the analysis outlined here-in-above and for the reasons
afore-stated, this writ petition being devoid of merit deserves to be
dismissed.
Accordingly, it is dismissed. No order as to costs.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed.
JUDGE
Snigdha
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review