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IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C)No.684 of 2021
Sri Munna Das,
son of late Dip Kumar Das,
resident of Village-Kalibazar,
P.O. & P.S. Santirbazar,
District : South Tripura, PIN : 799144
……… Petitioner(s)
–Versus–
1.
The State of Tripura,
to be represented by the Secretary, Department of
Information and Cultural Affairs, Government of
Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Kunjaban,
Agartala, West Tripura, PIN : 799010
2.
The Deputy Secretary,
GA (P & T) Department, Government of Tripura,
New Secretariat Complex, Kunjaban, Agartala,
West Tripura, PIN : 799010
3.
The Director,
Information, Cultural Affairs & Tourism,
Government of Tripura, Gandhighat, Agartala,
West Tripura, PIN : 799001
4.
The Senior Information Officer,
District Information and Cultural Affairs Office,
Belonia, South Tripura
5.
The Secretary,
Department of Finance, Government of Tripura,
New Secretariat Complex, Kunjaban, Agartala,
West Tripura, PIN : 799010
…….. Respondent(s)
For the Petitioner(s)
:
For the Respondent(s)
:
Date of hearing & delivery of
Judgment and Order
:
Whether fit for reporting
:
Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Adv.
Mr. K. Nath, Adv.
Ms. N. Ghosh, Adv.
Mr. D. Sharma, Addl. G.A.
04.02.2022
YES
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE S. TALAPATRA
JUDGMENT & ORDER (Oral)
Heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. K.
Nath, learned counsel and Ms. N. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner as well as Mr. D. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the
respondents.
2.
At the outset, this Court would note that the reference [see the order
dated 15.12.2021] that has been reportedly made apparently cannot have any
relevance in the present context. Briefly stated, the grievance of the petitioner as
enumerated in this petition is that his father namely Dipkumar Das passed away on
25.12.2018 while working as the Sweeping and Cleaning Assistant borne in the
regular establishment and at the time of death he was posted in the office of the
Information and Cultural Affairs situated at Santirbazar, South Tripura. After death
of the father of the petitioner, the petitioner applied for the compassionate
appointment under Die-in-Harness Scheme. It may be noted that the petitioner has
been working as Casual Worker under the Directorate of Information and Cultural
Affairs, Government of Tripura but he is not in the regular establishment. In terms
of the memorandum No.F.1(1)-G&A/97 dated 11.08.1997 [Annexure-2 to the writ
petition] a surviving family member of the deceased employee who has been
working as Daily Rated/Contingent Labourer if selected by the family may be given
regular employment under Die-in-Harness Scheme. As such, there had been no
impediment in appointing the petitioner under Die-in-Harness Scheme. Even the
surviving members of the family left by the deceased employee have executed a
no-objection certificate relinquishing their individual claims and laying their noobjection in respect of appointment of the petitioner under Die-in-Harness Scheme.
The petitioner had filed his application for compassionate appointment on
26.03.2019 within one year from the day of death of his father. It has been also
asserted by the petitioner that except him, none of his family members is eligible
for the government employment. This fact has not been disputed by the
respondents. As the respondents did not take any decision on the prayer for
compassionate appointment, the petitioner served a notice on 16.03.2020 for his
appointment under Die-in-Harness Scheme. Thereafter, he had filed a writ petition
being WP(C)No.853 of 2020 in this Court and the said writ petition had been
disposed of by the order dated 13.01.2021 with the following direction :
“In facts of the present case, let the respondents decide the application
of the petitioner for compassionate appointment within 4(four) weeks
from today and communicate the decision to the petitioner. If the
decision is adverse to the petitioner, the competent authority shall state
brief reasons for arriving at such conclusions upon which it would be
open for the petitioner to seek further remedy in law.”
3.
It transpires that pursuant to the said order dated 13.01.2021, the
Director, Information and Cultural Affairs, Government of Tripura by the order
dated 06.02.2021 has dismissed the prayer of the petitioner for compassionate
appointment having observed as follows :
“Whereas, GA(P & T) Department has issued a notification vide
No.F.1(1)-GA(P & T)/18 dt. 2nd March, 2019 regarding die-in-harness
scheme mentioning the date of effect of this Notification from
21/11/2018;
AND
Whereas, it is clearly mentioned in support category-I of the above
Notification that ”if the age of the affected Government servant is equal
to or more than 50 years on the date of occurrence, then the family will
be paid special pension amounting to difference between last drawn
salary and pension in addition to the normal pension till the affected
employee would have attained 60 years of age, provided that there is no
earning member in the family. After attaining 60 years of age, only
normal pension will be paid.”
AND
Whereas, the date of birth of deceased Dip Kr. Das was on 10/12/1967,
so at the time of death his age was over 50 years for which the support
category-1 as mentioned in the notification mentioned above is
applicable in this case;
AND
Whereas, after consulting all the documents submitted/scheme of diein-harness and date of death of the deceased person , Smt. Kajal Mali
Das, w/o Lt. Dip Kr. Das was informed through a letter vide No.F.1(14)DICA(S)/BLN/2014/478 dt. 18th August, 2020 regarding the scheme for
compassionate benefit under die-in-harness scheme;
Now, considering the whole aspects, the petition as submitted by
Sri Munna Das, s/o deceased Dip Kr. Das, Ex- Sweeping & Cleansing
Assistant of this Department is liable to be dismissed.”
4.
Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner has submitted that the basis of the said order dated 06.02.2021
[Annexure-8 to the writ petition] is the scheme for compassionate appointment etc.
as published by the notification No.F.1(1)-GA/(P & T)/18 dated 02.03.2019
[Annexure-9 to the writ petition]. According to Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior
counsel since the notification was published on 02.03.2019, the said scheme cannot
be applied for consideration of compassionate appointment of the petitioner as the
death in harness took place on 25.12.2018. The said policy cannot be given
retrospective operation.
5.
In support of his contention, Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel
has relied on a decision of this Court in Smt. Kamalabati Gour versus State of
Tripura and Others [judgment and order dated 08.03.2021 delivered in
WP(C)No.502 of 2020 ]. The basis of the said judgment was the decision of the
apex Court in Canara Bank and Another versus M. Mahesh Kumar reported in
(2015) 7 SCC 412 where it had been observed as follows :
“13. Applying these principles to the case in hand, as discussed earlier,
respondent‟s father died on 10.10.1998 while he was serving as a clerk
in the appellant-bank and the respondent applied timely for
compassionate appointment as per the scheme „Dying in Harness
Scheme‟ dated 8.05.1993 which was in force at that time. The appellantbank rejected the respondent‟s claim on 30.06.1999 recording that there
are no indigent circumstances for providing employment to the
respondent. Again on 7.11.2001, the appellant-bank sought for
particulars in connection with the issue of respondent‟s employment. In
the light of the principles laid down in the above decisions, the cause of
action to be considered for compassionate appointment arose when the
Circular No.154/1993 dated 8.05.1993 was in force. Thus, as per the
judgment referred in Jaspal Kaur‟s case, the claim cannot be decided as
per 2005 Scheme providing for ex-gratia payment. The Circular dated
14.2.2005 being an administrative or executive order cannot have
retrospective effect so as to take away the right accrued to the
respondent as per circular of 1993”
6.
In Indian Bank and Anr. Vs. Promila & Anr. reported in (2020) 2
SCC 729 the apex Court restated the principle laid down in M. Mahesh
Kumar(supra) unequivocally in the following manner :
“18. The question of applicability of any subsequent scheme really does
not apply in view of the judgment of this Court in Canara Bank. Thus, it
would not be appropriate to examine the case of the respondents in the
context of subsequent schemes, but only in the context of the Scheme of
4-4-1979, the terms of which continued to be applicable even as per the
new Scheme of 5-11-1985 i.e. the Scheme applicable to the respondents.
There is no provision in this Scheme for any ex gratia payment. The
option of compassionate appointment was available only in the full
amount of gratuity was not taken, something which was done. Thus,
having taken the full amount of gratuity, the option of compassionate
appointment really was not available to the respondents.”
[Emphasis added]
7.
Having recorded the submission placed for the State of Tripura this
Court had occasion to observe that the retrospective operation as given to the
scheme for compassionate appointment etc. by the notification dated 02.03.2019
[Annexure-9 to the writ petition] is not sustainable. The relevant passages from
Kamalabati Gour (supra) is reproduced hereunder for purpose of extensive
reference :
9. Mr. D Sharma, learned Addl. GA appearing for the State has stated that
in the Die-in-harness scheme, there cannot be any vested right. In this
regard, the decision of the apex court in Sate Bank of India Vs. Raj
Kumar reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661 has been referred. In that report,
the apex court having restated the law as enunciated in Union of India
Vs. P Padmanabhan reported in (2003) 7 SCC 270 has observed that it is
well settled that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source
of recruitment. On the other hand it is an exception to the general rule
that recruitment to public services should be on the basis of merit, by an
open invitation providing equal opportunity to all eligible persons to
participate in the selection process. The dependants of employees, who
die in harness, do not have any special claim or right to employment,
except by way of the concession that may be extended by the employer
under the rules or by a separate scheme, to enable the family of the
deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. The claim for
compassionate appointment is therefore traceable only to the scheme
framed by the employer for such employment and there is no right
whatsoever beyond such scheme. An appointment under the scheme can
be made only if the scheme is in force. It follows therefrom that when a
scheme is abolished, any pending application seeking appointment under
the scheme will also cease to exist, unless saved. The mere fact that an
application was made when the scheme was in force, will not by itself
create a right in favour of the applicant.
10. It has been further observed that where the earlier scheme is
abolished and the new scheme which replaces it specifically provides
that all pending applications will be considered only in terms of the new
scheme, then the new scheme alone will apply. As compassionate
appointment is a concession and not a right, the employer may wind up
the scheme or modify the scheme at any time depending upon its
policies, financial capacity and availability of posts.
11. In sequel, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. GA has relied another decision
of the apex court in High Court of Delhi and Anr. Vs. A.K. Mahajan,
reported in (2009) 12 SCC 62 where the apex court has laid down that
the law regarding the retrospectivity or retroactive operation regarding
the rules of selection is that where such amended rules affect the benefit
already given, then alone such rules would not be permissible to the
extent of retrospectivity.
12. Having referred A.K. Mahajan (supra) Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. GA
has contended that since no benefit has been extended to the petitioner
by retrospectivity we cannot save his purported right from
retrospectivity.
13. So far the meaning of vested right is concerned, Mr. Sharma, learned
counsel has pressed in service the law as enunciated in MGB Gramin
Bank Vs. Chakrawarti Singh, reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583 where the
apex court, in the context of that case, had occasion to observe that the
word „vested‟ has been defined in Black‟s Law Dictionary as fixed,
accrued, settled, absolute, complete. Mere expectancy of future benefits,
or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of
existing laws, does not constitute „vested rights‟.
14. The apex court has further observed to crystallize the meaning of
vested right in the following terms:
“13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any
contingency and it cannot be taken away without
consent of the person concerned. Vested right can
arise from contract, statute or by operation of law.
Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by
a party, the policy decision/scheme could be changed.
[Vide Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi). [(2006) 5
SCC 702: AIR 2006 SC 2652]”
[Emphasis added]
15. Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. GA has thereafter apprised this Court that
in view of conflicting judgments in respect of retrospective operation visà-vis the right under the former scheme, by the judgment dated
08.02.2019 delivered in SLP(C) 30335 of 2017 [State Bank of India Vs.
Sheo Shankar Tewari] the apex court has referred the matter to a larger
Bench to iron out the edges of difference as expressed by their equal
Benches of the apex court. In this matter, they have referred State Bank
of India & Anr. Vs. Raj Kumar, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661, MGB
Gramin Bank Vs. Chakrawarti Singh, reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583.
16. Having appreciated the submission of the learned counsel for the
parties and scrutinized the records, this court at the outset would recall
the decision of the apex court in State Bank of India Vs. Jaspal Kaur,
reported in (2007) 9 SCC 571 where the apex court had observed that an
administrative or executive order cannot have retrospective effect so as
to take away the right accrued in favour of any person. The decision of
Mahesh Kumar (supra) is consistent to that principle as laid down in
Jaspal Kaur (supra). The distinction as sought to be made in Raj Kumar
(supra) is on the basis that there is no general vested right in favour of
the persons seeking appointment under the Die-in-harness scheme.
Whatever rights arose in favour of the persons is within that scheme. The
right within that scheme is subject to the changes made in the policy and
it hardly creates any vested right. In the case in hand, considering the
death of the deceased employee had taken place on 18.01.2019, the
previous notification dated 26.02.2015 was supposed to be in operation
till repeal of the said notification dated 26.12.2015 w.e.f. 21.11.2018.
The respondents have contended that the petitioner will not be
considered for any compassionate appointment but the petitioner would
be considered for the special pension as has been created by the Scheme
for Compassionate Appointment/Benefit for Government Employees of
Tripura by the notification dated 02.03.2019. The clause that repeals the
former scheme retrospectively reads as under:
“19. Repeal: The existing orders/instructions issued
from time to time in connection with the Die-in-
harness scheme or benefit to the family of missing
Government employee or permanent invalidation,
while in Government job hereby stand repealed w.e.f.
21st November, 2018”
17. The solitary question which is of paramount importance to the
controversy is that whether the provision repealing the former scheme of
2015 w.e.f. 21.11.2018 can be sustained or not? By the subsequent
decision of the apex court in Raj Kumar (supra) it has been quite
categorically stated apparently, following the law as enunciated in Jaspal
Kaur (supra) that no executive order can be given retrospective
operation. As such, in the considered view of this Court even though the
said notification dated 02.03.2019 has not been challenged by the
petitioner, the said notification cannot be given retrospective operation,
from 21.11.2018 inasmuch as, whatever right has arisen in favour of the
petitioner that arose on 18.01.2019 from the death of Sukha Gaur, her
father. In the Scheme of 2015 it has been categorically observed that
eligibility in all respects shall be determined as on the date of the death
of the concerned Page 11 of 11 employee. The respondents have not
indicated to any other embargo in considering the petitioner for
compassionate appointment for death of her father. Those rights in
favour of the petitioner emerged prior to 02.03.2019, the day of
notification of the new scheme as referred above. Those rights cannot be
taken away by retrospective repeal w.e.f. 21.11.2018, in view of the law
as espoused by the apex court. Hence, this Court is inclined to direct the
respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for compassionate
appointment under the die-in-harness scheme as notified on 26.12.2015
(Annexure-6 to the writ petition) within a period of three months from
the day, when a copy of this order will be made available by the
petitioner.”
8.
Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel has contended that the
present controversy is squarely covered by Kamalabati Gour(supra). In addition
thereto, According to Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel, eligibility in all
respect shall be determined as on the date of death of the concerned employee as
has been provided by the notification No.F.1(2)-GA(P & T)/15 dated 26.12.2015.
When the petitioner was supposed to be considered for the appointment in terms of
the notification dated 26.12.2015, his eligibility was to be considered on the day of
death of his father i.e. 25.12.2018. On that day, the said notification dated
02.03.2019 did not see the light of the day. Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel
has contended that the retrospective operation of the notification dated 02.03.2019
w.e.f.21.11.2018 as the decision was taken by the council of ministers on
21.11.2018 for introduction of a new scheme for compassionate appointment etc.
cannot be sustained inasmuch as any decision taken by the Council of Ministers
gets effect from the date when it is published or it is shown that the Council of
Ministers had decided to give such retrospective operation. Even then, by operating
a scheme by an executive order retrospectively by replacing the scheme in force is
not sustainable.
9.
Mr. D. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the respondents has
in order to repel the submission made by Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel
contending that the date of relevance would be the date of consideration. That
apart, he has referred to the reply filed by the respondents No.1 to 5 on 14.12.2021
where it has been contended as follows :
“In the instant case, since the date of death of deceased Dip Kr. Das is on
25/12/2018 and the case of the petitioner was also considered after
notification dated, 2nd March, 2019 which came into force from 21-112018, so the instant case falls under the notification dated, 2nd March,
2019 where scheme for compassionate appointment/benefit for Govt.
Job has been revised.
It is also stated here that the date of birth of deceased Dip Kr. Das is
10/12/1967, so at time of death his age was over 50 years. In view of
this, the nature of support category-I as mentioned in the notification
may be applicable in this case. [see para-8 of the reply]”
It has been reiterated in the said paragraph as follows :
“In the instant case, when the father of the petitioner (Late Dip Kr. Das)
expired, the deceased has already crossed 50 years of age, therefore, the
instant case will come under purview of Support Category-I as per
Compassionate Appointment/Benefit for Government employees of
Tripura.
Effective
date
of
the
scheme
for
Compassionate
Appointment/Benefit for Government employees of Tripura has been
given w.e.f. 21st November, 2018 as the decision was taken in the
meeting of the Council of Ministers on 21.11.2018. Therefore the
contention of the petitioner for providing job under the aforementioned
scheme is not tenable and hence, denied. However, the petitioner is
entitled for special pension amounting to difference between last drawn
salary and pension in addition to the normal pension till be affected
employee would have attained 60 years of age, provided that there is no
earning member in the family.”
10.
Thus, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has contended that as the
family will be getting the pension, it can be stated that the family left by the
deceased employee will not suffer any form of destitution. On the foundation of the
said policy, the impugned decision has been taken by the respondents. According to
Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. when a scheme is abolished, any pending
application seeking appointment under the scheme will also cease to exist unless its
operation for a purpose is saved. The mere fact that an application was made when
the scheme was in force, will not by itself create a right in favour of the petitioner.
11.
In support of his contention, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has relied
on two decisions of the apex court on the point of retrospectivity and on the
purpose of Die-in-Harness Scheme. In Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited and Others versus Nirval Singh reported in (2019) 6 SCC 774, it has
been observed that the fundamental principle which is the foundation of the
compassionate appointment is that there is no inherent right and such
compassionate appointment has to be in accordance with the existing policy as the
objective is to ameliorate the condition of the family at the relevant stage of time
and it is the deviation from the rule of merit. In Nirval Singh (supra) the apex
Court has referred the following passages from State Bank of India versus Raj
Kumar reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661 :
“8. It is now well settled that appointment on compassionate grounds is
not a source of recruitment. On the other hand it is an exception to the
general rule that recruitment to public services should be on the basis of
merit, by an open invitation providing equal opportunity to all eligible
persons to participate in the selection process. The dependants of
employees, who die in harness, do not have any special claim or right to
employment, except by way of the concession that may be extended by
the employer under the Rules or by a separate scheme, to enable the
family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. The claim
for compassionate appointment is therefore traceable only to the scheme
framed by the employer for such employment and there is no right
whatsoever outside such scheme. An appointment under the scheme can
be made only if the scheme is in force and not after it is
abolished/withdrawn. It follows therefore that when a scheme is
abolished, any pending application seeking appointment under the
scheme will also cease to exist, unless saved. The mere fact that an
application was made when the scheme was in force, will not by itself
create a right in favour of the applicant.
*
*
*
13. Further where the earlier scheme is abolished and the new scheme
which replaces it specifically provides that all pending applications will
be considered only in terms of the new scheme, then the new scheme
alone will apply. As compassionate appointment is a concession and not
a right, the employer may wind up the scheme or modify the scheme at
any time depending upon its policies, financial capacity and availability of
posts.”
[Emphasis added]
12.
Even though, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has not made a
reference of paragraph-9 of Nirval Singh(supra), but the said passage cannot be
disjuncted for purpose of holistic reading of the opinion of the apex court in Nirval
Singh(supra). Hence, the said passage is reproduced hereunder :
“9. Our attention has been drawn to the relevant clause of the new policy
which reads as under:
“The above policy instructions shall be applicable from the
date of issue of instructions. The cases, where compassionate
employment has not been given due to discontinuance of the earlier
policy since 4/2002, shall also be considered and requisite relief, in lieu
compassionate employment, shall be granted as per above policy
instructions.”
Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has contended placing his reliance on
Nirval Singh(supra) that all pending applications will be considered only in terms
of the new scheme and the new scheme will only apply.
13.
Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that his case will be guided
by the policy as was existing prior to 02.03.2019 cannot be sustained. However, Mr.
Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has not disputed the claim that a DRW working under
the Government can be appointed under Die-in-Harness Scheme, if he is the only
person to earn for subsistence of the family.
14.
Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. has further has referred to a decision
of the apex court in N.C. Santhosh versus State of Karnataka and Others
reported in (2020) 7 SCC 617. Even though, the controversy in N.C.
Santhosh(supra) is poised differently. The following passages have been relied by
Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. to contend that the date of death cannot be the
basis for consideration, but the relevant date would be the date of consideration. As
such, the policy that existed on the date of consideration would be the relevant
policy. For reference, the following passages are reproduced :
14. This Court in SBI v. Raj Kumra:(2010) 11 SCC 661 while reiterating
that no aspirant has a vested right to claim compassionate appointment,
declared that the norms that are in force, when the application is actually
considered, will be applicable. The employer‟s right to modify the scheme
depending on its policies was recognized in this judgment. Similarly
in MCB Gramin Bank vs. Chakrawarti Singh : (2014) 13 SCC 583 this
Court reiterated that compassionate appointment has to be considered in
accordance with the prevalent scheme and no aspirant can claim that his
case should be considered as per the scheme existing on the date of
death of the Government employee.
15. However in Canara Bank & Anr. vs. M. Mahesh Kumar: (2015) 7 SCC
412 in the context of major shift in policy, whereunder, instead of
compassionate appointment (envisaged by the scheme dated 8.5.1993),
ex gratia payment was proposed (under the circular dated 14.02.2005),
the Court adopted a different approach. Noticing the extinguishment of,
the right to claim appointment, this Court held the “dying in harness
scheme” which was prevalent on the death of the employee, be the basis
for consideration.
16. A two judges bench headed by Justice Uday U. Lalit noticed the
Supreme Court‟s view in SBI vs. Raj Kumar (supra) and MCB Gramin
Bank vs. Chakrawarti Singh (supra) on one side and the contrary view
in Canara Bank & Anr. vs. M. Mahesh Kumar (supra) and felt the
necessity of resolution of the conflicting question on whether the norms
applicable on the date of death or on the date of consideration of
application should apply. Accordingly, in State Bank of India & Ors. vs.
Sheo Shankar Tewari:(2019) 5 SCC 600 the Court referred the matter for
consideration by a larger Bench so that the conflicting views could be
reconciled.
17. The above discussion suggest that the view taken in Canara Bank &
Anr. vs. M. Mahesh Kumar (supra) is to be reconciled with the contrary
view of the coordinate bench, in the two earlier judgments. Therefore,
notwithstanding the strong reliance placed by the appellants counsel
on Canara Bank & Anr. vs. M. Mahesh Kumar (supra) as also the opinion
of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Uday Krishna
Naik vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. :ILR 1999 Kar 2648, it cannot be said
that the appellants claim should be considered under the unamended
provisions of the Rules prevailing on the date of death of the Government
employee.
18. In the most recent judgment in State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. vs.
Shashi Kumar:(2019) 3 SCC 653 the earlier decisions governing the
principles of compassionate appointment were discussed and analysed.
Speaking for the bench, Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud reiterated that
appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be made
on the basis of principles in accord with Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution and compassionate appointment is an exception to the
general rule. The Dependent of a deceased government employee are
made eligible by virtue of the policy on compassionate appointment and
they must fulfill the norms laid down by the State‟s policy.
19. Applying the law governing compassionate appointment culled out
from the above cited judgments, our opinion on the point at issue is that
the norms, prevailing on the date of consideration of the application,
should be the basis for consideration of claim for compassionate
appointment. A dependent of a government employee, in the absence of
any vested right accruing on the death of the government employee, can
only demand consideration of his/her application. He is however
disentitled to seek consideration in accordance with the norms as
applicable, on the day of death of the government employee.”
[Emphasis added]
15.
Again, Mr. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A., based on N.C. Santhosh
(supra), has contended that the petitioner’s claim cannot be considered under the
old Scheme prevailing on the date of death of the government employee. The
relevant date would be the date of consideration and hence, the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed.
16.
Having appreciated the rival contentions, the pertinent question which
surfaces for consideration in this petition is that whether retrospective operation as
given to the new scheme for compassionate appointment etc. by the notification
dated 02.03.2019 can be sustained and if not sustained, whether the case of the
petitioner is to be considered from the date of consideration by applying the new
scheme. Even though, this issue has been substantially dwelled upon in
Kamalabati Gour(supra) but for purpose of this writ petition, that question may
shortly be revisited. Both in the case of Nirval Singh(supra) and N.C.
Santhosh(supra), the new scheme was not given retrospective operation. In
Nirval Singh(supra) as it has been observed by the apex court that where the
earlier scheme is abolished and the new scheme which replaces, its specifically
provides that all pending applications will be considered only in terms of new
scheme, then the new scheme alone will apply. That apart, one important
observation has been made in para-9 of Nirval Singh(supra) that the above policy
instruction shall be applicable from the date of issue of instructions. This
observation is in consonance with the principle that the executive orders cannot be
made operational retrospectively.
17.
So far the proposition of N.C. Santhosh(supra) is concerned, it had
root in cancellation of compassionate appointment as the appointment was made
without looking into the new scheme of compassionate appointment w.e.f.
01.04.1999 by which the proviso relating to minor children was obliterated. But by
mistake under the said proviso N.C. Santhosh was appointed. Hence, the facts of
the case as narrated in those cited cases are quite distinguishable. In Nirval
Singh(supra), the new scheme as referred, there had been an express provision
that all pending applications will be governed by the new scheme. There had been
no challenge again such express provision. The similar provision is not available in
the new scheme as notified by the State under the notification dated 02.03.2019
[Annexure-9 to the writ petition]. As such, the proposition of Nirval Singh (supra)
can hardly be considered germane to the context to this writ petition. The question,
that falls for further consideration is that whether by implication, any vested right
can be taken away?
18.
So far the proposition of N.C. Santhosh(supra) is concerned, it lays
down that the norms prevailing on the date of consideration of the application
should be the basis for consideration of the claim for compassionate appointment.
This cannot be treated as laying down the general principle for all cases as it is well
entrenched principle that the employer’s right to modify the scheme cannot be
disputed. In MCB Gramin Bank vs. Chakrawarti Singh (supra), the apex court
has unequivocally laid down by restating the law that compassionate appointment
has to be considered in accordance with the prevalent scheme. But it has been also
observed that no aspirant can claim that his claim has to be considered on the date
of death of the government employee. But in Chakrawarti Singh(supra) no
opinion has been expressed in respect of a situation when the prevalent scheme
provides the relevant date of consideration, whether that should be acted upon or
not. But in view of Chakrawarti Singh(supra), the consideration has to be made
in accordance with the prevalent scheme. So far the retrospective operation of the
new scheme is concerned, this court is to hold that no executive order can
ordinarily be given retrospective operation [see State Bank of India Vs. Jaspal
Kaur reported in (2007) 9 SCC 571].
19.
True it is that the scheme for compassionate appointment does not
create any vested right but definitely it create the right to be fairly considered in
accordance with the prevalent scheme.
20.
Thus, two pertinent questions viz. (a) what will be the date of
consideration in the case of the petitioner and (b) under which scheme the
petitioner will be considered meaning whether the petitioner would be considered
under the Die-in-Harness Scheme which was brought into operation by the
notification No.F.1(2)-GA(P&T)/15 dated 26.12.2015 or the scheme that has been
brought into effect by the notification under No.F.1(1)-GA(P&T)/18 dated
02.03.2019 [Annexure-9 to the writ petition]?
21.
So far the date of consideration is concerned, the decision of the apex
court in N.C. Santhosh(supra) has been heavily relied on by Mr. D. Sharma,
learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the respondents. In N.C. Santhosh(supra), the
apex court has laid down that the norms prevailing on the date of consideration of
the application should be the basis for consideration of claim for compassionate
appointment. A dependent of a government employee in the absence of any vested
night accruing on the death of the government employee can only demand
consideration of his/her application. He is however disentitled to seek consideration
in accordance with the norms as applicable, on the day of death of the government
employee. In this regard, a two Judges bench in State Bank of India and
Others versus Sheosankar Tiwari reported in (2019) 5 SCC 600 having
noticed the view in S.B.I. versus Raj Kumar(supra) and M.C.B Gramin Bank
versus Chakrawarti Singh(supra) and the contrary view in Canara Bank and
Another versus M. Mahesh Kumar(supra) on the question of whether the norms
applicable on the date of death or on the date of consideration of the application
should apply, the bench referred the matter for consideration by a larger bench so
that the conflicting views could be reconciled. Before the reference was answered,
in N.C. Santhosh(supra) it has been held that the norms prevailing on the date of
consideration should be the basis for consideration of the claim for compassionate
appointment. The ancillary question therefore is whether this is a general
declaration of law or it is the declaration in the context of the particular case. In
N.C. Santhosh(supra), it has been also held that whatever consideration is made
has to be made on the basis of the policy on compassionate appointment and they
must fulfill the norms as laid down by the State policy.
If in the policy, it is
provided that the date of consideration will be the date of the death, then what
would be the effect of the law laid down by N.C. Santhosh(supra)? For example,
in the Die-in-Harness Scheme as notified on 26.12.2015, it has been provided as
follows :
“9. Limitations for making claim and dispose of case under Die-inharness SchemeClaims for employment/financial assistance under Die-in-harness
Scheme should be submitted before the appropriate authority
within 1(one) year from the date of
death of the Government
servant as per provisions contained under Para-1(II) above. The
eligibility in all respect shall be determined as on the date of
death of the concerned employee.”
But in the subsequent Die-in-Harness Scheme as notified on 02.03.2019, the
said express provision as regards the date of consideration has been omitted,
without any provision in this regard.
22.
The decision in N.C. Santhosh(supra) was rendered on 04.03.2020
by a three judges bench. But a two judges bench of the apex court in The
Secretary to Govt. Department of Education (Primary) & Ors. versus
Bheemesh alias Bheemappa reported in AIR 2022 SC 402 considered all the
relevant judgments including N.C. Santosh(Supra) which have been presented in
a table in the manner as under :
Citation
Scheme in force on the date
of death of the Government
servant
Modified Scheme
which came into force
after death
Decision of this
Court
State
Bank
of India vs.
Jaspal Kaur
The
Scheme
of the year
1996,
which made
the
financial condition
of
the
family as the main criterion,
was
in force, on the date of
death
of
the
employee in the year 1999.
The 1996 Scheme
was subsequently
modified by policy
issued
in
2005,
which
laid
down
few parameters for
determining penury.
One
of
the
parameters
was to see if the
income
of
the
family
had
been
reduced
to
less
than 60% of the
salary drawn by the
employee
at
the time of death.
Therefore, the wife
of
the deceased
employee
claimed
the
consideration
of the application on
the
basis
of
parameters
laid
down in the policy
of the year 2005.
But with effect
from 04.08.2005
a new Scheme for
payment of
exgratia lumpsum
was introduced in the
place of the old
Scheme. The new
Scheme contained a
provision to the
effect that all
applications pending
under the old
Scheme
will be dealt with only
in accordance with
the new Scheme.
However, a new
Scheme dated
12.06.2006 came
into force on
6.10.2006,
providing only for
ex gratia payment
instead of
compassionate
appointment.
Rejecting
the
claim
of
the
wife of
the
deceased
employee,
this
Court held that
the application of
the
dependant
made in the year
2000, after the
death
of
the
employee in the
year 1999, cannot
be decided on the
basis of a Scheme
which came into
force
in
the
year 2005.
(2007)
SCC 571 [a
two member
Bench]
State Bank
of India Vs.
Raj Kumar
(2010) 11 SCC
661 [a two
member
Bench]
MGB Gramin
Bank vs.
Chakrawarti
Singh
The employee died on
1.10.2004 and the
applications for compassionate
appointment were made on
6.06.2005 and 14.06.2005. On
the date of death and on
the date of the applications,
a Scheme known as
compassionate
appointment Scheme
was in force.
member
Bench]
The employee died on
19.04.2006 and the
application for appointment
made on 12.05.2006. A
scheme for appointment on
compassionate
grounds was in force
on that date.
Canara Bank
vs. M.
Mahesh
The employee died on
10.10.1998 and the
application for appointment
(2014) 13 SCC
583 [a two
The 1993 Scheme was
substituted by a
Scheme for payment
This Court held
that the
application could
be considered
only under the
new Scheme, as it
contained a
specific provision
relating to
pending
applications.
This Court took
the view that the
new Scheme alone
would apply as it
contained a
specific provision
which mandated
all pending
applications to be
considered under
the new Scheme.
This Court
dismissed the
appeals filed by
Kumar
(2015) 7
SCC 412 [a
two member
Bench]
Indian Bank
vs. Promila
and Another
(2020) 2
SCC 729 [a
two member
Bench]
N.C. Santosh
vs. State of
on compassionate grounds,
was made under the Scheme of
the year 1993. It was rejected
on 30.06.1999. The 1993
Scheme was known as
“Dying in Harness Scheme.”
The employee died on
15.01.2004 and the
application for appointment
was made by his minor son
on 24.01.2004. On these
dates, a circular bearing
No.56/79 dated 4.04.1979
which contained a Scheme for
appointment on compassionate
grounds was in force. But
the Scheme provided for
appointment, only
for those who do not opt for
payment of gratuity for the
full term of service of
employee who died
in harness.
Under the existing Scheme
referable to Rule 5 of the
of ex
gratia in the year
2005. But by the time
the 2005 Scheme
was issued, the
claimant had already
approached the High
Court of
Kerala by way of writ
petition and
succeeded before
the learned Single
Judge vide a
Judgment dated
30.05.2003. The
Judgment was
upheld by the
Division Bench in
the year 2006 and
the matter landed up
before this Court
thereafter. In other
words,
the Scheme of the
year 2005 came
into force: (i) after
the rejection of
the application for
compassionate
appointment under
the old scheme;
and (ii)
after the order of
rejection was set
aside by the Single
Judge of
the High Court
A new Scheme was
brought into force
on 24.07.2004 after
the death of the
employee. Under
this Scheme an ex
gratia compensation
was provided for,
subject to certain
conditions. After the
coming into force
of the new Scheme,
the claimant was
directed by the
bank to submit a
fresh application
under the new
Scheme. The
claimant did not
apply under the
new Scheme, as
he was interested
only in
compassionate
appointment and not
monetary benefit.
But by virtue of
an amendment to the
the Bank on
account of two
important
distinguishing
features, namely,
(i) that the
application for
appointment on
compassionate
grounds was
rejected in the
year 1999 and the
rejection order
was set aside
by
the High Court in
the year 2003
much before
the
compassionate
appointment
Scheme was
substituted by an
ex gratia
Scheme
in year 2005; and
(ii) that in the
year 2014, the
original scheme
for appointment
on compassionate
grounds stood
revived, when the
civil appeals were
decided.
In the light of the
decision in
Canara Bank vs.
M. Mahesh
Kumar, this
Court held that
the case of the
claimant cannot
be examined in
the context of the
subsequent
Scheme and
that since the
family had taken
full
gratuity under the
old scheme,
they were not
entitled to seek
compassionate
appointment
even under the
old Scheme.
After taking
note of a
Karnataka
and Others
(2020) 7
SCC 617 (a
three Member
Bench)
23.
Karnataka Civil Services
(Appointment on
Compassionate Grounds) Rules,
1999, a minor dependant of
a deceased Government
employee may apply
within one year from
the date of attaining majority.
Thereafter,
very
proviso to Rule 5,
a
minor
dependant should
apply
within
one
year from the date of
death
of
the
Government
servant and must
have attained the
age of 18 years on the
date of making the
application. Applying
the
amended
provisions,
the
appointment
of
persons
already
made
on
compassionate
grounds,
were
cancelled
by
the
appointing authority
which led
to
the
challenge
before
this Court.
succinctly
it
has
reference made
in State Bank of
India vs. Sheo
Shankar Tewari
to a larger bench,
a three member
Bench of this
Court held in N.C.
Santosh that the
norms prevailing
on the date of
consideration of
the application
should be the
basis for
consideration of
the claim for
compassionate
appointment. The
Bench further
held that the
dependant of a
government
employee, in
the absence of
any vested right
accruing on the
date of death
of the
government
employee, can
only demand
consideration of
his application
and hence he
is
disentitled to seek
the application of
the norms
prevailing on
the date of
death of the
government
servant.
been
held
in
Bheemesh alias Bheemappa (supra) as follows :
“15. Let us now come to the reference pending before the larger
Bench. In State Bank of India vs. Sheo Shankar Tewari (supra), a
two member Bench of this Court noted the apparent conflict
between State Bank of India vs. Raj Kumar and MGB Gramin Bank
on the one hand and Canara Bank vs. M. Mahesh Kumar on the
other hand and referred the matter for the consideration of a
larger Bench. The order of reference to a larger Bench was
actually dated 8.02.2019.
16. It was only after the aforesaid reference to a larger Bench
that this Court decided at least four cases, respectively in (i)
Indian Bank vs. Promila; (ii) N.C. Santhosh vs. State of Karnataka;
(iii) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Amit Shrivas; and (iv) State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Ashish Awasthi. Out of these four decisions,
N.C. Santosh (supra) was by a three member Bench, which
actually took note of the reference pending before the larger
Bench.
17. Keeping the above in mind, if we critically analyse the way in
which this Court has proceeded to interpret the applicability of a
new or modified Scheme that comes into force after the death of
the employee, we may notice an interesting feature. In cases
where the benefit under the existing Scheme was taken away or
substituted with a lesser benefit, this Court directed the
application of the new Scheme. But in cases where the benefits
under an existing Scheme were enlarged by a modified Scheme
after the death of the employee, this Court applied only the
Scheme that was in force on the date of death of the employee.
This is fundamentally due to the fact that compassionate
appointment was always considered to be an exception to the
normal method of recruitment and perhaps looked down upon
with lesser compassion for the individual and greater concern for
the rule of law.
18. If compassionate appointment is one of the conditions of
service and is made automatic upon the death of an employee in
harness without any kind of scrutiny whatsoever, the same would
be treated as a vested right in law. But it is not so. Appointment
on compassionate grounds is not automatic, but subject to strict
scrutiny of various parameters including the financial position of
the family, the economic dependence of the family upon the
deceased employee and the avocation of the other members of
the family. Therefore, no one can claim to have a vested right for
appointment on compassionate grounds. This is why some of the
decisions which we have tabulated above appear to have
interpreted the applicability of revised Schemes differently,
leading to conflict of opinion. Though there is a conflict as to
whether the Scheme in force on the date of death of the
employee would apply or the Scheme in force on the date of
consideration of the application of appointment on compassionate
grounds would apply, there is certainly no conflict about the
underlying concern reflected in the above decisions. Wherever the
modified Schemes diluted the existing benefits, this Court applied
those benefits, but wherever the modified Scheme granted larger
benefits, the old Scheme was made applicable.
19. The important aspect about the conflict of opinion is that it
revolves around two dates, namely, (i) date of death of the
employee; and (ii) date of consideration of the application of the
dependant. Out of these two dates, only one, namely, the date of
death alone is a fixed factor that does not change. The next date
namely the date of consideration of the claim, is something that
depends upon many variables such as the date of filing of
application, the date of attaining of
majority of the claimant and the date on which the file is put up
to the competent authority. There is no principle of statutory
interpretation which permits a decision on the applicability of a
rule, to be based upon an indeterminate or variable factor. Let us
take for instance a hypothetical case where 2 Government
servants die in harness on January 01, 2020. Let us assume that
the dependants of these 2 deceased Government servants make
applications for appointment on 2 different dates say 29.05.2020
and 02.06.2020 and a modified Scheme comes into force on June
01, 2020. If the date of consideration of the claim is taken to be
the criteria for determining whether the modified Scheme applies
or not, it will lead to two different results, one in respect of the
person who made the application before June 1, 2020 and
another in respect of the person who applied after June 01, 2020.
In other words, if two employees die on the same date and the
dependants of those employees apply on two different dates, one
before the modified Scheme comes into force and another
thereafter, they will come in for differential treatment if the date
of application and the date of consideration of the same are taken
to be the deciding factor. A rule of interpretation which produces
different results, depending upon what the individuals do or do
not do, is inconceivable. This is why, the managements of a few
banks, in the cases tabulated above, have introduced a rule in the
modified scheme itself, which provides for all pending
applications to be decided under the new/modified scheme.
Therefore, we are of the considered view that the interpretation
as to the applicability of a modified Scheme should depend only
upon a determinate and fixed criteria such as the date of death
and not an indeterminate and variable factor.
20. Coming to the case on hand, the employee died on 8.12.2010
and the amendment to the Rules was proposed by way of a draft
notification on 20.06.2012. The final notification was issued on
11.07.2012. Merely because the application for appointment was
taken up for consideration after the issue of the amendment, the
respondent could not have sought the benefit of the amendment.
The Judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court
in Akkamahadevamma on which the Tribunal as well as the High
Court placed reliance, was not applicable to the case of
compassionate
appointments,
as
the
amendment
in
Akkamahadevamma came as a result of the existing rule being
declared to be ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.”
[Emphasis Added]
24.
On reading of Bheemesh alias Bheemappa (supra) it appears that
even though this court is persuaded to adopt the rationale in determining the date
of consideration but since the Bheemesh alias Bheemappa (supra) is a decision
rendered by two judges bench by the apex court whereas N.C. Santhosh(supra)
on the point of date of consideration has been delivered by three judges bench of
the apex court. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Another
versus State of Maharashtra and Another reported in (2005) 2 SCC 673, a
Constitution Bench of the apex court has held as under :
“ [a] The law laid down by the apex court in a decision delivered by a
Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent bench of lesser or
coequal strength [b] A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent
from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of
doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention
of the Chief Justice and request of the matter being placed for hearing
before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has
come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal
strength to express an opinion of doubting the correctness of the view
taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter
may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger
than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the
correctness of which is doubted and [c] the above rules are subject to
two exceptions : (i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the
Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can
direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular
Bench of any strength; and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down
hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a
Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the
law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs
correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a
rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and
examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing
with the need of a specific reference or the order of the Chief Justice
constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in
Raghubir Singh reported in (1989) 2 SCC 754 and Hansoli Devi reported
in (2002) 7 SCC 273.”
25.
Though the Bheemesh alias Bheemappa (supra) cannot be stated
a decision per incuriam but the said decision being a decision of two judges bench
cannot be preferred over N.C. Santhosh(supra), as stated, as the said decision
was rendered by a three judge bench of the apex court and that is to be observed
for purpose of certainty and consistency in the judicial decisions. Central Board of
Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) is a partial departure from Raghubir
Singh(supra) which decision has recorded that the question is not whether the
apex court is bound by its own previous decisions, the question is under what
circumstances and within what limit and in what manner should the highest court
overturn its own pronouncement. It may be noted that the inquiry into the
circumstances for purpose of arriving at a different opinion has been restricted by
the
observation
as
referred
above.
Thus,
the
decision
of
Bheemesh alias Bheemappa (supra) would not be relied by this court for any
purpose. However, this court is of the considered opinion that the change of the
contextuility may change the binding effect of N.C. Santhosh(supra). As we have
already reproduced para-9 of the Die-in-Harness Scheme as notified on 26.12.2015,
it transpires clearly that the eligibility in all respect shall be determined as on the
date of death of the concerned employee. To achieve the humane objective of the
Die-in-Harness Scheme it would better be achieved by the stipulation in the Scheme
as notified on 16.12.2015 but the same has not been saved in the subsequent Diein-Harness Scheme as notified on 02.03.2019.
26.
Now, the fundamental question that would emerge is that which Die-
in-Harness Scheme would be applicable in the case of the petitioner. It may not be
out of context to state that even though three years has lapsed after the death of
the deceased employee, no step has been taken for the family of the deceased
employee. There is no assertion on the records, that such step has been taken.
True it is that while introducing the new Die-in-Harness scheme by the notification
dated 02.03.2019 [Annexure-9 to the writ petition], it has been provided as follows:
“The revised Die-in-harness Scheme shall be termed as “Scheme for
Compassionate Appointment/Benefit for Government Employees of
Tripura”. The date of effect of the scheme is 21st November 2018 as the
decision was taken in the meeting of the Council of Ministers on
21.11.2018.”
27.
It has been argued that the retrospectivity in operation is grossly
unreasonable inasmuch as the right to be considered on the day of death of the
deceased employee for purpose of compassionate appointment has been taken
away. On the face of such argument what is material to appreciate is that whether
that right is a vested right or not, or whether this court would mechanically go by
the retrospectivity. The vested right is a right, independent of any contingency and
it cannot be taken away. The vested right can also arise from the provisions of a
scheme framed by the executive exercising its powers as provided under Article 162
of the Constitution of India. It cannot be denied when the notification dated
02.03.2019 was issued, before that time the deceased employee had passed away.
The deceased employee died on 25.12.2018. On that day the petitioner had right to
be considered under the old scheme which was notified on 26.12.2015. As the new
scheme has been published by the notification dated 02.03.2019 with retrospective
operation from 21.11.2018, the said right to be considered on the day of death of
the deceased employee has eclipsed. The petitioner does not have any vested right
to the compassionate appointment, but he has a right to be considered on the
relevant date. The rationale of retrospectivity is that the decision of repealing and
bringing about a new Die-in-Harness Scheme was taken on 21.11.2018 by the
Council of Ministers and hence, the retrospective operation has been given from
21.11.2018. There is no other reason to set up a date for purpose of taking away
the right to consideration for compassionate appointment on the date of death of
the deceased employee by retrospective operation of the scheme as notified on
02.03.2019. Para-19 of the new scheme provides as follows :
“19. Repeal:
The existing orders/instructions issued from time to time in connection
with the Die-in-harness scheme or benefit to the family of missing
Government employee or permanent invalidation, while in Government
job hereby stand repealed w.e.f.21st November 2018.”
28.
It is well known principle that the citizen should know where he is.
There is no manner of doubt that the public authorities and the government are
bound to act reasonably and fairly and each action of such authorities must pass
the test of reasonableness. Wherever the action is lacking bonafide and is in
colourable exercise of power, the court should not hesitate to interfere [Delhi
Transport Corporation versus DTC Majdur Congress :AIR 1991 SC 101].
29.
In this case, even though it has been argued that to extend the
retrospective operation is arbitrary but we cannot be oblivious that the State has its
power, inherent in it, to change its policies. But while changing any policy, the State
shall always be careful while extending retrospectivity, that someone’s legitimate
expectation is not brushed aside. In such event, such action can only be taken
showing some overriding public interest [Union of India and Others versus
Hindustan Development Corporation & Ors. :AIR 1994 SC 988]. Whether
the public interest overrides the substantive legitimate expectation of the individual
or not, can be subject to the judicial review. The courts shall intervene in the
decision only if they are satisfied that the decision is irrational or perverse [Punjab
Communications Ltd. Versus Union of India : AIR 1999 SC 1801]. The
rational nexus test can be used to weigh the action. The person claiming to have
been adversely affected by the change or has been deprived of some benefit or
advantage can legitimately expect that the policy will not operate against him
unless such benefits are withdrawn on some rational ground. The change of policy
ordinarily should not violate the substantive legitimate expectation. The test to
determine is whether the action taken by the government or the authority is
arbitrary or is anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
30.
It is pertinent to note that from 21.11.2018 till 02.03.2019 the old
scheme as notified on 26.12.2015 was in force. No overriding public interest has
been shown by the respondents to take away the effect of the old scheme during
the said period, but for such retrospectivity the petitioner’s right to be considered
on the date of death of his father, who died in harness on 25.12.2018, has eclipsed.
Such action fails to survive the reasonable nexus test. Hence, this court is of the
view that the provision of retrospectivity as provided in the new scheme is required
to be read down in the present case.
31.
Having observed thus, the respondents are directed to consider the
case of the petitioner for compassionate appointment on the day of death of the
deceased employee i.e. on 25.12.2018 under the Die-in-Harness Scheme circulated
by the notification dated 26.12.2015. Such exercise shall be completed within a
period of two months from the day when a copy of this order will be furnished to
the respondents by the petitioner.
Hence, the writ petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated
above.
No order as to costs.
JUDGE
Sabyasachi B
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