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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRL.A(J) NO.32 OF 2023
Sri Bikram Munda,
S/o- Sri Laxmicharan Munda,
Resident of Purba Ludhua, Ward No.5,
P.S. & P.O.- Sabroom, South Tripura.
……Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura,
.......Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s)
: Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. R. Datta, Public Prosecutor.
Date of hearing and delivery of
Judgment & Order
: 23.07.2024.
Whether fit for reporting : NO.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
J U D G M E N T & O R D E R(ORAL)
T. AMARNATH GOUD(J)
This present appeal has been filed under Section
374 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the Judgment
of conviction and Order of Sentence dated 12.04.2023 passed in
ST(T-1)02/2022 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Sabroom South Tripura sentencing the appellant to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/with default stipulation for committing offence under Section 302
of IPC.
2.
The brief fact of this case is that one Pradip Roy
i.e., P.W.-1 herein lodged an FIR with the Officer-in-Charge of
Sabroom Police Station vide registration No.2021/SBM/021
dated 22.04.2021 under Sections 498A/302 of IPC alleging that
the accused-appellant who is the husband of his elder sister
Arati Roy(Munda) used to torture her over demand of cash
money. On 11.04.2021 at around 9.00. P.M., while serving rice
in their kitchen room, the accused-Bikram Munda set her ablaze
by pouring kerosene oil on her person. Immediately after such
occurrence, she was brought to Sabroom Sub-Division Hospital,
and from there, the attending Doctor referred her to Gomati
District Hospital, Udaipur. Due to her deteriorating condition, she
was again shifted to the AGMC & GBP Hospital, Agartala where
on 18.04.2021 at around 12 noon, she succumbed to her injuries
under treatment.
3.
Based on the said written complaint, the police
started investigation. During the investigation, the investigating
Officer of the case recorded the statement of witnesses,
collected the dying declaration of the victim-deceased, postmortem report, material objects, arrested the appellant, and
filed charge sheet under section 498A/302 IPC.
4.
After taking cognizance of the offence by the
learned SDJM, Sabroom, South Tripura, the case was committed
to the court of learned Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Belonia
for trial according to law. The learned Session Judge, South
Tripura framed charges under Section 498A of IPC and under
Section 302 of IPC, which the appellant denied and claimed to be
tried.
5.
During the trial, the prosecution examined as many
as 15 witnesses, and relevant documents were also exhibited.
The accused-appellant was also examined under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C. Thereafter the case was transferred to the Court of
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sabroom, South Tripura.
6.
On 14.03.2022, the argument of both the parties
was heard, and by a judgment dated 12.04.2023, learned
Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellant and on the
same date sentenced the convict-appellant herein as stated
here-in-above.
7.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the Judgment
of conviction and Order of sentence dated 12.04.2023, the
convict-appellant has preferred this appeal.
8.
Heard
Mr.
S.
Bhattacharjee,
learned
counsel
appearing for the appellant herein as well as Mr. Raju Datta,
learned Addl. P.P., appearing for the State-respondent.
9.
It is the argument of Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant that on the strength of the
evidence of P.W.-4, P.W.-10 and Exbt P-4, the dying declaration
of the victim deceased, the conviction has been ordered without
examining the issue of whether there was any presence of
kerosene as alleged. Further, there was no forensic test done to
find out whether the cause of death was by pouring kerosene.
Learned counsel further argued that on the strength of the dying
declaration, the conviction cannot be made.
In this regard, learned counsel relied upon paras-14 to
17 of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in
2021 STPL 4376 SC titled as Jayamma and anr., Vs. State
of Karnataka. The same is given here-in-under:“14. Before we advert to the actual admissibility and
credibility of the dying declaration (Ex.P5), it will be beneficial to brace
ourselves of the case law on the evidentiary value of a dying declaration
and the sustenance of conviction solely based thereupon. We may
hasten to add that while there is huge wealth of case law, and incredible
jurisprudential contribution by this Court on this subject, we are
consciously referring to only a few decisions which are closer to the
facts of the case in hand. We may briefly notice these judgments.
14.1. In P.V. Radhakrishna. v. State of Karnataka11, this Court
considered the residuary question whether the percentage of burns
suffered is a determinative factor to affect the credibility of a dying
declaration and the probability of its recording. It was held that there is
no hard and fast rule of universal application in this regard and much
would depend upon the nature of the burn, part of the body affected,
impact of burn on the faculties to think and other relevant factor.
14.2. In Chacko v. State of Kerala12, this Court declined to accept the
prosecution case based on the dying declaration where the deceased
was about 70 years old and had suffered 80 per cent burns. It was held
that it would be difficult to accept that the injured could make a detailed
dying declaration after a lapse of about 8 to 9 hours of the burning,
giving minute details as to the motive and the manner in which he had
suffered the injuries. That was of course a case where there was no
certification by the doctor regarding the mental and physical condition
of the deceased to make dying declaration. Nevertheless, this Court
opined that the manner in which the incident was recorded in the dying
declaration created grave doubts to the genuineness of the document.
The Court went on to opine that even though the doctor therein had
recorded “patient conscious, talking” in the wound certificate, that fact
by itself would not further the case of the prosecution as to the
condition of the patient making the dying declaration, nor would the
oral evidence of the doctor or the investigating officer, made before the
court for the first time, in any manner improve the prosecution case.
14.3. In Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra13, it was
restated that the dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence
and must like any other evidence satisfy the Court that what is stated
therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon
it. Further, relying upon the decision in Paniben v. State of Gujarat14
wherein this Court summed up several previous judgments governing
dying declaration, the Court in Sham Shankar Kankaria (Supra)
reiterated::
“(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration
cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State
of M.P.[(1976) 3 SCC 104]);
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true
and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See
State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC 552 and Ramawati Devi
v. State of Bihar [(1983)1 SCC 211]);
(iii) The Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must
ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or
imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify
the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K.
Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [(1976) 3 SCC 618]);
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon
without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.
[(1974) 4 SCC 264]);
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any
dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See
Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25]);
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the
basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC
654]);
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as
to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v.
Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [1980 Supp SCC 455]);
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be
discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself
guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC
769]);
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in
a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the
medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased
was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the
medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [1988
Supp SCC 152]);
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in
the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See
State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390]);
(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying
declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the
plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and
reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State
of Maharashtra [(1982) 1 SCC 700])”
15.
It goes without saying that when the dying declaration
has been recorded in accordance with law, and it gives a cogent and
plausible explanation of the occurrence, the Court can rely upon it as
the solitary piece of evidence to convict the accused. It is for this reason
that Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is an exception to the general
rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence and its Clause (1)
makes the statement of the decease admissible. Such statement,
classified as a “dying declaration” is made by a person as to the cause
of his death or as to the injuries which culminated to his death or the
circumstances under which injuries were inflicted. A dying declaration is
thus admitted in evidence on the premise that the anticipation of
brewing death breeds the same human feelings as that of a
conscientious and guiltless person under oath. It is a statement
comprising of last words of a person before his death which are
presumed to be truthful, and not infected by any motive or malice. The
dying declaration is therefore admissible in evidence on the principle of
necessity as there is very little hope of survival of the maker, and if
found reliable, it can certainly form the basis for conviction.
16.
We may also take note of the decision of this Court in
the case of Surinder Kumar (Supra). In the said case, the victim was
admitted in hospital with burn injuries and her dying declaration was
recorded by an Executive Magistrate. This Court, first doubted whether
the victim could put a thumb impression on the purported dying
declaration when she had suffered 9597 per cent burn injuries.
Thereafter, it was noted that “at the time of recording the statement of
the deceased…….no endorsement of the doctor was made about her
position to make such statement”, and only after the recording of the
statement did the doctor state that the patient was conscious while
answering the questions, and was “fit to give statement”. This Court
lastly noticed that before the alleged dying declaration was recorded,
the victim in the course of her treatment had been administered Fortwin
and Pethidine injections, and therefore she could not have possessed
normal alertness. It was hence held that although there is neither a rule
of law nor of prudence that the dying declaration cannot be acted upon
without corroboration, the Court must nonetheless be satisfied that the
dying declaration is true and voluntary, and only then could it be the
sole basis for conviction without corroboration.
17.
Consistent with the cited principles, this Court refused to
uphold the conviction in the case of Sampat Babso Kale and Another v.
State of Maharashtra15. The dying declaration in that case was made by
a victim who had suffered 98 percent burn injuries, and the statement
was recorded after the victim was injected with painkillers. This Court
adopted a cautious approach, and opined that there were serious doubts
as to whether the victim was in a fit state of mind to make the
statement. Given the extent of burn injuries, it was observed that the
victim must have been in great agony, and once a sedative had been
injected, the possibility of her being in a state of delusion could not be
completely ruled out. Further, it was specifically noted that “the
endorsement made by the doctor that the victim was in a fit state of
mind to make the statement has been made not before the statement
but after the statement was recorded. Normally it should be the other
way around.”
[emphasis supplied]”
Stating thus, learned counsel urged this Court to
set aside the impugned Order of the Court below.
10.
Per contra, learned P.P., placed reliance on the
evidence on P.W.-4, P.W.-10, and P.W.-11, the Doctor who had
initially given first aid to the victim-deceased. P.W.11 stated that
he smelled kerosene from the body and wearing apparels of the
victim. Learned P.P., also indicated that it is evident from the
dying declaration of the victim-deceased that the accusedappellant poured kerosene on the person of the victim and set
her ablaze.
To support his argument, learned P.P., relied upon
para-6 of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported
in (1998) 9 SCC 303 titled as Ravi Chander and ors., Vs.
State of Punjab. The same is given here-in-under:“6. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts
and circumstances of the case and the evidences adduced and also
after taking into consideration the two recorded dying declarations,
namely, the first one recorded by the ASI and the second one recorded
by the Executive Magistrate and also after taking into consideration
the oral dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased to
PW 4, Prem Chand, it appears to us that the first dying declaration
which was recorded by the ASI cannot be accepted. The deposition of
PW 4 Prem Chand appears to be reliable and his deposition also gets
support from the post-mortem report. Prem Chand has deposed that
his sister stated to him that previously in the hospital under threat her
signature was taken on a paper by the police and she had not made
any such statement. PW 4 also deposed that in the previous evening
the mother-in-law hit the deceased on the head with the rolling pin.
From the post-mortem report it transpires that a lacerated injury was
found in the parietal region. Such injury on the head fits in with the
case of hitting the deceased with a rolling pin (belna) as alleged by the
deceased. We have carefully looked into the dying declaration
recorded by the Executive Magistrate and it appears to us that there is
no occasion to hold that such dying declaration was not taken properly
by the Executive Magistrate. Correction made in the first leaf in
respect of Question No. 7 and the answer given to such question is
only in respect of describing whether it was the question or the
answer. The statements given by the deceased have been recorded
without any overwriting or without any interpolation. Initials have
been put by the Executive Magistrate at the bottom of the first leaf and
only a part of the signature has touched some writing in respect of
Question No. 8 for which no doubt can be entertained about the
correctness of recording. So far as the flow of writing is concerned, it
also appears that all the questions and answers have been recorded in
the same flow. We have also looked at the reverse side of the page and
considering the same it does not appear to us that there is any
occasion to doubt that such writing was subsequently made by the
Executive Magistrate. The Executive Magistrate has also deposed in
the case and he has specifically deposed that he recorded the dying
declaration in question and answer form. He has denied the suggestion
in the cross-examination that there was any antedating or fabrication
on his part in recording the dying declaration. The Executive
Magistrate is a disinterested witness and is a responsible officer. There
is no circumstance or any material on record to suspect that he had
any animus against the accused or was in any way interested in
fabricating the dying declaration. The dying declaration recorded by
him tallies substantially with the dying declaration said to have been
made orally to the brother Prem Chand PW 4. Simply because the
offence under Sections 498A and 304B IPC could not be established
beyond doubt by the prosecution for which the accused were acquitted
of the said charges, it cannot be held that the accused had no motive
for committing the said murder. Although the dying declaration
recorded by the Executive Magistrate was sent to the Investigating
Officer after about a fortnight, we do not think that for such delay,
genuineness of the said dying declaration recorded by the Executive
Magistrate is to be doubted. There is an entry in the despatch register
by which the said statement was sent to the DSP (H) Ludhiana by the
Head Constable of the police post. Mr Roy has contended that the
doctor who countersigned the first dying declaration recorded by the
ASI has not been examined by the prosecution. In our view, for not
examining the doctor, the dying declaration recorded by the Executive
Magistrate and the dying declaration orally made to Prem Chand, PW
4, need not be doubted. Moreover, it was open to the accused to
examine the doctor alleged to have countersigned the dying
declaration recorded by the ASI if the accused had intended to rely on
such dying declaration.
Learned P.P., also relied upon para-14 of the
Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2024 SCC
Online SC 237 titled as Naeem Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh.
The same produced here-in-under:“14 It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held
that dying declaration can be the sole basis of the conviction if it
inspires the full confidence of the court. The Court is required to
satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of
making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring,
prompting or imagination. It has further been held that, where the
Court is satisfied about the dying declaration being true and voluntary,
it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It has
further been held that there cannot be an absolute rule of law that the
dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is
corroborated. It has been held that the rule requiring corroboration is
merely a rule of prudence. The Court has observed that if after careful
scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to
induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and
consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of
conviction, even if there is no corroboration.”
Stating thus, learned P.P., urged this Court to
dismiss this appeal and uphold the impugned Judgment and
Order of conviction.
11.
record.
Heard both sides and perused the evidence on
12.
To adjudicate the case in hand, let us examine
some important witnesses and evidence.
13.
P.W.-1, Sri Pradip Roy is the brother of the
deceased-victim. Being the informant he deposed that the
accused-appellant entered into marital knot with his deceased
sister about 20 years ago. Initially, they were leading a peaceful
conjugal life for about 10-15 years of their marriage. Thereafter,
the accused started torturing her on illegal demand for money. It
is also asserted that the accused is an addicted person and used
to demand money from her so that he could expend to gratify
his addicted life. On being demanded, sometimes she gave
money to the accused. His sister shared with them such
difficulties happening in her life whenever she comes to their
house. Further, he went on to testify that on 11.04.2021, the
accused poured kerosene oil on his sister and set her ablaze.
After the incident his nephew P.W.-4 Joy Munda, son of his
deceased sister rushed to his house and informed him about the
incident that the accused caused burn injuries to his sister by
setting fire on her and during such incident, PW-4 tried to save
his mother by throwing water on her burning body. It is also
found in the deposition of P.W.-1 that he along with his nephew
P.W.-4 immediately shifted his injured sister to a nearby hospital
of Sabroom by ambulance. Due to grave burn injuries, his sister
was referred to Gomati District Hospital, Gomati, and again, she
was taken to GBP Hospital for better treatment; but after about
a week on 18.04.2021, his victim sister succumbed to burn
injuries.
P.W-1
also
added
to
his
deposition
stating
the
incriminating fact that his sister told him in the presence of
P.W.-4 and other P.W.s that the accused deliberately set fire on
her by pouring kerosene oil. Based on such incident, he lodged
FIR with Sabroom Police Station written by one Sri Dipankar
Debbarma P.W.-12 as per his versions.
In the cross-examination of P.W.-1, nothing is found
relevant except suggestions and denial made on behalf of the
accused.
14.
P.W.-4 Sri Joy Munda who is the son of the
deceased and accused-Bikram Munda deposed that on the date
of the incident at around 9 pm he was sleeping in a separate
room of their dwelling house and his parents i.e. accused father
and deceased mother were in another room and at that relevant
time, all on a sudden, his mother cried out sharply and telling
'fire and fire'. On hearing this, he hurriedly entered into the
room where his mother was screaming and he threw water on
his mother to stop burning. His mother told him that the accused
father poured kerosene oil on her and ignited the fire. Later on,
he, being accompanied by his maternal uncle (P.W.-1) and
neighbour (P.W.-5) shifted his injured mother immediately to
Sabroom Sub-Divisional Hospital where from, she was referred
to Gomati District Hospital and again was taken to GBP Hospital,
Agartala.
His
relatives
visited
the
injured
mother
during
treatment to see her condition and after four days of treatment
his mother was incapable of speaking, and on 18.04.2021, she
succumbed to burn injuries. On the specific question of the Court
below about the reason for setting fire on his mother, the
witness replied that at the relevant time of the incident, the
accused father was picking up quarrel with his mother.
In cross-examination, he replied in response to a query
that when he was throwing water on the person of her mother,
at that time, his father also went to bring water.
15.
PW-10, Shri Samit Kumar Das is an Executive
Magistrate of the office of SDM, Sadar Sub-Division Agartala. He
deposed that, on 12.04.2021
on being endorsed as per
requisition received from the Police Out Post, GBT, Agartala, he
recorded the dying declaration of deceased Arati Munda. Before
recording, he consulted with one available attending doctor who
examined the victim lady, and finding her to be in a conscious
and sound/fit state of mind on her consent, the declaration was
recorded. He stated that the name of the attending doctor is
Sovik Majumder. The witness identified the recorded dying
declaration marked as Exhibit-P-4.
In cross-examination P.W.-10 deposed that he
noticed burn injuries on the person of injured Arati Munda; but
he did not cite the percentage of such burn injuries in his
recording.
16.
P.W.-11, Dr. Tamal Roy is a Medical Officer of
Sabroom Sub- Divisional Hospital. From his testimony, it reveals
that on 11.04.2021 at 10:10 p.m. he examined one patient
named Arati Munda who came to the Hospital with a history of
homicidal burn injuries caused by kerosene pertaining to
Sabroom PS case No.21/21 under Section 498A/302 of IPC. On
examination, he found smell of kerosene from the wearing
apparel as well as from the body of the victim woman. She
sustained around 90% burn covering the whole upper and lower
limbs, front and back trunk, blackening of burn areas and such
burn injuries are serious in nature. After examination, the
patient was referred to Gomati District Hospital, Udaipur for
further treatment. Based on his examination, he prepared injury
report dated 28.04.2021 marked as exhibit P-5 on identification
and the same was sent to the O/C of Sabroom PS.
In cross-examination of P.W.-11 indicated that the
patient Arati Munda was conscious when she was brought to the
Hospital.
17.
The dying declaration of the victim-deceased i.e.,
Exbt-P-4 is a crucial piece of evidence and the same is produced
herein:"I, Arati Munda, in sound health do state that, on 1104-2021 AD, last Sunday, I returned home from work at 6 pm. After
returning home I found that my husband i.e. Bikram Munda, is in
drunken state. My husband habitually indulges in alcohol and does not
do any work. I have to work to shoulder the burden of our family's
expenses. That evening after returning home from work, upon
confronting him about his drinking and remaining idle without work, a
heated argument ensued between us. Subsequently, he poured 2 litre of
kerosene on my body. When I ran out of the room, he ignited a broom
and set fire on my body. My son rushed to me and doused the fire by
pouring water on my body. I was subsequently taken to Sabroom
hospital. Currently, I am undergoing treatment at GBP Hospital."
18.
The evidence of the eye-witness i.e. P.W.-4, who is
none other than the son of the accused-appellant and the victimdeceased has not been shaken in the initial stage or before the
Court. The evidence of P.W.-4 is corroborated and reiterated by
P.W.-1, the complainant who stated that it was P.W.-4 who
informed them about the action of his father in burning his
mother. Further, P.W-11 the Doctor who had provided First Aid
to the victim-deceased categorically stated that he smelled
kerosene from the body and wearing apparels of the victim,
when she was brought to the hospital. When the evidence of
P.Ws-1, 4, 10, and 11, are coupled with the dying declaration
i.e. Exbt P-4, this Court is convinced with the argument of the
learned Public Prosecutor. Accordingly, this present appeal
stands dismissed and the impugned Judgment and Order dated
12.04.2023 is confirmed.
19.
As a sequel, stay if any stands vacated. Pending
application(s), if any also stands closed.
Send down the LCRs.
B. PALIT, J
suhanjit
RAJKUMAR
SUHANJIT
SINGHA
RAJKUMAR SUHANJIT
SINGHA
Date: 2024.07.26
13:16:13 +05'30'
T. AMARNATH GOUD, J
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