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Sri Munna Das vs The State of Tripura and 3 Ors

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Court
Tripura High Court
Date
4 February 2022
Case No.
WP(C) 684/2021
Result
Disposed
Bench
S. Talapatra
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31. Having observed thus, the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner for compassionate appointment on the day of death of the deceased employee i.e. on 25.12.2018 under the Die-in-Harness Scheme circulated by the notification dated 26.12.2015. Such exercise shall be completed within a period of two months from the day when a copy of this order will be furnished to the respondents by the petitioner. Hence, the writ petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated above. No order as to costs. Sabyasachi B

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA WP(C)No.684 of 2021 Sri Munna Das, son of late Dip Kumar Das, resident of Village-Kalibazar, P.O. & P.S. Santirbazar, District : South Tripura, PIN : 799144 ……… Petitioner(s) –Versus– 1. The State of Tripura, to be represented by the Secretary, Department of Information and Cultural Affairs, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Kunjaban, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN : 799010 2. The Deputy Secretary, GA (P & T) Department, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Kunjaban, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN : 799010 3. The Director, Information, Cultural Affairs & Tourism, Government of Tripura, Gandhighat, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN : 799001 4. The Senior Information Officer, District Information and Cultural Affairs Office, Belonia, South Tripura 5. The Secretary, Department of Finance, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Kunjaban, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN : 799010 …….. Respondent(s) For the Petitioner(s) : For the Respondent(s) : Date of hearing & delivery of Judgment and Order : Whether fit for reporting : Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Adv. Mr. K. Nath, Adv. Ms. N. Ghosh, Adv. Mr. D. Sharma, Addl. G.A. 04.02.2022 YES HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE S. TALAPATRA JUDGMENT & ORDER (Oral) Heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. K. Nath, learned counsel and Ms. N. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. D. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the respondents. 2. At the outset, this Court would note that the reference [see the order dated 15.12.2021] that has been reportedly made apparently cannot have any relevance in the present context. Briefly stated, the grievance of the petitioner as enumerated in this petition is that his father namely Dipkumar Das passed away on 25.12.2018 while working as the Sweeping and Cleaning Assistant borne in the regular establishment and at the time of death he was posted in the office of the Information and Cultural Affairs situated at Santirbazar, South Tripura. After death of the father of the petitioner, the petitioner applied for the compassionate appointment under Die-in-Harness Scheme. It may be noted that the petitioner has been working as Casual Worker under the Directorate of Information and Cultural Affairs, Government of Tripura but he is not in the regular establishment. In terms of the memorandum No.F.1(1)-G&A/97 dated 11.08.1997 [Annexure-2 to the writ petition] a surviving family member of the deceased employee who has been working as Daily Rated/Contingent Labourer if selected by the family may be given regular employment under Die-in-Harness Scheme. As such, there had been no impediment in appointing the petitioner under Die-in-Harness Scheme. Even the surviving members of the family left by the deceased employee have executed a no-objection certificate relinquishing their individual claims and laying their noobjection in respect of appointment of the petitioner under Die-in-Harness Scheme. The petitioner had filed his application for compassionate appointment on 26.03.2019 within one year from the day of death of his father. It has been also asserted by the petitioner that except him, none of his family members is eligible for the government employment. This fact has not been disputed by the respondents. As the respondents did not take any decision on the prayer for compassionate appointment, the petitioner served a notice on 16.03.2020 for his appointment under Die-in-Harness Scheme. Thereafter, he had filed a writ petition being WP(C)No.853 of 2020 in this Court and the said writ petition had been disposed of by the order dated 13.01.2021 with the following direction : “In facts of the present case, let the respondents decide the application of the petitioner for compassionate appointment within 4(four) weeks from today and communicate the decision to the petitioner. If the decision is adverse to the petitioner, the competent authority shall state brief reasons for arriving at such conclusions upon which it would be open for the petitioner to seek further remedy in law.” 3. It transpires that pursuant to the said order dated 13.01.2021, the Director, Information and Cultural Affairs, Government of Tripura by the order dated 06.02.2021 has dismissed the prayer of the petitioner for compassionate appointment having observed as follows : “Whereas, GA(P & T) Department has issued a notification vide No.F.1(1)-GA(P & T)/18 dt. 2nd March, 2019 regarding die-in-harness scheme mentioning the date of effect of this Notification from 21/11/2018; AND Whereas, it is clearly mentioned in support category-I of the above Notification that ”if the age of the affected Government servant is equal to or more than 50 years on the date of occurrence, then the family will be paid special pension amounting to difference between last drawn salary and pension in addition to the normal pension till the affected employee would have attained 60 years of age, provided that there is no earning member in the family. After attaining 60 years of age, only normal pension will be paid.” AND Whereas, the date of birth of deceased Dip Kr. Das was on 10/12/1967, so at the time of death his age was over 50 years for which the support category-1 as mentioned in the notification mentioned above is applicable in this case; AND Whereas, after consulting all the documents submitted/scheme of diein-harness and date of death of the deceased person , Smt. Kajal Mali Das, w/o Lt. Dip Kr. Das was informed through a letter vide No.F.1(14)DICA(S)/BLN/2014/478 dt. 18th August, 2020 regarding the scheme for compassionate benefit under die-in-harness scheme; Now, considering the whole aspects, the petition as submitted by Sri Munna Das, s/o deceased Dip Kr. Das, Ex- Sweeping & Cleansing Assistant of this Department is liable to be dismissed.” 4. Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the basis of the said order dated 06.02.2021 [Annexure-8 to the writ petition] is the scheme for compassionate appointment etc. as published by the notification No.F.1(1)-GA/(P & T)/18 dated 02.03.2019 [Annexure-9 to the writ petition]. According to Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel since the notification was published on 02.03.2019, the said scheme cannot be applied for consideration of compassionate appointment of the petitioner as the death in harness took place on 25.12.2018. The said policy cannot be given retrospective operation. 5. In support of his contention, Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel has relied on a decision of this Court in Smt. Kamalabati Gour versus State of Tripura and Others [judgment and order dated 08.03.2021 delivered in WP(C)No.502 of 2020 ]. The basis of the said judgment was the decision of the apex Court in Canara Bank and Another versus M. Mahesh Kumar reported in (2015) 7 SCC 412 where it had been observed as follows : “13. Applying these principles to the case in hand, as discussed earlier, respondent‟s father died on 10.10.1998 while he was serving as a clerk in the appellant-bank and the respondent applied timely for compassionate appointment as per the scheme „Dying in Harness Scheme‟ dated 8.05.1993 which was in force at that time. The appellantbank rejected the respondent‟s claim on 30.06.1999 recording that there are no indigent circumstances for providing employment to the respondent. Again on 7.11.2001, the appellant-bank sought for particulars in connection with the issue of respondent‟s employment. In the light of the principles laid down in the above decisions, the cause of action to be considered for compassionate appointment arose when the Circular No.154/1993 dated 8.05.1993 was in force. Thus, as per the judgment referred in Jaspal Kaur‟s case, the claim cannot be decided as per 2005 Scheme providing for ex-gratia payment. The Circular dated 14.2.2005 being an administrative or executive order cannot have retrospective effect so as to take away the right accrued to the respondent as per circular of 1993” 6. In Indian Bank and Anr. Vs. Promila & Anr. reported in (2020) 2 SCC 729 the apex Court restated the principle laid down in M. Mahesh Kumar(supra) unequivocally in the following manner : “18. The question of applicability of any subsequent scheme really does not apply in view of the judgment of this Court in Canara Bank. Thus, it would not be appropriate to examine the case of the respondents in the context of subsequent schemes, but only in the context of the Scheme of 4-4-1979, the terms of which continued to be applicable even as per the new Scheme of 5-11-1985 i.e. the Scheme applicable to the respondents. There is no provision in this Scheme for any ex gratia payment. The option of compassionate appointment was available only in the full amount of gratuity was not taken, something which was done. Thus, having taken the full amount of gratuity, the option of compassionate appointment really was not available to the respondents.” [Emphasis added] 7. Having recorded the submission placed for the State of Tripura this Court had occasion to observe that the retrospective operation as given to the scheme for compassionate appointment etc. by the notification dated 02.03.2019 [Annexure-9 to the writ petition] is not sustainable. The relevant passages from Kamalabati Gour (supra) is reproduced hereunder for purpose of extensive reference : 9. Mr. D Sharma, learned Addl. GA appearing for the State has stated that in the Die-in-harness scheme, there cannot be any vested right. In this regard, the decision of the apex court in Sate Bank of India Vs. Raj Kumar reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661 has been referred. In that report, the apex court having restated the law as enunciated in Union of India Vs. P Padmanabhan reported in (2003) 7 SCC 270 has observed that it is well settled that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. On the other hand it is an exception to the general rule that recruitment to public services should be on the basis of merit, by an open invitation providing equal opportunity to all eligible persons to participate in the selection process. The dependants of employees, who die in harness, do not have any special claim or right to employment, except by way of the concession that may be extended by the employer under the rules or by a separate scheme, to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. The claim for compassionate appointment is therefore traceable only to the scheme framed by the employer for such employment and there is no right whatsoever beyond such scheme. An appointment under the scheme can be made only if the scheme is in force. It follows therefrom that when a scheme is abolished, any pending application seeking appointment under the scheme will also cease to exist, unless saved. The mere fact that an application was made when the scheme was in force, will not by itself create a right in favour of the applicant. 10. It has been further observed that where the earlier scheme is abolished and the new scheme which replaces it specifically provides that all pending applications will be considered only in terms of the new scheme, then the new scheme alone will apply. As compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right, the employer may wind up the scheme or modify the scheme at any time depending upon its policies, financial capacity and availability of posts. 11. In sequel, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. GA has relied another decision of the apex court in High Court of Delhi and Anr. Vs. A.K. Mahajan, reported in (2009) 12 SCC 62 where the apex court has laid down that the law regarding the retrospectivity or retroactive operation regarding the rules of selection is that where such amended rules affect the benefit already given, then alone such rules would not be permissible to the extent of retrospectivity. 12. Having referred A.K. Mahajan (supra) Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. GA has contended that since no benefit has been extended to the petitioner by retrospectivity we cannot save his purported right from retrospectivity. 13. So far the meaning of vested right is concerned, Mr. Sharma, learned counsel has pressed in service the law as enunciated in MGB Gramin Bank Vs. Chakrawarti Singh, reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583 where the apex court, in the context of that case, had occasion to observe that the word „vested‟ has been defined in Black‟s Law Dictionary as fixed, accrued, settled, absolute, complete. Mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute „vested rights‟. 14. The apex court has further observed to crystallize the meaning of vested right in the following terms: “13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency and it cannot be taken away without consent of the person concerned. Vested right can arise from contract, statute or by operation of law. Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by a party, the policy decision/scheme could be changed. [Vide Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi). [(2006) 5 SCC 702: AIR 2006 SC 2652]” [Emphasis added] 15. Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. GA has thereafter apprised this Court that in view of conflicting judgments in respect of retrospective operation visà-vis the right under the former scheme, by the judgment dated 08.02.2019 delivered in SLP(C) 30335 of 2017 [State Bank of India Vs. Sheo Shankar Tewari] the apex court has referred the matter to a larger Bench to iron out the edges of difference as expressed by their equal Benches of the apex court. In this matter, they have referred State Bank of India & Anr. Vs. Raj Kumar, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661, MGB Gramin Bank Vs. Chakrawarti Singh, reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583. 16. Having appreciated the submission of the learned counsel for the parties and scrutinized the records, this court at the outset would recall the decision of the apex court in State Bank of India Vs. Jaspal Kaur, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 571 where the apex court had observed that an administrative or executive order cannot have retrospective effect so as to take away the right accrued in favour of any person. The decision of Mahesh Kumar (supra) is consistent to that principle as laid down in Jaspal Kaur (supra). The distinction as sought to be made in Raj Kumar (supra) is on the basis that there is no general vested right in favour of the persons seeking appointment under the Die-in-harness scheme. Whatever rights arose in favour of the persons is within that scheme. The right within that scheme is subject to the changes made in the policy and it hardly creates any vested right. In the case in hand, considering the death of the deceased employee had taken place on 18.01.2019, the previous notification dated 26.02.2015 was supposed to be in operation till repeal of the said notification dated 26.12.2015 w.e.f. 21.11.2018. The respondents have contended that the petitioner will not be considered for any compassionate appointment but the petitioner would be considered for the special pension as has been created by the Scheme for Compassionate Appointment/Benefit for Government Employees of Tripura by the notification dated 02.03.2019. The clause that repeals the former scheme retrospectively reads as under: “19. Repeal: The existing orders/instructions issued from time to time in connection with the Die-in- harness scheme or benefit to the family of missing Government employee or permanent invalidation, while in Government job hereby stand repealed w.e.f. 21st November, 2018” 17. The solitary question which is of paramount importance to the controversy is that whether the provision repealing the former scheme of 2015 w.e.f. 21.11.2018 can be sustained or not? By the subsequent decision of the apex court in Raj Kumar (supra) it has been quite categorically stated apparently, following the law as enunciated in Jaspal Kaur (supra) that no executive order can be given retrospective operation. As such, in the considered view of this Court even though the said notification dated 02.03.2019 has not been challenged by the petitioner, the said notification cannot be given retrospective operation, from 21.11.2018 inasmuch as, whatever right has arisen in favour of the petitioner that arose on 18.01.2019 from the death of Sukha Gaur, her father. In the Scheme of 2015 it has been categorically observed that eligibility in all respects shall be determined as on the date of the death of the concerned Page 11 of 11 employee. The respondents have not indicated to any other embargo in considering the petitioner for compassionate appointment for death of her father. Those rights in favour of the petitioner emerged prior to 02.03.2019, the day of notification of the new scheme as referred above. Those rights cannot be taken away by retrospective repeal w.e.f. 21.11.2018, in view of the law as espoused by the apex court. Hence, this Court is inclined to direct the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for compassionate appointment under the die-in-harness scheme as notified on 26.12.2015 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) within a period of three months from the day, when a copy of this order will be made available by the petitioner.” 8. Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel has contended that the present controversy is squarely covered by Kamalabati Gour(supra). In addition thereto, According to Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel, eligibility in all respect shall be determined as on the date of death of the concerned employee as has been provided by the notification No.F.1(2)-GA(P & T)/15 dated 26.12.2015. When the petitioner was supposed to be considered for the appointment in terms of the notification dated 26.12.2015, his eligibility was to be considered on the day of death of his father i.e. 25.12.2018. On that day, the said notification dated 02.03.2019 did not see the light of the day. Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel has contended that the retrospective operation of the notification dated 02.03.2019 w.e.f.21.11.2018 as the decision was taken by the council of ministers on 21.11.2018 for introduction of a new scheme for compassionate appointment etc. cannot be sustained inasmuch as any decision taken by the Council of Ministers gets effect from the date when it is published or it is shown that the Council of Ministers had decided to give such retrospective operation. Even then, by operating a scheme by an executive order retrospectively by replacing the scheme in force is not sustainable. 9. Mr. D. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the respondents has in order to repel the submission made by Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel contending that the date of relevance would be the date of consideration. That apart, he has referred to the reply filed by the respondents No.1 to 5 on 14.12.2021 where it has been contended as follows : “In the instant case, since the date of death of deceased Dip Kr. Das is on 25/12/2018 and the case of the petitioner was also considered after notification dated, 2nd March, 2019 which came into force from 21-112018, so the instant case falls under the notification dated, 2nd March, 2019 where scheme for compassionate appointment/benefit for Govt. Job has been revised. It is also stated here that the date of birth of deceased Dip Kr. Das is 10/12/1967, so at time of death his age was over 50 years. In view of this, the nature of support category-I as mentioned in the notification may be applicable in this case. [see para-8 of the reply]” It has been reiterated in the said paragraph as follows : “In the instant case, when the father of the petitioner (Late Dip Kr. Das) expired, the deceased has already crossed 50 years of age, therefore, the instant case will come under purview of Support Category-I as per Compassionate Appointment/Benefit for Government employees of Tripura. Effective date of the scheme for Compassionate Appointment/Benefit for Government employees of Tripura has been given w.e.f. 21st November, 2018 as the decision was taken in the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 21.11.2018. Therefore the contention of the petitioner for providing job under the aforementioned scheme is not tenable and hence, denied. However, the petitioner is entitled for special pension amounting to difference between last drawn salary and pension in addition to the normal pension till be affected employee would have attained 60 years of age, provided that there is no earning member in the family.” 10. Thus, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has contended that as the family will be getting the pension, it can be stated that the family left by the deceased employee will not suffer any form of destitution. On the foundation of the said policy, the impugned decision has been taken by the respondents. According to Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. when a scheme is abolished, any pending application seeking appointment under the scheme will also cease to exist unless its operation for a purpose is saved. The mere fact that an application was made when the scheme was in force, will not by itself create a right in favour of the petitioner. 11. In support of his contention, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has relied on two decisions of the apex court on the point of retrospectivity and on the purpose of Die-in-Harness Scheme. In Punjab State Power Corporation Limited and Others versus Nirval Singh reported in (2019) 6 SCC 774, it has been observed that the fundamental principle which is the foundation of the compassionate appointment is that there is no inherent right and such compassionate appointment has to be in accordance with the existing policy as the objective is to ameliorate the condition of the family at the relevant stage of time and it is the deviation from the rule of merit. In Nirval Singh (supra) the apex Court has referred the following passages from State Bank of India versus Raj Kumar reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661 : “8. It is now well settled that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. On the other hand it is an exception to the general rule that recruitment to public services should be on the basis of merit, by an open invitation providing equal opportunity to all eligible persons to participate in the selection process. The dependants of employees, who die in harness, do not have any special claim or right to employment, except by way of the concession that may be extended by the employer under the Rules or by a separate scheme, to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. The claim for compassionate appointment is therefore traceable only to the scheme framed by the employer for such employment and there is no right whatsoever outside such scheme. An appointment under the scheme can be made only if the scheme is in force and not after it is abolished/withdrawn. It follows therefore that when a scheme is abolished, any pending application seeking appointment under the scheme will also cease to exist, unless saved. The mere fact that an application was made when the scheme was in force, will not by itself create a right in favour of the applicant. * * * 13. Further where the earlier scheme is abolished and the new scheme which replaces it specifically provides that all pending applications will be considered only in terms of the new scheme, then the new scheme alone will apply. As compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right, the employer may wind up the scheme or modify the scheme at any time depending upon its policies, financial capacity and availability of posts.” [Emphasis added] 12. Even though, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has not made a reference of paragraph-9 of Nirval Singh(supra), but the said passage cannot be disjuncted for purpose of holistic reading of the opinion of the apex court in Nirval Singh(supra). Hence, the said passage is reproduced hereunder : “9. Our attention has been drawn to the relevant clause of the new policy which reads as under: “The above policy instructions shall be applicable from the date of issue of instructions. The cases, where compassionate employment has not been given due to discontinuance of the earlier policy since 4/2002, shall also be considered and requisite relief, in lieu compassionate employment, shall be granted as per above policy instructions.” Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has contended placing his reliance on Nirval Singh(supra) that all pending applications will be considered only in terms of the new scheme and the new scheme will only apply. 13. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that his case will be guided by the policy as was existing prior to 02.03.2019 cannot be sustained. However, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has not disputed the claim that a DRW working under the Government can be appointed under Die-in-Harness Scheme, if he is the only person to earn for subsistence of the family. 14. Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has further has referred to a decision of the apex court in N.C. Santhosh versus State of Karnataka and Others reported in (2020) 7 SCC 617. Even though, the controversy in N.C. Santhosh(supra) is poised differently. The following passages have been relied by Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. to contend that the date of death cannot be the basis for consideration, but the relevant date would be the date of consideration. As such, the policy that existed on the date of consideration would be the relevant policy. For reference, the following passages are reproduced : 14. This Court in SBI v. Raj Kumra:(2010) 11 SCC 661 while reiterating that no aspirant has a vested right to claim compassionate appointment, declared that the norms that are in force, when the application is actually considered, will be applicable. The employer‟s right to modify the scheme depending on its policies was recognized in this judgment. Similarly in MCB Gramin Bank vs. Chakrawarti Singh : (2014) 13 SCC 583 this Court reiterated that compassionate appointment has to be considered in accordance with the prevalent scheme and no aspirant can claim that his case should be considered as per the scheme existing on the date of death of the Government employee. 15. However in Canara Bank & Anr. vs. M. Mahesh Kumar: (2015) 7 SCC 412 in the context of major shift in policy, whereunder, instead of compassionate appointment (envisaged by the scheme dated 8.5.1993), ex gratia payment was proposed (under the circular dated 14.02.2005), the Court adopted a different approach. Noticing the extinguishment of, the right to claim appointment, this Court held the “dying in harness scheme” which was prevalent on the death of the employee, be the basis for consideration. 16. A two judges bench headed by Justice Uday U. Lalit noticed the Supreme Court‟s view in SBI vs. Raj Kumar (supra) and MCB Gramin Bank vs. Chakrawarti Singh (supra) on one side and the contrary view in Canara Bank & Anr. vs. M. Mahesh Kumar (supra) and felt the necessity of resolution of the conflicting question on whether the norms applicable on the date of death or on the date of consideration of application should apply. Accordingly, in State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Sheo Shankar Tewari:(2019) 5 SCC 600 the Court referred the matter for consideration by a larger Bench so that the conflicting views could be reconciled. 17. The above discussion suggest that the view taken in Canara Bank & Anr. vs. M. Mahesh Kumar (supra) is to be reconciled with the contrary view of the coordinate bench, in the two earlier judgments. Therefore, notwithstanding the strong reliance placed by the appellants counsel on Canara Bank & Anr. vs. M. Mahesh Kumar (supra) as also the opinion of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Uday Krishna Naik vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. :ILR 1999 Kar 2648, it cannot be said that the appellants claim should be considered under the unamended provisions of the Rules prevailing on the date of death of the Government employee. 18. In the most recent judgment in State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. vs. Shashi Kumar:(2019) 3 SCC 653 the earlier decisions governing the principles of compassionate appointment were discussed and analysed. Speaking for the bench, Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud reiterated that appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be made on the basis of principles in accord with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule. The Dependent of a deceased government employee are made eligible by virtue of the policy on compassionate appointment and they must fulfill the norms laid down by the State‟s policy. 19. Applying the law governing compassionate appointment culled out from the above cited judgments, our opinion on the point at issue is that the norms, prevailing on the date of consideration of the application, should be the basis for consideration of claim for compassionate appointment. A dependent of a government employee, in the absence of any vested right accruing on the death of the government employee, can only demand consideration of his/her application. He is however disentitled to seek consideration in accordance with the norms as applicable, on the day of death of the government employee.” [Emphasis added] 15. Again, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A., based on N.C. Santhosh (supra), has contended that the petitioner’s claim cannot be considered under the old Scheme prevailing on the date of death of the government employee. The relevant date would be the date of consideration and hence, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 16. Having appreciated the rival contentions, the pertinent question which surfaces for consideration in this petition is that whether retrospective operation as given to the new scheme for compassionate appointment etc. by the notification dated 02.03.2019 can be sustained and if not sustained, whether the case of the petitioner is to be considered from the date of consideration by applying the new scheme. Even though, this issue has been substantially dwelled upon in Kamalabati Gour(supra) but for purpose of this writ petition, that question may shortly be revisited. Both in the case of Nirval Singh(supra) and N.C. Santhosh(supra), the new scheme was not given retrospective operation. In Nirval Singh(supra) as it has been observed by the apex court that where the earlier scheme is abolished and the new scheme which replaces, its specifically provides that all pending applications will be considered only in terms of new scheme, then the new scheme alone will apply. That apart, one important observation has been made in para-9 of Nirval Singh(supra) that the above policy instruction shall be applicable from the date of issue of instructions. This observation is in consonance with the principle that the executive orders cannot be made operational retrospectively. 17. So far the proposition of N.C. Santhosh(supra) is concerned, it had root in cancellation of compassionate appointment as the appointment was made without looking into the new scheme of compassionate appointment w.e.f. 01.04.1999 by which the proviso relating to minor children was obliterated. But by mistake under the said proviso N.C. Santhosh was appointed. Hence, the facts of the case as narrated in those cited cases are quite distinguishable. In Nirval Singh(supra), the new scheme as referred, there had been an express provision that all pending applications will be governed by the new scheme. There had been no challenge again such express provision. The similar provision is not available in the new scheme as notified by the State under the notification dated 02.03.2019 [Annexure-9 to the writ petition]. As such, the proposition of Nirval Singh (supra) can hardly be considered germane to the context to this writ petition. The question, that falls for further consideration is that whether by implication, any vested right can be taken away? 18. So far the proposition of N.C. Santhosh(supra) is concerned, it lays down that the norms prevailing on the date of consideration of the application should be the basis for consideration of the claim for compassionate appointment. This cannot be treated as laying down the general principle for all cases as it is well entrenched principle that the employer’s right to modify the scheme cannot be disputed. In MCB Gramin Bank vs. Chakrawarti Singh (supra), the apex court has unequivocally laid down by restating the law that compassionate appointment has to be considered in accordance with the prevalent scheme. But it has been also observed that no aspirant can claim that his claim has to be considered on the date of death of the government employee. But in Chakrawarti Singh(supra) no opinion has been expressed in respect of a situation when the prevalent scheme provides the relevant date of consideration, whether that should be acted upon or not. But in view of Chakrawarti Singh(supra), the consideration has to be made in accordance with the prevalent scheme. So far the retrospective operation of the new scheme is concerned, this court is to hold that no executive order can ordinarily be given retrospective operation [see State Bank of India Vs. Jaspal Kaur reported in (2007) 9 SCC 571]. 19. True it is that the scheme for compassionate appointment does not create any vested right but definitely it create the right to be fairly considered in accordance with the prevalent scheme. 20. Thus, two pertinent questions viz. (a) what will be the date of consideration in the case of the petitioner and (b) under which scheme the petitioner will be considered meaning whether the petitioner would be considered under the Die-in-Harness Scheme which was brought into operation by the notification No.F.1(2)-GA(P&T)/15 dated 26.12.2015 or the scheme that has been brought into effect by the notification under No.F.1(1)-GA(P&T)/18 dated 02.03.2019 [Annexure-9 to the writ petition]? 21. So far the date of consideration is concerned, the decision of the apex court in N.C. Santhosh(supra) has been heavily relied on by Mr. D. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the respondents. In N.C. Santhosh(supra), the apex court has laid down that the norms prevailing on the date of consideration of the application should be the basis for consideration of claim for compassionate appointment. A dependent of a government employee in the absence of any vested night accruing on the death of the government employee can only demand consideration of his/her application. He is however disentitled to seek consideration in accordance with the norms as applicable, on the day of death of the government employee. In this regard, a two Judges bench in State Bank of India and Others versus Sheosankar Tiwari reported in (2019) 5 SCC 600 having noticed the view in S.B.I. versus Raj Kumar(supra) and M.C.B Gramin Bank versus Chakrawarti Singh(supra) and the contrary view in Canara Bank and Another versus M. Mahesh Kumar(supra) on the question of whether the norms applicable on the date of death or on the date of consideration of the application should apply, the bench referred the matter for consideration by a larger bench so that the conflicting views could be reconciled. Before the reference was answered, in N.C. Santhosh(supra) it has been held that the norms prevailing on the date of consideration should be the basis for consideration of the claim for compassionate appointment. The ancillary question therefore is whether this is a general declaration of law or it is the declaration in the context of the particular case. In N.C. Santhosh(supra), it has been also held that whatever consideration is made has to be made on the basis of the policy on compassionate appointment and they must fulfill the norms as laid down by the State policy. If in the policy, it is provided that the date of consideration will be the date of the death, then what would be the effect of the law laid down by N.C. Santhosh(supra)? For example, in the Die-in-Harness Scheme as notified on 26.12.2015, it has been provided as follows : “9. Limitations for making claim and dispose of case under Die-inharness SchemeClaims for employment/financial assistance under Die-in-harness Scheme should be submitted before the appropriate authority within 1(one) year from the date of death of the Government servant as per provisions contained under Para-1(II) above. The eligibility in all respect shall be determined as on the date of death of the concerned employee.” But in the subsequent Die-in-Harness Scheme as notified on 02.03.2019, the said express provision as regards the date of consideration has been omitted, without any provision in this regard. 22. The decision in N.C. Santhosh(supra) was rendered on 04.03.2020 by a three judges bench. But a two judges bench of the apex court in The Secretary to Govt. Department of Education (Primary) & Ors. versus Bheemesh alias Bheemappa reported in AIR 2022 SC 402 considered all the relevant judgments including N.C. Santosh(Supra) which have been presented in a table in the manner as under : Citation Scheme in force on the date of death of the Government servant Modified Scheme which came into force after death Decision of this Court State Bank of India vs. Jaspal Kaur The Scheme of the year 1996, which made the financial condition of the family as the main criterion, was in force, on the date of death of the employee in the year 1999. The 1996 Scheme was subsequently modified by policy issued in 2005, which laid down few parameters for determining penury. One of the parameters was to see if the income of the family had been reduced to less than 60% of the salary drawn by the employee at the time of death. Therefore, the wife of the deceased employee claimed the consideration of the application on the basis of parameters laid down in the policy of the year 2005. But with effect from 04.08.2005 a new Scheme for payment of exgratia lumpsum was introduced in the place of the old Scheme. The new Scheme contained a provision to the effect that all applications pending under the old Scheme will be dealt with only in accordance with the new Scheme. However, a new Scheme dated 12.06.2006 came into force on 6.10.2006, providing only for ex gratia payment instead of compassionate appointment. Rejecting the claim of the wife of the deceased employee, this Court held that the application of the dependant made in the year 2000, after the death of the employee in the year 1999, cannot be decided on the basis of a Scheme which came into force in the year 2005. (2007) SCC 571 [a two member Bench] State Bank of India Vs. Raj Kumar (2010) 11 SCC 661 [a two member Bench] MGB Gramin Bank vs. Chakrawarti Singh The employee died on 1.10.2004 and the applications for compassionate appointment were made on 6.06.2005 and 14.06.2005. On the date of death and on the date of the applications, a Scheme known as compassionate appointment Scheme was in force. member Bench] The employee died on 19.04.2006 and the application for appointment made on 12.05.2006. A scheme for appointment on compassionate grounds was in force on that date. Canara Bank vs. M. Mahesh The employee died on 10.10.1998 and the application for appointment (2014) 13 SCC 583 [a two The 1993 Scheme was substituted by a Scheme for payment This Court held that the application could be considered only under the new Scheme, as it contained a specific provision relating to pending applications. This Court took the view that the new Scheme alone would apply as it contained a specific provision which mandated all pending applications to be considered under the new Scheme. This Court dismissed the appeals filed by Kumar (2015) 7 SCC 412 [a two member Bench] Indian Bank vs. Promila and Another (2020) 2 SCC 729 [a two member Bench] N.C. Santosh vs. State of on compassionate grounds, was made under the Scheme of the year 1993. It was rejected on 30.06.1999. The 1993 Scheme was known as “Dying in Harness Scheme.” The employee died on 15.01.2004 and the application for appointment was made by his minor son on 24.01.2004. On these dates, a circular bearing No.56/79 dated 4.04.1979 which contained a Scheme for appointment on compassionate grounds was in force. But the Scheme provided for appointment, only for those who do not opt for payment of gratuity for the full term of service of employee who died in harness. Under the existing Scheme referable to Rule 5 of the of ex gratia in the year 2005. But by the time the 2005 Scheme was issued, the claimant had already approached the High Court of Kerala by way of writ petition and succeeded before the learned Single Judge vide a Judgment dated 30.05.2003. The Judgment was upheld by the Division Bench in the year 2006 and the matter landed up before this Court thereafter. In other words, the Scheme of the year 2005 came into force: (i) after the rejection of the application for compassionate appointment under the old scheme; and (ii) after the order of rejection was set aside by the Single Judge of the High Court A new Scheme was brought into force on 24.07.2004 after the death of the employee. Under this Scheme an ex gratia compensation was provided for, subject to certain conditions. After the coming into force of the new Scheme, the claimant was directed by the bank to submit a fresh application under the new Scheme. The claimant did not apply under the new Scheme, as he was interested only in compassionate appointment and not monetary benefit. But by virtue of an amendment to the the Bank on account of two important distinguishing features, namely, (i) that the application for appointment on compassionate grounds was rejected in the year 1999 and the rejection order was set aside by the High Court in the year 2003 much before the compassionate appointment Scheme was substituted by an ex gratia Scheme in year 2005; and (ii) that in the year 2014, the original scheme for appointment on compassionate grounds stood revived, when the civil appeals were decided. In the light of the decision in Canara Bank vs. M. Mahesh Kumar, this Court held that the case of the claimant cannot be examined in the context of the subsequent Scheme and that since the family had taken full gratuity under the old scheme, they were not entitled to seek compassionate appointment even under the old Scheme. After taking note of a Karnataka and Others (2020) 7 SCC 617 (a three Member Bench) 23. Karnataka Civil Services (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Rules, 1999, a minor dependant of a deceased Government employee may apply within one year from the date of attaining majority. Thereafter, very proviso to Rule 5, a minor dependant should apply within one year from the date of death of the Government servant and must have attained the age of 18 years on the date of making the application. Applying the amended provisions, the appointment of persons already made on compassionate grounds, were cancelled by the appointing authority which led to the challenge before this Court. succinctly it has reference made in State Bank of India vs. Sheo Shankar Tewari to a larger bench, a three member Bench of this Court held in N.C. Santosh that the norms prevailing on the date of consideration of the application should be the basis for consideration of the claim for compassionate appointment. The Bench further held that the dependant of a government employee, in the absence of any vested right accruing on the date of death of the government employee, can only demand consideration of his application and hence he is disentitled to seek the application of the norms prevailing on the date of death of the government servant. been held in Bheemesh alias Bheemappa (supra) as follows : “15. Let us now come to the reference pending before the larger Bench. In State Bank of India vs. Sheo Shankar Tewari (supra), a two member Bench of this Court noted the apparent conflict between State Bank of India vs. Raj Kumar and MGB Gramin Bank on the one hand and Canara Bank vs. M. Mahesh Kumar on the other hand and referred the matter for the consideration of a larger Bench. The order of reference to a larger Bench was actually dated 8.02.2019. 16. It was only after the aforesaid reference to a larger Bench that this Court decided at least four cases, respectively in (i) Indian Bank vs. Promila; (ii) N.C. Santhosh vs. State of Karnataka; (iii) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Amit Shrivas; and (iv) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ashish Awasthi. Out of these four decisions, N.C. Santosh (supra) was by a three member Bench, which actually took note of the reference pending before the larger Bench. 17. Keeping the above in mind, if we critically analyse the way in which this Court has proceeded to interpret the applicability of a new or modified Scheme that comes into force after the death of the employee, we may notice an interesting feature. In cases where the benefit under the existing Scheme was taken away or substituted with a lesser benefit, this Court directed the application of the new Scheme. But in cases where the benefits under an existing Scheme were enlarged by a modified Scheme after the death of the employee, this Court applied only the Scheme that was in force on the date of death of the employee. This is fundamentally due to the fact that compassionate appointment was always considered to be an exception to the normal method of recruitment and perhaps looked down upon with lesser compassion for the individual and greater concern for the rule of law. 18. If compassionate appointment is one of the conditions of service and is made automatic upon the death of an employee in harness without any kind of scrutiny whatsoever, the same would be treated as a vested right in law. But it is not so. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not automatic, but subject to strict scrutiny of various parameters including the financial position of the family, the economic dependence of the family upon the deceased employee and the avocation of the other members of the family. Therefore, no one can claim to have a vested right for appointment on compassionate grounds. This is why some of the decisions which we have tabulated above appear to have interpreted the applicability of revised Schemes differently, leading to conflict of opinion. Though there is a conflict as to whether the Scheme in force on the date of death of the employee would apply or the Scheme in force on the date of consideration of the application of appointment on compassionate grounds would apply, there is certainly no conflict about the underlying concern reflected in the above decisions. Wherever the modified Schemes diluted the existing benefits, this Court applied those benefits, but wherever the modified Scheme granted larger benefits, the old Scheme was made applicable. 19. The important aspect about the conflict of opinion is that it revolves around two dates, namely, (i) date of death of the employee; and (ii) date of consideration of the application of the dependant. Out of these two dates, only one, namely, the date of death alone is a fixed factor that does not change. The next date namely the date of consideration of the claim, is something that depends upon many variables such as the date of filing of application, the date of attaining of majority of the claimant and the date on which the file is put up to the competent authority. There is no principle of statutory interpretation which permits a decision on the applicability of a rule, to be based upon an indeterminate or variable factor. Let us take for instance a hypothetical case where 2 Government servants die in harness on January 01, 2020. Let us assume that the dependants of these 2 deceased Government servants make applications for appointment on 2 different dates say 29.05.2020 and 02.06.2020 and a modified Scheme comes into force on June 01, 2020. If the date of consideration of the claim is taken to be the criteria for determining whether the modified Scheme applies or not, it will lead to two different results, one in respect of the person who made the application before June 1, 2020 and another in respect of the person who applied after June 01, 2020. In other words, if two employees die on the same date and the dependants of those employees apply on two different dates, one before the modified Scheme comes into force and another thereafter, they will come in for differential treatment if the date of application and the date of consideration of the same are taken to be the deciding factor. A rule of interpretation which produces different results, depending upon what the individuals do or do not do, is inconceivable. This is why, the managements of a few banks, in the cases tabulated above, have introduced a rule in the modified scheme itself, which provides for all pending applications to be decided under the new/modified scheme. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the interpretation as to the applicability of a modified Scheme should depend only upon a determinate and fixed criteria such as the date of death and not an indeterminate and variable factor. 20. Coming to the case on hand, the employee died on 8.12.2010 and the amendment to the Rules was proposed by way of a draft notification on 20.06.2012. The final notification was issued on 11.07.2012. Merely because the application for appointment was taken up for consideration after the issue of the amendment, the respondent could not have sought the benefit of the amendment. The Judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Akkamahadevamma on which the Tribunal as well as the High Court placed reliance, was not applicable to the case of compassionate appointments, as the amendment in Akkamahadevamma came as a result of the existing rule being declared to be ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.” [Emphasis Added] 24. On reading of Bheemesh alias Bheemappa (supra) it appears that even though this court is persuaded to adopt the rationale in determining the date of consideration but since the Bheemesh alias Bheemappa (supra) is a decision rendered by two judges bench by the apex court whereas N.C. Santhosh(supra) on the point of date of consideration has been delivered by three judges bench of the apex court. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Another versus State of Maharashtra and Another reported in (2005) 2 SCC 673, a Constitution Bench of the apex court has held as under : “ [a] The law laid down by the apex court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent bench of lesser or coequal strength [b] A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request of the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion of doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted and [c] the above rules are subject to two exceptions : (i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of the Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh reported in (1989) 2 SCC 754 and Hansoli Devi reported in (2002) 7 SCC 273.” 25. Though the Bheemesh alias Bheemappa (supra) cannot be stated a decision per incuriam but the said decision being a decision of two judges bench cannot be preferred over N.C. Santhosh(supra), as stated, as the said decision was rendered by a three judge bench of the apex court and that is to be observed for purpose of certainty and consistency in the judicial decisions. Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) is a partial departure from Raghubir Singh(supra) which decision has recorded that the question is not whether the apex court is bound by its own previous decisions, the question is under what circumstances and within what limit and in what manner should the highest court overturn its own pronouncement. It may be noted that the inquiry into the circumstances for purpose of arriving at a different opinion has been restricted by the observation as referred above. Thus, the decision of Bheemesh alias Bheemappa (supra) would not be relied by this court for any purpose. However, this court is of the considered opinion that the change of the contextuility may change the binding effect of N.C. Santhosh(supra). As we have already reproduced para-9 of the Die-in-Harness Scheme as notified on 26.12.2015, it transpires clearly that the eligibility in all respect shall be determined as on the date of death of the concerned employee. To achieve the humane objective of the Die-in-Harness Scheme it would better be achieved by the stipulation in the Scheme as notified on 16.12.2015 but the same has not been saved in the subsequent Diein-Harness Scheme as notified on 02.03.2019. 26. Now, the fundamental question that would emerge is that which Die- in-Harness Scheme would be applicable in the case of the petitioner. It may not be out of context to state that even though three years has lapsed after the death of the deceased employee, no step has been taken for the family of the deceased employee. There is no assertion on the records, that such step has been taken. True it is that while introducing the new Die-in-Harness scheme by the notification dated 02.03.2019 [Annexure-9 to the writ petition], it has been provided as follows: “The revised Die-in-harness Scheme shall be termed as “Scheme for Compassionate Appointment/Benefit for Government Employees of Tripura”. The date of effect of the scheme is 21st November 2018 as the decision was taken in the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 21.11.2018.” 27. It has been argued that the retrospectivity in operation is grossly unreasonable inasmuch as the right to be considered on the day of death of the deceased employee for purpose of compassionate appointment has been taken away. On the face of such argument what is material to appreciate is that whether that right is a vested right or not, or whether this court would mechanically go by the retrospectivity. The vested right is a right, independent of any contingency and it cannot be taken away. The vested right can also arise from the provisions of a scheme framed by the executive exercising its powers as provided under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. It cannot be denied when the notification dated 02.03.2019 was issued, before that time the deceased employee had passed away. The deceased employee died on 25.12.2018. On that day the petitioner had right to be considered under the old scheme which was notified on 26.12.2015. As the new scheme has been published by the notification dated 02.03.2019 with retrospective operation from 21.11.2018, the said right to be considered on the day of death of the deceased employee has eclipsed. The petitioner does not have any vested right to the compassionate appointment, but he has a right to be considered on the relevant date. The rationale of retrospectivity is that the decision of repealing and bringing about a new Die-in-Harness Scheme was taken on 21.11.2018 by the Council of Ministers and hence, the retrospective operation has been given from 21.11.2018. There is no other reason to set up a date for purpose of taking away the right to consideration for compassionate appointment on the date of death of the deceased employee by retrospective operation of the scheme as notified on 02.03.2019. Para-19 of the new scheme provides as follows : “19. Repeal: The existing orders/instructions issued from time to time in connection with the Die-in-harness scheme or benefit to the family of missing Government employee or permanent invalidation, while in Government job hereby stand repealed w.e.f.21st November 2018.” 28. It is well known principle that the citizen should know where he is. There is no manner of doubt that the public authorities and the government are bound to act reasonably and fairly and each action of such authorities must pass the test of reasonableness. Wherever the action is lacking bonafide and is in colourable exercise of power, the court should not hesitate to interfere [Delhi Transport Corporation versus DTC Majdur Congress :AIR 1991 SC 101]. 29. In this case, even though it has been argued that to extend the retrospective operation is arbitrary but we cannot be oblivious that the State has its power, inherent in it, to change its policies. But while changing any policy, the State shall always be careful while extending retrospectivity, that someone’s legitimate expectation is not brushed aside. In such event, such action can only be taken showing some overriding public interest [Union of India and Others versus Hindustan Development Corporation & Ors. :AIR 1994 SC 988]. Whether the public interest overrides the substantive legitimate expectation of the individual or not, can be subject to the judicial review. The courts shall intervene in the decision only if they are satisfied that the decision is irrational or perverse [Punjab Communications Ltd. Versus Union of India : AIR 1999 SC 1801]. The rational nexus test can be used to weigh the action. The person claiming to have been adversely affected by the change or has been deprived of some benefit or advantage can legitimately expect that the policy will not operate against him unless such benefits are withdrawn on some rational ground. The change of policy ordinarily should not violate the substantive legitimate expectation. The test to determine is whether the action taken by the government or the authority is arbitrary or is anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 30. It is pertinent to note that from 21.11.2018 till 02.03.2019 the old scheme as notified on 26.12.2015 was in force. No overriding public interest has been shown by the respondents to take away the effect of the old scheme during the said period, but for such retrospectivity the petitioner’s right to be considered on the date of death of his father, who died in harness on 25.12.2018, has eclipsed. Such action fails to survive the reasonable nexus test. Hence, this court is of the view that the provision of retrospectivity as provided in the new scheme is required to be read down in the present case. 31. Having observed thus, the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner for compassionate appointment on the day of death of the deceased employee i.e. on 25.12.2018 under the Die-in-Harness Scheme circulated by the notification dated 26.12.2015. Such exercise shall be completed within a period of two months from the day when a copy of this order will be furnished to the respondents by the petitioner. Hence, the writ petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated above. No order as to costs. JUDGE Sabyasachi B

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