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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl. Rev. P. No. 21 of 2023
1. Sri Amit Bhowmik, son of late Dhirendra Chandra Bhowmik, resident of
Water Supply Road, South Dhaleswar, P.O.-Dhaleswar, PS-East Agartala,
District-West Tripura, PIN-799004.
2. Sri Arjun Debnath, son of late Pramod Debnath, resident of Paoramura,
P.O.-R.K. Pur, Udaipur, PS-R.K. Pur, District-Gomati, Tripura.
3. Sri Suman Majumder, son of Sri Dilip Majumder, resident of
Singhicherra, P.O. + P.S.-Khowai, District-Khowai, Tripura.
………Petitioner(s).
VERSUS
The State of Tripura
………Respondent(s).
For Petitioner(s)
: Mr. S. Lodh, Advocate,
Ms R. Bhowmik, Advocate.
For Respondent(s)
: Mr. Ratan Dutta, Public Prosecutor
Mr. S Debnath, Addl. PP.
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. APARESH KUMAR SINGH
ORDER
22.05.2023
By the impugned order dated 20.01.2023, learned Sessions
Judge, Dhalai Judicial District, Ambassa has rejected the application under
Section 227 of the CrPC preferred by the petitioners to discharge them in
connection with Raishyabari PS Case No. 2020RSB09 dated 27.12.2020
(Annexure-1) registered under Sections 120(B)/121/124(A)/387 of the IPC
and Section 10 & 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
[UA(P)A, 1967 for short]. The complaint was lodged by one Er. Rangchak
Tripura on 27.12.2020 before the Officer-in-charge of Raishyabari Police
Station alleging that while he was discharging his duties as Junior Engineer
in the office of the Block Development Officer, Raishyabari RD Block, he
got various voice calls and voice messages from an unknown whatsapp
number (880-1842783331) on 20.12.2020 at about 2.58 p.m. onwards on his
whatsapp number. The miscreants sent him several voice messages in
Kokborok language stating that they wanted to talk to him through whatsapp
voice calls or else the miscreants warned him to cause harm and threatened
him with dire consequences and face recent Ganganagar like incidence. The
last voice call of the miscreants was received when they inquired about
different government development works that was supervised by him.
Thereafter, they started asking him for extortion and wanted to come at his
residence.
2.
The instant Raishyabari PS case No. 2020RSB09 was lodged
on 27.12.2020 under the aforesaid provisions of the Indian Penal Code and
the UA(P)A, 1967. After investigation, police filed chargesheet against eight
persons, including the petitioners, for committing offences under Sections
120(B)/121/124(A)/387 of the IPC and Section 10 & 13 of the UA(P)A,
1967 (Annexure-3).
3.
Cognizance was taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate and
the case was committed before the learned Sessions Judge, Dhalai Judicial
District for trial. The petitioners appeared and filed an application under
Section 227 of the CrPC for discharge stating that as per the materials found
during investigation and contained in the chargesheet, the petitioners are not
liable for any offence under any of those penal provisions. The petitioners
also made an application for release of seized articles including
Rs.15,00,000/- [under Section 451 of the CrPC] which was seized on
20.01.2021. The Bolero vehicle had earlier been released. The learned
Sessions Judge has rejected both the applications filed by the petitioners.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has inter alia urged the
following grounds in support of the challenge:
(i)
That, the learned trial court has rejected the application for
discharge on the ground that there are sufficient materials found during
investigation to proceed against them for the alleged offences but it failed to
appreciate that the allegations in the chargesheet reveal that the petitioners
are the victims of the instant case and cannot be chargesheeted under any of
the penal provisions.
(ii)
Learned counsel for the petitioner has further buttressed his
submissions by relying upon the relevant contents of the charge sheet in
order to submit that the petitioners were involved in construction of border
roads/fencing, etc.
(iii)
The materials collected during investigation reveal that
petitioners No. 1 and 2 were found sitting inside the vehicle along with the
Driver Suman Majumder, petitioner No.3, when they were apprehended
with Rs.15,00,000/- currency notes wrapped in a paper which as per the
instructions of their boss were to be handed over to the accused person,
Sona Mohan Tripura @Mitrafa.
(iv)
The charge sheet further reveals that during investigation they
admitted that they were paying this amount to the banned NLFT extremist
group out of fear to protect their labourers from the attack of the NLFT
extremists.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the
petitioners were carrying on their lawful business and are not members of
the banned organization, i.e. NLFT. The ingredients of the offence under
Section 10(a) of the UA(P)A, 1967 cannot be made out against them. An
interpretation of Section 10(a)(iii) also would go to show that there was no
contribution on the part of the petitioners for the purposes of the banned
organization. The petitioners have not taken part in meetings of any such
banned organization nor were they found to assist the operations of any such
organization. Even the ingredients of Section 13 of the UA(P)A are not
made out against the petitioners as they have not taken part in any unlawful
activities nor advocated, abetted, advised or incited the commission of any
unlawful activity to invite the rigors of the penal provisions. If the
ingredients of the UA(P)A are not made out, these petitioners who are the
innocent businessmen and driver of the vehicle cannot be made liable for
conspiracy for the commission of the alleged acts under the IPC, as alleged.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of the
Calcutta High Court in Graphite India Limited & Anr., Vs. Dalpat Rai
Mehta & Anr., reported in 1978 SCC Online Cal 152 in support of the
submission that the ingredients of the word “contribution” used in Section
10 of the UA(P)A are not made out and no such contributions were ever
made. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further drawn support from the
observation of the Apex Court in case of Sudesh Kedia vs. Union of India
reported in (2021) 4 SCC 704, (paragraphs 12 and 14) to submit that no
prima facie case is made out from the materials collected by the
investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused
persons in the first information report for framing of the charge. It is
submitted that in the said case, the Apex Court had been pleased to grant
bail under Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P)A in favour of the accusedappellant as the materials collated by the investigating agency did not
establish the alleged accusations made against the accused who was said to
have paid extortion money to the banned terrorist organization. Prima facie,
there was no unlawful activity carried out by such person who also was
carrying a business of transport company M/s Esskay Concast and Minerals
Pvt. Ltd. The case of the petitioners also stands on the similar footings.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon a
decision of the Apex Court on the scope of exercise of powers under Section
227 of the CrPC such as Sajjan Kumar Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368 and subsequent decisions such
as Asim Shariff Vs. National Investigation Agency reported in (2019) 7
SCC 148. It is submitted that in the facts of the present case not only are the
materials collected by the investigating agency unable to make out a prima
facie case against the accused persons but the materials do not even give rise
to suspicion against the accused persons. As such, the trial court committed
error in refusing to discharge them. The petitioners would be unnecessarily
subjected to a full-dressed trial though they are innocent and there are no
incriminating materials collected against them by the investigating agency
to justify their implication. As such, the impugned order may be set aside
and the petitioners may be discharged.
7.
Learned
Public
Prosecutor
has
strongly
opposed
the
submission. A counter affidavit has been filed by the State. It is stated that
during investigation, the investigating officer arrested 7 accused persons,
including the 3 petitioners, who were arrested on 20.01.2021. It was
submitted by the learned PP that during investigation the investigating
officer seized (i) one Samsung Galaxy S10E mobile Cell Phone of Amit
Bhowmik and SIM card No. 9436136384/9612439207; (ii) One Samsung
Duos mobile Cell Phone of Amit Bhowmik with SIM card No.
60099342239; (iii) One OPPO ID mobile Cell Phone of Suman Majumder
with SIM Card No.9863422598/9089079215; (iv) One Xiaomi mobile cell
phone of Arjun Debnath and SIM card No. 8794891976; and (v) Rs.
15,00,000/- Indian Currency, etc.
8.
It has been further submitted by the learned PP that during
investigation on 10.02.2021 the investigating officer seized vehicle bearing
Registration No. TR-01-M-0707 (Mahindra Bolero) but the same was
released to its actual owner vide order dated 05.02.2011.
9.
It was also submitted that in the course of investigation from
secret sources it transpired that a group of NLFT extremists led by Bikram
Bahadur Jamatia @ Bomtom was camping on the other side of the IndoBangla Border of Raishyabari area and with the help of NLFT collaborators
they were trying to extort money from civilians residing in Raishyabari
areas, particularly construction agency engaged in construction of border
roads/fencing etc. It was revealed that one Sona Mohan Tripura @ Mitrafa
was acting as a collaborator of the banned NLFT extremist group for
collecting extortion money and the petitioners, namely, Amit Bhowmik and
Arjun Debnath had been approached by the extremist group for giving
money as safeguard from extremist attack.
10.
It was further submitted that based on secret information that
some transaction of money would take place at Raishyabari market area on
20.01.2021 the investigating officer carried out a raid and managed to detect
one Bolero vehicle bearing registration No. TR01M0707 at Hospital
Choumuhani, Raishyabari and found the petitioners sitting inside the
vehicle. On search, one bundle of Indian currency notes amounting to
Rs.15,00,000/- wrapped in paper was found. On query, the petitioners stated
that as per instruction of their Boss they were waiting to hand over the
money to Sona Mohan Tripura @ Mitrafa. It has been stated that on
interrogation the petitioners admitted that they were paying this amount to
the banned NLFT extremist group out of fear to protect their labourers from
the attack of the NLFT extremists. The accused persons have admitted that
their mobile phones contain call lists of their conversation with the banned
NLFT (BM) extremist group and the accused persons tried to assist the
banned organization by providing money instead of informing the police
which is punishable under the provisions of the UA(P)A, 1967.
11.
During the course of investigation it was further revealed that
Sri Rangchak Tripura was threatened by Sri Sumen Kanti Tripura @ Hero,
alleged NLFT(BM) extremist and spoke of extortion. Sri Joydeb Saha and
Sri Nupur Banik of Raishyabari were examined and it was revealed that
Sumen Kanti Tripura @ Hero had threatened them by calling and sending
voice calls in their mobile No. 8413847408 and 7630971841 from
9485428612 which belonged to NLFT(BM) extremist Sumen Kanti Tripura
@ Hero and two other mobile No. 8801575454367 and 8801842783331 and
on several occasions spoke of extortion with a view to send money to
banned NLFT (BM) extremist group. Another witness namely Sri Bikram
Saha of Gandacherra has revealed that the alleged miscreant had also
threatened him and demanded Tax money in the name of an extremist group
by calling him on his mobile No. 9485143907 on 23.12.2020, 26.12.2020,
27.12.2020, 31.12.2020 and 02.01.2021, respectively.
12.
Learned public prosecutor has specifically referred to the
ingredients of Section 10(a)(iii) of the UA(P)A and submitted that the
ingredients of the offences against the accused persons-petitioners herein,
are made out since they have admitted of being involved in payment of huge
amounts to the banned NLFT extremist group and have not informed the
police or took the help of the security forces and thereby assisted the banned
NLFT extremist group. The accused persons admitted that their mobile
phones contained some call lists of their conversation with the banned
NLFT (BM) extremist organization by providing money instead of
informing the police which is punishable under the provisions of UA(P)A,
1967. The learned PP has specifically referred to the relevant paragraphs of
the charge sheet which show that these accused persons were apprehended
while waiting to pay Rs.15,00,000/- Indian currency notes to the accused
person Sona Mohan Tripura @ Mitrafa, the collaborator of the banned
organization.
13.
It is submitted that as per the principles settled by the Apex
Court at the stage of discharge, the learned trial court is not required to
conduct a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record. The
investigating agency has established that the materials are sufficient enough
to proceed with the case and that they do give subjective satisfaction of
existence of prima facie case of the alleged offence. The learned trial court
has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been
made out. It is not the case where there are two views possible, one of which
gives rise to suspicion as distinguished from grave suspicion against
accused which would justify the trial court discharging them. Learned PP
has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Asim Shariff Vs.
National Investigation Agency reported in (2019) 7 SCC 148 and also State
of Tamil Nadu by Ins. of Police Vigilance and Anti Corruption Vs. N
Suresh Rajan & Ors., reported in (2014) 11 SCC 709 (paragraphs 21, 22 &
23 in particular) in support of his submission. Based on these factual
assertions and the legal submissions, learned Public Prosecutor has prayed
that the petitioners have failed to make out any grounds for interference
under the inherent powers of the court under Section 482 of the CrPC to
discharge the petitioners in this case and set aside the impugned order.
14.
I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for
the parties at length and gone through the materials on record. I have also
perused the charge sheet submitted by the police. The principles of law
governing discharge are now well settled by the decisions of the Apex Court
such as, in the case of Asim Shariff (supra). The Apex Court has also
considered the earlier decisions rendered in the case of Union of India vs
Prafulla Kumar Samal reported in (1979) 3 SCC 4; Sajjan Kumar Vs.
CBI reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368, Vikram Johar vs. State of U.P. reported
in (2019) 14 SCC 207 and held as under:
“15. Before we proceed to examine the facts of the present
case, it may be apposite to take note of the ambit and scope of
the powers of the Court at the time of considering the
discharge application. This Court in Union of India v. Prafulla
Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 had an occasion to consider
the scope of Section 227 CrPC and it held in para 7 as under :
“7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus:
„227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the
case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing
the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this
behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for so doing.‟
The words „not sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused‟ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office
to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to
exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the
prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the
court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a
weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is
really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section
227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find
out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take
within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the
police or the documents produced before the court which ex
facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against
the accused so as to frame a charge against him.”
16. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368, this Court had
an occasion to consider the scope of Sections 227 and 228
CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have been
taken note of in para 21 as under :
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles
emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the
charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to
sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding
out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has
been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would
depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge
and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and
the documents produced before the court, any basic
infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh
the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could
form an opinion that the accused might have committed
offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the
conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value
of the material on record cannot be gone into but before
framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the
material placed on record and must be satisfied that the
commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required
to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view
to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face
value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting
the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence
as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all
that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed
to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial
Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this
stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction
or acquittal.”
17. The exposition of law on the subject has been further
considered by this Court in State v. S. Selvi, (2018) 13 SCC
455 followed in Vikram Johar v. State of U.P., (2019) 14 SCC
207.
18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid
down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while
considering the question of framing charge under Section 227
CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC
pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift
and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been
made out; where the material placed before the court discloses
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing
the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of
them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from
grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be
justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while
examining the discharge application filed under Section 227
CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its
judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has
been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the
court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the
evidence on record.”
15.
Further, the Apex Court in the case of ME Shivalingamurthy
vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Bengaluru reported in (2020) 2 SCC
768 reiterated the above principles in paragraphs 17, 18, 28 to 31 which are
quoted hereunder:
“Legal principles applicable in regard to an application
seeking discharge
17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We
refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier
decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398
and discern the following principles:
17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial
Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.
17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the
charge at the instance of the prosecution.
17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to
find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements
recorded by the police or the documents produced before the
Court.
17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce
to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before
it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the
defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused
committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for
proceeding with the trial”.
17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials
giving rise to the grave suspicion.
17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the
total effect of the evidence and the documents produced
before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case
and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make
a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.
17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative
value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the
material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be
accepted as true.
17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the
strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a
charge and refusing to discharge the accused.
18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the
stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section
227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar, (1995) 4
SCC 181. The expression, “the record of the case”, used in
Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents and
the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code
does not give any right to the accused to produce any
document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of
framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be
confined to the material produced by the police (see State of
Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568.
xxxxx
xxxx
xxxx
28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind
ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227
CrPC. The principle established is to take the materials
produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral
statements and also documentary material, and act upon it
without it been subjected to questioning through crossexamination and everything assumed in favour of the
prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as
alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly,
would enure to the benefit of the accused warranting the trial
court to discharge the accused.
29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way
of defence and persuade the court to discharge him.
30. However, what is the meaning of the expression
“materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in
the mind of the court's”, which is not explained away? Can the
accused explain away the material only with reference to the
materials produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely
upon material which he chooses to produce at the stage?
31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can
only rely on the materials which are produced by the
prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if
it is established on the materials, should be explained away
only in terms of the materials made available by the
prosecution. No doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad
probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge
him.”
16.
The principles of law which emerge from a combined reading
of these decisions rendered by the Apex Court show that the learned trial
court at the stage of considering the question of framing of charge under
Section 227 of the CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
case against the accused has been made out. Where the materials placed
before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not
been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the
charge. In such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by
marshalling the evidence on record. If the materials adduced by the
investigating agency are sufficient enough to proceed with the case and if
the same do give subjective satisfaction of the existence of prima facie case
of alleged offences, the learned trial court would be justified in framing the
charges against the accused persons. However, if two views are possible and
one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave
suspicion, the trial judge will be justified in discharging him. In such cases,
the trial judge is expected to exercise his judicial mind to determine as to
whether a case for trial has been made out or not.
17.
Considered in this light, the materials which have been
collected by the investigating agency do show that these three accused
persons were apprehended while waiting in a Bolero vehicle bearing
registration No. TR01M0707 at Hospital Chowmuhani, Raishyabari in order
to hand over the packet of Rs.15,00,000/- Indian currency notes to the
accused person Sona Mohan Tripura @ Mitrafa, a member of the banned
terrorist organization NLFT. The accused persons admitted that they were
acting on the instructions of their boss to hand over the packet to Sona
Mohan Tripura @ Mitrafa. These accused persons admitted that their
mobile phones contained some call lists of their conversations with the
banned NLFT(BM) extremist group and that they had tried to assist the
extremist organization by providing money instead of informing the police
which is punishable under the provisions of the UA(P)A, 1967.
18.
During course of investigation, the CDRs of the mobile
numbers of the accused person Amit Bhowmik were analyzed and found
that they had communicated with the user of the mobile number
6033242681 of Sona Mohan Tripura which was currently being used by
Badanjoy Tripura and 7628862174 of accused Samaresh Debbarma at
several times during the period 18.01.2021 to 20.01.2021 before they were
detained along with Rs.15,00,000/- by the police at Raishyabari. From the
customer application form of 6033242681 it was seen that the SIM bearing
that mobile number had been obtained by the accused Sona Mohan Tripura
on 20.03.2020. Thereafter, the SIM card was given to one Bangladeshi
national namely, Badanjoy Tripura, an inhabitant of Kestamani Para,
Silchari, District-Khagrachari, Bangladesh in the month of March, 2020 to
assist him in carrying out all kinds of extremist activities such as extortion,
kidnapping, etc., inside the Indian territory on behalf of the NLFT(BM)
group. During investigation, it was also learnt from reliable sources that
Badanjoy Tripura is an active member of the NLFT(BM) group led by one
Bikram Bahadur Jamatia @ Bomtom, SS COAS.
19.
The following mobile phones with SIM cards were seized from
the accused-petitioners:
(i)
One Samsung Galaxy S10E mobile cell phone of petitioner
Amit Bhowmik with SIM number 9436136384/9612439207;
(ii) One Samsung DUOS mobile cell phone of petitioner Amit
Bhowmik with SIM number 6099342239;
(iii) One OPPO ID mobile cell phone of petitioner-Suman
Majumder with SIM number 9863422598/9089079215;
(iv) One Xiaomi mobile cell phone of petitioner-Arjun Debnath
with SIM number 8794891976.
(v) Indian currency notes for Rs.15,00,000/- along with one
Mahindra Bolero vehicle bearing registration No. TR01M0707 was
also seized on 20.01.2021.
20.
As noted above, the investigating agency has after analysis of
the CDRs of the Mobile number 60099342239 of the petitioner-Amit
Bhowmik found that he had communicated with the mobile number
6033242681 of accused-Sona Mohan Tripura, a member of the banned
organization, which cell phone was being used by Badanjoy Tripura, an
active member of the NLFT(BM). The communications between the
numbers 6033242681 and 7628862174 showed that these accused persons,
Sona Mohan Tripura and Badanjoy Tripura, used to communicate with each
other frequently and the interchange of mobile phone and SIM cards show a
strong link between the two. The investigating agency thus collated the
materials collected during the investigation and thus submitted charge sheet
that a prima facie case under Sections 120(B)/121/124(A)/387 of the IPC
and Section 10 & 13 of the UA(P)A, 1967 has been established against the
accused persons, including these three petitioners.
21.
The learned trial court has, on sifting and weighing the
evidence, found out a prima facie case against the accused persons which
gives rise to grave suspicion against them which has not been properly
explained to justify their prayer for discharge. On the basis of the materials
on record if the court has formed an opinion that the accused persons might
have committed the offence it is empowered to frame the charge though for
conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the offence as per the principles laid down
by the Apex Court in Sajjan Kumar (supra) at para 21(iv).
22.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to impress that the
ingredients of Section 10(a)(iii) has not been made out as there is no proof
of contribution already made to the banned organization as these petitioners
were apprehended with a packet of Rs.15,00,000/- only, and no money was
shown to have been transferred to the members of the banned organization
to implicate them for the serious charges under Section 10 of the UA(P)A,
1967. The materials contained in the charge sheet, however, on being
weighed as a whole, on the other hand, make out a prima facie case. Such
satisfaction is definitely higher than the degree of satisfaction required to be
recorded for considering an application for bail of the accused persons under
Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P)A, 1967.
23.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case of
Sudesh Kedia (supra) in particular para 12 thereof. However, in the said
case, the Apex Court was considering the degree of satisfaction as is
required by the learned court for the purposes of grant of bail to the
appellant Sudesh Kedia, accused under the UA(P)A. In such circumstances,
the Apex Court had observed that by its very nature the expression “prima
facie true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the
investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused
concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and
overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the
complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. The
Apex Court has thereafter, gone on to draw a distinction between the degree
of satisfaction to be recorded by the court for granting of bail as compared
to the degree of satisfaction required to be recorded for considering a
discharge application or of framing of charge in relation to offence under the
1967 Act by observing as under:
“In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the
Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie
true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded
for considering a discharge application or framing of charges
in relation to offences under the 1967 Act.”
24.
As such, in the given facts of the case, the plea that since the
petitioners admitted that they were paying this amount to the banned NLFT
extremist group to protect their labourers from the attack of the NLFT
extremists could not be the basis to discharge them, at this stage, as the said
plea would be subject to scrutiny at the time of trial. The present case is not
one of grant of bail under Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P)A like that of
Sudesh Kedia (supra). If the materials collected by the investigating agency
and forming part of the charge sheet do prima facie make out a case against
these petitioners, the probative value of the materials is not to be gone into
in deep to hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction as per the
opinion of the Apex Court expressed at para 21 in the case of N Suresh
Rajan (supra). What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for
presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground
for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the
court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis
of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge;
though for conviction the court has to come to the conclusion that the
accused has committed the offence. Such a mini trial is not permitted at this
stage. The Apex Court has further, at para 22 of the report, observed that at
the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the pros
and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial.
25.
Therefore, having regard to the proposition of law applicable to
the case at hand, it cannot be said that the materials collected by the
investigating agency do not make out even a prima facie case for the
purposes of discharging the petitioners. As such, this court after careful
consideration of the submission of the parties, the materials placed on record
and the reasons recorded hereinabove, is satisfied that the impugned order
passed by the learned trial court dated 20.01.2023 rejecting the application
for discharging the petitioners does not require any interference, in exercise
of the inherent powers of the court under Section 482 of the CrPC.
26.
The instant petition being devoid of merit is dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(APARESH KUMAR SINGH), CJ
SIDDHARTHA
LODH
lodh
LODH
Date: 2023.05.30 11:57:48 +05'30'
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