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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl.A(J) 36 of 2023
Shri Kajal Sarkar
---Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura
---Respondent(s)
For Appellant (s)
For Respondent(s)
Date of hearing and date of
judgment and order
Whether fit for reporting
:
:
Mr. Samar Das, Advocate.
Mr. S. Ghosh, Addl. PP.
:
:
16.07.2024.
No
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order (Oral)
T.Amarnath Goud, J
Heard Mr. Samar Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellant also
heard Mr. S. Ghosh, learned Addl. PP appearing for the state-respondent.
[2]
This is an application under Section 374 of Cr.PC against the order of
conviction and sentence passed by the Learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge,
Sepahijala District, Bishalgarh, in case No. ST(T/1) 17 of 2020 vide judgment dated
09.11.2022 in which the Ld. Trial Court below convicted and sentenced the appellant to
suffer RI for 10 (ten) years and to pay a Rs.6000/- only under Section 304(Part-I) of the
IPC in default of payment of fine he will undergo further RI for 1 year.
[3]
The prosecution case in brief is that the victim was married to the accused
12 years before the incident as per social customs. After the marriage, her husband Kajal
Sarkar and mother- in-law Gita Rani Sarkar used to torture her for money etc. On
30.04.2020, the accused husband had assaulted the victim and thereafter set her on fire on
pouring kerosene oil over her. The victim had got burnt and was moved to Bishramganj
hospital at first and subsequently shifted to AGMC & GBP Hospital on the said day. On
01.05.2020 the victim had succumbed to her burn injuries at GBP hospital, Agartala.
[4]
On the written ejahar filed by the informant Smt. Kiran Bala Das (mother
of the victim), Bishramganj PS case no. 2020 BRG 009 u/s 498-A/302/34 of IPC was
registered against 2 accused Kajal Sarkar and Smt. Gita Rani Sarkar and the same was
endorsed to WSI Swarna Debbarma for investigation.
[5]
After conclusion of investigation the I/O filed the c/s in this case vide
Bishramganj PS c/s no. 21 of 2020 dated 29.09.2020 u/s 498-A/302 of IPC against the
accused person namely Kajal Sarkar only for trial before the Court. The case record was
received on commitment from the Court of Ld. SDJM, Bishalgarh, Sepahijala on
28.10.2020 after the committing Court had complied with the section 207 of CrP.C.
[6]
The charge was framed against the accused u/s 498-A/ 302 of IPC on
02.02.2021 and the accused had pleaded not guilty after the charge was read over to the
accused in Bengali. Accordingly trial was commenced.
[7]
The prosecution adduced as many as 13 witnesses and also exhibited
certain documents described fully in the appendix and after closure of the prosecution
evidence, the accused person was examined by me u/s 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. on
16.06.2022 wherein the accused was inclined to adduce defence witness from his side.
Accordingly 4 Dws were adduced from the side of the accused.
[8]
After hearing both sides, the learned trial Court delivered the judgment and
order of conviction and sentence dated 09.11.2022 wherein, the accused-appellant has
been convicted as under:
In the result, the convict namely, Sri Kajal Sarkar is sentenced to suffer RI for 10
(Ten) years and to pay fine of Rs.6000/- (six thousand) only for the offence u/s
304 (Part I) of IPC, in default of payment of fine, to suffer RI for 1 (one) year.
The period of custody already undergone during investigation, inquiry or trial
(from 28.08.2018 to 08.03.2021 and from 18.03.2021 to till today i.e.
09.11.2022) shall be set off u/s 428 of Cr.P.C.
[9]
Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of
conviction, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant.
[10]
It is the case of the counsel for the appellant that there are discrepancies in
the evidence of the PW-2, the minor complainant and also in the other defence witnesses
who support the case of the appellant. It is further contended by the counsel for the
appellant that the appellant is innocent. He also pointed out that since the entire case
moves around setting fire upon the deceased wife of the appellant by way of pouring
kerosene. The prosecution has failed to obtain the analysis report from the forensic
department to say that the burnt injuries of the deceased wife were due to pouring of
kerosene.
[11]
Learned counsel for the appellant to support his contention has placed his
reliance on a judgment of the apex court in Hari Om alias Hero versus State of Uttar
Pradesh reported in (2021) 4 SCC 345 where the apex court has observed has observed
as follows:
22. At the outset, we must note the perspective from which the evidence of a child
witness is to be considered. The caution expressed by this Court in
Suryanarayana that “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a
rule but a measure of caution and prudence” is a well-accepted principle. While
applying said principle to the facts of that case, this Court in Suryanarayana
observed:- (SCC pp. 133-35, paras 5-9)
“5. Admittedly, Bhavya (PW 2), who at the time of occurrence was about
four years of age, is the only solitary eyewitness who was rightly not given
the oath. The time and place of the occurrence and the attending
circumstances of the case suggest no possibility of there being any other
person as an eyewitness. The evidence of the child witness cannot be
rejected per se, but the court, as a rule of prudence, is required to consider
such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the
quality of the statements and its reliability, base conviction by accepting the
statement of the child witness. The evidence of PW 2 cannot be discarded
only on the ground of her being of tender age. The fact of PW 2 being a child
witness would require the court to scrutinise her evidence with care and
caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of cross- examination and
there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a
conviction based upon her testimony alone. Corroboration of the testimony
of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some
discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis
for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in
material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness
who, under the normal circumstances, would like to mix-up what the witness
saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to have seen. While appreciating
the evidence of the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the
possibility of the child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation
regarding tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior purposes of the
prosecution, the courts have no option but to rely upon the confidence
inspiring testimony of such witness for the purposes of holding the accused
guilty or not.
6. This Court in Panchhi v. State of U.P. : (1998) 7 SCC 177 held that the
evidence of the child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with
greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what
others tell him and thus an easy prey to tutoring. The evidence of the child
witness must find adequate corroboration before it is relied upon, as the rule
of corroboration is of practical wisdom than of law (vide Prakash v. State of
M.P : (1992) 4 SCC 225, Baby Kandayanathil v. State of Kerala : 1993 Supp
(3) SCC 667, Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar: (1996) 9 SCC 287, and
Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra: (1997) 5 SCC 341
7. To the same effect is the judgment in State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit : (2000)
3 SCC 70.
8. In this case Bhavya (PW 2) when appeared before the trial court was of 6
years of age. After questioning the witness, the Sessions Judge found,
“though the girl is 6 years old she is active and she understands
everything”. Without administering the oath to the witness her statement
was recorded wherein she stated:
“I know Saroja, I call her as ammayi, she is my aunt. The person sitting in
the court box is my uncle. His name is Suryanarayana. Since I call him as
uncle, he is my uncle.
My aunt Saroja is now dead. I know how she died. Several days back after
taking lunch my ammayi i.e. my aunt Saroja and myself went to the lake to
wash the clothes and to take bath. On that day, my uncle Suryanarayana
sitting in the court pierced with a knife the stomach and neck of my ammayi.
Hence she suffered injuries and her entire body covered with blood. My
ammayi while running after being injured, fell down, I screamed.
Immediately I ran and told my father and mother that uncle killed the aunt.
If the knife is shown I can identify (a white cloth bag sealed, was opened). I
have seen the knife now. With the same knife that day my uncle pierced my
ammayi (this was marked as Ext. P-01) on that day. Police asked me as to
what happened, I have told everything to the police.”
9. In her cross-examination the witness stated that before the date of
occurrence the deceased was living with her (witness) parents. At the time of
occurrence the witness used to go to aanganwadi school. The witness denied
the suggestion that she had not gone with the deceased to wash the clothes.
Nothing favouring the defence could be extracted out of her in the crossexamination. She denied the suggestion that “my uncle did not pierce my
aunt with the knife. It is not correct that I have not seen the knife in the
hands of my uncle”. The trial court as well as the High Court accepted her
testimony as no inherent defect was pointed out by the defence. We also find
no reason to take a contrary view. The mere fact that her mother had told
that she did not know any other language except Malyalam and that the
words spoken to by her were not in that language cannot be used as a
ground to reject her testimony. The child and her parents conversed in
Malyalam language at their residence which was explained to the
investigating officer in the language which was understood by him. There is
no ground of doubting the veracity of the testimony of this child witness as
we find that her name is mentioned in the FIR which is proved to have been
recorded immediately after the occurrence. P.H. Krishnappa, the Tahsildar
who prepared the inquest report is also proved to have recorded the
statement of this child witness, wherein, she is shown to have made similar
deposition. Otherwise also there is sufficient corroboration on record to rule
out the possibility of PW 2 being tutored or used for ulterior purposes by
some alleged interested persons. In the absence of any inherent defect we do
not find any substance in the plea to reject the testimony of this child
witness. The statement of PW 2 shows that the deceased and the appellant
were living together as husband and wife and she used to address them as
uncle and aunt. Her testimony to the effect of the deceased living with PW 1
is sufficiently corroborated by the other evidence led in the case. The factum
of the deceased having received stabbed wound with a knife is proved by the
medical evidence. The recovery of the knife at the instance of the appellant,
in consequence of his disclosure statement, leaves no doubt to believe her
statement. The place of occurrence being near the water tank has not been
seriously disputed. The report received from FSL as per Exhibit P-15 shows
that blouse (MO 2), towel (MO 3) and the bangle pieces (MO 4) of the
deceased and the knife (MO 1) which was used in the commission of the
crime, the towel (MO 7), lungi (MO 6) and shirt (MO5) of the appellant
were found to be stained with blood. Dr Ram Dass (PW 12) has opined that
the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased could be caused with a
weapon like MO 1.” (emphasis supplied)
[12]
Learned counsel for the appellant contended before this court that the child
witness cannot be treated in toto and omission needs to be considered. He also prayed to
allow the appeal by setting aside impugned judgment and order of the learned court
below.
[13]
On the other side, Mr. S. Ghosh, learned Addl. PP appearing for the state-
respondent has contended before this court the evidence of PW 2 and the injury witnesses
clearly indicates that the accused person is guilty of the offence and he shall be punished
and prayed to confirm the impugned judgment and order by dismissing the present
appeal.
[14]
Heard both sides.
[15]
Admittedly it is a case of burns and the eye witness is PW 2 who is the
child of the accused and the deceased. She has categorically narrated the entire incident
that had taken place wherein her father poured kerosene upon her mother and set her
ablaze. When she cried watching the scenario, her father slapped her and also pushed her
aside. PW 2 further narrated that she ran towards the neighborhood and alerted everyone.
Being alarmed, they came to the place of occurrence for providing assistance. PW 2 has
also deposed that her father also made an attempt to extinguish the fire by way of
jumping over the deceased body and while doing so, the accused got himself injured. The
same statement has been confirmed by the other witnesses and more particularly by the
defence witnesses with regard to the injuries sustained by the accused person.
[16]
On perusal of the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the appellant,
this court is of the view that the said judgment is not relevant to the subject matter of this
case and hence it holds no weightage.
[17]
Considering the statement made by PW-2, this Court is of the opinion that
since the death has taken place because of the burns caused by the accused person out of
fit of anger and there was no intention to kill the deceased. But in considering his action
that he went to extinguish the fire and the accused person also got himself injured while
making that attempt. Stating thus, it can be said that the accused cannot be punished
under Section 302 of the IPC but this whole incident clearly attracts the provision of
Section 304 (Part-1) of IPC. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the conclusion reached
by the learned Court below is apt and proper and does not need interference of this Court.
Hence the present appeal is liable to be dismissed.
[18]
In view of the abode discussion, the present appeal stands dismissed
confirming the impugned judgment dated 09.11.2022 passed by the Addl. District and
Sessions Judge, Sepahijala District, Bishalgarh, in case No. ST(T/1) 17 of 2020.
B.Palit, J
Dipak
DIPAK DAS
DIPAK DAS
Date: 2024.07.26
16:32:12 +05'30'
T. Amarnath Goud, J
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