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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C) No.726 of 2024
Sri Haripada Ray,
S/o Lt. Manoranjan Ray,
R/o Ramnagar Road No.9,
P.O.: Ramnagar, P.S.: West Agartala,
Dist: West Tripura, PIN: 799002, Aged about 51 years.
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
1. The State of Tripura, represented by it‟s Secretary, Finance
Department, Govt. of Tripura, P.O.: Secretariat, P.S.: New Capital
Complex, Dist: West Tripura, PIN: 799010.
2. The Commissioner of Taxes, Govt. of Tripura, P.N. Complex,
Gurkhabasti, P.O.: Kunjaban, P.S.: NCC, District: West Tripura,
PIN:799006.
3. The Superintendent of Taxes, charge IV, P.O.: Agartala, P.S.:
West Agartala, Dist: West Tripura, PIN: 799001.
----Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Arijit Bhaumik, Adv.
Ms. Ishpa Chakma, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Saktimoy Chakraborty, Adv. General
Mr. Pradyumna Gautam, Sr. GA
Mrs. Pinki Chakraborty, Adv.
Date of hearing
:
24.07.2025
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
06.08.2025
Whether fit for
reporting
:
YES
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
Heard Learned Counsel, Mr. Arijit Bhaumik appearing on
behalf of the petitioner. Also heard Learned Advocate General, Mr.
Saktimoy Chakraborty assisted by Learned Senior GA, Mr. Pradyumna
Gautam and Learned Counsel, Mrs. Pinki Chakraborty appearing on
behalf of the respondents.
2.
The crux question in the present writ petition is to decide
whether this Court can exercise writ jurisdiction where disciplinary
proceeding is contemplated by issuing show-cause notice?
3.
Taking part in the hearing, Learned Counsel, Mr. Bhaumik
appearing on behalf of the petitioner has first of all drawn the attention
of this Court referring Annexure-13 to the writ petition i.e. the memo
dated 07.09.2024 issued by the Secretary, Finance Department, Govt.
of Tripura (Disciplinary Authority) wherein it was informed that the
disciplinary authority intended to conduct an inquiry against the
petitioner under Rule 14 of the CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965 enclosing
statement of articles of charge against the petitioner and submitted
that on perusal of articles of charge it can be found that no separate
articles of charge was formulated/framed by the disciplinary authority
against the petitioner excepting a detailed canvass of the allegation set
forth by the prosecution-State. In the articles of charge framed against
the petitioner it is specifically mentioned that:
“whereas, the alleged distortion of public records by the
Superintendent of Taxes, Charge-IV, Agartala by way of
overwriting „36‟ on „31‟ in the assessment order dated
28.03.2015 for the year 2006-07 had taken place during
processing of the refund application on 10.01.2023;”
3.1.
It was further submitted that by order/memo dated
26.07.2024 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition) the petitioner was
placed under suspension. Learned Counsel further submitted that on
22.08.2012 one assessment order was passed by Mr. P. Roy, the then
Superintendent of Taxes Charge-IV, Agartala, against the dealer M/s
M.P. Khaitan (contractor) quoting the provision of Section 31(4) of the
TVAT Act, 2004 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition). Challenging the said
assessment order, the dealer M/s M.P. Khaitan preferred revision
petition after filing statutory deposit before the Commissioner of
Taxes. The Commissioner of Taxes being the revisional authority vide
order dated 19.02.2014 in connection with revision case No.01 to
06/CH-IV/2013/1473-75(Annexure-5 to the writ petition) remanded
the matter back to the Superintendent of Taxes, Charge-IV setting
aside the assessment orders for the year 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09,
2009-10, 2010-11 & 2011-12 dated 22.08.2012 with a further
direction to complete the reassessment within 30.04.2014.
3.2.
Thereafter, another assessment order was passed on
28.03.2015 under Rule 21(3) of The Tripura Value Added Tax Rules
(for short, TVAT Rules) by Mr. M. Sengupta, another Superintendent of
Taxes, Charge-IV, Agartala in which assessment was made under
Section 36 of the TVAT Act, 2004. In the said assessment order
Section „36‟ was overwritten by ink(Annexure-6 to the writ petition)
and at the time of passing assessment order under Section 36 of the
TVAT Act, 2004, one Mr. Asish Saha (authorized person of the
company) on behalf of M/s M.P. Khaitan appeared along with the
books of accounts. So, referring Annexure-8, according to Learned
Counsel for the petitioner there was no scope on the part of said M.P.
Khaitan that he/his company was unheard at the time of passing order
on that relevant day. It was also stated that in the second page of the
assessment order “Section 36” was also overwritten by ink by the
assessing officer stating that “the assessment was taken up under
Section 36 of the TVAT Act, 2004”.
3.3.
Learned Counsel thereafter drawn the attention of this
Court referring the provisions of Section 31 and 36 of TVAT Act, 2004
and submitted that although in both the provisions it is written that
the Commissioner of Taxes has the power to assess but the said power
is delegated to the Superintendent of Taxes although there is no
dispute in this regard.
3.4.
Further, referring Section 74(1) of the TVAT Act, 2004
Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this
Court that the assessing, appellate or revisional authority on the basis
of an application or suo moto also, within 3(three) years from the date
of any order passed can rectify any error apparent on the face of the
record. Learned Counsel further submitted that as per Section 74(1) of
the TVAT Act, 2004 if the liability of payment of tax or penalty or penal
interest is increased only in that case personal hearing and reasonable
opportunity of being heard be given to the person affected. Section
74(1) of the TVAT Act, 2004 is reproduced hereunder:
“74(1) An assessing, appellate or revisional authority
including the Tribunal may, on an application or
otherwise at any time within three years from the date of
any order passed by it, rectify any error apparent on the
face of the record;
Provided no such rectification which has the effect of
enhancing the liability to pay tax or penalty or penal
interest shall be made unless such authority has given
notice to the person affected and has allowed him a
reasonable opportunity of being heard.”
3.5
It is further submitted that at the time of passing
assessment order in pursuance of the direction of the revisional
authority dated 19.02.2014, the Superintendent of Taxes being the
assessing authority had the scope to rectify any error and prima facie
it is on record that the figure „6‟ was overwritten by ink. The earlier
assessment order dated 22.08.2012 was shown to have been passed
under Section 31(4) of the TVAT Act. Learned Counsel thereafter
submitted that when the assessment orders dated 22.08.2012 and
subsequent order dated 28.03.2015 were passed the petitioner was
holding the post of Inspector of Taxes and as such, on that relevant
point of time as a Superintendent of Taxes he had no authority or
scope to pass any assessment order but surprisingly the department
concerned tried to implicate him as the assessing officer in both the
occasions which is nothing but a frivolous, vexatious allegation of the
department just to damage his service career.
3.6.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner then referred the order
dated 18.03.2002 issued by the then Commissioner of Taxes by which
the petitioner was appointed to the post of Inspector of Taxes
(Annexure-1 to the writ petition) and the subsequent order dated
15.09.2017 by which he was promoted to the post of Superintendent
of Taxes w.e.f. 02.02.2017 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition). Further,
vide notification dated 20.06.2023 issued by the Under Secretary,
Finance Department, Govt. of Tripura, the petitioner was appointed to
the
post
of
Asstt.
Commissioner
of
Taxes
on
Ad-hoc
promotion(Annexure-3 to the writ petition). Referring those documents
Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that on the alleged date
of passing the assessment orders when the petitioner was not holding
the post of Superintendent of Taxes in that case how the department
without
any
basis
falsely
implicated
him
in
this
departmental
proceeding. It is submitted that the petitioner is suffering from mental
agony and harassment for this reason. Learned Counsel further
submitted that on bare perusal of both the assessment orders
(Annexures-4 and 6 to the writ petition) it will be crystal clear that
both the orders were passed by two different officers not by the
present petitioner but with an ulterior motive and on the basis of a
fake communication submitted by one Sanjay Khaitan on behalf of M/s
M.P. Khaitan to the Commissioner of Taxes on 09.04.2024(Annexure-9
to the writ petitioner), the petitioner was given show-cause notice and
later on he has been entangled with the departmental proceeding as
stated above(Annexures-10 and 13 to the writ petition). Furthermore,
referring
Annexure-8
i.e
the
communication
dated
21.03.2024,
Learned Counsel drawn the attention of this Court that in para 3 of the
said communication it is stated that they have not received any
assessment order which was passed on 28.03.2015 but surprisingly at
the time of passing assessment order the representative of the
concerned dealer was present. So, how it can be agitated by them that
no copy of order was served upon them or they had no knowledge.
Learned Counsel has again drawn the attention of this Court referring
the notice dated 13.03.2024(Annexure-7 to the writ petition) issued by
Sri Suman Das, Superintendent of State Tax, Charge-IV, Agartala
wherein it was specifically stated that the assessment order was
passed under Section 36 of TVAT Act, 2004 and M/s M.P. Khaitan was
asked to make payment of Rs.47,38,775/- as interest on delayed
payment but by this time the interest has been paid by the dealer
itself.
Again,
Learned
Counsel
for
the
petitioner
referred
the
communication dated 11.04.2016 submitted by Mr. M. Sengupta, the
then Superintendent of Taxes, Charge-IV, Agartala to the Joint
Commissioner of Taxes, Govt. of Tripura regarding the inspection
report on the receipt and expenditure accounts for the period from
10/2014 to 11/2015 wherein it was clearly stated that the fresh
assessment order was passed under Section 36 of the TVAT Act, 2004
when the dealer submitted a prayer requesting adjustment of said
dues
of
Rs.30,67,168/-
from
the
pre-requisite
money
of
Rs.2,00,06,981/- which was statutorily deposited at the time of
revision case. The same was duly adjusted by deducting from the prerequisite money of Rs.2,00,06,981/- vide B.S. No.18 & 19 dated
26.10.2013 and 17.09.2013.
3.7.
Learned Counsel has further drawn the attention of this
Court referring another communication dated 02.06.2016 written by
the then Joint Commissioner of Taxes to the Senior Audit Officer, O/o
the Accountant General (Audit) wherein in para No.4 of the table
representing the replies to the Inspection Report for the period from
10/2014
to
11/2015,
it
was
clearly
mentioned
that
“The
Superintendent of Taxes, Charge-IV, Agartala has informed that as per
direction of the Revisional Authority vide order dated 07.02.2014 in
Revision case No.01 to 06 Ch-IV/2013 a fresh assessment U/S 36 of
the
TVAT
Act,
was
made
vide
assessment
order
dated
28.03.2015 raising demand Rs.30,67,168/-. The dealer had deposited
Rs.2,00,06,981/- at time of admission in the revision case vide B.S.
no.18 & 19 dated, 26.10.2013 & 11.09.2013 and the demand
Rs.30,67,168/- has been adjusted with the said pre-requisite payment
of Rs.2,00,06,981/- and excess payment made by the dealer becomes
Rs.1,69,39,813/- (20006981-3067168). Therefore there is no question
for levy of interest as raised by the audit”.
3.8.
Learned Counsel, Mr. Bhaumik further submitted that in
the year 2022, said M/s M.P. Khaitan submitted refund application
seeking relief for deduction and adjustment. Learned Counsel also
submitted that by incorporation of Section 31 and 36 of the TVAT Act,
2004, liability of tax was not diminished and since the orders were
passed by two different officers on two different times so it is
surprising as to how the present petitioner has been entangled in this
case. It is further submitted by Learned Counsel for the petitioner that
the dealer initially deposited Rs.2,00,06,981/- at the time of admission
of revision case vide BS No.18 and 19 dated 26.10.2013 and
11.09.2013 and later on the demand of Rs.30,67,168/- has been
adjusted with the said statutory deposited amount of Rs.2,00,06,981/and excess payment made by the dealer becomes Rs.1,69,39,813/-.
So, there was no question for levy of interest as raised by the audit.
After that, Learned Counsel submitted that as per Sub-Rule 14(2) of
the CCS(CC&A) Rules until and unless there is imputation
misconduct or
misbehavior, there
is no
scope
to
initiate
of
any
departmental proceeding against a government servant. Learned
Counsel also drawn the attention of this Court referring Sub-Rule 3 of
Rule 14 of CCS(CC&A) Rules and submitted that in the articles of
charge there is no imputation of misconduct or misbehavior. So, in
absence of the charge of misbehavior and misconduct the present
proceeding cannot be sustained against the petitioner and finally
Learned Counsel urged for setting/quashing the order of suspension
and
also
prayed
contemplated
for
against
quashing
the
the
petitioner.
departmental
Learned
proceeding
Counsel
further
submitted that although there is very little scope on the part of this
Court to look into the issues but since the errors are apparent on the
face of record and the present petitioner was in no way involved with
the passing of assessment orders on that relevant point of time so if
this Court does not exercise writ jurisdiction then the petitioner shall
have to suffer mental harassment, trauma without any basis and
default on his part for which the interference of this Court is required.
4.
The State-respondents filed counter affidavit challenging
the writ petition and Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of
the respondents has submitted that the present writ petition is not
maintainable and this Court can only interfere when there is statutory
violation but at this stage since the departmental proceeding has just
initiated and is still pending for disposal, the present petitioner would
have the liberty or scope to substantiate his contention before the
inquiring authority as referred in this writ petition. Learned Advocate
General submitted that by filing the present writ petition the petitioner
cannot curtail the right of the statutory authority to proceed with the
proceeding. It was further submitted that it is not the case of the
petitioner that there was no scope given to the petitioner and it is also
not the case of the petitioner that the departmental proceeding was
initiated by an incompetent person. There was also no allegation on
the part of the petitioner that the proceeding is contemplated by
appointing an inquiring authority who is incompetent to proceed with
the matter. According to Learned Advocate General since the order of
suspension is an appealable order so without approaching to the
appellate forum the petitioner has got no scope to approach this Court
at this stage for interference. Finally, Learned Advocate General
referring few citations drawn the attention of this Court that the
present writ petition is not maintainable at this stage and there is no
scope on the part of this Court to interfere with the same. Learned
Advocate General finally urged for dismissal of this writ petition with
costs.
5.
To counter the submission of Learned Advocate General for
the respondents, Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon one
citation of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India &
Ors. vs. Upendra Singh reported in (1994) 3 SCC 357, wherein in
para No.6, Hon‟ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“6. In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary
inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the
charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of
the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity
alleged can be said to have been made out or the
charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage,
the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the
correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot
take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The
truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the
disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the
conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter
comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to
look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness
of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or
the appellate authority as the case may be. The function
of the court/tribunal is one of judicial review, the
parameters of which are repeatedly laid down by this
Court. It would be sufficient to quote the decision in
H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing
Authority, Karnal v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2)
SCC 312] . The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah,
J. (as he then was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the
principle thus : (SCC p. 317, para 8)
“Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against
the decision but is confined to the decision-making
process. Judicial review cannot extend to the
examination of the correctness or reasonableness
of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of
judicial review is to ensure that the individual
receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the
authority after according fair treatment reaches,
on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide,
a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the
Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which the
decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that
the Court sits in judgment not only on the
correctness of the decision making process but
also on the correctness of the decision itself.”
Relying upon the same, Learned Counsel for the petitioner
submitted that although at this stage there is very least scope on the
part of this Court to interfere with the departmental proceeding
contemplated against the petitioner. But, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case since there is no allegation of
misbehavior or misconduct by the petitioner so, in view of the principle
of law laid down in the aforesaid judgment, this Court can exercise writ
jurisdiction to address the grievances of the petitioner.
6.
On the other hand, Learned Advocate General for the
respondents relied upon one judgment of Hon‟ble Allahabad High court
in Constable C.P. 117 Yad Ali & Ors. vs. Superintendent of
Police, Chandauli & Anr. reported in 2001 SCC OnLine All 20
wherein in para Nos. 27.19, the Hon‟ble Allahabad High Court has
observed as under:
“27.19. Even in those cases where preliminary enquiry
has been ordered it would not necessarily mean that
such an enquiry has been ordered with a view to collect
prima facie material against the delinquent employee.
In a case where the preliminary enquiry has been
ordered, the order of suspension cannot be treated to
have vitiated merely on the ground that the competent
authority has not waited for the result of the
preliminary enquiry. The preliminary enquiry may be
ordered simultaneously with the order of suspension
with a view to ascertain whether on the facts and in the
circumstances and the nature of the allegations against
a delinquent employee the procedure prescribed for
inflicting the major punishment or the minor
punishment is to be adopted.”
Learned Advocate General further referred another citation
of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in V.P. Gidroniya vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh reported in (1970) 1 SCC 362 wherein in para
Nos.6 and 7 Hon‟ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“6. Three kinds of suspension are known to law. A
public servant may be suspended as a mode of
punishment or he may be suspended during the
pendency of an enquiry against him if the order
appointing him or statutory provisions governing his
service provide for such suspensions. Lastly he may
merely be forbidden from discharging his duties during
the pendency of an enquiry against him which act is
also called suspension. The right to suspend as a
measure of punishment as well as the right to suspend
the contract of service during the pendency of an
enquiry are both regulated by the contract of
employment or the provisions regulating the conditions
of service. But the last category of suspension referred
to earlier is the right of the master to forbid his servant
from doing the work which he had to do under the
terms of the contract of service or the provisions
governing his conditions of service at the same time
keeping in force the master's obligations under the
contract. In other words the master may ask his servant
to refrain from rendering his service but he must fulfil
his part of the contract.
7. The legal position as regards a master's right to place
his servants under suspension is now well settled by the
decisions of this Court. In Management of Hotel
Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union [(1960) 1
SCR 476] the question whether a master could suspend
his servant during the pendency of an enquiry came up
for consideration by this Court. Therein this Court
observed that it was well settled that under the
ordinary law of master and servant the power to
suspend the servant without pay could not be implied as
a term in an ordinary contract of service between the
master and the servant but must arise either from an
express term in the contract itself or a statutory
provision governing such contract. It was further
observed therein that ordinarily in the absence of such a
power either in express terms in the contract or under
the rules framed under some statute would mean that
the master would have no power to suspend a workman
and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the
employee to work he will have to pay the wages during
the so-called period of suspension. Where, however,
there is power to suspend either in the contract of
employment or in the statute or the rules framed
thereunder, the suspension has the effect of temporarily
suspending the relationship of master and the servant
with the consequence that the servant is not bound to
render service and the master is not bound to pay.”
Again, Learned Advocate General referred another citation
of Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in R.P. Kapur vs. Union of India
& Anr. reported in 1963 SCC OnLine SC 47 wherein in para Nos.4, 6
and 11 Hon‟ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“4. The appellant filed a writ petition in the Punjab High
Court on February 16, 1962 challenging this order of
suspension. His contention was that he was entitled to
the guarantee contained in Article 314 of the
Constitution and the order of suspension passed against
him violated that guarantee and was therefore
ineffective and invalid. He relied for this purpose on
Rule 49 of the Appeal Rules, which provided for
suspension as a penalty. He contended that the Appeal
Rules which governed him and which must be held to
have continued to govern him in view of the guarantee
contained in Article 314 provided for suspension as a
penalty only and that there was no provision anywhere
in any rule or statute immediately before January 26,
1950 on which date the Constitution came into force,
providing for suspension otherwise than as a penalty.
Therefore it was not open to the Governor to suspend
him in the manner in which he did so in the present
case, though it was not denied that he could be
suspended pending criminal proceedings provided the
suspension was as a penalty under Rule 49 of the
Appeal Rules; on the other hand mere suspension
pending a criminal case not inflicted as a penalty was
not provided at all by the Rules or the statute governing
the appellant immediately before January 26, 1950.
Therefore when the Governor proceeded to suspend him
under Rule 7(3) of the Discipline Rules, he violated the
guarantee contained in Article 314. The appellant also
contends that as it was not open to any authority to
suspend him except as a punishment immediately
before January 26, 1950, Rule 7 of the Discipline Rules
which provides for suspension during disciplinary
proceedings or during the pendency of a criminal charge
insofar as it applies to him was ultra vires Article 314 of
the Constitution. He also attacked Rules 3 and 10 of the
Discipline Rules as violative of Article 314 of the
Constitution, Rule 3 being concerned with penalties to
be imposed on members of the Indian Administrative
Service and Rule 10 with the right of appeal. The
contention in this connection was that Rule 3 omitted
the penalty of suspension which was to be found in Rule
49 of the Appeal Rules with the result that suspension
under Rule 7 was not open to appeal under Rule 10
which provided for appeals against penalties mentioned
in Rule 3. Therefore the guarantee under Article 314
was violated inasmuch as previously whenever the
penalty of suspension was inflicted on a member of the
Secretary of State's Services it was open to him to
appeal under Rule 56 of the Appeal Rules. Therefore the
scheme of the Discipline Rules was such as to take away
the protection to a member of the Secretary of State's
Service which was available to him immediately before
the Constitution came into force and in consequence
Rules 3 and 10 also violated the guarantee contained in
Article 314 and were ultra vires. The appellant therefore
prayed for an appropriate writ, order or direction in the
nature of mandamus striking down Rules 3, 7 and 10 of
the Discipline Rules being violative of Article 314 of the
Constitution and also for an order striking down the
order of the Governor dated July 18, 1959 by which he
suspended the appellant and such other appropriate
relief as was just and proper.
6. The High Court dismissed the petition. It was of the
view that it was inconceivable that under the old rules
prevailing before January 26, 1950, a civil servant could
never be suspended while an enquiry into his conduct
was pending. It was further of the view that suspension
during the pendency of an enquiry was a power
inherent in an employer like the Government and the
power to suspend was always implied in the authority
making the appointment. The High Court therefore
rejected the contention of the appellant that under the
old rules no member of the Secretary of State's Services
could have been suspended except by way of
punishment. The High Court further held that even if the
contention of the appellant be accepted that a member
of the Secretary of State's Services had a right of appeal
even where he was suspended during a departmental
enquiry there was a provision in the Discipline Rules for
a memorial to the President (see Rule 20) and that in
the opinion of the High Court gave a right as similar to
the right existing before January 26, 1950 as the
changed circumstances permitted. The High Court
therefore dismissed the petition. The appellant then
applied for a certificate which was granted; and, that is
how the matter has come up before us.
11. The general principle therefore is that an employer
can suspend an employee pending an enquiry into his
conduct and the only question that can arise on such
suspension will relate to the payment during the period
of such suspension. If there is no express term in the
contract relating to suspension and payment during
such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in
any law or rule, the employee is entitled to his full
remuneration for the period of his interim suspension;
on the other hand if there is a term in this respect in the
contract or there is a provision in the statute or the
rules framed thereunder providing for the scale of
payment during suspension, the payment would be in
accordance therewith. These general principles in our
opinion apply with equal force in a case where the
government is the employer and a public servant is the
employee with this modification that in view of the
peculiar structural hierarchy of Government, the
employer in the case of government, must be held to be
the authority which has the power to appoint a public
servant. On general principles therefore the authority
entitled to appoint a public servant would be entitled to
suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his
conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may
eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him.
This general principle is illustrated by the provision in
Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 10 of 1897, which
lays down that where any Central Act or Regulation
gives power of appointment that includes the power to
suspend or dismiss unless a different intention appears.
Though this provision does not directly apply in the
present case, it is in consonance with the general law of
master and servant. But what amount should be paid to
the public servant during such suspension will depend
upon the provisions of the statute or rule in that
connection. If there is such a provision the payment
during suspension will be in accordance therewith. But
if there is no such provision, the public servant will be
entitled to his full emoluments during the period of
suspension. This suspension must be distinguished from
suspension as punishment which is a different matter
altogether depending upon the rules in that behalf. On
general principles therefore the government, like any
other employer, would have a right to suspend a public
servant in one of two ways. It may suspend any public
servant pending departmental enquiry or pending
criminal proceedings; this may be called interim
suspension. Or the government may proceed to hold a
departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty
order suspension as a punishment if the rules so permit.
This will be suspension as a penalty. These general
principles will apply to all public servants but they will
naturally be subject to the provisions of Article 314 and
this brings us to an investigation of what was the right
of a member of the former Secretary of State's Services
in the matter of suspension, whether as a penalty or
otherwise.”
Referring the same, Learned Advocate General again
submitted that at this stage there is no scope to entertain the writ
petition filed by the petitioner. It was submitted that since the
departmental proceeding is still pending for adjudication before the
inquiring authority so, the grounds referred by Learned Counsel for the
petitioner may be well placed to the respective inquiring authority and
if thereafter, the petitioner feels to be aggrieved/dissatisfied with the
order of the inquiring authority in that case scope shall be there to the
petitioner to approach this Court.
7.
Heard both the sides at length.
8.
As
already
stated,
to
resist
the
writ
petition,
the
respondents have filed their counter affidavit to which the petitioner
again filed rejoinder.
9.
There is no dispute on record that the petitioner is placed
under suspension and the suspension order still exists. There is also no
dispute on record that the authority of the department has issued
memo dated 07.09.2024 by which the petitioner was informed that
authority has decided to conduct inquiry against him with articles of
charge which is under challenge before this Court. It is not the case of
the writ petitioner that by issuing memo dated 07.09.2024(Annexure13 to the writ petition) no scope is given to the petitioner to submit his
written statement of defense. It is also not the case of the petitioner
that articles of charge is not supplied to him to substantiate his
defense. Probably the evidence part has not yet been started.
10.
I have gone through the documents annexed with the writ
petition filed by the writ petitioner.
11.
On bare perusal of the articles of charge prima facie it
appears that the main allegation of the State-respondents against the
petitioner is that he has distorted public records by way of overwriting
“Section 36” over “Section 31” in the assessment order dated
28.03.2015 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) for the year 2006-07 in
course of processing of refund application on 10.01.2023. However, on
perusal of assessment order dated 22.08.2012(Annexure-4 to the writ
petition)
and
subsequent
assessment
order
dated
28.03.2015
(Annexure-6 to the writ petition) it is crystal clear that both the orders
were passed by two different persons. One was passed by Mr. P. Roy,
Superintendent of Taxes, Charge-IV (Annexure-4) and Annexure-6 i.e.
subsequent assessment order dated 28.03.2015 was issued/passed by
one Mr. M Sengupta, Superintendent of Taxes, Charge-IV, Agartala.
Further, on perusal of order dated 18.03.2002 (Annexure-1 to the writ
petition) it appears that by that order the petitioner was appointed as
Inspector of Taxes and on perusal of order dated 15.09.2017 issued by
Commissioner of Taxes (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) it appears
that he was promoted to the post of Superintendent of Taxes w.e.f.
02.02.2017. So, when assessment order dated 22.08.2012 was issued
that time the present petitioner was not Superintendent of Taxes of
the respective charge and when the subsequent assessment order
dated
28.03.2015
was
passed
by
Mr.
M.
Sengupta,
another
Superintendent of Taxes, Charge-IV (Annexure-6 to the writ petition)
that time the present petitioner was also holding the post of Inspector
of Taxes. So, it is very much surprising as to how the respondents
have issued memo dated 07.09.2024 (Annexure-13 to the writ
petition) to the present petitioner when the petitioner was in no way
attached to the respective charge as alleged by the State-respondents.
12.
At the time of hearing some more other points were
referred by Learned Counsel for the petitioner but since the petitioner
himself were not attached to any of the aforesaid charges on that
relevant point of time so, prima facie it appears that the memo dated
07.09.2024 issued by the respondents authority was misconceived and
not supported by any cogent materials on record. As already stated
since the State-respondents by their counter affidavit could not dispute
anything regarding the documents submitted by the petitioner as
annexures, so, prima facie it appears that there was error apparent on
the face of record.
13.
Furthermore, although it is the settled position of law that
there is very least scope on the part of a Writ Court to entertain such
issues like departmental proceedings in absence of any procedural
irregularities/lapses but, here in the case at hand the proceeding is not
yet been commenced fully, only the memo and articles of charge have
been supplied to the petitioner and probably the inquiring authority is
contemplating to record the evidence of the witnesses within a short
span of time. Furthermore, on bare perusal of Annexure-9 i.e. the
communication of one Sanjay Khaitan being the representative of M/s
M.P. Khaitan it appears that there is no specific allegation against the
petitioner that he distorted the public records. However, based on that
communication internal inquiry was conducted by the authority
concerned against the petitioner.
14.
On bare perusal of all the annexed documents, this Court
at this stage does not find any materials against the petitioner to allow
the respondent authority to continue the departmental proceeding
against him furthermore.
14.1.
In this regard, Hon‟ble the Supreme court of India in
Union of India & Anr. vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana reported in
(2006) 12 SCC 28 in para No.16 observed as under:
“16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases
the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause
notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or
for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However,
ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a
matter.”
Further,
in
Union
of
India
&
Anr.
vs.
Vicco
Laboratories reported in (2007) 13 SCC 270, Hon‟ble the Apex
Court in para No.31 observed as under:
“31. Normally, the writ court should not interfere at the
stage of issuance of show-cause notice by the
authorities. In such a case, the parties get ample
opportunity to put forth their contentions before the
authorities concerned and to satisfy the authorities
concerned about the absence of case for proceeding
against the person against whom the show-cause
notices have been issued. Abstinence from interference
at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice in order
to relegate the parties to the proceedings before the
authorities concerned is the normal rule. However, the
said rule is not without exceptions. Where a show-cause
notice is issued either without jurisdiction or in an
abuse of process of law, certainly in that case, the writ
court would not hesitate to interfere even at the stage
of issuance of show-cause notice. The interference at
the show-cause notice stage should be rare and not in a
routine manner. Mere assertion by the writ petitioner
that notice was without jurisdiction and/or abuse of
process of law would not suffice. It should be prima
facie established to be so. Where factual adjudication
would be necessary, interference is ruled out.”
Again, in Union of India & Ors. vs. Coastal Container
Transporters Association & Ors. reported in (2019) 20 SCC 446,
Hon‟ble the Apex Court in para No.30 observed as under:
“30. On the other hand, we find force in the contention
of the learned Senior Counsel, Shri Radhakrishnan,
appearing for the appellants that the High Court has
committed error in entertaining the writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the stage of
show-cause notices. Though there is no bar as such for
entertaining the writ petitions at the stage of showcause notice, but it is settled by a number of decisions
of this Court, where writ petitions can be entertained at
the show-cause notice stage. Neither it is a case of lack
of jurisdiction nor any violation of principles of natural
justice is alleged so as to entertain the writ petition at
the stage of notice. The High Court ought not to have
entertained the writ petition, more so, when against the
final orders appeal lies to this Court.”
14.2.
I have perused the said citations of the Hon‟ble Apex
Court. There is no dispute on record that excepting very rare and
exceptional cases there is no scope to interfere with the departmental
proceeding. The citations referred by Learned Advocate General at the
time of hearing are no doubt very much relevant but those citations
cannot be applied in this case at this stage since the departmental
proceeding has not yet been commenced fully save and except issuing
of show cause notice and delivery of articles of charge. Learned
Advocate General also submitted that there is no scope to exercise the
writ jurisdiction at this stage but it appears to this Court that Learned
Advocate General could not place any satisfactory argument/defense
to refute the submission made by Learned Counsel for the petitioner
and it appears to this Court that this is a very exceptional case where
this Court can exercise the power of writ jurisdiction to grant relief to
the petitioner.
15.
In view of the above, the writ petition filed by the
petitioner is allowed and thus, disposed of.
The order of suspension dated 26.07.2024 and the
subsequent order dated 23.10.2024 are accordingly stands revoked.
The consequential memo dated 07.09.2024 issued by the respondent
authority also stands set aside and quashed.
JUDGE
Snigdha
signed
AMRITA Digitally
by AMRITA DEB
Date: 2025.08.07
DEB
16:12:10 +05'30'
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