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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
IA No.01/2023 in Crl.A. No.11 of 2023
Sri Amlan Chowdhury, S/o Shri Mantosh Chowdhury of Madhyapara, PS-R.K.
Pur, Udaipur, Dist-Gomati, Tripura
.........Applicant/Appellant(s)
Versus
1. Sri Abhijit Das, S/o Shri Debabrata Das of Badarmokam, Poultry Road,
under R.K. Pur PS, Udaipur, Dist- Gomati, Tripura
2. The State of Tripura, represented by Secretary-cum-Commissioner, Home
Department, Govt. of Tripura, New Capital Complex, P.O-Lichubagan, P.S.West Agartala.
.........Respondent(s)
For Applicant/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. A. Acharjee, Advocate,
Miss Shreya Sarkar, Advocate,
Mr. Rahul Acharjee, Advocate.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Samrat Ghosh, Addl. P.P.,
Mr. D.K. Daschoudhury, Advocate.
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. APARESH KUMAR SINGH
Order
23/08/2023
Heard Mr. A Acharjee, learned counsel for the applicant/appellant,
Mr. Samrat Ghosh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondentState and Mr. D.K. Daschoudhury, learned counsel for the respondent No.1.
2.
The Criminal Leave Petition No.07/2023 has been filed after a
delay of 919 days. The applicant/appellant has filed IA No.01/2023 for
condonation of delay. The judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondent
No.1 in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI
Act, for short) was passed on 19.11.2018 by learned Judicial Magistrate, First
Class, Udaipur, Gomati District in case No.CR (NI) 30 of 2017. The applicant
had preferred an appeal before the learned Sessions Court, Udaipur, Gomati
District instead of seeking leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C
before this Court. The Criminal Appeal No.39(4) of 2018 was finally dismissed
as not maintainable on 11.03.2022. Even thereafter, the applicant did not prefer
any application seeking leave under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C; but chose to
prefer a Criminal Revision Petition No.21 of 2022. It was directed against the
order of the Appellate Court. This Court vide order dated 19.05.2023 observed
that there is no infirmity in the order of the Appellate Court. The revision
petition is misconceived. Thereafter, learned counsel for the petitioner sought
leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C in a separate proceeding
against the judgment of acquittal dated 19.11.2018 passed by the learned Trial
Court which was opposed by learned counsel for the respondent-accused. This
Court, therefore, did not make any comments upon the request made by learned
counsel for the petitioner. The revision petition was dismissed with an
observation that if it is permissible for the petitioner to file a fresh application
under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C, it is up to the petitioner to do so. The
chronology of dates, therefore, shows that there was a delay of 385 days from
29.04.2022 to 19.05.2023. Thereafter, the instant petition had been filed on
12.07.2023. It has occasioned a total delay of 919 days in filing the appeal.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the delay has been
occasioned on account of pursuing wrongful remedies. As such, the delay is not
unexplained or inordinate. The applicant/appellant, being an ordinary citizen,
may not have been properly advised to pursue the right remedy. Therefore, the
delay may be condoned.
3.
Mr. A Acharjee, learned counsel for the applicant/appellant, has
also drawn the attention of this Court to the findings of the learned Trial Court
in the judgment of acquittal. He submits that the ingredients of the offence
under Section 138 were satisfied, but the accused has been acquitted of the
charges only on the ground that the complainant had not been able to adduce
evidence in order to discharge the burden that the cheque in question bearing
No.656473 dated 26.05.2017 was issued towards discharge of debt or liability.
Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant has relied upon at Paragraph 13 of a
decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rangappa v. Sri Mohan reported in
(2010) 11 SCC 441 which is reproduced hereunder:
“13. The High Court in its order noted that in the course of the trial
proceedings, the accused had admitted that the signature on the impugned
cheque (No.0886322 dated 8-2-2001) was indeed his own. Once this fact
has been acknowledged, Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption
that the cheque pertained to a legally enforceable debt or liability. This
presumption is of a rebuttal nature and the onus is then on the accused to
raise a probably defence. With regard to the present facts, the High Court
found that the defence raised by the accused was not probable.”
It is submitted that if the accused has admitted his signature on the impugned
cheque, the presumption that the cheque was issued pertaining to a legally
enforceable debt or liability is fulfilled. The presumption is of a rebuttal nature
and the onus is then on the accused to raise a probable defence. It is also
submitted that the accused has not been able to raise any probable defence for
shifting of the onus upon the complainant to show that the cheque was issued
for discharge of any debt or liability. However, the learned Trial Court wrongly
interpreted the provisions of Section 138 read with Section 139 and Section 118
of the NI Act and acquitted the accused person of the charges.
4.
Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant has however, not been
able to show from the records and from the impugned judgment that the
complainant had adduced any document or been able to show even the date and
the manner in which the loan of Rs.2,60,000/- was advanced in favour of the
accused. A bland statement was made by the complainant that the loan amount
was
advanced
in
June,
2016.
However,
learned
counsel
for
the
applicant/appellant submits that if the delay is condoned and the leave is
allowed, then the applicant/appellant would be in a position to demonstrate the
infirmities in the impugned judgment from the lower court records so that a
proper adjudication on merits of the case of the complainant is made by this
Court.
5.
Both the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and respondent
No.2-State have strongly opposed the prayer. It is submitted that the manner in
which the complainant has invoked one forum after the other repeatedly and
allowed the judgment of acquittal to attain finality, the cause shown by the
applicant/appellant for condonation of delay is wholly insufficient to be
condoned. A double presumption of innocence has accrued in favour of the
accused after the judgment of acquittal dated 19.11.2018 which should not be
unsettled at the behest of the complainant who is negligent and lacking in due
diligence. Both the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and the State have
also submitted that mere fulfillment of the ministerial requirements of
presentation of cheque and issuance of return memo by the Bank on account of
insufficient fund or the service of notice on the accused and his refusal to pay
the amount claimed in lieu of the check, would not suffice to establish a charge
under Section 138 of the NI Act, if the complainant on his own, has not been
able to show even the date on which the amount was disbursed or the manner in
which it was paid and also there being no document or instrument to show that
there was an acknowledgment of the loan between the parties. It is submitted
that since the complainant had failed to fulfil the above ingredients, the accused
had discharged his burden on the standards of preponderance of probabilities to
shift the onus upon the complainant to prove that the loan amount was
disbursed and the cheque was issued to discharge any debt or liability on the
part of the accused person. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and the
State submit that the findings of the learned Trial Court on that account are
unimpeachable. The learned Trial Court has also relied upon the decisions of
the Apex Court which show that it is not necessary for the accused to step in the
witness box to prove his defence of rebuttal nature. The onus can be discharged
by the accused by raising a probable defence even relying upon the
circumstances of the case of the complainant and the evidence adduced on
behalf of the complainant. The complainant having failed to discharge the
liability under Section 139 of the NI Act, the findings of the learned Trial Court
need not require any interference to unsettle the finality attached to the
impugned judgment. Therefore, both on merits and on the point of delay, the
present application deserves to be dismissed.
6.
I have considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties
and taken note of the materials placed both from the application seeking
condonation of delay and also from the special leave petition. I have also gone
through the findings of the learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 19.11.2018
passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Udaipur, Gomati
District in CR (NI) No.30 of 2017. The chronology of dates referred to in the
opening paragraphs and taken note of from the delay condonation application in
fact, points to a very negligent and casual approach on the part of the
complainant in laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal by invoking the
incorrect forum and wrong proceedings. Not only was the appeal preferred
against the judgment of acquittal not maintainable before the learned Sessions
Court, Gomati District, Udaipur; but even after the appeal was held to be not
maintainable by the learned Sessions Court vide judgment dated 11.03.2022,
the complainant/applicant herein chose to challenge the judgment of the
Appellate Court in a criminal revision petition before this Court being
Crl.Rev.P. No.21 of 2022, instead of seeking leave to appeal under Section
378(4) of the Cr.P.C which is the correct remedy. That criminal revision
petition was also dismissed by order dated 19.05.2023 by this Court. A plea
was raised at the end by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner may be
allowed liberty to seek leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C in a
separate proceedings against the judgment of acquittal dated 19.11.2018. The
plea was strongly opposed by the respondent-accused. Therefore, this Court
only made an observation that if it is permissible for the petitioner to file a fresh
application under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C, it is up to the petitioner to do
so. The observations in no way can be said to clothe the petitioner with a
bonafide explanation to justify the filing of an application for leave to appeal
against the judgment of acquittal of the learned Trial Court under Section
378(4) of Cr.P.C after such a long delay. Legal remedies are to be pursued with
due diligence. In this case the judgment of acquittal has created a double
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused which should not be lightly
interfered if the other party/complainant is not prompt in seeking appropriate
remedy from the competent forum/court. As such, the petitioner has failed to
show sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 919 days in approaching this
Court in the present application.
7.
Apart from that, learned counsel for the applicant/appellant has
sought to draw the attention of this Court to the findings of the learned Trial
Court in the judgment dated 19.11.2018 by which the accused was acquitted of
the charges. Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant has also sought to rely
upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rangappa (supra), in
particular, Paragraph 13 thereof. The complaint was filed alleging dishonor of
Cheque bearing No.656473 dated 26.05.2017 of Rs.2,50,000/- issued on the
Tripura Gramin Bank, Chandrapur Branch in favour of the complainant
alleging that it is for discharge of a loan amount of Rs.2,60,000/- taken by the
accused from the complainant for personal need. On presentation, the cheque
had been returned by the Bank due to “Account dormant”. A demand notice
was also issued by registered post upon the accused stipulating that failing to
pay the liability, legal action would be taken. Thereafter, the complaint was
filed. The complainant exhibited the following documents:
1. An original cheque bearing No.656473 dated 26.05.2017 for
Rs.2,50,000/- marked as Exhibit-1,
2. Deposit slip of SBI marked as Exhibit-2,
3. Bank Endorsement by Tripura Gramin Bank dated 29.05.2017 marked
as Exhibit-3,
4. Postal Receipt marked as Exhibit-4,
5. Xerox copy of Demand notice marked as Exhibit-5,
6. Acknowledgment Card marked as Exhibit-6,
7. The account details of Abhijit Das marked as Exhibit-7 (SO),
8. Registered letter marked as Exhibit-7.
Four witnesses were also adduced. The learned Trial Court framed the
following points for determination:
“6. The points for determination in this case are:
Whether the accused person issued cheque in question to the
complainant in discharge of any debt or liability.
Whether the cheque was dishonoured when properly presented for
encashment by the complainant.
Whether the complainant made a demand for payment of
Rs.2,50,000/- to the accused person within 30 days of dishonor of
cheque.”
8.
The findings of the learned Trial Court on Point No.I show that the
complainant had not given any details about the payment or produced any
evidence in favour of the fact that the loan money was given to the accused
person. Learned Trial Court relied upon decisions of the Apex Court and
Bombay High Court to hold that it is not necessary for the accused to lead
positive evidence to rebut the presumption as it can be rebutted from
circumstances on record since the complainant failed to produce even the loan
agreement. No date of disbursement of loan of Rs.2,60,000/- and the manner in
which it was disbursed were either evidenced. Therefore, the Point No.I was
decided in favour of the accused. It held that the complainant had failed to show
that the cheque was issued in discharge of any debt or liability by the accused
person. The Point No.II was also decided against the complainant as the
complainant had failed to mention anywhere that in what form, the loan amount
was given; either in cash or in cheque. So far as Point No.III is concerned, it
was decided in favour of the complainant wherein the learned Trial Court also
cited the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dr.Y.N. Rao & Anr. v.
Nalgonda Distt. Co-operative Central Bank & Ors. reported in 2002(3) Crimes
37. However, on an overall consideration of the matter and the findings
rendered on Point No.I and II, the accused was acquitted of the charges. In this
background, it is appropriate to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of Rangappa (supra) itself cited by learned counsel for the
applicant/appellant. Para 20 and 28 thereof are extracted hereunder:
“20. The counsel appearing for the appellant-accused has relied on a
decision given by a Division Bench of this Court in Krishna Janardhan
Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, the operative observations from which are
reproduced below: (S.B. Sinha, J. at SCC pp. 61-63, paras 29-32 & 34)
"29. Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients viz.:
(i) that there is a legally enforceable debt;
(ii) that the cheque was drawn from the account of bank for
discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which
presupposes a legally enforceable debt; and
(iii) that the cheque so issued had been returned due to
insufficiency of funds.
30. The proviso appended to the said section provides for
compliance with legal requirements before a complaint petition can be
acted upon by a court of law. Section 139 of the Act merely raises a
presumption in regard to the second aspect of the matter. Existence of
legally recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under Section 139
of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in favour of a holder of the
cheque that the same has been issued for discharge of any debt or other
liability.
31. The courts below, as noticed hereinbefore, proceeded on the
basis that Section 139 raises a presumption in regard to existence of a debt
also. The courts below, in our opinion, committed a serious error in
proceeding on the basis that for proving the defence the accused is
required to step into the witness box and unless he does so he would not
be discharging his burden. Such an approach on the part of the courts, we
feel, is not correct.
32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon
him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his
burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. An accused
has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part
of the accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different.
*
*
*
34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an
accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove
a defence on the part of the accused is `preponderance of probabilities'.
Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from
the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the
circumstances upon which he relies."
(emphasis supplied)
28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses
usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.
Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to
rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing
so is that of “preponderance of probabilities”. Therefore, if the accused is
able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As
clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted
by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable
that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her
own.”
9.
The Apex Court has laid down that the accused can rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is
conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of
his/her own to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act since the
standard of proof for doing so is that of “preponderance of probabilities”. If the
accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. In
the instant case, the accused has been able to raise such a defence relying upon
the materials submitted by the complainant itself. The complainant however
failed to discharge his onus to show that the cheque was issued by the accused
to discharge any debt or liability on his part. As such, even on consideration of
the plea raised by the applicant/appellant as against the findings of the learned
Trial Court, this Court is of the opinion that no tenable grounds on facts or in
law are made out to have a relook on the judgment of acquittal rendered by the
learned Trial Court as way back as 19.11.2018 because with the passage of
time, the judgment of acquittal has attained finality and raised a double
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused.
10.
On consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances noted
above and for the reasons recorded, the application for condonation of delay is
dismissed.
11.
The petition for granting special leave to file appeal being
Crl.L.P. No.07/2023 is also dismissed and consequently, the Criminal Appeal
No.11/2023 stands dismissed.
(APARESH KUMAR SINGH), CJ
Pijush
2023.09.22
PULAK BANIK Date:
13:32:15 +05'30'
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