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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRL.A.No.08 of 2024
Sri Ajit Datta,
son of Late Gopal Chandra Datta,
resident of Village-Ramkrishna Pally,
P.O. & P.S. Bishramganj, District-Sepahijala, Tripura
---- Appellant-Petitioner (s)
Versus
1) Sri Mithan Das,
son of Haribandhu Das,
resident of Joynagar,
(Opposite of Ramthakur Ashram)
P.O. & P.S. Teliamura, District-Khowai, Tripura
2) The State of Tripura,
represented by the Secretary,
Home Department, Government of Tripura,
Agartala
----Respondent(s)
_____________________________________________________
For Appellant (s)
:
Mr. Kishore Kr. Pal, Adv.
Ms. Punam Murasing Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Sankar Lodh, Adv.
Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.
Mr. Subham Majumder, Adv.
Date of Hearing
:
07.02.2025
Date of Judgment
& Order
:
17.02.2025
Whether fit for reporting
:
YES
_________________________________________________________
[---
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This appeal is preferred challenging the judgment and order of
acquittal dated 22.12.2023 delivered by Learned Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Bishalgarh, Sepahijala, Tripura in connection with Case No.N.I.15
of 2022 under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
[2]
Heard Mr. Kishore Kr. Pal, Learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the petitioner-complainant/appellant as well as Mr. Sankar Lodh, Learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-accused and Mr. Raju Datta,
Learned P.P. appearing on behalf of the State of Tripura.
(2)
[3]
Before admission of the appeal, the petitioner-appellant sought
leave of the Court to file an appeal under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C. and
accordingly the leave was granted.
[4]
Taking part in the hearing, Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr.
Kishore Kr. Pal first of all drawn the attention of the Court that before the
Learned Trial Court, the complainant proved the demand notice which was
marked as Exhibit. But the complainant although submitted the photo copies of
relevant documents before the Court but could not produce and prove the
original postal receipt for marking of exhibit for which the Learned Trial Court
came to the observation that the requirement of Section 138 of N.I. Act was
not proved. Learned counsel further submitted that before the Learned Trial
Court the complainant appellant adduced evidence how he acquired the money
but the Learned Court did not believe his story and rejected the contention of
the appellant and more so, in a case under Section 138 of N.I. Act it is not the
duty of the complainant to establish as to how he has secured the money and
from what source but the Learned Court below failed to appreciate the
evidence on record of the complainant and came to the observation that the
demand notice was not proved and finally, acquitted the respondent-accused
from the charge of the case. Learned counsel also drawn the attention of the
Court the prayer submitted by the petitioner appellant for permitting the
appellant to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the claim of the
petitioner appellant by annexing the report of the postal authority wherein it
was specifically stated that the demand notice was duly served upon the
respondent accused.
[5]
Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the
respondent accused before the Learned Trial Court did not dispute the fact that
he did not receive any money from the complainant appellant and also did not
dispute the fact that he did not receive any demand notice from the appellant
and further more as alleged by the respondent accused that some cheques
belonging to the respondent accused are/were found missing and accordingly,
(3)
he lodged complaint to the police and also gave intimation to the bank and in
this regard, no such documentary evidences were adduced and proved by the
respondent accused before the Trial Court to believe his defence theory. But
the Learned Trial Court below did not consider the same and gave the
judgment thereby acquitting the respondent accused from the charge of the
case.
[6]
On the other hand, Mr. Sankar Lodh, Learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent accused first of all submitted that in the record of
the Learned Court there is no such document like postal receipt was ever
submitted by the complainant appellant before the Learned Court and also
there was no such prayer from the side of the appellant that he was willing to
prove the postal receipt but failed to do so and no such leave was also taken
by him. Learned counsel further submitted that from the evidence on record it
is clear that the appellant deals in rubber but in support of his contention, he
could not submit any income tax statement showing his income to substantiate
that he had got sufficient means to lend the money as alleged by the appellant
in the claim petition but in this regard, no evidence was led by the appellant.
Furthermore, Learned Trial Court below after elaborate discussions of the
evidence on record both oral/documentary rightly and reasonably delivered the
judgment acquitting the respondent accused from the charge of the N.I. Act
and there was no infirmity in the judgment delivered by the Learned Trial
Court. In regard to the separate application for adducing additional evidence,
Learned counsel submitted that at this stage, there is no scope to entertain the
application filed by the appellant, so, the same is liable to be dismissed.
[7]
Both the sides in course of hearing relied upon some citations
which would be discussed in due course of time. The appellant complainant
filed one complaint petition which was registered as N.I.15 of 2022 to the
Learned Court below alleging inter alia that on 30.03.2019 the respondent
accused took loan of Rs.20,00,000/- from the appellant complainant and
promised to return the same within 30 days. On 22.08.2022, the respondent
(4)
accused issued a cheque bearing No.335061 dated 22.08.2022 in respect of
his account bearing No.0584010343565 maintained in the Punjab National
Bank of India, Chakmagdhat SDM Office (Khowai) for payment to the
complainant to discharge his liability, and the same was returned back by the
State Bank of India, Bishramganj Branch unpaid on account of insufficient
funds. This is the gist of the complaint. On receipt of complaint, cognizance of
offence was taken under Section 138 of N.I. Act. The respondent accused
appeared before the Learned Trial Court and was enlarged on bail and
thereafter, evidence were adduced by both the sides. For the sake of
convenience, I would like to refer the name of witnesses of the appellant
complainant and his exhibited documents along with the name of the witnesses
of the respondent accused and his documents herein below:
LIST OF PROSECUTION/DEFENCE/COURT WITNESSES
A.Prosecution witnesses:
Rank
Name
1.
2.
Sri Ajit Dutta
Sri Ujjwal Kirti
Name of evidence (Eye witness, medical witness,
panch witness, other witness)
Complainant
Expert witness
B. Defence witness, if any :
Rank
Name
1.
2.
3.
Sri Mithan Das
Sri Prasenjit Singha
Sri Amal Ch. Das
Name of evidence (Eye witness, medical witness,
panch witness, other witness)
Accused
Other witness
Other witness
C. Court witness, if any :
Rank
Name
Nil
Nil
Name of evidence (Eye witness, medical witness,
panch witness, other witness)
Does not arise
LIST OF PROSECUTION/DEFENCE/COURT WITNESSES
A. Prosecution exhibits :
Sl.
Nos.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Exhibit No.
Description
Exbt.1
Exbt.1(a)
Exbt.2
Exbt.3
Exbt.4
Exbt.5
Complaint petition
Signature of PW1 on the complaint
Original Cheque
Original deposit slip
Original return memo report
Legal notice
B. Defence exhibits :
Sl.
Exhibit No.
Description
(5)
Nos.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Exbt.P 1
Exbt.P 1(a)
Exbt.P 2
Exbt.P 2(a)
Exbt.P 3
Exbt.P 3(a)
Examination in chief of DW1
Signature of DW1
Examination in chief of DW2
Signature of DW2
Examination in chief of DW3
Signature of DW3
C. Court exhibits, if any :
Sl.
Nos.
Nil
Exhibit No.
Description
Nil
Does not arise
C. Material objects :
Sl.
Nos.
Nil
Exhibit No.
Description
Nil
Does not arise
Finally, after hearing of both the sides, Learned Trial Court by the
judgment dated 22.12.2023 acquitted the respondent accused from the charge
of N.I. Act. The operative portion of the judgment runs as follows :
“Hence, accused Sri Mithan Das is acquitted of the offence
alleged and is set at liberty forthwith. The surety of the bond
furnished for the accused persons shall remain in force for a
period of six months from today as required under section
437A of Cr.P.C.”
[8]
I have heard arguments of both the sides and gone through the
record of the Learned Court below including the judgment. In deciding the
judgment, Learned Trial Court has referred the provisions of Sections 20, 138,
118, 139, 142 of the N.I. Act and relied upon few judgments. Now, before
coming to the conclusion of this appeal, let us discuss the evidence on record
of the contesting parties. The appellant complainant as already stated has
adduced two witnesses including himself.
[9]
The appellant complainant, Sri Ajit Dutta in his examination-in-
chief stated that he filed the case against the respondent accused on
30.03.2019. The respondent accused took loan of Rs.20,00,000/- from him
with a promise to repay the same within a month but he failed to do the same.
Thereafter, on 22.08.2022 he gave a cheque bearing No.335061 issued on
Punjab National Bank of India, Chakmagdhat SDM Office (Khowai) and on the
same day, the complainant presented the cheque to State Bank of India,
Bishramganj Branch for encashment but on 25.08.2022, the said cheque was
(6)
returned unpaid due to insufficiency of funds and after that, on 01.09.2022, he
had send the legal notice to the respondent accused with request to repay the
amount within 15 days but the respondent accused did not pay the same and
hence, he filed the case. He identified the complaint petition marked as
Exbt.P/1 series and his signature marked as Exbt.P1(a). He also submitted that
he submitted the original cheque, deposit slip, return memo, report of the
Bank Manager and legal notice and identified those documents marked as
Exbts.P/2, P/3, P/4 and P/5.
During cross-examination, he stated that he is a small rubber
businessman and he files income tax return every year. Also admitted that in
the income tax return he did not mention about his transaction of
Rs.20,00,000/- with the accused. Further stated that he know the accused as
he works in Charilam Forest Office. Also stated that he could not say exact
date and year from which he is acquainted with the accused. Further stated
that at the time of paying money of Rs.20,00,000/- he did not enter into any
written agreement with Mitan Das and volunteered that he paid him money
amounting to Rs.20,00,000/- and the accused issued a cheque in his favour.
Being asked by the Court he stated that he lend amounting to Rs.20,00,000/in cash and gave him a cheque after putting his signature. Also stated that he
procured the money to be given to the accused from various sources viz.
earning from his business, taking loan and by selling of land. Also admitted
that he did not mention in his petition as to how he procured the money.
[10]
PW-2, Ujjwal Kirti deposed that he is the Bank Manager of SBI,
BRG branch and whenever any cheque is deposited to the bank it is generally
honoured however, there are many reasons to dishonor the cheque i.e. illegal
signature or other details of the cheque and insufficiency of fund and
whenever, the cheque is returned, dishonoured, the reason is mentioned in the
return memo report.
During cross-examination, nothing came out relevant.
(7)
[11]
The respondent accused as DW-1 in his examination-in-chief in
affidavit stated that he is the alleged accused of the case and he is conversant
about the subject matter of the case. He further stated that he never
acquainted with the complainant of the case who was a stranger to him and
never seen him except the first day when the complainant came to the Court
for deposition and as such he had no verbal or telephonic conversation with
him. Also stated that on 20.08.2022 out of 20 numbers of cheque 5 numbers
of cheque were fall down bearing No.335061 to 335065 at any place of
Bishalgarh from his diary and tried to find out but failed. But from 20.08.2022
till receipt of the notice of the Court he could not understand how the 5
number cheques have gone and according to him, the complainant has
misused the same. Accordingly, he gave a specific complain to Bishalgarh P/S
in respect of five missing cheques which refers to Bishalgarh P/S G.D. Entry
No.39 dated 07.09.2022 and denied the other allegations and identified the
affidavit marked as Exbt.P 1 and his signature marked as Exbt.P 1(a).
During cross-examination, he stated that he was unable to say
the account number which was lost. Further admitted that he have not
mentioned the account number, cheque leaves which was lost in his
examination-in-chief in affidavit. Also he has not mentioned the date when he
informed the matter to PNB, SDM Office Branch Chakmaghat Khowai and also
admitted that in his examination-in-chief in affidavit he did not mention as to
the fact of lodging any FIR in connection with lost cheques against Ajit Dutta.
Further volunteered that he made complaint against the accused Ajit Dutta in
Bishalgarh P.S. but the same was not mentioned in his examination-in-chief.
[12]
DW-2, Prasenjit Sinha deposed that he is a Forest Guard presently
posted at Gandhigram (TNTR), Forest Training Centre. He further stated that
the matter of missing of 5 unwritten signed cheque leaves of the forester
Mithan Das came to him on 20.08.2022 afternoon, when Mithan Das informed
him about missing of 5 signed but unwritten cheques which was kept inside the
diary and the same was found to be lost. Later on, Mithan Das has informed
(8)
the matter at Bishalgarh P.S. and a G.D. Entry was made. He also stated that
later on he could know that Ajit Datta filed a case against Mithan Das.
During cross-examination, he admitted that the details of the lost
cheques along with account number and branch were not mentioned in his
examination-in-chief in affidavit. He also admitted that in his examination-inchief in affidavit that it was also not mentioned when Mithan Das informed the
Branch Manager PNB, SDM Office Branch, Chakmaghat, Khowai about missing
cheques. Also admitted that the date of lodging FIR or GD number in
connection with missing cheques were not mentioned in his examination-inchief in affidavit.
[13]
DW-3, Amal Ch. Das is also a Forest Guard posted at Jampuijala
at Charilam Office. He stated that he know forester Mithan Das who informed
him that he had lost five signed cheques but unwritten on 20.08.2022 in any
place from Rastharmatha, Bishalgarh and in this regard, GD Entry was made.
During cross-examination, he stated that the details of the lost
cheques of Mithan Das viz. Account number and Branch of the Bank have not
been mentioned in is examination-in-chief in affidavit. It was also not
mentioned in the affidavit as to when Mithan Das informed the matter to
Branch Manager PNB, SDM Office Branch Chakmaghat Khowai and in his
examination-in-chief in affidavit it was also not mentioned the date of lodging
of the FIR or GD number.
These are the sum and substance of the evidence on record.
[14]
The complainant before the Learned Trial Court proved the
disputed cheque marked as Exbt.P 2, banking slip marked as Exbt.P 3,
memorandum of the bank dated 25.08.2022 marked as Exbt.P 4 and the
advocates notice dated 01.09.2022 marked as Exbt.P 5. To decide the case,
Learned Court below determined the following points :
“i) Whether the accused drew the cheque bearing No.335061
dated 22.08.2022 of Rs.twenty lakhs only from his account
No.0584010343565 maintained in the Punjab National Bank,
Chakmaghat SDM Office, Khowai Branch, for payment of the
amount to complainant Sri Ajit Dutta from out of that account?
(9)
ii) Whether such cheque was drawn for the discharge, in
whole or in part, of any debt or other liability?
iii) Whether the cheque was returned by the State Bank of
India, Bishramganj Branch unpaid because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of that account to be insufficient
to honour the cheque?
iv) Whether the complaint has been lodged to the Court after
fulfilling the legal requirements provided under section 138
proviso and section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 ?”
In determining the Point No.i Learned Court below came to
the observation that Exbt.2 i.e. the cheque was issued on 22.08.2022 and the
same was submitted the Bank on the same day and deposit slip was marked as
Exbt.P.3. So, Learned Court below came to the observation that the cheque
was deposited within time as required under sub clause (a) of Section 138 of
N.I. Act. In respect of legal notice the complainant appellant stated that on
01.09.2022 he send a legal notice to the accused with request to pay the
amount within 15 days. But as he failed to make the payment, so he filed the
case. During examination before the Court the appellant complainant also
reiterated
the
same
fact
and
also
stated
that
he
submitted
an
acknowledgement receipt of the legal notice along with a petition but the same
was not placed before the Court and no documentary evidence was placed on
record that the notice was duly served. The respondent accused also in his
examination-in-chief in affidavit not denied the said fact. But as the
complainant failed to prove the postal receipt showing service of notice upon
the respondent accused, so, the Learned Trial Court below came to the
observation that the complainant has failed to prove the requirements of sub
clause (b) of section 138 of N.I. Act i.e. the statutory period. Finally, came to
the conclusion that since the complainant has failed to prove the demand
notice upon the respondent accused, so Learned Court below did not rely upon
the appellant complainant. Learned Court further came to the conclusion that
as the complainant has failed to serve the demand notice, so, the case was not
maintainable as the appellant complainant has failed to fulfill the requirements
of Section 138 of N.I. Act. Now, for the sake of convenience, I would like to
(10)
refer herein below the relevant provision of Sections 138 of N.I. Act which
provides as under :
138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in
the account.—Where any cheque drawn by a person on an
account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any
amount of money to another person from out of that account
for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the
amount of money standing to the credit of that account is
insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the
amount arranged to be paid from that account by an
agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed
to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to
any other provision of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for [a term which may be extended to two
years’], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of
the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply
unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date on
which it is drawn or within the period of its validity,
whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for
the payment of the said amount of money by giving
a notice; in writing, to the drawer of the
cheque,[within thirty days] of the receipt of
information by him from the bank regarding the
return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the
payment of the said amount of money to the payee
or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course
of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of
the said notice.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt of other
liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.”
From the above it appears that the disputed cheque should be
presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it
is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier the payee or
the holder after receipt of information from the Bank regarding dishonor of
cheque shall intimate to the issuer of the cheque within 30 days regarding the
return of the cheque as unpaid and after that, the drawer of the said cheque
should be informed by sending notice to make payment within 15 days. These
are the basic three ingredients for initiation of proceeding under Section 138 of
N.I. Act.
[15]
Here, in the given case, the cheque was deposited to the bank
within the stipulated period and the same was returned unpaid on the ground
of insufficiency of fund and the notice was also issued upon the respondent
accused but the respondent accused failed to make payment within 15 days.
(11)
Legal notice was marked as Exbt.5 without any objection. Although, the
Learned Court below on the ground that the postal receipt was not proved
came to the observation that the requirement of sub clause (c) of Section 138
of the N.I. Act could not be proved by the complainant. But the respondent
accused in his examination-in-chief in affidavit specifically did not deny that no
cheque was issued by him, even, the said fact of issuing notice as asserted by
the complainant appellant has not been rebutted or denied by the respondentaccused during his examination before the Court. So, the observation of
Learned Court in this regard is not convincing and the Learned Court below has
failed to appreciate the evidence on record in this regard.
[16]
Now, I would also mention the relevant provision of Section 142
of N.I. Act which provides as under :
142. Cognizance of offences.—(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974),—
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence
punishable under section 138 except upon a
complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the
case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the
date on which the cause of action arises under
clause (c) of the proviso to section 138: 2 [Provided
that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by
the Court after the prescribed period, if the
complainant satisfies the Court that he had
sufficient cause for not making a complaint within
such period;]
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan
Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class
shall try any offence punishable under section 138.].
(2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired
into and tried only by a court within whose local
jurisdiction,—
(a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through
an account, the branch of the bank where the payee
or holder in due course, as the case may be,
maintains the account, is situated; or
(b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the
payee or holder in due course, otherwise through an
account, the branch of the drawee bank where the
drawer maintains the account, is situated.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque
is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the
payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be
deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in
which the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be,
maintains the account.]
From the aforesaid provision also it appears that the complaint
was filed by the complainant appellant within the stipulated period required by
law.
(12)
[17]
Now, in respect of source it is the admitted position that the
complainant is an income tax payee and filing return to the department. In his
examination-in-chief he specifically stated that how he procured the amount
which he had lent to the respondent accused. On bare perusal of Section 138
of N.I. Act nowhere I find that the complainant should disclose his source from
where he had procured the money. So, in my considered view it appears that
Learned Court below wrongly came to the conclusion that the complainant has
failed to disclose the source from which he procured the amount.
[18]
In course of hearing of argument, Learned counsel for the
appellant complainant has relied upon one citation of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in Kalamani Tex and Another versus P. Balasubramanian
reported in (2021) 5 SCC 283 wherein in para No.17 the said Apex Court has
observed as under :
“17. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at
face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp
papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory
presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir
Singh v. Mukesh Kumar : (2019) 4 SCC 197 where this Court
held that :
“36.Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and
handed over by the accused, which is towards some
payment, would attract presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence
of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was
issued in discharge of a debt.”
Referring
the
same,
Learned
counsel
for
the
appellant
complainant submitted that since the complainant has been able to prove the
cheque issued by the respondent accused, so, there is no scope to presume
that the cheque was not issued by the respondent accused.
Learned counsel for the appellant complainant referred another
citation in Rangappa versus Mohan reported in AIR 2010 SCC 1898
wherein in para No.15 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under :
“15. Coming back to the facts in the present case, we are in
agreement with the High Court's view that the accused did not
raise a probable defence. As noted earlier, the defence of the
loss of a blank cheque was taken up belatedly and the
accused had mentioned a different date in the `stop payment'
instructions to his bank. Furthermore, the instructions to
`stop payment' had not even mentioned that the cheque had
been lost. A perusal of the trial record also shows that the
accused appeared to be aware of the fact that the cheque was
with the complainant. Furthermore, the very fact that the
(13)
accused had failed to reply to the statutory notice
under Section 138 of the Act leads to the inference that there
was merit in the complainant's version. Apart from not raising
a probable defence, the appellant-accused was not able to
contest the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
The fact that the accused had made regular payments to the
complainant in relation to the construction of his house does
not preclude the possibility of the complainant having spent
his own money for the same purpose. As per the record of the
case, there was a slight discrepancy in the complainant's
version, in so far as it was not clear whether the accused had
asked for a hand loan to meet the construction-related
expenses or whether the complainant had incurred the said
expenditure over a period of time. Either way, the
complaint discloses the prima facie existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability since the complainant has
maintained that his money was used for the constructionexpenses. Since the accused did admit that the signature on
the cheque was his, the statutory presumption comes into
play and the same has not been rebutted even with regard to
the materials submitted by the complainant.”
Referring
the
same,
Learned
counsel
for
the
complainant
appellant submitted that since the accused has failed to draw the attention of
the Court by raising any presumption that his alleged cheques were lost and
although he took the plea that he intimated the police station and the bank
authority regarding missing of cheques but in this regard, no documents could
be produced and proved by him to substantiate his assertions and even his
independent witnesses could not give any specific account about that. There
was no evidence from his side to stop payment to the Bank. So, the story
projected by the respondent accused that he had lost his cheque cannot be
accepted.
[19]
On the other hand, Mr. Sankar Lodh, Learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent accused at the time of hearing referred few
citations regarding additional evidence. In Rajaram Sriramulu Naidu (since
deceased) through L.Rs. v. Maruthachalam (since deceased) through
L.Rs reported in AIR 2023 SC 471 wherein in para No.12 Hon’ble the Apex
Court observed as under :
12. This Court in the case of Baslingappa v. Mudibasappa : AIR
2019 SC 1983 has summarized the principles on Sections
118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act. It will be relevant to reproduce
the same.
“25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the
above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise
the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:
25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of
the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the
discharge of any debt or other liability.
(14)
25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable
presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the
probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the
presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.
25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to
rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a
probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities
can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record
by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon
which they rely.
25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the
witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an
evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.
25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come in the
witness box to support his defence.”
Learned counsel for the respondent accused also referred another
citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Basalingappa versus
Mudibasappa reported in AIR 2019 SC 1983 wherein in para Nos.23 and 24
the said Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under :
“23. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in
above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise
the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:(i) Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of
the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the
discharge of any debt or other liability.
(ii) The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable
presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the
probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the
presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.
(iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to
rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a
probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities
can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record
by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon
which they rely.
(iv) That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the
witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an
evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.
(v) It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness
box to support his defence.
24. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in facts of
the present case, it is clear that signature on cheque having
been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section
139 that cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability.
The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable
defence was raised by the accused. In cross-examination of
the PW1, when the specific question was put that cheque was
issued in relation to loan of Rs.25,000/- taken by the accused,
the PW1 said that he does not remember. PW1 in his evidence
admitted that he retired in 1997 on which date he received
monetary benefit of Rs. 8 lakhs, which was encashed by the
complainant. It was also brought in the evidence that in the
year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale agreement for
which he paid an amount of Rs.4,50,000/- to Balana Gouda
towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs.4,50,000/- being
admitted in the year 2010 and further payment of loan of
Rs.50,000/- with regard to which complaint No.119 of 2012
was filed by the complainant, copy of which complaint was
also filed as Ex.D2, there was burden on the complainant to
prove his financial capacity. In the year 2010-2011, as per
own case of the complainant, he made payment of Rs.18
lakhs. During his cross-examination, when financial capacity
to pay Rs.6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no
(15)
satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on
record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused,
which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his
financial capacity and other facts.”
Referring the same, Learned counsel for the respondent accused
submitted that before the Learned Trial Court the accused complainant has
failed to prove the cheque in accordance with law and the signature of the
accused that he has issued the same.
In respect of adducing additional evidence, Learned counsel for
the respondent accused relied upon another citation of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in Rajvinder Singh versus State of Haryana reported in
(2016) 14 SCC 671 wherein in para No.12 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed
as under :
“12. At the outset, we must deal with submissions as regards
application for leading additional evidence at the appellate
stage. It has been the consistent defence of the appellant that
the dead body found in agricultural fields in District Muzaffar
Nagar was that of Pushpa Verma and he went to the extent of
producing photograph of the dead body in the present trial. He
also examined Brahm Pal Singh, Sub- Inspector and other
witnesses. It was certainly possible to examine Forensic
Expert at the trial court stage itself and the High Court was
right and justified in rejecting the prayer to lead additional
evidence at the appellate stage. Nonetheless, we have gone
through the report of said Forensic Expert engaged by the
appellant. The exercise undertaken by that expert is to start
with the admitted photograph of Pushpa Verma on a
computer, then remove the “bindi” by some process on the
computer, then by same process remove her spectacles and by
computer imaging change the image as it would have looked if
the lady was lying down in an injured condition. The computer
image so changed was then compared with the photograph of
the dead body. We have seen both the images and we are not
convinced at all about any element of similarity. We do not
therefore see any reason to differ from the view taken by the
High Court.”
Learned counsel for the respondent accused relied upon another
citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in AjitSinh Chehuji Rathod
versus State of Gujarat and Another reported in (2024) 4 SCC 453
wherein in para No.9 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under :
“9. It is apposite to mention that the learned first appellate
court i.e. the Principal Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar had taken
note of the fact that during the trial, the appellant examined
the witness of Bank of Baroda in support of his defence but
not a single question was put to the said witness regarding
genuineness or otherwise of the signatures as appearing on
the cheque in question.”
(16)
Referring the same, Learned counsel for the respondent accused
submitted that the complainant has failed to prove the case against the
respondent accused. So, the Learned Court below rightly and reasonably
delivered the judgment acquitting the respondent accused from the charge of
this case.
[20]
Now, for the sake of convenience, I would like to refer herein
below the relevant provision of Sections 20, 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act which
provides as under :
“20. Inchoate stamped instruments.—Where one person signs
and delivers to another a paper stamped in accordance with
the law relating to negotiable instruments then in force in
[India], and either wholly blank or having written thereon an
incomplete negotiable instrument, he thereby gives prima
facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete, as
the case may be, upon it a negotiable instrument, for any
amount specified therein and not exceeding the amount
covered by the stamp. The person so signing shall be liable
upon such instrument, in the capacity in which he signed the
same, to any holder in due course for such amount:
Provided that no person other than a holder in due
course shall recover from the person delivering the instrument
anything in excess of the amount intended by him to be paid
thereunder.”
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.—Until the
contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be
made:—
(a) of consideration:—that every negotiable instrument was
made or drawn for consideration, and that every such
instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated
or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or
transferred for consideration;
(b) as to date:—that every negotiable instrument bearing a
date was made or drawn on such date;
(c) as to time of acceptance:—that every accepted bill of
exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date
and before its maturity;
(d) as to time of transfer:—that every transfer of a negotiable
instrument was made before its naturity;
(e) as to order of indorsements:—that the indorsements
appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the
order in which they appear then on;
(f) as to stamp:— that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange
or cheque was duly stamped;
(g) that holder is a holder in due course:—that the holder of a
negotiable instrument is a holder in due course:
Provided that, where the instrutment has been
obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful
custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been
obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an
offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of
providing that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon
him.”
“139. Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed,
unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque
received the cheque of the nature referred to in section138 for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability.”
(17)
On perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it appears that if the issue
of cheque is proved and also if it is found that the cheque was issued by
discharge of debt, in that case the presumption will go against the accused in a
case, if it is signed.
[21]
Here in the case at hand, since there is no rebuttable evidence on
record from the side of the respondent accused that the signature was not
given by him and since the respondent accused has failed to disprove the said
fact by showing any documentary evidence on record that regarding missing of
cheques he had intimated to the police station and to the bank, so the defence
theory as projected by the respondent accused cannot be accepted in the given
circumstances. Furthermore, as per Section 139 of N.I. Act creates a
rebuttable presumption in favour of the complainant appellant that the cheque
in question had been received by the complainant for the discharge in whole or
in any part of any debt or other liability. Since, the complainant has been able
to prove that the cheque was issued by the respondent accused in his favour,
against his debt (loan), so the burden automatically shifts upon the accused to
rebut the same on preponderance of probabilities that there was no liability for
the amount of cheque in question. Learned Trial Court below came to the
observation that the source of Rs.20,00,000/- could not be properly explained
by the complainant and there was no documentary transaction in this regard.
But on bare perusal of the relevant provision of N.I. Act nowhere it is found
that at the time of filing the complaint to a Court the complainant shall be
under obligation to disclose the source of money which he had lend to the
accused and furthermore, since the complainant disclosed his source by
adducing oral evidence without any objection from the defence side, so the
observation of the Learned Trial Court in my considered view was also not
correct.
[22]
Admittedly in this case, the Manager of the Bank, PW-2 could not
explain anything regarding the memo issued by the Bank i.e. Exbt.P/4 from
which it is crystal clear that the cheque bearing No.335061 was dishonoured
(18)
due to insufficient fund and the respondent accused before the Learned Trial
Court failed to make any circumstance to disbelieve the said document.
Although, Learned Trial Court without considering Exbt.P/4 based upon his
decision on the evidence of PW-2 which in my considered view Learned Trial
Court below has failed to appreciate the same in accordance with law.
Moreover, since the respondent has failed to prove his defence case both by
oral/documentary evidence on record, so there is no scope to disbelieve the
story of the appellant.
[23]
Thus, after hearing both the sides, it appears to this Court that
Learned Court below at the time of delivery of judgment has failed to consider
the requirements of law to prove a charge under N.I. Act at the time of
disposal of this case for which this case requires to be remanded back to the
Learned Trial Court with a direction to rehear the case afresh right from the
time of taking evidence i.e. after affording opportunity to both the sides to
adduce fresh evidence and thereafter to deliver a fresh judgment in
accordance with law.
[24]
It
is
observed
that
in
the
body
of
the
judgment
some
typographical errors were found in the first page of the judgment as well as in
the last page of judgment in respect of date of judgment and also in respect of
amount of money involved in the cheque for which it is required that in future
the Learned Court below before signing the judgment repeatedly should go
through line by line the body of judgment so that no clerical/typographical
error is detected to avoid any confusion. Furthermore, it is also observed that
at the time of recording evidence of the witnesses the documents were not
marked in accordance with the criminal rules and order because every
document should contain a separate exhibit mark and once the affidavit is
submitted by either of the parties then the question of separate marking of
exhibit for the affidavit and signature of the witness is not required to be
further marked by the concerned Trial Court.
(19)
[25]
Situated thus, it appears to this Court that the Director Judicial
Academy be asked to take step for conducting fresh training program of the
newly appointed Judicial Officers for proper dealing with the cases under N.I.
Act for their future guidance so that the evidence is properly appreciated and
the documents are properly marked and exhibited during trial.
[26]
In view of the above, the judgment and order of acquittal dated
22.12.2023
delivered
by
Learned
Sub-Divisional
Judicial
Magistrate,
Bishalgarh, Sepahijala, Tripura in connection with Case No.N.I.15 of 2022 is
hereby set aside. The case is remanded back to the Learned Trial Court with a
direction to rehear the case afresh right from the time of taking their evidence
both oral/documentary evidence by affording reasonable opportunities to both
the parties and to deliver a fresh judgment in accordance with law. The entire
exercise shall be completed within a period of 6(six) months from the date of
receipt of a copy of this judgment.
With this observation and direction, this appeal stands disposed
of.
Send down the LCR along with a copy of this judgment/order.
Copy of this judgment also be communicated to Director, Tripura Judicial
Academy.
Pending application/s, if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
SABYASACHI
SABYASACHI
BHATTACHARJE BHATTACHARJEE
Date: 2025.02.20 05:02:32
E
+05'30'
Sabyasachi B
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