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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl. Rev.P. No.34 of 2025
Sri Ranjit Barua (aged about 44 years),
Son of late Kunja Bihari Barua, resident of
Shyamnagar, Nuapara, P.O. Shyamnagar,
P.S. Jagaddal, District: North 24 Paragana,
West Bengal.
----Petitioner(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura
----Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Sankar Lodh, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.
Date of hearing
and delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
04.12.2025
Whether fit for
reporting
:
YES
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order (Oral)
This criminal revision petition is filed under Section 397 read
with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the
order dated 16.05.2025 passed by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Gomati
Judicial District, Udaipur, in connection with Case No. S.T.(Type-2) 18 of
2024.
2.
Heard Learned Counsel, Mr. Sankar Lodh appearing on behalf
of the accused-petitioner. Also heard Learned Addl. P.P., Mr. Rajib Saha
appearing on behalf of the State-respondent.
3.
Taking part in the hearing, Learned Counsel, Mr. S. Lodh first
of all drawn the attention of this Court the order dated 16.05.2025 and
submitted that before the Learned Trial Court, the accused-petitioner filed
an application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. for discharging him from the
charge of this case as during investigation, no material could be revealed
against him. But, the Learned Trial Court did not consider the submission
made by the accused-petitioner and framed charge under Section 120B of
IPC and Section 12 of IPP (Entry into India) Act, 1967 (for short, Passport
Act, 1967). Referring Section 120B of IPC, Learned Counsel for the
accused-petitioner submitted that from the materials on record, no
evidence can be revealed against the accused-petitioner that he made any
conspiracy for invoking the provision of the said Section. So, according to
Learned Counsel, the charge framed by Learned Court below was
misconceived and not supported by any cogent material evidence on
record.
4.
In respect of another charge framed under Section 12 of
Passport Act, 1967, Learned Counsel submitted that on bare perusal of
the said provision of Section 12 of the Passport Act, 1967, it will be
transpired that for framing of charge under the said Section, sanction
would be required as per Section 15 of the Passport Act 1967. But, here in
the case at hand, prosecution could not produce any sanction for
prosecuting the accused-petitioner before the Learned Trial Court and as
such, the charge cannot be sustained against him.
Referring the provision of Section 12 of the Passport Act,
1967, Learned Counsel further submitted that Section 12 deals with
offences and penalties. Learned Counsel also submitted that there is no
evidence on record that the accused-petitioner has committed any offence
punishable under Section 3 of the said Act. As such, according to Learned
Counsel for the accused-petitioner, the said charge cannot be sustained in
the eye of law against the accused-petitioner. Finally, Learned Counsel
urged for discharging the accused-petitioner by setting aside the order
dated 16.05.2025 delivered by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Gomati
Judicial District, Udaipur.
5.
Learned Counsel for the accused-petitioner again drawn the
attention of this court referring a citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba vs. The State of West Bengal
in Criminal Appeal No. 5146 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.)
No.3002/2024, wherein in para Nos. 28 and 29, Hon’ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
“TENDENCY OF FILING CHARGESHEETS AND FRAMING
CHARGES IN MATTERS WHERE NO STRONG SUSPICION IS
MADE OUT CLOGS THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
28. Before parting with this case, this Court would like to
emphasise that where there is a pending civil dispute
between the parties, the Police and the Criminal Courts
must be circumspect in filing a chargesheet and framing
charges respectively. In a society governed by rule of law,
the decision to file a chargesheet should be based on the
Investigating Officer's determination of whether the
evidence collected provides a reasonable prospect of
conviction. The Police at the stage of filing of Chargesheet
and the Criminal Court at the stage of framing of Charge
must act as initial filters ensuring that only cases with a
strong suspicion should proceed to the formal trial stage to
maintain the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system.
The tendency of filing chargesheets in matters where no
strong suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system. It
forces Judges, court staff, and prosecutors to spend time on
trials that are likely to result in an acquittal. This diverts
limited judicial resources from handling stronger, more
serious cases, contributing to massive case backlogs.
Undoubtedly, there can be no analysis at the charge
framing stage as to whether the case would end in
conviction or acquittal, but the fundamental principle is that
the State should not prosecute citizens without a
reasonable prospect of conviction, as it compromises the
right to a fair process.
29. In the present case, the Police and the Trial Court
should have been cognizant that as there was a pending
civil dispute with regard to the property in question as well
as a prior subsisting injunction order and the complainant
had refused to make any judicial statement, strong
suspicion founded on legally tenable material/evidence was
absent.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that at the
time of framing of charge, Criminal Court must act as initial filters
ensuring that only cases with a strong suspicion should proceed to the
formal trial stage to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the judicial
system. However, here in the case at hand, in absence of any materials
on record, Learned Trial Court framed charge against the accusedpetitioner, which is liable to be set aside.
Learned Counsel also referred another citation of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Gauri Shankar Prasad vs. State of Bihar &
Anr., reported in (2000) 5 SCC 15, wherein in para No.12 Hon’ble the
Apex Court observed as under:
“12. In the case of State v. B.L. Verma [(1997) 10 SCC 772 :
1997 SCC (Cri) 1037] this Court held that since it is not
disputed that actions alleged against the public servant lay
within the scope of his official duties or at any event were
allegedly committed in the purported discharge of his duties
as Director of Enforcement though it is canvassed that he
had abused his official position while discharging his official
duties that would not oust the necessity of sanction under
Section 197 CrPC to take cognizance of the offence. This
Court observed that the expression “no court shall take
cognizance of such offence except with the previous
sanction” occurring in Section 197 CrPC unmistakably
shows that the bar on exercise of powers by the Court to
take cognizance is mandatory and the previous sanction
from the competent authority for prosecution of the public
servant, who is accused of having committed an offence
either in the execution of his duties or in the purported
execution of his duties is essential to take cognizance. This
Court confirmed the order of the High Court directing the
dropping of proceedings against the public servant in the
absence of such a sanction.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that in
absence of sanction, there is no scope to proceed for trial against the
accused-petitioner.
Reliance was placed upon another citation of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Kanchan Kumar vs. State of Bihar reported
in (2022) 9 SCC 577, wherein in para Nos.11, 12 and 13 Hon’ble the
Apex Court observed as under:
“Issue
11. The short question arising for consideration is whether
the appellant is entitled to be discharged of the proceedings
initiated against him under the PC Act.
Legal provision and precedents
12. Section 227CrPC relating to discharge is as under:
“227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the
record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the
accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the
Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused, he shall
discharge the accused and record his reasons for so
doing.”
13. The threshold of scrutiny required to adjudicate an
application under Section 227CrPC, is to consider the broad
probabilities of the case and the total effect of the material
on record, including examination of any infirmities
appearing in the case. In Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of
India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC
(Cri) 609] it was noted that : (SCC p. 9, para 10)
“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities
mentioned above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the
question of framing the charges under Section
227 of the Code has the undoubted power to
sift and weigh the evidence for the limited
purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
facie case against the accused has been made
out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the
Court disclose grave suspicion against the
accused which has not been properly explained
the Court will be fully justified in framing a
charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case
would naturally depend upon the facts of each
case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of
universal application. By and large however if
two views are equally possible and the Judge is
satisfied that the evidence produced before him
while giving rise to some suspicion but not
grave suspicion against the accused, he will be
fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under
Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under
the present Code is a senior and experienced
court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the case,
the total effect of the evidence and the
documents produced before the Court, any
basic infirmities appearing in the case and so
on. This however does not mean that the Judge
should make a roving enquiry into the pros and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if
he was conducting a trial.”
(emphasis supplied)”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel again submitted that in
absence of material evidence on record, there was no scope to frame
charge against the accused-petitioner.
Learned Counsel further relied upon another citation of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel vs.
State of Gujarat & Anr., reported in AIR 2019 SC 3363, wherein in
Para Nos.16, 27, 28, 44, and 53, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
16. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of
India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC
(Cri) 609 : AIR 1979 SC 366] , after survey of case law, this
is what the Court has laid down: (SCC p. 9, para 10)
“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities
mentioned above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence
for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a
prima facie case against the accused has been made
out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has
not been properly explained the Court will be fully
justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the
trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is
difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By
and large however if two views are equally possible
and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced
before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not
grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully
within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section
227 of the Code the Judge which under the present
Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act
merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the
prosecution,
but
has
to
consider
the
broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the
Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and
so on. This however does not mean that the Judge
should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of
the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.”
27. Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Evidence Act”, for short) renders
inadmissible a confession made to a police officer. It
declares in fact that no confession made to a police officer
shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
28. Section 26 of the Evidence Act, on the other hand, reads
as follows:
“26. Confession by accused while in custody of police
not to be proved against him.—No confession made by
any person whilst he is in the custody of a police
officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of
a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.
Explanation.—In this section “Magistrate” does not
include the head of a village discharging magisterial
functions in the Presidency of Fort St. George or
elsewhere, unless such headman is a Magistrate
exercising the powers of a Magistrate under the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1882 (10 of 1882).”
44. Such a person viz. person who is named in the FIR, and
therefore, the accused in the eye of the law, can indeed be
questioned and the statement is taken by the police officer.
A confession, which is made to a police officer, would be
inadmissible having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence
Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the
Evidence Act would also be inadmissible. A confession
unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala Narayana
Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC
OnLine PC 1 : (1938-39) 66 IA 66 : AIR 1939 PC 47] and as
accepted by this Court, may still be used as an admission
under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is
subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement under
Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a statement contains
admission, the statement being one under Section 161, it
would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 CrPC.
53. We also notice the following statement in the judgment
rendered by the Bench of seven learned Judges in
Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar [Haricharan Kurmi v.
State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184 at p. 1188 : (1964) 2 Cri
LJ 344] : (AIR p. 1184)
“As a result of the provisions contained in Section 30,
Evidence Act, the confession of a co-accused has to be
regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way,
because whatever is considered by the court is
evidence; circumstances which are considered by the
court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in
that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be
regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of
the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is
not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The
result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against
an accused person, the court cannot start with the
confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with
other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it
has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and
effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to
turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to
the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about
to reach on the said other evidence.
Thus, the confession of a co-accused person cannot be
treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed
into service only when the court is inclined to accept
other evidence and feels the necessity of seeking for
an assurance in support of its conclusions deducible
from the said evidence. … In criminal cases where the
other evidence adduced against an accused person is
wholly unsatisfactory and the prosecution seeks to rely
on the confession of a co-accused person, the
presumption of innocence which is the basis of
criminal jurisprudence assists the accused person and
compels the court to render the verdict that the charge
is not proved against him, and so, he is entitled to the
benefit of doubt.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel drawn the attention of
the court that from the contents of the prosecution materials and based
on the statement of the co-accused, no charge could be framed against
him, but the Learned Trial Court committed serious error in framing of
charge against the accused-petitioner. So, Learned Counsel urged for
setting aside the impugned order.
In support of the sanction, Learned Counsel relied upon one
citation of the Kerala High Court in Noufal M.H. vs. State of Kerala
reported in 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 10002, wherein in para Nos.2, 12, 13,
14, 16, 30 and 31 the Kerala High Court observed as under:
“2. Section 15 of the Passports Act runs as follows:
No prosecution shall be instituted against any person in
respect of any offence under this Act without the previous
sanction of the Central Government or such officer or
authority as may be authorised by that Government by
order in writing in this behalf.
12. Section 132(1) Cr.P.C. also creates a bar for institution
of prosecution. It reads thus:
(1) No prosecution against any person for any act
purporting to be done under Section 129, section 130
or section 131 shall be instituted in any Criminal Court
except(a) with the sanction of the Central Government where
such person is an officer or member of the armed
forces;
(b) with the sanction of the State Government in any
other case.
(2) Omitted
(3) Omitted
13. In State of Kerala v. T.T. Antony (2000 (2) KLT 90) a
division bench of this court considered the question when a
party can raise the defence of want of sanction
contemplated by Section 132 Cr.P.C. The division bench
held: “According to us, the benefit of S.132 can be availed
of only during the trial of the proceedings, if the charge is
filed”.
14. A learned single judge of this court also took the same
view in M.K. Musthafa Haji v. Director, Central Bureau of
Investigation, New Delhi (2011 Crl.L.J. 3968). It was
observed:
“Thus, under Section 132(1) Cr.P.C. there is a total
embargo against the institution of a prosecution
against any person for any act purporting to be done
inter alia under Sec.129 Cr.P.C. except with the
sanction of the appropriate Government. (In this case,
it is the State Government which has to accord the
sanction). Such sanction must precede the institution
of the prosecution. Institution of a prosecution can
ordinarily be either in the form of a complaint made to
a Magistrate or in the form of a police report filed
before the Magistrate”.
16. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the three
judge bench of the Supreme court in Jamuna Singh v.
Bhadai Shah (AIR 1964 SC 1541) that institution of a case
takes place only when cognizance is taken, which was
followed by another three Judge bench in Devarapalli
Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy ((1976) 3
SCC 252 : AIR 1976 SC 1672) and two judge bench in
Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2013) 14
SCC 696 : AIR 2013 SC 1896) and the two judgment of this
court referred to above, the decision in Shymesh v. State of
Kerala (2014 KHC 3684) cannot be held to be good law.
30. To recapitulate, mere absence of declaration in a statute
that an offence under it is cognizable is no reason to hold
that that offence is non cognizable. The phrase „or under
any law for the time being in force‟ used in Section 2(c)
Cr.P.C. refers to offences which are punishable with
imprisonment for less than three years, but for which police
have been empowered to arrest without warrant because
all offences punishable with imprisonment for three years
and above are cognizable offences as specified in list 2 in
Schedule 1 Cr.P.C. Even if only a class of police officers has
been empowered to arrest without warrant for an offence
under an Act which is punishable with imprisonment for
less than three years, it is a cognizable offence. The offence
under Section 12(1)(b) of the Passports Act, or for that
matter any offence under Section 12, is a cognizable
offence because Section 13 of the Act empowers police
officers of and above the rank of Sub Inspectors to arrest
without warrant. For the purpose of Section 15 of the Act
institution of prosecution takes place only when cognizance
is taken by the court having jurisdiction. Sanction of the
Central Government contemplated by the Section is
necessary only at the time cognizance is taken. For
registration of case or investigation sanction is not
required.
31. In the result, this Crl.M.C. is dismissed.”
Referring the
same, Learned Counsel
for
the
accused-
petitioner submitted that in absence of sanction, there is no scope to
proceed against the accused. Even, there is bar to take cognizance of
offense in absence of sanction. Finally, referring the relevant prosecution
papers, Learned Counsel submitted that the impugned order passed by
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge suffers from infirmity and urged for setting
aside the said order and also to discharge the accused-petitioner.
6.
On the other hand, Learned Addl. P.P. appearing on behalf of
the State-respondent fairly submitted that there are sufficient materials
against the accused-petitioner for framing of charge under Section 120B
of IPC read with section 12 of the Passport Act, 1967. Furthermore, in
absence of sanction there is also scope to frame charge against the
accused-petitioner which is a curable defects.
7.
In support of his contention Learned Addl. P.P. relied upon one
citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Sajjan Kumar vs.
Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368,
wherein in Para Nos. 17 and 21, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
“17. In Prafulla Kumar Samal [(1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC
(Cri) 609] the scope of Section 227 CrPC was considered.
After adverting to various decisions, this Court has
enumerated the following principles: (SCC p. 9, para 10)
“(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence
for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a
prima facie case against the accused has been made
out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has
not been properly explained the court will be fully
justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the
trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is
difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By
and large however if two views are equally possible
and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced
before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not
grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully
within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section
227 of the Code the Judge which under the present
Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act
merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the
prosecution,
but
has
to
consider
the
broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the
court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and
so on. This however does not mean that the Judge
should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of
the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.”
Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC
21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles
emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for
the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a
prima facie case against the accused has been made
out. The test to determine prima facie case would
depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has
not been properly explained, the court will be fully
justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the
trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the
court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage,
there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court
could form an opinion that the accused might have
committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for
conviction the conclusion is required to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has
committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative
value of the material on record cannot be gone into but
before framing a charge the court must apply its
judicial mind on the material placed on record and
must be satisfied that the commission of offence by
the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on
record with a view to find out if the facts emerging
therefrom taken at their face value disclose the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it
cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept
all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it
is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities
of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives
rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave
suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to
discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to
see whether the trial will end in conviction or
acquittal.”
Referring the same, Learned Addl. P.P. submitted that Learned
Trial Court, considering the materials on record, rightly framed charge
against the accused-petitioner and there was no infirmity in the order
passed by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge and finally, urged for dismissal of
the present petition filed by the accused-petitioner.
8.
I have heard both the sides at length and perused the
relevant prosecution papers and also the order dated 16.05.2025 passed
by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Gomati Judicial District, Udaipur.
9.
It is the admitted position that the present accused-petitioner
moved an application before the Learned Trial Court under Section 227 of
the Cr.P.C. for discharging him from the charge of the case. But, the
Learned Trial Court, after hearing both the sides, by a reasoned order,
dismissed the application filed by the accused-petitioner and on the same
day, framed charge against him under Section 120B of IPC and Section 12
of Passport Act, 1967, which is presently under challenge before this
Court.
10.
In this case the prosecution was set into motion on the basis
of an F.I.R./ suo moto complaint laid by one ASI Ajut Miah, Karbook PS to
O/C, Karbook PS alleging inter alia that on 12.05.2024 morning at about
0745hrs based upon a secret information from reliable source of Chandra
Hongsha Para that some unknown persons crossed border fencing from
Bangladesh side into India through Chandra Hongsha Para area, he
entered the fact in PS GD and rushed towards Chandra Hangsha Para near
border road. The ASI i.e. the complainant found one suspected person
proceeding towards Karbook side by an Auto-Rickshaw Bearing No. TR03B-4128. Seeing that vehicle the complainant stopped the said AutoRickshaw and on being asked the said driver and passenger could not give
any satisfactory reply regarding their identity as well as their presence
near Indo-Bangladesh border. On spot preliminary interrogation, the
suspect gave statement that he is an Indian National belonging to West
Bengal, North 24 Pargona but, he could not give any satisfactory reply
regarding his visit to Chandra Hangsha Para near bordering area and also
could not produce any valid document. As such, it was strongly suspected
that he entered into India from Bangladesh illegally, after crossing the
Indo-Bangladesh
fencing.
Thereafter,
ASI
Ajut
Miah
(Complainant)
detained the suspected person and the auto driver observing all legal
formalities and brought them to Karbook PS for further interrogation. In
course of checking the luggage, one Aadhar Card, Cash of Rs. 1220/-
(Indian Currency) and Rs. 5/- (five rupee) (Bangladesh Currency) and one
Redmi mobile phone were found from the possession of the suspected
Bangladeshi namely, Ranjit Barua and one Samsung mobile phone and
Cash of Rs. 800/- (Indian Currency), one Auto Rickshaw vide B/R No.
TR03-B-4128 along with its key was also found from the possession of Sri
Bir Karna Jamatia @ Pulung Jamatia, which were seized accordingly. On
the basis of the F.I.R., the case was registered. The I.O. on completion of
investigation
laid
charge-sheet
and
accordingly,
by
order
dated
07.10.2024, Learned SDJM, Amarpur, Gomati Tripura took cognizance of
offence. After that, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and
then, the case was transferred to the Court of Learned Addl. Sessions
Judge, Gomati Judicial District, Udaipur
who
by the
order
dated
16.05.2025 framed charge against the present accused-petitioner.
11.
I have also perused the charge-sheet very carefully.
12.
In the charge-sheet, it was clearly written by the I.O. that
during investigation it was revealed that the present accused-petitioner is
an Indian national and he is an inhabitant of West Bengal. As already
stated, in this case, formal charge under Section 120B of IPC read with
Section 12 of the Passport Act, 1967 has been framed by the Learned Trial
Court against the accused-petitioner.
Now, for the sake of convenience, I would like to refer herein
below the relevant provisions of Section 120B of IPC and Section 12 of the
Passport Act, 1967:
“Section 120B of IPC:
120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.--(1) Whoever is a
party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence
punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous
imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall,
where no express provision is made in this Code for the
punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same
manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a
criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as
aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term not exceeding six months, or with
fine or with both.
Section 12 of Passport Act, 1967:
12. Offences and penalties.-(1) Whoever(a) contravenes the provisions of section 3; or
(b) knowingly furnishes any false information or
suppresses any material information with a view to
obtaining a passport or travel document under this Act
or without lawful authority alters or attempts to alter
or causes to alter the entries made in a passport or
travel document; or
(c) fails to produce for inspection his passport or
travel document (whether issued under this Act or
not) when called upon to do so by the prescribed
authority; or
(d) knowingly uses a passport or travel document
issued to another person; or
(e) knowingly allows another person to use a passport
or travel document issued to him;
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to
five thousand rupees or with both.
(1A) Whoever, not being a citizen of India,(a) makes an application for a passport or obtains a
passport by suppressing information about his
nationality, or
(b) holds a forged passport or any travel document,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five
years and with fine which shall not be less than ten
thousand rupees but which may extend to fifty thousand
rupees.
(2) Whoever abets any offence punishable under subsection (1) or sub-section (1A) shall, if the act abetted is
committed in consequence of the abetment, be
punishable with the punishment provided in that subsection for that offence.
(3) Whoever contravenes any condition of a passport or
travel document or any provision of this Act or any rule
made thereunder for which no punishment is provided
elsewhere in this Act shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
months or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees or with both.
(4) Whoever, having been convicted of an offence under
this Act, is again convicted of an offence under this Act
shall be punishable with double the penalty provided for
the latter offence.”
Section 120B of IPC deals with punishment of criminal
conspiracy and Section 12 of Passports Act, 1967 deals with offences and
penalties for contravention of provision of Section 3 of the Passport Act,
1967 and for some other purposes.
Now, for the sake of convenience, let us reproduce herein
below the relevant provision of Section 3 of the Passport Act, 1967:
“3. Passport or travel document for departure from India.No person shall depart from, or attempt to depart from
India, unless he holds in this behalf a valid passport or
travel document.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,(a) "passport" includes a passport which having been
issued by or under the authority of the Government of a
foreign country satisfies the conditions prescribed
under the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 (34 of
1920), in respect of the class of passports to which it
belongs;
(b) "travel document" includes a travel document which
having been issued by or under the authority of the
Government of a foreign country satisfies the conditions
prescribed.”
From the aforesaid provision it appears that if any person
departs from India or attempts to depart from India in absence of any
valid passport or travel document, then he is liable to be prosecuted under
Section 12 of the Passport Act, 1967.
13.
prosecution
Here, in the case at hand, this is not the case of the
that
the
present
accused-petitioner
departed
India
or
attempted to depart India in absence of any valid passport or travel
document. So, virtually there is no scope for application of Section 3 of
Passport Act, 1967 against the accused-petitioner.
14.
Now, from the other ingredients of Section 12 of the Passports
Act, 1967, it appears that the allegation of the prosecution does not cover
any of the ingredients as mentioned under Section 12 of the said Act
against the present accused-petitioner.
Now, let us refer herein below the provision of Section 15 of
the Passports Act, 1967:
“15. Previous sanction of Central Government necessary.No prosecution shall be instituted against any person in
respect of any offence under this Act without the previous
sanction of the Central Government or such officer or
authority as may be authorised by that Government by
order in writing in this behalf.”
From the aforesaid provision, it appears that in absence of any
sanction of the Central Government, there is no scope to prosecute any
person under any of the provisions of the Passports Act, 1967.
From the order of Learned Trial Court dated 16.05.2025, it
appears that Learned Trial Court at the time of deciding the matter dealt
with the issue and came to the observation that the same may be
considered during the period of trial. In this regard, I have also gone
through the citations referred by Learned Counsel for the accusedpetitioner in the afore-noted cases.
It appears that in absence of appropriate sanction issued by
the authority, there is no scope to prosecute a person under Section 12 of
the Passports Act, 1967, nor he could be prosecuted under Section 3 of
the said Act. Here, in the case at hand, it is not the case of the
prosecution that at the time of crossing Indo-Bangladesh border, the
present accused-petitioner was detained by police or by BSF authority,
rather from the relevant prosecution papers, it appears that he was
detained inside the Indian Territory, at Karbook, when he was moving by
an auto-rickshaw.
15.
In course of hearing, Learned Addl. P.P. tried to draw the
attention of the Court that from the statement/interrogation report of the
co-accused, it is transpired that the present accused-petitioner entered
into India from Bangladesh on that relevant day in absence of any travel
document. But, in this regard, the prosecution, before the Learned Trial
Court could not place any cogent materials on record that on that relevant
day, the accused entered into India and he was detained at the time of
crossing Indo-Bangladesh border. Rather, it is on record that he was
detained inside the Indian Territory at Karbook when he was moving
through
an
auto
rickshaw.
So,
simply
on
the
basis
of
the
statement/interrogation report of the co-accused, there is no scope to
believe that the accused-petitioner has committed any offence under
Section 12 of the Passport Act, 1967. Furthermore, there is no legal bar
for an Indian national to visit just nearby bordering areas.
So, in such a situation, in absence of specific evidence on
record and also in absence of valid sanction as observed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the afore-noted cases, in the considered view of
this Court, there was no scope to prosecute the present accused-petitioner
under Section 12 of the Passport Act, 1967. Further, on perusal of
materials on record, I also do not find any sufficient material to prosecute
the petitioner under Section 120B of the IPC in absence of any specific
evidence.
16.
Thus, in my considered opinion, the order dated 16.05.2025
passed by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge in respect of the present
accused-petitioner suffers from infirmity and the same needs to be
interfered with.
In the result, the order dated 16.05.2025 delivered by
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Gomati Judicial District, Udaipur in respect
of the present petitioner stands interfered with in absence of cogent
materials on record and valid sanction for prosecution as required under
Section 15 of the Passport Act, 1967.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition filed by the
present accused-petitioner is hereby allowed and thus, disposed of.
The order dated 16.05.2025 passed by Learned Addl. Sessions
Judge, Gomati Judicial District, Udaipur is hereby modified and the
accused-petitioner is hereby discharged from the charge levelled against
him under Section 120B of IPC read with Section 12 of the Passport Act,
1967, and his surety, if any, also accordingly stands discharged. Learned
Trial Court shall proceed with the trial in respect of the rest of the accused
persons.
Send down the record to the Learned Trial Court along with a
copy of this judgment and order. Return back the CD to I.O. through
Learned Addl. P.P. along with a copy of this judgment and order. A copy
of this judgment and order also be supplied to Learned Counsel for the
accused-petitioner for information.
JUDGE
Snigdha
signed by
SATABDI Digitally
SATABDI DUTTA
2025.12.05
DUTTA Date:
13:48:37 +05'30'
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