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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl. A 16 of 2022
Sri Dulal Baidya
S/o Late Monoranjan Baidya,
R/o –Vil Sarashima, PO- Sarashima
PS- Belonia, Dist- South Tripura.
---Appellant(s)
Versus
1. The State of Tripura
Represented by its Secretary Cum Commissioner,
Department of Home, Government of Tripura,
PO- Kunjaban, PS- New Capital Complex, Dist- West Tripura,
2. Sri Prakash Tripura,
S/o- Late Dehamani Tripura,
R/o- Vill Shibpur, PO-Ratanpur
PS- Belonia, Dist- South Tripura.
---Respondent(s)
Crl. A 17 of 2022
Sri Dulal Baidya
S/o Late Monoranjan Baidya,
R/o –Vil Sarashima, PO- Sarashima
PS- Belonia, Dist- South Tripura.
---Appellant(s)
Versus
1. The State of Tripura
Represented by its Secretary Cum Commissioner,
Department of Home, Government of Tripura,
PO- Kunjaban, PS- New Capital Complex, Dist- West Tripura,
2. Sri Dipendra Uchai,
S/o- Late Brindamani Uchai,
R/o- Vill Shibpur, PO-Ratanpur
PS- Belonia, Dist- South Tripura.
---Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
For Respondent(s)
Date of hearing
Date of pronouncement
Whether fit for reporting
: Mr. D. Sarkar, Adv.
: Mr. Rajib Saha, Adv.
Mr. S. Debnath, Adv.
: 17.07.2023
: 20.07.2023
: No
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
Judgment & Order
17.07.2023
Both these appeals are consolidated for disposal by a common
judgment at this stage as agreed to by the learned counsel appearing for the
parties inasmuch as the conspectus as raised in these appeals as well as the
question in respect of the right of the appellant are identical.
In Crl. A 16 of 2022
[2]
It is the case of the complainant-appellant that he is a businessman at
Belonia town and on account of business between the complainant and the accused,
a good relation made between them and the accused also visited the shop of the
complainant on various occasions subsequently a family relation also made between
them. It is further case of the complainant-appellant that out of good and friendly
relation the accused demanded to borrow of Rs.4,60,000/- from the complainant
for his personal purpose as he is defaulter to a bank and complainant any how
managed the said amount and gave to the accused on 26.03.2021 at 10.00 am in
presence of witnesses in his house at Sarashima and the accused borrowed the said
amount for one month. It is further case of the complaint that after expiry of one
month on 28.04.2021. Complainant demanded the said amount then the accused
issued a cheque bearing no. 615352 dated 28.04.2021 drawn on Triprua Gramin
Bank, Muhuripur branch in the name of the complainant and on the same day the
complainant deposited the said cheque for encashment in his bank i.e. Tripura
State Co-opeative Bank, Belonia Branch accordingly banker of the complainant sent
the cheque to Triprua Gramin Bank for encashment but banker of the accused on
10.05.2021 returned the said cheque dishonoured mentioning with remarks,
“Insufficient fund”. It is further case of the complainant that he requested the
accused to pay the cheque amount but the accused did not pay the said amount
and also did not pay any heed after which a legal demand notice dated 20.05.2021
was sent to the accused through „India Post‟ Service and also requested the
accused person to make payment within 15 days from the date of receipt of the
said notice and it is evident that on 25.05.2021, the accused person received the
said demand notice and inspite receiving of notice the accused did not take any
step to liquidate his liability then the complainant was constrained to file the
present case.
[3]
On the other hand, the accused in his plea of defence recorded on
29.09.2021 pleaded not guilty and claimed trial and stated as follows:
“The cheque in question is completely false and fabricated and he did
not issue any cheque in favour of the complainant.
[4]
The learned trial court framed charged under Section 138 of NI Act
and to bring home the guilt of the accused the complainant had to prove the
elements of section 138 of NI Act by crossing following legal formalities.
a) The cheque was drawn by the drawer on an account maintained by him with the
banker for payment of any amount of money out of that account to the
complainant.
b) The said payment was made for discharge of legally enforceable debt or other
liability, in whole or in part.
c)
The said cheque were returned unpaid by the bank.
d) The cheque was presented to the bank within a period of three months from the
date on which it was drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier.
e) The prayer of the Holder in the due course of the cheque as the case may be made
a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving the notice in
writing to the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of information by
him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid.
f)
[5]
The drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money
to the payee or as the case may be the Holder in due course of the cheque within
15 days of the receipt of the said notice.
The Ld. Court below after perusing the statements of the PWs and Dws
and also having dealt with the entire case has observed in the following manner:
“As such, I hold that accused has remain successful in rebutting the mandatory
presumption of law in favour of the complainant.
I accordingly return a finding of not guilt against the accused person namely Shri
Prakash Tripura.”
[6]
Aggrieved by the said acquittal under Section 378(4) of CrPC
challenging the legality, validity of propriety of the judgment and order of acquittal
dated 07.06.2022 in Connection with case No.NI 19 of 2021 passed by the Learned
Chef Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Belonia whereby the accused Sri Prakash
Tripura was acquitted for the offense punishable under section 138 of NI Act, 1881,
the complainant-appellant has approached this court seeking relief against the
order of acquittal dated 07.06.2022.
In Crl.A 17 of 2022
[7]
It is the case of the complainant-appellant that he is a businessman at
Belonia town and on account of business between the complainant and the accused,
a good relation made between them and the accused also visited the shop of the
complainant on various occasions subsequently a family relation also made between
them. It is further case of the complainant-appellant that out of good and friendly
relation the accused demanded to borrow of Rs.3,00,000/- from the complainant
for his personal purpose as he is defaulter to a bank and complainant any how
managed the said amount and gave to the accused on 22.03.2021 at 10.00 am in
presence of witnesses in his house at Sarashima and the accused borrowed the said
amount for one month. It is further case of the complaint that after expiry of one
month on 25.04.2021. complainant demanded the said amount then the accused
issued a cheque bearing no. 664128 dated 25.04.2021 drawn on Tripura Gramin
Bank, South Sonaichari branch in the name of the complainant and on the same
day the complainant deposited the said cheque for encashment in his bank i.e.
Tripura State Co-opeative Bank, Belonia Branch. Accordingly banker of the
complainant sent the cheque to Triprua Gramin Bank for encashment but banker of
the accused on 10.05.2021 returned the said cheque dishonoured mentioning with
remarks, “Insufficient fund”. It is further case of the complainant that he requested
the accused to pay the cheque amount but the accused did not pay the said
amount and also did not pay any heed after which a legal demand notice dated
20.05.2021 was sent to the accused through „India Post‟ Service and also requested
the accused person to make payment within 15 days from the date of receipt of the
said notice and it is evident that on 25.05.2021, the accused person received the
said demand notice and inspite receiving of notice the accused did not take any
step to liquidate his liability then the complainant was constrained to file the
present case.
[8]
On the other hand, the accused in his plea of defence recorded on
29.09.2021 pleaded not guilty and claimed trial and stated as follows:
“The cheque in question is completely false and fabricated and he did
not issue any cheque in favour of the complainant.
[9]
The learned trial court framed charged under Section 138 of NI Act
and to bring home the guilt of the accused the complainant has to prove the
elements of section 138 of NI Act by crossing following legal formalities.
a) The cheque was drawn by the drawer on an account maintained by him with the
banker for payment of any amount of money out of that account to the
complainant.
b) The said payment was made for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or other
liability, in whole or in part.
c)
The said cheque were returned unpaid by the bank.
d) The cheque was presented to the bank within a period of three months from the
date on which it was drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier.
e) The payee of the Holder in the due course of the cheque as the case may be made
a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving the notice in
writing to the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of information by
him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid.
f)
[10]
The drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money
to the payee or as the case may be the Holder in due course of the cheque within
15 days of the receipt of the said notice.
The Ld. Court below after perusing the statements of the PWs and Dws
and also having dealt with the entire case has observed in the following manner:
“As such, I hold that accused has remain successful in rebutting the mandatory
presumption of law in favour of the complainant.
I accordingly return a finding of not guilt against the accused person namely Shri
Dipendra Uchai.”
[11]
Aggrieved by the said acquittal under Section 378(4) of CrPC
challenging the legality, validity of propriety of the judgment and order of acquittal
dated 06.06.2022 in Connection with case No.NI 18 of 2021 passed by the Learned
Chef Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Belonia whereby the accused Sri Dipendra
Uchai was acquitted for the offense punishable under section 138 of NI Act, 1881,
the complainant-appellant has approached this court seeking relief against the
order of acquittal dated 06.06.2022.
[12]
Today in course of the argument, Mr. Sarkar, learned counsel for the
appellant has referred to the judgment of the apex court in Rangappa vs Sri Mohan
reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441 with regard to the complainant giving loan to the
accused and the accused persons issuing a cheque which was dishonoured by the
bank of the accused persons and also the complainant sending a legal notice to the
accused persons. The relevant portion of the above cited judgment is extracted
herein under:
13. The High Court in its order noted that in the course of the trial
proceedings, the accused had admitted that the signature on the impugned
cheque (No. 886322, dated 8-2-2001) was indeed his own. Once this fact has
been acknowledged, Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the
cheque pertained to a legally enforceable debt or liability. This presumption is
of a rebuttal nature and the onus is then on the accused to raise a probable
defence. With regard to the present facts, the High Court found that the
defence raised by the accused was not probable.
16. All of these circumstances led the High Court to conclude that the accused
had not raised a probable defence to rebut the statutory presumption. It was
held that:
6. Once the cheque relates to the account of the accused and he accepts and
admits the signatures on the said cheque, then initial presumption as
contemplated under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be
raised by the Court in favour of the complainant. The presumption referred to
in Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a mandatory presumption and not a general
presumption, but the accused is entitled to rebut the said presumption.
What is required to be established by the accused in order to rebut the
presumption is different from each case under given circumstances. But the
fact remains that a mere plausible explanation is not expected from the
accused and it must be more than a plausible explanation by way of rebuttal
evidence. In other words, the defence raised by way of rebuttal evidence must
be probable and capable of being accepted by the Court……”
17…….138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.
- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with
a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of
that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the
cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account
by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have
committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of
this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or
with both:…
20. The Counsel appearing for the appellant- accused has relied on a decision
given by a division bench of this Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v.
Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, the operative observations from which
are reproduced below (S.B. Sinha, J. at Paras. 29
"29. Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients viz.:
(i) that there is a legally enforceable debt
(ii) that the cheque was drawn from the account of bank for discharge in
whole or in part of any debt or other liability which presupposes a legally
enforceable debt; and
(iii) that the cheque so issued had been returned due to insufficiency of funds.
[13]
Mr. Sarkar, has also relied on a judgment passed by this court in
Keshab Banik vs. Sekhar Banik reported in (2013) 1 TLR 528. The relevant portion
of the judgment is extracted herein below:
6. I have meticulously gone through the complaint and the evidence on
record. Except denial there is nothing in the cross-examination of PW-1
regarding the alleged-advance of Rupees one lakh to the accused by the
complainant and issuance, of the cheque by the accused assuring repayment
of the amount.
Section 138 has been incorporated to protect the holder of a negotiable
instruments in due course. If a cheque is issued and the payee presented the
cheque for encashment and it is dishonoured for not having the adequate
amount in the accut of the drawer of the cheque and he is informed by a
notice by the payee and if it is found that still the drawer of the cheque fails to
make the payment, he is liable to be booked under section 138 of the NI Act.
8. According to the complainant, notice was sent, on 14.12.2005, through a
courier service and the notice received by the accused Ext. 4 is the document
proved by the complainant in respect of notice and Ext.5 is the copy of the
notice. Ext.4 (consignment note) indicates, the names of the consigner and
consignee and a separate block with the heading „received by consignee in
good condition‟. The name of the consigner Keshab Banik has been mentioned
as M/s. Electronics, Battala, Agartla and in the Receipt Column an initial with
date 17.12.2005 has been written which indicates that it was received by the
proprietor of M/s. S.S. Electronics. The name of the accused has not been
mentioned by the courier, but the name of the consignee, S.S Electronics
which is not denied by the accused, has been clearly mentioned. PW1, in his
cross-examination, clearly stated that he has submitted the acknowledgment
of proper service of the notice upon the accused and there is signature of the
accused in the said acknowledgement. The complainant being full-blood
brother is likely to know the signature of his brother and he has asserted that
his brother received it by putting his initial.
The accused adduced no evidence to discard the cogent evidence by the
complainant. The accused even did not specifically deny the initial and date in
Ext.4, in the block meant for the consignee with the heading “Received by
consignee in good condition,” as not of him.
[14]
Mr. D. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has also
relied on a judgment of this high court in Benu Roy vs. Rajib Ghosh reported in
(2018) 2 TLR 463. The relevant paragraphs have been extracted here in below:
34. Section 118 of the NI Act, which deals specially with the special rule of
evidence under the NI Act, 1881 provides the rule of presumption as to
ramification of the negotiable instrument. It provides further that, until the
contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:
(a) of consideration – that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for
consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted,
indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or
transferred for consideration;
(b) as to date- that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or
drawn on such date;
(c) as to time of acceptance – that every accepted bill of exchange was
accepted within the reasonable time after its date and before its maturity;
(d) as to time of transfer – that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was
made before its maturity;
(e) As to order of indorsements - that the indorsements appearing upon a
negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon;
(f) as to stamps – that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was
duly stamped;
(g) that holder is a holder in due course – that the holder is a holder of a
negotiable instrument in due course:
Provided that, where instrument has been obtained for its lawful owner, or
from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or
has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence
or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is
a holder in due course lies upon him.
46. In Hiten P Dalal (supra) the Apex Court has distinguished or made
distinction between the two types of presumption but also has delineated the
nature of evidence required to rebut the two. In the case of discretionary
presumption, the presumption drawn may be rebutted by the expression,
“might reasonably be true and which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused”. In case of statutory presumption, the burden on the accused is
heavy and it cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason that
explanation offered by the accused is reasonable and probable. It shall be
shown that the explanation has its true and probably foundation. The words
“unless the contrary is proved” which occur in this provision, make it clear that
the presumption is required to be rebutted by proof not by mere explanation.
So probably that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that the
probable cause so offered did exist. Unless, explanation is founded on proof,
the presumption created by that provision cannot be said to have rebutted.
56. This Court has also noticed that the accused respondent has acted
sometimes in a manner which cannot be stated to be bona fide. Even in the
Court, he has stated that he did not receive the notice but the record from the
postal department has squarely established that notice was duly served. Even
he did not make any attempt to bring someone from the postal department to
demonstrate that the communication dated 23.02.2013 (Exhibit-B) is not
based on delivery of the registered article. Even there is no infirmity in the
admission of the communication received from the Postal Department. As
such, this Court does not have any other alternative but to observe that the
accused-respondent has grossly failed to rebut the presumption under Section
139 read with Section 138 of the NI Act. Therefore, this Court is persuaded to
interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal dated 27.05.2016 delivered
in case No. NI 19/2013. From the evaluation as made above, the accusedrespondent is liable to be convicted and is accordingly convicted under Section
138 of the NI Act.
[15]
Reliance has also been placed on another judgment of this High Court
in Shri Subal Chandra Ghosh vs The State of Tripura dated 24.04.2019 by Mr. D.
Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. The relevant portion of which
is extracted herein below:
29) While dealing with the next point of the argument of Mr. Chakraborty,
learned Sr. counsel that the loan was not given through account payee cheque
as is required under Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act relying upon the
decision of Krishna Janardhan Bhat (Supra), wherein a Division Bench of the
Apex Court dismissed the petition under Section 138 of N.I. Act on the ground
that the complainant failed to follow the legal provisions as enshrined in
Section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act. But the said judgment has been
overruled by three judges Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Rangappa
vs Sri Mohan reported in (2010) 11 SCC-441 wherein the Apex Court upheld
the order of the High Court convicting the appellant. It was held that the
principle of Krishna Janardhan Bhat(Supra) is in conflict with the statutory
provisions as well as the established line of precedence of the Apex Court.
56) The explanation appended to Section 138 explains the meaning of the
expression „debt or other liability‟. The provision includes not only debt but
other liability as well. The word „liability‟ denotes the state of being liable. The
debt or other liabilities for the purpose of attracting the provision are to be
legally enforceable. Section 138 treats dishonored cheque as an offence, if the
cheque has been issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. In the trial,
the accused had admitted that the signature on the impugned Cheques were
indeed his own. Once this fact is acknowledged, Section 139 read with Section
118 of the N.I. Act mandates a presumption that the cheques pertained to a
legally enforceable debt or liability. This presumption is of a rebuttal nature
and onus is then on the accused to raise a probable defence.
59) True, it is, that the Apex Court in the long line of decisions has held that
unless an order passed by Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the
Court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant
materials or there is palpable misreading of records, the revision Court will not
be justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is
possible. While viewing so, the Apex Court has further held that if the findings
of the Courts below, which decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be
perverse or untenable to law or is grossly erroneous and glaringly
unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the
material are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised
arbitrarily or capriciously, the Courts may not interfere with decision in
exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.
[16]
Mr. D. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
submitted before this court that the court below has acquitted the accused only on
the solitary ground that the appellant could not prove his income source. According
to him, the court below has failed to cite any judgment passed by the apex court
showing that the complainant has to show his source of income. He further submits
that the appellant is capable of lending that money which has been given to the
accused persons by way of loan on various dates. The complainant having a good
relation with the accused persons and having known them for a long time gave
them the money. He further urges this court to interfere with the impugned
judgment & order of acquittal dated 07.06.2022 & 06.06.2022 respectively.
[17]
On the contrary Mr. Rajib Saha, learned counsel appearing for the
accused persons has submitted before this court that since the complainant has
failed to prove his enforceable liability against the accused persons, Section 139 of
the NI Act shall come into play. For ready reference, Section 139 of the NI Act is
extracted below:
139. Presumption in favour of holder: It shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the
nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any
debt or other liability.
[18]
Mr. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the accused-responded has
drawn the attention of this court to the state of the DW2 Tarunjit Nag which is
extracted herein below.
“That I say that I know the complainant and the accused person. Accused
person is a day labour. Approximately 1 year ago in Shibpur bazaar both the
complainant Dulal Baidya and accused came and Dulal Baidya said to Prakash
Tripura to sign in the cheques and accordingly Prakash Tripura signed in the
blank cheques in my presence and handed over the chequebook to Dulal
Baidya after signed the cheques.”
[19]
From the above statement, it appears to this court that the
complainant has taken the sign on the cheque book for making his own story. It is
further submitted by the counsel for the respondents that the complainant has
failed to produce any record during the trial showing that he has given the money
in question to the accused persons.
[20]
It is further stated by the counsel for the accused persons that the
court below has rightly dealt stating that once presumption under Section 139 NI
Act is rebutted, burden of proof shifts upon the complainant to prove as a matter of
fact that cheque was actually issued in discharge of liability.
[21]
In view of the above observation, this court is of the opinion that the
complainant has failed to prove his source of income. It is evident from the record
that during the cross-examination in the court below the complainant had stated
that he had filed two numbers of NI case against the accused person namely
Prakash Tripura for an amount of Rs.4,60,000 and Rs.2,00,000/-. The complainant
also states that he is a businessman by profession and earning Rs.10,000/- to
Rs.20,000/- per month approximately. He also lodged one number of NI case
against Pranab Chowdhury for an amount of Rs.3,00,000/-. He also admitted that
he is not any income tax payee. This court finds it hard to believe if a person is
earning barely Rs.10,000 to Rs.20,000/- per month what makes him able to
advance a sum of Rs.9,60,000/- in couple of days. Further, it is unreasonable to
belief as to giving loan of huge sum to a person coming to have Xerox copy. No
transaction is established to consider the cheque amount as legally enforceable
debt. Moreover, the citations referred by Mr. D. Sarkar, learned counsel for the
appellant is of no relevance to the present context of the case.
[22]
This court feels that the capacity to advance loans to the accused
persons has not been established by the complainant and the alleged loans was not
reflected in the ITR by the complainant. The defence of the accused persons that
they had not taken any loan from the complainant and signing the blank cheque as
security for loans of lesser amount has been subsequently filled up for an inflated
amount and misused in filing the present complaint seems quite probable.
[23]
Having regard to the evidence on record and the discussion made
hereinabove, this Court is of the view that the appellant has failed to prove his
projected case against the accused persons and consequently, the instant appeal
preferred by the appellant stands dismissed. Hence, the orders of acquittal dated
07.06.2022 in connection with case No.NI 19 of 2021 and order of acquittal dated
06.06.2022 in connection with case No.NI 18 of 2021 passed by the Learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Belonia do not require and interference from this
court. Both the Judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Court below
are affirmed. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand
closed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.
JUDGE
Dipak
DIPAK DAS
DIPAK DAS
Date: 2023.07.21
18:07:41 +05'30'
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