The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
7. In view of the above reasons, the present writ petition is allowed and the impugned Order is set aside. The petitioner is reinstated into his service with all consequential benefits. However, this Court has taken into consideration the prima facie allegations of disproportionate assets against the petitioner herein and directs the respondents that while reinstating the petitioner to his service, he should not be posted to the original place of posting instead the petitioner should be posted elsewhere in the same rank.
8. As a sequel, stay if any stands vacated. application(s), if any also stands closed. suhanjit +05'30' Pending
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C) NO.96 OF 2023
Sri Bikash Bhowmik
……… Appellant(s)
Vs.
The State of Tripura and ors.
……. Respondent(s)
For the Petitioner(s)
: Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Advocate.
Mrs. R. Chakraborty, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. D. Sharma, Addl. G.A.
Mr. R. Datta, Advocate.
Date of hearing and delivery of
Judgment & Order
: 19.07.2023
Whether fit for reporting : YES/NO.
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
JUDGMENT AND ORDER(ORAL)
This present petition has been filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs:“ i. Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of
them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Certiorari and/or in the nature
thereof, shall not be issued, for transmitting the records, lying them, for
rendering substantive and conscionable justice to the petitioner, and for
quashing/setting aside the impugned Order dated 27.12.2022(Annexure-15
supra)
ii. Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of them,
to show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the nature thereof,
shall not be issued, mandating/directing them to forthwith revoke/rescind
the impugned Order dated 27.12.2022(Annexure-15 supra), and further,
for mandating/directing them, to reinstate the petitioner in service, with
effect from the date of his dismissal from service, i.e.27.12.2022,
alongwith all other consequential benefits;
iii. Call for the records, appertaining to this writ petition;
iv. After hearing the parties, be pleased to make the Rule absolute
in terms of (i) to (ii) above;
v. Costs of and incidental to this proceedings;
vi. Any other Relief(s) as to this Hon’ble High Court may deem fit
and proper.”
2.
Heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mrs.
R. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as
Mr. D. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A. appearing for the respondent-State
and Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel appearing for respondent-TPSC.
3.
Mr. Deb, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner
submitted that the disciplinary authority proceeding with a premeditation fixing the goal to punish the petitioner. The penalty imposed
on
the
petitioner
by
the
impugned
Order
dated
27.12.2022
is
disproportionate and the same is liable to be set aside.
To support his argument, Mr. Deb, learned sr. counsel
referred to Para-22, 26 and 27 of the Hon’ble Apex Court Judgment
reported in (2014) 9 SCC 105 titled as Gorkha Security services Vs.
Government(NCT of Delhi) and ors. The same is reproduced herein
under:“20) The High Court has simply stated that the purpose
of show cause notice is primarily to enable the noticee to meet the grounds
on which the action is proposed against him. No doubt, the High Court is
justified to this extent. However, it is equally important to mention as to
what would be the consequence if the noticee does not satisfactorily meet
the grounds on which an action is proposed. To put it otherwise, we are of
the opinion that in order to fulfil the requirements of principles of natural
justice, a show cause notice should meet the following two requirements
viz:
i) The material/ grounds to be stated on which according to the
Department necessitates an action;
ii) Particular penalty/action which is proposed to be taken. It is this second
requirement which the High Court has failed to omit.
we may hasten to add that even if it is not specifically mentioned in the
show cause notice but it can be clearly and safely be discerned from the
reading thereof, that would be sufficient to meet this requirement.
Discussion with reference to the instant case.
26) In the present case, it is obvious that action is
taken as provided in sub clause 2(ii). Under this clause, as is clear from the
reading thereof, the Department had a right to cancel the contract and
withhold the agreement. That has been done. The Department has also a
right to get the job which was to be carried out by the defaulting
contractor, to be carried out from other contractor(s). In such an event,
the Department also has a right to recover the difference from the
defaulting contractor. This clause, no doubt, gives further right to the
Department to blacklist the contractor for a period of 4 years and also
forfeit his earnest money/ security deposit, if so required. It is thus
apparent that this sub-clause provides for various actions which can be
taken and penalties which can be imposed by the Department. In such a
situation which action the Department proposes to take, need to be
specifically stated in the show cause notice. It becomes all the more
important when the action of black listing and/ or forfeiture of earnest
money/ security deposit is to be taken, as the clause stipulates that such
an action can be taken, if so warranted. The words “if so warranted”, thus,
assume great significance. It would show that it is not necessary for the
Department to resort to penalty of black listing or forfeiture of earnest
money/ security deposit in all cases, even if there is such a power. It is left
to the Department to inflict any such penalty or not depending upon as to
whether circumstances in a particular case warrant such a penalty. There
has to be due application of mind by the authority competent to impose the
penalty, on these aspects. Therefore, merely because of the reason that
clause 27 empowers the Department to impose such a penalty, would not
mean that this specific penalty can be imposed, without putting the
defaulting contractor to notice to this effect.
27) We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was incumbent on the part of
the Department to state in the show cause notice that the competent
authority intended to impose such a penalty of blacklisting, so as to provide
adequate and meaningful opportunity to the appellant to show cause
against the same. However, we may also add that even if it is not
mentioned specifically but from the reading of the show cause notice, it can
be clearly inferred that such an action was proposed, that would fulfill this
requirement. In the present case, however, reading of the show cause
notice does not suggest that noticee could find out that such an action
could also be taken. We say so for the reasons that are recorded
hereinafter.
4.
On the other hand, Mr. D. Sharma, learned Addl. G.A.
appearing for the State respondent submitted that the petitioner has
accumulated an unaccounted sum of wealth which is disproportionate to
his income and the impugned order as passed by the disciplinary
authority is just and proper.
To support his argument, learned Addl. G.A relied upon
Para-15 of the Full Bench Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court
Judgment passed in State of Madras Vs. A.R. Srinivasan reported
in (1966) AIR(SC) 1827. The same is reproduced herein:“15. We are not prepared to accept this argument. In dealing with
the question as to whether it is obligatory on the State Government to give
reasons in support of the order imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer
we cannot overlook the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against such a
delinquent officer begin with an enquiry conducted by an officer appointed in
that behalf. That enquiry is followed by a report and the Public Service
Commission is consulted where necessary. Having regard to the material
which is thus made available to the State Government and which is made
available to the delinquent officer also, it seems to us somewhat unreasonable
to suggest that the State Government must record its reasons why it accepts
the findings of the Tribunal. It is conceivable that if the State Government
does not accept the findings of the Tribunal which may be in favour of the
delinquent officer and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer,
it should give reasons why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal,
though even in such a case, it is not necessary that the reasons should be
detailed or elaborate. But where the State Government agrees with the
findings of the Tribunal which are against the delinquent officer, we do not
think as a matter of law, it could be said that the State Government cannot
impose the penalty against the delinquent officer in accordance with the
findings of the Tribunal unless it gives reasons to show why the said findings
were accepted by it. The proceedings are, no. doubt, quasi-judicial; but
having regard to the manner in which these enquiries are conducted, we do
not think an obligation can be imposed on the State Government to record
reasons in every case.
5.
Heard both sides and perused the evidence on record.
6.
It is evident from the record that though an allegation has
been raised that the petitioner has accumulated unaccounted wealth
disproportionate to his income, but, the count of those wealth has not
been given or pinpointed as to where the petitioner has accumulated it.
No bank statements or property has been mentioned by the respondent
authorities. Further, the respondents have not given proper reasons and
passed a detailed order while imposing punishment on the petitioner
herein. Even in the A.R. Srinivasan(supra), the Full Bench of Hon'ble
Apex Court stated that the authorities have to pass a detailed order
while imposing punishment in a Disciplinary proceeding, but the same
has not been followed in the case at hand. The inquiry report since not
accepted no reasons to is given indicating as to what portion of the
report is not accepted. It is against Rule 15 of CCS CCA Rules.
7.
In view of the above reasons, the present writ petition is
allowed and the impugned Order is set aside. The petitioner is reinstated
into his service with all consequential benefits. However, this Court has
taken into consideration the prima facie allegations of disproportionate
assets against the petitioner herein and directs the respondents that
while reinstating the petitioner to his service, he should not be posted to
the original place of posting instead the petitioner should be posted
elsewhere in the same rank.
8.
As
a
sequel,
stay
if
any
stands
vacated.
application(s), if any also stands closed.
JUDGE
suhanjit
RAJKUMAR
SUHANJIT
SINGHA
SUHANJIT SINGHA
Date: 2023.07.21 16:01:00
+05'30'
Pending
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review