Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRL.A. (J) No.63 of 2023
Sri Chenja Mohan Tripura @ Chensa,
son of Sri Tapindra Tripura @ Ranjan @
Patindra, resident of Sajai Gairaing Para,
West Jamicherra V/C P.S. Dhumcherra,
District- Dhalai Tripura.
……… Appellant
–Versus–
The State of Tripura,
…….. Respondent
For the Appellant(s)
:
Mr. S. Das, Legal Aid Counsel.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. R. Datta, PP.
Date of hearing
:
23.02.2024
Date of delivery of
Judgment & order
:
12.04.2024
Whether fit for reporting
:
YES
NO
√
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER
This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 28.07.2023
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dhalai Judicial District,
Ambassa in case No.ST (Tpye-1) 19 of 2022 whereby the appellant
was convicted under Section 326 of the IPC and under Section 307 of
IPC with a direction to suffer sentence of rigorous imprisonment for
5[five] years each and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- under both the
counts and in default to pay the fine, to suffer rigorous imprisonment
for a further period of 6 months.
[2]
On 06.04.2022, one Tharmoni Tripura lodged a written
Ejahar to Dhumacherra Police Station alleging, inter alia, that on that
day, at about 11.30 am the appellant who is the husband of his
daughter, Ringkhalaiti Tripura, came to informant’s house and gave
Dao blows on Ringkhalaiti Tripura with an intention to kill her. She
was taken
to Dhumacherra hospital
where she was receiving
treatment. The police authority registered the case as Dhumacherra
P.S Case No.03 of 2022 under Sections 324/307 of the IPC and
proceeded with the investigation which finally culminated into filing of
a chargesheet by the Investigating Officer (I.O), Sub-Inspector of
Police, Sri
Debananda Tripura [PW-10] under Sections 326/307 of
the IPC against the appellant.
[3]
The
charges
under
Sections
&
IPC
were
accordingly framed by the Sessions Judge, Dhalai Judicial District,
Ambassa, to which the appellant claimed his innocence and to
establish the charges, the prosecution thereafter examined total 10
[ten] witnesses and
finally, learned Sessions Judge found the
appellant guilty under both the Sections as indicated above.
[4]
Mr. S. Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
argued that no weapon of offence was seized by the I.O and that
there were major discorroborations amongst the testimonies of vital
witnesses to the case. According to Mr. Das, learned counsel, it was
doubtful that the uncle of the victim i.e. P.W.5 had any scope to
witness the occurrence and PW-6, the sister of the victim, was also
practically a hearsay witness. Learned counsel also argued that
according to PW-3 & PW-4, i.e. grandmother and elder sister of the
victim had claimed to have remained there at the scene of crime but
the victim nowhere stated that the said witnesses were present at the
time of alleged occurrence. According to him, what sort of weapon
exactly used for the alleged commission of crime was not proved by
the prosecution and also there was no basis for the opinion by the
doctor that a sharp cutting weapon was used to cause the injuries to
the victim. Mr. Das, learned counsel further strengthened his
submission, pointing out that the cause of occurrence was due to
matrimonial
dispute
between
the
husband
and
wife
but
no
FIR/complaint regarding any sort of such matrimonial discord between
them was proved. None from the locality also came forward to depose
against the appellant though according to the prosecution witnesses,
the locals immediately arrived there after the occurrence and shifted
the victim to the hospital. Other two points, learned counsel argued,
were that no knowledge or intention of committing murder by the
appellant was proved by the prosecution to attract Section 307 of the
IPC but the trial court omitted to take notice of the same and even the
appellant was deprived of the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act,
1958.
[5]
Mr. Das, learned counsel finally relied on a decision rendered
in Santosh Das vs. State of Tripura, (2014) 2 GLR 667 where
Division Bench of this Court has observed that to attract Section 307
IPC, the act must be done with such intention and knowledge or done
under such circumstances that if death be caused by that act, the
offence of murder would emerge. In that case, out of 4[four] injuriesone was grievous in nature caused on the left forearm of the victim.
Finally, the Court in that case set aside the conviction under Section
307 of the IPC and convicted him under Section 325 IPC. Mr. Das,
learned counsel also referred another decision of this Court in Etim
Miah vs. State of Tripura & Ors, (2018) 2 TLR 628, where the
victim suffered tenderness on the left temporal region, slight
laceration over left supra orbital ridge, laceration with contusion over
left lower lid, bruise over nose, incised wound on the left side of the
neck and bruises over anterior abdominal wall. Keeping in view the
evidence of the doctor in that case, this Court observed that the
medical evidence did not disclose that the cumulative effect of such
injuries were dangerous to life. Such injuries also did not cause any
damage to any vital parts or organs of the body and therefore, finally
concluded that the requirements of Section 307 of the IPC were not
fulfilled in that case.
[6]
The last decision as referred by Mr. Das, learned counsel
was of Orissa High Court between Bagina Munda vs. State of
Orissa [JCRLA No.26 of 2011 decided on 10.01.2024], where on
appreciation of the evidences, the court came to the conclusion that in
absence of any medical evidence that the injury caused upon the
victim was fatal, though it was a grievous one and in absence of
medical evidence that injured was hospitalised for more than 15 days,
the prosecution had failed to prove that the appellant had intended to
kill the victim and therefore, the conviction was altered from Section
307 to Section 326 IPC.
[7]
Mr. R. Datta, learned PP appearing for the State, submitted
that as per the evidence of the relevant witnesses, when the persons
from locality had arrived at the spot, the appellant fled away with the
weapon, otherwise he would inflict further Dao blows on the person of
the victim and therefore, conduct of the appellant and severity of Dao
blow, though may be single in count, amply justified that the
appellant had intention to kill the victim or at least he had the
knowledge that his such Dao blow in the vital area of the head of the
victim, could result in her death. Mr. Datta, learned PP further argued
that all the key witnesses corroborated with each other on material
points regarding commission of alleged crime and therefore, there
was no legal necessity to prove the motive of the crime. Mr. Datta,
learned
PP
further
supplemented
his
submission
that
during
examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant except
giving some denials, did not explain as to how such injuries were
sustained by the victim and why all the witnesses were deposing
against him and therefore, such non-explanation further warranted
the raising of a presumption adverse to the appellant.
[8]
To gain support of his submissions, learned PP relied on the
following decisions:
i) Manubhai Atabhai vs. State of Gujarat, (2007) 10
SCC 358 - In this case, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the
nature of intention has to be gathered from the kind of weapon used,
the part of the body hit, amount of force employed and the
circumstances attendant upon the death.
This case was related to
offence under Section 302 of the IPC
ii) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kedar Yadav (2009)
17 SCC 280- In this case the following principles were reiterated for
rendering conviction under section 307 IPC“13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307
if there is present an intention coupled with some overt act
in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury
capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The
section makes a distinction between the act of the accused
and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act,
irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or
knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the
section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307
IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted
on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.”
iii)
Singapagu Anjaiah vs. State of Andhra Pradesh,
(2010) 9 SCC 799 - While dealing with the issue of applicability of
Section 302 of IPC, Hon’ble Apex Court in this case viewed that as
nobody can enter into the mind of the accused, his intention has to be
gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for the
assault and nature of the injuries caused.
iv)
Prakash Chandra Yadav vs. State of Bihar and
others, (2017) 13 SCC 134- Hon’ble Apex Court while discussing
the applicability of Section 307 of IPC, held that the first part of the
provision of Section 307 of IPC does not contemplate that receipt of
any injury on the part of the victim is a prerequisite for convicting the
accused and in the event any injuries are received, the second part of
Section 307 would be attracted. However, the necessary ingredient for
attracting the first part of Section 307 of IPC is the intention or
knowledge of the accused.
v)
Sadakat
Kotwar
and
Anr.
Jharkhand, [2021 SCC Online SC 1046]
Singapagu Anjaiah(supra),
vs.
The
State
of
- In this case, like
same principle was reiterated that
nobody can enter into the mind of the accused and his intention has
to be ascertained from the weapon used, part of the body chosen for
assault and the nature of injury caused. In that case, a deadly weapon
was used for giving a single blow to the vital part of the body of two
victims i.e. in the stomach and near the chest and therefore, it was
held that the appellants were rightly convicted under Section 307 read
with Section 34 of IPC.
vi) Jafel Biswas and others vs. State of West Bengal,
(2019) 12 SCC 560 – In this case, it was held that absence of
motive does not disperse the prosecution case if the prosecution
succeeds in proving the same. When there are definite evidence
proving an incident and the eyewitness account prove the role of the
accused, absence in proving of the motive by the prosecution does not
affect the prosecution case.
[9]
The key witnesses in this case are PW-1, PW-3, PW.4, PW-
5, PW-8 & PW-9.
PW-8, Ringkhaiti Tripura, the victim stated that two years
prior to the date of the incident, her marriage with the appellant was
solemnized and after the marriage, she was more or less happy in her
matrimonial home but gradually, the appellant became rude to her
and finally started physical torture on her on the pretext of family
affairs. Then she left her matrimonial home and started living in her
paternal house at Padma Kumar Para, Dhumacherra. On fifth day of
her stay there, at about 10.30 am, the appellant suddenly arrived at
her matrimonial house and asked her to go with him. When she
denied to join him in his house, he became furious and gave her blows
from behind with a Takkal. At that time, she was on the embankment
of a pond of her grandmother [PW-3] for tethering her cow.
Consequently, she received bleeding injuries on her head, shoulder,
right elbow etc. and became senseless. According to her, she regained
her sense at Dhumacherra hospital. Subsequently, she came to know
that her grandmother, elder sister, younger brother and few others
had witnessed the occurrence. Except for a single denial that her
husband did not assault her with Takkal, there was no crossexamination from the side of the defence.
[10]
PW-3, Smt. Chanderbala Tripura, the grandmother of the
victim, stated that on that day at about 11.30 am, the appellant went
to their house when she was taking a bath in her pond and the victim
was on the embankment of the pond for grazing purposes. The
appellant met the victim there and after altercating with her, attacked
her with a Takkal and assaulted her indiscriminately. Consequently,
the victim suffered bleeding injuries and fell on the ground. Hearing
the chaos and hullabaloo, when the locals arrived there, the appellant
fled away with that Takkal towards the nearby jungle. The witness
was also released without any cross-examination, except two denials
that the victim was never assaulted by the appellant with Takkal and
she was never subjected to torture by him in her matrimonial home.
[11]
PW-4, Smt. Mallika Tripura, the elder sister of the victim, in
corroboration with above said witnesses stated that at the time of
incident, the victim was on the bank of the pond, tethering her cow
for grazing. The appellant met her there and had altercation with her
and the witness noticed that the appellant had attacked the victim
with a Takkal and assaulted her indiscriminately. The appellant fled
away with that Takkal towards the nearby jungle and locals shifted
the victim to Dhumacherra hospital. She was also similarly released
by the defence without any cross-examination except for one or two
denials.
[12]
PW-1, Smt. Sasha Laxmi Tripura, mother of the victim, was
also in the house at the relevant point in time and corroborated with
the victim on material points. She stated that suddenly hearing the
shouting of the victim, she along with PWs-3 & 4 went there and
found the appellant giving Dao blows to the victim.
Thereafter, he
fled away through said jungle with that Dao. She was also not crossexamined on any substantial point by the defence except for a few
denials.
[13]
Learned Counsel Mr. Das strenuously argued that PW-1
was dis-corroborating with PW-3 and PW-4 stating that both the said
two witnesses went with her to the place of occurrence but those
witnesses had deposed otherwise, and therefore, their presence in the
place of occurrence became doubtful. As far as the question of
discorroboration of PW-4 with PW-1 is concerned, nowhere has PW-4
stated that she was at some other place in her father’s house
wherefrom place of occurrence was not visible at that time. Therefore,
there is no significant dis-corroboration between them. Regarding the
evidence of PW-3 that she was taking a bath in the pond at the
material time of incident, the same also cannot be treated as a major
dis-corroboration. PW.1 simply stated that hearing the shouting of the
victim she alongwith her mother and elder daughter rushed to the
spot but did not say that all of them went there together from a single
point of the house. Even if, it is treated as a little variation with the
evidence of PW.3, but for this reason only, the entire evidence of
PW.3 cannot be discarded, especially when she could not be shaken in
her cross examination.
[14]
PW-5, Sri Krittibashi Tripura, uncle of the victim, deposed
that at the time of incident, he was in his house and saw that the
appellant had attacked the victim with Takkal at the embankment of
pond. He was also not cross-examined except giving of some denials
to him by the defence. Learned counsel for the appellant referring to
hand sketch map argued that it was not probable from this witness to
see the incident from his house. But without any cross-examination on
that point with reference to the site map, such inference cannot be
drawn.
[15]
PW-2, Sri Tharmoni Tripura (informant), father of the
victim was not an eye witness of the incident and he met his daughter
in the hospital. Therefore, his testimony is not discussed further. PW6, Sri Bijoy Babu Tripura, the cousin of the victim also stated that he
learnt about the incident subsequently.
[16]
PW-7, Sanjoy Tripura another uncle of the victim, however,
deposed that on hearing the hue and cry from the house of the victim
he rushed there and found the appellant was fleeing away with a
Takkal towards nearby jungle. He also found the victim in an injured
condition having fallen to the ground. He further stated that at the
time of incident, both the grandmother and elder sister of victim were
taking a bath in their pond. Learned counsel for the appellant also
argued that according to this witness, PW.4 was taking bath in the
pond, but PW.4 stated that she was doing her household work. Be
that as it may, such minor variations in the evidence of the witnesses
are natural and cannot be counted as fatal for the prosecution case.
In view of the enormous evidence as discussed above, it is established
that the appellant had caused hurt on the person of the victim by a
Takkal on the alleged date of incident.
[17]
Mr. Das, learned counsel, though argued that there
was dis-corroboration between the parents of the victim and other eye
witnesses regarding the nature of the weapon used, as PW-1, mother
of the victim and PW.2, father of the victim both had stated about the
use of Dao by the appellant in inflicting such injury, whereas other
eye-witnesses, including the victim had deposed about use of Takkal
by the appellant. Such dis-corroboration is, however, insignificant
specially when the father was not the eye-witness and both the Takkal
and Dao are similar nature of weapon with a very little variation in
their shape.
[18]
Coming to the point of medical evidence, PW-9 Dr. Indrajit
Debbarma, stated that the following injures were found by him on the
person of the victim and she was hospitalised for 5 days. He also
proved his injury report.
Description of injuries:
(i) Incised wound
(ii)
[19]
Contusion
- (8 cm X 1 cm
X 2 cm)
- - 1.5 cm in
diameter
- Over left
parietal region
of scalp
- Severe
-Sharp object
-Over posterior
aspect of mid
forearm
-Slight
-Blunt object
Despite the fact that the medical officer did not, in specific
words, say that such injures were dangerous enough to endanger the
life of the victim, but the measurement of the first injury itself
suggests that the first injury was very serious in nature and was
caused over the most vital parts of the head with force, though the
second injury was simple in nature. Inflicting such type of injury on
the vital part of the head with a higher degree of force is sufficient to
infer that the appellant had inflicted such injury with the intention to
kill her or at least he had the knowledge that such type of injury could
take away the life of the victim. Therefore, Section 307 of IPC is
attracted in the instant case.
[20]
In the instant case, the victim is a rustic tribal woman
and was brutally attacked in her own paternal house by the appellant
who was also armed with one sharp cutting weapon like Takkal while
visiting his in-laws house. This fact itself indicates that he had certain
mental preparations to commit the crime. The injury was inflicted with
greater force on one of the most vital parts of the human body and he
left the place, leaving the victim in seriously injured condition, when
he found other local people were arriving there. In such a backdrop,
releasing the appellant on admonition or on execution of bond will
give a wrong message to the victim as well as to the society.
Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958.
In view of the above, it is held that the appeal is devoid of merit
and accordingly, the same is dismissed.
Send down the LCRs forthwith with a copy of this judgment.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
SATABDI
DUTTA
Sujay
DUTTA
Date: 2024.04.12 18:14:36
+05'30'
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review