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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C) NO.335 OF 2021
Sri Abhijit Das, son of Late Jatindra Chandra Das, resident of
Village & P.O. Indranagar (South) Surja Sen Road,
Agartala, West Tripura.
… Petitioner
Vrs.
1. The State of Tripura, represented by the Secretary &
Commissioner to the Department of Finance, Government of Tripura,
having his office at New Secretariat Complex, Gorkhabasti, Agartala,
PO-Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-Division-Agartala,
District-West Tripura.
2. The Secretary & Commissioner to the Department of Finance,
Government of Tripura, having his office at New Secretariat
Complex, Gorkhabasti, Agartala, P.O. Kunjaban, PS- New Capital
Complex, Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
3. The Hon’ble High Court of Tripura, represented by the Learned
Registrar General, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura.
4. The Learned Registrar General, having his office at the Hon’ble
High Court of Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
5. The Learned Registrar General (Administration, P & M) InCharge, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of Tripura,
P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-Division-Agartala,
District-West Tripura.
6. Sri Arindam Das, son of Sri Sital Chandra Das, working in the
post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura.
7. Sri Indu Bhusan Sarkar, son of Sri Naresh Ch. Sarkar, working in
the post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura.
8. Sri Anil Majumder, son of Sri Balahari Majumder, working in the
post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura.
9. Sri Krishnadhan Debnath, son of Sri Surya Kumar Debnath,
working in the post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble
High Court of Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
10. Sri Biswajit Mallik, son of Sri Radhasshyam Mallik, working in
the post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura.
11. Sri Chinmoy Debbarma, son of Sri Rathin Kumar Debbarma,
working in the post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble
High Court of Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
12. Sri Daya Sankar Chakma, son of Sri Gyana Lal Chakma,
working in the post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble
High Court of Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
… Respondents.
WP(C) NO.177 OF 2022
Sri Hiralal Hrishidas, son of Late Bishnu Hrishidas, resident of
Village-79 Tilla, PO-Kunjaban, PS-East Agartala, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura, PIN-799006, aged about 48 years.
… Petitioner
Vrs.
1. The State of Tripura, represented by the Secretary &
Commissioner to the Department of Finance, Government of Tripura,
having his office at New Secretariat Complex, Gorkhabasti, Agartala,
PO-Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-Division-Agartala,
District-West Tripura.
2. The Secretary & Commissioner to the Department of Finance,
Government of Tripura, having his office at New Secretariat
Complex, Gorkhabasti, Agartala, P.O. Kunjaban, PS- New Capital
Complex, Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
3. The Hon’ble High Court of Tripura, represented by the Learned
Registrar General, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, P.O. Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura.
4. The Learned Registrar General, having his office at the Hon’ble
High Court of Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
5. The Learned Registrar General (Administration, P & M) InCharge, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of Tripura,
P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-Division-Agartala,
District-West Tripura.
6. Sri Arindam Das, son of Sri Sital Chandra Das, working in the
post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura.
7. Sri Indu Bhusan Sarkar, son of Sri Naresh Ch. Sarkar, working in
the post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura.
8. Sri Anil Majumder, son of Sri Balahari Majumder, working in the
post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura.
9. Sri Krishnadhan Debnath, son of Sri Surya Kumar Debnath,
working in the post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble
High Court of Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
10. Sri Biswajit Mallik, son of Sri Radhasshyam Mallik, working in
the post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble High Court of
Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex, Sub-DivisionAgartala, District-West Tripura.
11. Sri Chinmoy Debbarma, son of Sri Rathin Kumar Debbarma,
working in the post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble
High Court of Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
12. Sri Daya Sankar Chakma, son of Sri Gyana Lal Chakma,
working in the post of Head Clerk, having his office at the Hon’ble
High Court of Tripura, P.O.Kunjaban, PS-New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division-Agartala, District-West Tripura.
13. Sri Abhijit Das, son of Late Jatindra Chandra Das, resident of
Village & P.O. Indranagar (South) Surja Sen Road, Agartala, West
Tripura.
… Respondents.
PRESENT
In WP(C) No.335 of 2021
For the petitioner (s)
: Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Abir Baran, Advocate.
Mrs. Riya Chakraborty, Advocate.
For the respondent
Nos. 1 & 2
: Mr. D. Bhattacharya, G.A.
Mr. D. Sarma, Addl. G.A.
For the respondent
Nos.3,4 & 5
: Mr. B. N. Majumder, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. D. J. Saha, Advocate.
For the respondent
Nos. 7 & 10
: Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, Advocate.
For the respondent
Nos.8,9 & 11
: Mr. Abhijit Sengupta, Advocate.
For the respondent
Nos. 6 & 12
: Ms. Rajashree Purkayastha,
Legal Aid Counsel.
In WP(C) No.177 of 2022
For the petitioner (s)
: Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Abir Baran, Advocate.
Mrs. Riya Chakraborty, Advocate.
For the respondent
Nos. 1 & 2
: Mr. D. Bhattacharya, G.A.
Mr. D. Sarma, Addl. G.A.
For the respondent
Nos.3, 4 & 5
: Mr. B. N. Majumder, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. D. J. Saha, Advocate.
For the respondent
Nos. 7 & 10
: Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee, Advocate.
For the respondent
: Mr. Abhijit Sengupta, Advocate.
Nos.8, 9 & 11
For the respondent
Nos. 6 & 12
: Ms. Rajashree Purkayastha,
Legal Aid Counsel.
For the respondent
No.13
: Mrs. S. Deb (Gupta), Advocate.
Date of hearing
:
19.05.2023
Date of delivery of Judgment
& Order
:
15.12.2023
Whether fit for reporting
:
Yes
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
JUDGMENT & ORDER
Since common questions of facts and law are involved,
these writ petitions were heard together on consent of learned counsel
appearing for the parties to the lis and these are taken up for disposal by this
common judgment.
2.
The facts, in a nutshell, are that the petitioners of both the writ
petitions were initially appointed in the year 2000 to the post of Lower
Division Assistant/Typist in the Agartala Bench of the then Gauhati High
Court (The High Court of Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura,
Mizoram & Arunachal Pradesh). Since then they had been rendering their
services in the Agartala Bench of the then Gauhati High Court and after 12
(twelve) years of their services, they had been promoted to the post of Bench
Assistant in the Agartala Bench in the Pay Band-2 of Rs.5,310-24,000/- with
Grade Pay of Rs.2,000/- vide notification dated 05.11.2012 [Annexure 2 to
the WP(C) No.335 of 2021] & notification dated 16.04.2012 [Annexure 2 to
the WP(C) No.177 of 2022] respectively. After a short span, they again had
achieved another promotion to the post of Senior Administrative Assistant
under the High Court of Tripura after bifurcation from the then Hon’ble
Gauhati High Court, in the Pay Band-2 of Rs.5,310-24,000/- with Grade Pay
of Rs.2,100/- vide notification dated 06.08.2013 [Annexure-4 to the writ
petition No.335 of 2021].
2.1
The petitioners contended that the private respondents namely,
Sri Arindam Das, Sri Anil Majumder, Sri Krishnadhan Debnath, Sri Chinmoy
Debbarma and Sri Dayasankar Chakma were appointed to the post of Lower
Division Assistant/Typist in the Agartala Bench of the then Gauhati High
Court with effect from 01.04.2002 i.e. after about two years from the date of
initial appointment of the petitioners to the said post of Lower Division
Assistant/Typist. Subsequently, the Registrar General, High Court of Tripura
vide notification dated 18.02.2016 [Annexure 6 to the writ petition No.335 of
2021] promoted nine persons including the petitioners and the aforesaid
private respondents to the post of Head Clerk Grade in the Pay Band-2 of
Rs.5,700-24,000/- with Grade Pay of Rs.4,200/- in order of preference therein
noting that the same represents their inter se seniority.
The notification dated 18th February, 2016 is the main bone of
contention of these two writ petitions because the petitioner in WP(C) No.335
of 2021 and the petitioner in WP(C) No.177 of 2022 have been placed at
Serial No.8 and 9 respectively in the seniority list i.e. at the bottom of private
respondents, which the petitioners have allegedly claimed that they have been
superseded by the private respondents.
2.2
Feeling aggrieved by the said seniority position, the petitioners
had submitted their representations for correction of their seniority position,
but, those were rejected vide communication dated 28.04.2016 [Annexure-9
to the Writ Petition No.335 of 2021] only on the ground that they had poor
recordings in their Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs, for short) than that of
the private respondents. Having dissatisfied with the said reply dated
28.04.2016, petitioner Sri Abhijit Das had submitted another representation to
the Respondents-High Court on 30.12.2020 soliciting his grievances, but, that
representation has not been addressed to till today.
2.3
The petitioners have assailed another Notification dated
23.03.2021, issued by the respondents-High Court of Tripura whereunder one
of the private respondents, namely, Sri Arindam Das has been again promoted
to the post of Superintendent (Group-B Gazetted) regardless of their original
i.e. initial seniority position.
2.4
With the aforesaid facts and grievances, the petitioners have
presented the above two writ petitions. WP(C) No. 335 of 2021 has been taken
up as lead case with the consent of the learned counsels appearing for the
parties and for brevity, the reliefs sought for therein may be reproduced
hereunder:
(i)
(ii)
“Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of them,
to show cause as to why a Writ of Certiorari and/or in the nature
thereof, shall not be issued for directing them, to transmit the
records, relevant to the subject matter of this writ petition for
rendering substantive and conscionable justice to the petitioner,
and for quashing/setting aside the impugned Notification dated
18.02.2016 (Annexure-6 supra) insofar as the same places the
petitioner below the private respondents, the impugned
Communication dated 28.04.2016 (Annexure-9 infra) & the
impugned Notification dated 23.03.2021 (Annexure-11 supra);
Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to
show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the nature
thereof, shall not be issued for mandating/directing the
respondents, to revoke/rescind the impugned Notification dated
18.02.2016 (Annexure-6 surpa) insofar as the same places the
petitioner below the private respondents, the impugned
Communication dated 28.04.2016(Annexure-9 supra) & the
impugned Notification dated 23.03.2021 (Annexure-11 supra),
and thereupon, restore the seniority of the petitioner over the
private respondents, and grant promotion to him to the post of
Superintendent (Group-B Gazetted), with effect from the date of
promotion of the private respondent, namely, Sri Arindam Das,
with all consequential benefits thereof:
(ii)(a) Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of
them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the
nature thereof, shall not be issued for mandating/directing the
respondents to place the petitioner above the private
respondents, thereby interfering with the impugned Notification
dated 18.02.2016, the impugned Communication dated
28.04.2016 and the impugned Notification dated 23.03.2021, and
accord promotion to the petitioner to the post of Head Clerk
Grade above the private respondents with all consequential
benefits thereof;
(ii)(b) Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of
them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Prohibition and/or in the
nature thereof, shall not be issued for restraining/prohibiting the
respondents, from according any promotion, in favour of the
private respondents, in furtherance of the impugned Notification
dated 18.02.2016, the impugned Communication dated
28.04.2016 and the impugned Notification dated 23.03.2021, till
the final decision of this writ petition.”
3.
Heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned senior counsel assisted by Mrs.
Riya Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both the
writ petitions.
Also heard Mr. B. Nandi Majumder, learned senior counsel
assisted by Mr. D.J.Saha, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-High
Court; Mr. D. Bhattacharya, learned GA assisted by Mr. D. Sarma, learned
Addl. GA appearing for the State-respondents; Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee,
Mr. Abhijit Sengupta; Ms. Rajashree Purkayastha and Mrs. S. Deb (Gupta),
learned counsels appearing for the private respondents.
4.
Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel at the time of hearing contended
with vehemence that the post of Head Clerk/Accountant is to be filled up by
promotion, from the feeder post of Senior Administrative Assistant, on the
basis of seniority-cum-merit. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel reiterated that
promotion by applying the principle of seniority-cum-merit would mean that
there cannot be any relative assessment of inter se merit, and once, a
government servant meets the requisite benchmark, promotion has to be made
on the basis of inter se seniority. In the instant cases, the petitioners have been
completely superseded by the private respondents merely on the basis of poor
ACR rating. He has challenged the legality and validity of the Communication
dated 28.04.2016 whereby it has been noted that the Order of promotion was
issued, solely on the basis of merit, even though, no statutory rule has been
placed on record to substantiate such conclusion. Learned senior counsel had
given much emphasis to the Rules 14 & 15 of the High Court of Tripura
Services (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 2014
(here-in-after referred to as the ‘Service Rules, 2014’). Drawing attention to
Rules 14 & 15 of the Service Rules, 2014 Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel
contended that in all grades of the High Court, promotions have been made
only on the basis of seniority, and therefore, adoption of such unique process
of marks allocated against the ACR gradings for 5(five) years for promotion to
the post of Head Clerk Grade has resulted in gross injustice to the petitioners
since the principle of seniority-cum-merit has been altered by the principle of
merit-cum-seniority, leaving no space for seniority which is contrary to the
settled principle of promotion by way of seniority-cum-merit. Mr. Deb,
learned senior counsel emphatically confronted the following parameters as
fixed by the High Court in contrary to Rule of promotion to the post of Head
Clerk Grade, which reads thus:
“…As far as the posts which are to be filled in on the
basis of seniority-cum-merit are concerned, I feel that it would be proper
to allot 25 marks for seniority and 25 marks for merit. The criteria in this
regard will be as follows:As far as merit is concerned, ACRs of each employees
for the last five years have been considered. An employee getting overall
grading „outstanding‟ will get 5 marks, 4 for „very good‟, 3 for „good‟, 2
for „fair‟ and for „poor‟ 0 marks….”
According to learned senior counsel, the High Court, particularly,
Hon’ble the Chief Justice arbitrarily exercised his jurisdiction by way of
flouting the established rules construing the principles of seniority-cum-merit
for the purpose of promotion.
In support of his submission, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel has
referred to the following decisions:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
5.
(2022) 5 SCC 150 [Rama Negi Vrs. Union of India &
Ors.];
(1974) 3 SCC 91[ Haryana State Electricity Board Vrs.
State of Punjab & Ors];
(1987) 3 SCC 622 [P.D. Aggarwal & Ors. Vrs. State of
U.P. & Ors.];
(1990) 4 SCC 174 [Mahadev Kalekar & Ors. Vrs. State
Bank of Hyderabad & Ors.];
(1998) 8 SCC 685 [State of U.P. & Ors. Vrs. Raj Bahadur
Singh & Anr.]
AIR 1976 SC 490: (1976) 2 SCC 310 [State of Kerala &
Anr. Vrs. N.M.Thomas & Ors.] and
(1998) 6 SCC 720 [B.V. Sivaiah & Ors. Vrs. K. Addanki
Babu & Ors];
(2002) 10 SCC 359 [Ved Prakash & Ors. Vrs. State of
Haryana & Ors.]
At the very outset, Mr. Nandi Majumder, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondents-High Court submitted that the promotion list
issued vide notification dated 18.02.2016 by the Hon’ble High Court showing
the placement of the petitioners at Serial No. 8 & 9 respectively was a
conscious decision of the then Hon’ble Chief Justice dated 17.02.2016 on
administrative side. He has submitted that a specific order was passed by the
then Hon’ble Chief Justice with respect to the filling up of 9(nine) vacant
posts of Head Clerk from the eligible Senior Administrative Assistant taking
into consideration the diverse merit of the candidates and directed that the
seniority of the employees on promotion to the grade of Head Clerk will be on
the basis of Merit List drawn up by the Registrar General which was based on
the formula evolved by the Hon’ble Chief Justice as per His Lordship’s order
dated 14.07.2014.
5.1
Mr. Nandi Majumder had drawn my attention to the Annexure
R/2 & R/3 to the counter affidavit of WP(C) No.335 of 2021, which read as
follows:ANNEXURE-R/2 [Note dated 14.07.2014]
“I have perused detailed note of the Registrar General. As
far as the post of Superintendent is concerned, the same has to be filled in
on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. The system which I have followed is
that the employee has been given 1(one) mark for each completed year of
service in the grade excluding the minimum service in the lower grade
which is necessary for being considered for the higher post upto a
maximum of 10 marks. Therefore, where three years service is required in
the lower grade, in case of an employee who has five years of service in
the lower grade he will get 2 marks for his seniority and the employees
having 13 or more years of service will get 10 marks for seniority. With
regard to merit 40 marks have been allotted in the following fashion:ACRs of each of the employees shall be considered for the
last 5(five) years. An employee getting overall grading „outstanding‟ has
been awarded 8 marks, for „very good‟ it is 6 marks, for „good‟ it is 4
marks, for „fair‟ it is 2 marks and for „poor‟ 0 marks.
As far as the posts which are to be filled in on the basis of
seniority-cum-merit are concerned, I feel that it would be proper to allot
25 marks for seniority and 25 marks for merit. The criteria in this regard
will be as follows:As far as merit is concerned, ACRs of each employee for the
last five years have been considered. An employee getting overall grading
„outstanding‟ will get 5 marks, 4 for „very good‟, 3 for „good‟, 2 for „fair‟
and for „poor‟ 0 marks.
In case of merit-cum-seniority, an employee must have 3
„good‟ in the last five years to be considered for promotion and in case of
seniority-cum-merit, an employee must have at least 2 „good‟ in the last
five years to be considered for promotion.
Where seniority is the only criterion for promotion, the
employee senior most in service will be selected subject to the condition
that he should have at least one „good‟ and not more than 2 „poor‟ in the
last five years. If an employee does not have one „good‟ or has more than
2 „poor‟ in the last five years shall not be considered fit for promotion.
Registrar General is directed to prepare a chart on the basis
of above formula. As far as relaxation is concerned, I shall pass
necessary order after preparation of the chart.”
ANNEXURE-R/3[Note dated 17.02.2016]
“I have considered the proposal of the Registrar General
dated 17.02.2016 for filling up the existing 09 vacant posts in the grade of
Head Clerk belonging to Group-C non-gazetted. These posts have to be
filled up on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. None of the employees who
are under consideration fulfill the requisite essential qualification of
having completed three years of service in the feeder post of Senior
Administrative Assistant. However, it is necessary to fill up these posts
because work of the High Court is suffering.
While making promotions merit cannot be ignored because I
find that there is a lot of disparity in the overall grading of the employees.
To give an example, there is one employee who has five „Outstanding‟
grading in the last five years‟ACRs whereas another employee has four
„Good‟ and one „Very Good‟ grading. As such they cannot be equated. I
am of the view that relaxation may be granted and all the nine vacant
posts in the grade of Head Clerk be filled up but the seniority of the
employees on promotion will be as per the merit drawn up by the
Registrar General on the basis of the formula evolved as per my Order
dated 14.7.2014.
After the nine vacant post of Head Clerk grade are filled up,
nine posts of Senior Administrative Assistant shall fall vacant. Two Bench
Assistants have more than three years service as Junior Administrative
Assistant and they may be promoted as Senior Administrative Assistants
in the order of their present seniority. Out of the remaining seven posts of
Senior Administrative Assistant only three may be filled in at present
maintaining the present seniority since only three Junior Administrative
Assistants namely, Smti Madhumita Debbarma, Smti Soma Rani Deb
(Nag) and Shri Sudip Pal have the requisite essential qualification of
three years service in the feeder post.”
5.2
It was argued that Hon’ble the Chief Justice had exercised his
power as envisaged under proviso to Rule 14 because none of the candidates
completed three years’ of service as required for promotion to the post of
Head Clerk from Senior Administrative Assistant.
5.3
Further, Mr. Nandi Majumder, learned senior counsel reiterated
that the petitioners have preferred these writ petitions after a lapse of more
than 4 and ½ years from the date of disposal of their representations dated
14.03.2016 & 15.03.2016. Petitioner Sri Abhijit Das of WP(C) No.335 of
2021 had submitted another representation dated 30.12.2020 i.e. after lapse of
more than four and half years without any cogent reason for delay. Mr. Nandi
Majumder, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents-High Court
quite emphatically submitted that these writ petitions are barred by the
doctrine of delay and laches.
5.4
Mr. Nandi Majumder, learned senior counsel has relied
upon the following decisions, in support of his argument:i.
5.5
AIR 1968 SC 1113 [The State of Mysore & Anr.
Vrs. Syed Mahmood & Ors.];
Finally, Mr. Nandi Majumder, learned senior counsel placing
strong reliance upon the ‘Residuary Power’ as contemplated under Rule 26 of
the Service Rules, 2014 strenuously argued that- Hon‟ble the Chief Justice has
ample power to make such order from time to time as he may deem fit in
regard to all matters, incidental or ancillary to these rules not specifically
provided for herein or in regard to the matters as have not been sufficiently
proved for and the Chief Justice shall have power to relax age or qualification
and experience for appointment to the service in appropriate case according
to his discretion. Hence, learned senior counsel for the respondents-High
Court prayed for dismissal of these writ petitions.
6.
Ms. Purkayastha, learned counsel appearing for the private
respondent, Arindam Das submitted that the petitioners have no locus to
challenge the promotion of respondent Arindam Das for his promotion to the
post of Superintendent, which he holds now since 2021. Ms. Purkayastha,
learned counsel appearing for the private respondent, Arindam Das has placed
reliance on the decisions reported in AIR 1974 SC 2271 [P.S. Sadasivaswamy
Vrs The State of Tamil Nadu]; (2009) 5 SCC 1 [Andhra Pradesh Public
Service Commission Vrs. Baloji Badhavath & Ors. & (2011) 10 SCC 121
[Hardev Singh Vrs. Union of India & Anr.].
7.
Learned counsels appearing on behalf of other private
respondents have adopted the submissions made by Mr. Deb, learned senior
counsel appearing for the petitioners.
8.
In reply to the argument advanced by learned counsels appearing
for the respondents, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel for the petitioners
submitted that there is no delay or laches in filing the writ petitions before the
High Court. To support this submission, Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel
eloquently contended that the promotion of the petitioners to the post of Head
Clerk was made on 18.02.2016. The petitioners submitted representations on
14.03.2016 & 15.03.2016 respectively. Those representations being not
responded to, the petitioners filed the present writ petitions on 28.04.2021 and
21.02.2022. As such, the last promotion of respondent no.6, Arindam Das vide
order dated 23.03.2021 and the representation thereafter raising serious
objection against such promotion with a prayer for consideration of the
promotion of the petitioners rectifying their seniority position gave rise to
fresh cause of action to file the instant writ petitions by the petitioners. In
support of his submission, learned senior counsel for the petitioners relied
upon a decision rendered in the case of Haryana State Electricity Board Vrs.
State of Punjab & Ors. reported in (1974) 3 SCC 91, wherein, Hon’ble
Supreme Court at Para 5 & 6 of the judgment held thus:
“5. On the question of laches various representations and
petitions which B.K. Puri had been making consistently were referred
to by the High Court and it was considered that it was not a case
where relief could be declined on the ground of laches or delay. The
High Court quashed the order, dated June 27, 1963, confirming
B.K.Puri in Class I with effect from April 7, 1957 and issued a writ of
Mandamus to consider the case for confirmation in Class I with effect
from September 1,1956 or a date earlier than that and refix his
seniority vis-à-vis Respondents 3 to 9 in Class I and that of Executive
Engineers in the light of interpretation of Rule 7-A as given in the
judgment. It may be mentioned that this interpretation was the same as
has been accepted by us as correct in the connected appeal, i.e.,
C.A.456 of 1970.
6.
It appears to us that the judgment of the High Court in this
case does not call for any interference. The main stress that was laid
by the learned counsel for the State was on the laches and delay on the
part of B. K. Puri in filing the petition in the High Court. From the
resume of the various dates which has already been given it is
apparent that he kept on making representations and moving the
appropriate authorities at all stages and the only reason which has
been suggested for confirming him Class I subsequent to Respondents
3 to 9 is that he had been passed over on the ground which has already
been mentioned. The High Court has dealt with that aspect fully and in
view of the interpretation of the proviso to Rule 7-A which has already
been discussed in the connected appeal by us it is difficult to disagree
with the High Court that there was no justification for not confirming
B. K. Puri in Class I from the same date on which the Respondents (3
to 9) were confirmed, namely, September 1, 1956……..”
9.
Here, in the instant writ petitions, I find that the petitioner in
WP(C) No.335 of 2021 had at first filed his representation on 14.03.2016 and
the petitioner in WP(C) No.177 of 2022 filed his representation on
15.03.2016. The filing of representations was the effect of deprivation of their
seniority position to the Post of Head Clerk whereby they were superseded by
the private respondents though they were senior to the private respondents by
virtue of seniority-cum-merit. Both the representations of the petitioners were
rejected by the Respondents-High Court vide communication dated 28th April,
2016. The extract of the said communication reads as follows:
“I have considered the representations of Shri Hiralal Das,
Head Clerk, dated 15.03.2016 and Shri Abhijit Das, Head Clerk, dated
14.03.2016 who were promoted as Head Clerk vide Notification dated
18.02.2016 granting relaxation in experience.
The grievance of these two officials is that in the feeder
category of Senior Administrative Assistants, they were at Sl. No. 1
and 2 respectively but now they have gone to Sl. Nos. 9 and 8
respectively in the merit of Head Clerks.
While making the promotions I had clearly mentioned that
merit cannot be ignored. There was a lot of disparity in the grading of
the various employees. Shri Hiralal Hrishidas was graded ; good‟ for
the years 2011, 2012. 2013 and 2014 and „very good‟ for the year
2015. On the other hand, Shri Arindam Das who has been placed
above them was graded „outstanding‟ for all the five years and Shri
Indu Bhusan Sarkar was graded „good‟ for the year 2011 and
„outstanding‟ for the remaining four years. The seniority positions in
the promotional post have been fixed as per the merit and, therefore, in
my opinion, there is no force in the representations made by the
representationists, which are accordingly rejected”
10.
Subsequently, another representation filed by the petitioner
Abhijit Das was also not redressed to by the Respondents-High Court which
prompted the petitioners to file these two writ petition seeking remedy.
11.
It is therefore, evident that there was a considerable period spent
by the petitioners in filing their writ petitions. Learned counsels for the
respondents expressively raised their pleas that these writ petitions have been
barred by delay and laches because the petitioners have come up with their
pleas before this Court after 4 and ½ years. It was their contention that the
petitioners could have sought remedy when the cause of action arose on
18.02.2016 i.e. when they were deprived of getting their seniority position in
the alleged promotion order. But, they did not. These averments have been
intensely resisted by Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel for the petitioners. Mr.
Deb, learned senior counsel strongly submitted that the petitioners obviously
could have come forward with filing of a case before the Court of law, but,
they had hope in their mind that perhaps their seniority matter would be
reckoned and considered by the Respondents-High Court at a subsequent
promotion. When they were again deprived of their promotion and they had
been placed at the bottom of the seniority list, they have come up before the
court finding no other way when they felt that they would be in a great
professional loss.
12.
Having considered the submission put forward by Mr. Deb,
learned senior counsel for the petitioners and in view of the decision rendered
in Haryana State Electricity Board (supra), I find force that these writ
petitions are not barred by doctrine of delay and laches.
13.
Now, coming to the main controversy which centered round the
impugned promotion order dated 18.02.2016 whereby the private respondents
had been shown top of the list allegedly violating the seniority position of the
petitioners, I must tally the actual seniority position of the petitioners on the
basis of seniority-cum-merit prepared vide Note dated 17.02.2016 [AnnexureR/3 to the WP(C) No.177 of 2022] with the promotion list dated 18.02.2016
which was made on the basis of merit-cum-seniority by the Respondents-High
Court, which may be reproduced here-in-below for the sake of convenience:
The extracts of Annexure-R/3 to the WP(C) No.177 of 2022
“THE HON‟BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
This is a proposal for kind consideration of Your Lordship for filling up of existing
09 vacant posts in the grade of Head Clerk (Group-C non-gazetted) in the Pay Band 2 of
Rs.5700-24000/- with Grade Pay of Rs.4200/- by promotion from the employees holding the
post of Senior Administrative Assistant (Sr. A.A.) of the High Court Service and also to fill
up the resultant vacancies thereof as desired by Your Lordship.
The proposal is submitted in seriatim as follows:
A.
THE POSTS OF HEAD CLERK GRADE BELONGING TO GROUP-C NON
GAZETTED
As per Schedule I(7) of the High Court of Tripura Services (Appointments,
Conditions of Service & Conduct) Rules,2014 (for short the Service Rules), the posts in the
grade of Head Clerk will be filled up by promotion from Senior Administrative Assistant
having 3 years experience in that grade on the basis of seniority-cum-merit.
In this Registry, there are 17 Sr. A.A. and as on today, none of them has
completed eligible period of 03 years of Service in that Grade. I am furnishing below the
particulars of the 12 senior most Sr. A.A. who have completed at least more than 1 ½ years
of service in the grade, as per their seniority, indicating their qualification, date of joining
in the present post & date of retirement for consideration in filling up the vacant posts of
Head Clerk Grade:
Sl.No.
1.
Name & Qualification of the Sr. Administrative Date of Joining Date
of
Assistant
in present post
retirement
Shri Hiralal Hrishidas, B.Com(Hons)
06.08.2013
28.02.2034
2.
Shri Abhijit Das, B.A.
06.08.2013
31.07.2033
3.
Shri Indu Bhusan Sarkar, B.A.
01.08.2014
31.11.2034
4.
Shri Biswajit Mallik, B.Com
01.08.2014
31.12.2031
5.
Shri Krishnadhan Debnath,M.A.
01.08.2014
31.07.2025
6.
Shri Arindam Das,B.A
01.08.2014
31.12.2036
7.
Sri Anil Majumder, B.A.
01.08.2014
31.03.2025
8.
Shri Chinmoy Debbarma,B.Com
01.08.2014
31.12.2036
9.
Shri Daya Sankar Chakma,B.A.
01.08.2014
30.06.2035
10.
Smti. Mithu Debbarma,B.A.
01.08.2014
30.09.3036
11.
Shri Biplab Chakraborty,B.Com
01.08.2014
30.11.2032
12.
Shri Prasenjit Mukherjee, B.Sc.
01.08.2014
31.03.2028
The remarks of A.C.Rs for the years 2011-2015 of above mentioned 12 Sr.
A.A. are given below for favour of kind consideration of Your Lordship as follows:
Sl.
No.
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.
14.
Name of the staff
Shri Hiralal Hrishidas
Shri A. Das
Shri I. Bhusan Sarkar
Shri Biswajit Mallik
Shri K. Debnath
Shri Arindam Das
Sri Anil Majumder
Shri Chinmoy Debbarma
Shri D. Sankar Chakma
Smti. Mithu Debbarma
Shri Biplab Chakraborty
Shri P.Mukherjee
Good
Good
Good
V.Good
V.Good
O.standing
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
Good
V.Good
Good
Good
Good
O.standing
V.Good
V.Good
O.standing
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
Good
Good
O.standing
V.Good
V.Good
O.standing
O.standing
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
Good
V.Good
O.standing
V.Good
O.standing
O.standing
O.standing
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
V. Good
V.Good
O.standing
V.Good
O.standing
O.standing
O.standing
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good
V.Good”
Subsequently, the Respondents-High Court issued the impugned
Notification dated 18th February, 2016 with regard to the promotion to the post
of Head Clerk from the feeder post of Sr. Administrative Assistant. In that
notification the petitioners’ name had been shown at the bottom of the list
whereas the private respondents had been shown ahead of them. The said
Notification dated 18.02.2016 also may be reproduced here-under for ready
reference:
“HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
No.F.4(22)-HC/2016/3065
Dated, Agartala, the 18th
February,2016
NOTIFICATION
With kind approval of Hon‟ble the Chief, the following employees in
the Grade of Senior Administrative Assistant, High Court of Tripura have
been promoted to the post of Head Clerk Grade, High Court of Tripura
temporarily in the following order of preference, which represents their
inter se seniority in the Pay Band-2 of ₹5700-24000/- with Grade Pay of
₹4200/- plus other allowances as admissible under the rules with effect
from the date of their joining with relaxation relating to experience as per
Rule 26 of the High Court of Tripura Services (Appointment, Conditions
of Service and Conduct) Rules, 2014 (as amended):
Sl.No.
Name of the Employees
1.
Shri Arindam Das,
Senior Administrative Assistant
2.
Shri Indu Bhusan Sarkar,
Senior Administrative Assistant
3.
Shri Anil Majumder,
Senior Administrative Assistant
4.
Shri Krishnadhan Debnath,
Senior Administrative Assistant
5.
Shri Biswajit Mallik,
Senior Administrative Assistant
6.
Shri Chinmoy Debbarma,
Senior Administrative Assistant
7.
Shri Daya Sankar Chakma,
Senior Administrative Assistant
8.
Shri Abhijit Das,
Senior Administrative Assistant
9.
Shri Hiralal Hrishidas,
Senior Administrative Assistant
They will perform their present duties until further order(s).
They will remain on officiating basis for a period of 2(two) years as
per Rule 121 of the High Court of Tripura Services (Appointment,
Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 2014 (as amended).
By order,
Sd/(M. Chakraborty)
Registrar General”
15.
The petitioners have contended in their writ petitions that both of
them had entered into the High Court Services as Lower Division Assistant
(LDC), now renamed as Junior Administrative Assistant in the year 2000
which is very much evident from the Note dated 21.01.2021[ Annexure-R/1
to the counter affidavit in WP(C) No.335 of 2021] made by the RespondentsHigh Court. On perusal of the said Note, I find that at the time of recruitment
in the year 2000, petitioner Abhijit Das along with three other candidates were
recruited by the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench, Agartala (now High
Court of Tripura) as per the following seniority;
1. Shri Hiralal Rrishidas
2. Shri Abhijit Das
3. Shri Indu Bhusan Sarkar
4. Shri Biswajit Mallik.
In the said Note, the Respondents-High Court further mentioned
that in the year 2002, following five persons joined on 01.04.2002 as
LDA/LDC:
1. Shri Arindam Das
2. Shri Anil Majumder
3. Shri Krishanadhan Debnath
4. Shri Chinmoy Debbarma
5. Shri Daya Sankar Chakma
16.
Therefore, it is established that the private respondents were
recruited in the year 2002 i.e. subsequent to the recruitment of the petitioners
in the year 2000. In this aspect, there is no ambiguity regarding their seniority
position among the nine incumbents by virtue of seniority-cum-merit. Further,
on perusal of the Notification dated 06.08.2013[Annexure-4 to the WP(C) No.
335 of 2021], it reveals that both the petitioners got promotion to the post of
Sr. Administrative Assistant and there was no dispute regarding their
promotion and seniority. But, the disputes cropped up in the year 2016 when
the petitioners have been promoted to the Post of Head Clerk showing their
inter se seniority at the place of Sl. Nos. 8 & 9 though they were noticeably
found senior to the private respondents in the Note dated 21.01.2021 made by
the Respondents-High Court.
17.
The Respondents-High Court in the their counter affidavit
unequivocally clarified that the then Hon’ble Chief Justice in administrative
side made a Note dated 14.07.2014 [Annexure-R/2 to the WP (C) No.335 of
2021] wherein it was observed that –
“With regard to merit 40 marks have been allotted in the following
fashion:ACRs of each of the employees shall be considered for the last 5(five)
years. An employee getting overall grading „outstanding‟ has been awarded
8 marks, for „very good‟ it is 6 marks, for „good‟ it is 4 marks, for „fair‟ it is
2 marks and for „poor‟ 0 marks.
As far as the posts which are to be filled in on the basis of senioritycum-merit are concerned, I feel that it would be proper to allot 25 marks for
seniority and 25 marks for merit. The criteria in this regard will be as
follows:As far as merit is concerned, ACRs. of each employee for the last five
years have been considered. An employee getting overall grading
„outstanding‟ will get 5 marks, 4 for „very good‟, 3 for „good‟, 2 for „fair‟
and for „poor‟ 0 marks.
In case of merit-cum-seniority, an employee must have 3 „good‟ in
the last five years to be considered for promotion and in case of senioritycum-merit, an employee must have at least 2 „good‟ in the last five years to
be considered for promotion.”
18.
It is apparent that subsequently, the then Hon’ble Chief Justice on
the basis of a proposal made on 17.02.2016 by the Registrar General for filling
up the existing 09 vacant posts of Head Clerk, the then Hon’ble Chief Justice
in His Lordship’s Note dated 17.02.2016 observed that-while making
promotions merit cannot be ignored because I find that there is a lot of
disparity in the overall grading of the employees. To give an example, there is
one employee who has five „Outstanding‟ grading in the last five years „ACRs
whereas another employee has four „Good‟ and one „Very Good‟ grading. As
such they cannot be equated. It has been further clarified in the said Note that
relaxation may be granted and all the nine vacant posts in the grade of Head
Clerk be filled up but the seniority of the employees on promotion will be as
per the merit drawn up by the Registrar General on the basis of the formula
evolved as per Note dated 14.07.2014 made by the then Chief Justice.
19.
On reading of the above Note made by the then Hon’ble Chief
Justice, it is apparently clear that a mechanism had been adopted for
consideration of promotion to the post of Head Clerk from the feeder post of
Sr. Administrative Assistant. More particularly, in case of promotion, the
ACR grading of an employee would be the first priority. In that system, there
is provision for allocation of 25 marks for seniority and 25 marks for merit.
From the Note dated 14.07.2014 made by the then Hon’ble Chief Justice, it is
aptly clear that special priority had been given on the point of merit to be
considered for promotion. It has been taken note of grading in the ACR of the
employees i.e. for ‘Outstanding’ 5 marks has been allocated, for ‘Very Good’
it is 4 marks, for ‘Good’ it is 3 marks, 2 marks for ‘Fair’ and 0 marks for
‘poor’. That formula had been applied in considering the promotion of the
petitioners including the private respondents. Resultantly, on calculation of
five years’ ACR grading of 09(nine) incumbents w.e.f. 2011 to 2015 the
promotion was effected to the private respondents including the petitioners. In
a clear perception, reckoning the five years’ grading of the employees who got
highest marks out of 25 marks on assessment of their ACR during those five
years would be considered for their promotion and thus, the impugned
notification dated 18.02.2016 was arranged in descending order.
20.
Following the aforesaid formula evolved by the then Hon’ble
Chief Justice, the private respondent, namely, Arindam Das had further been
promoted to the post of Superintendent from the post of Head Clerk vide
notification dated 23.03.2021, issued by the Respondents-High Court which is
also challenged by the petitioners in these writ petitions.
21.
Having gone through the above methodology, a question arose in
the mind of this Court that as to how and in what manner these marks have
been allotted since in the Service Rules, 2014 no provisions have been
prescribed for allocation of marks in order to provide promotion of the
employees of the High Court. This is beyond the established rule of the
seniority-cum-merit. For the sake of convenience, I may gainfully refer here
Rules 14 & 15 of the Service Rules, 2014 which reads as under:
“14. Promotion—
Promotion to the higher post/grade in all the cadres of the
service shall be made on the basis of merit, merit-cum-seniority,
seniority-cum-merit or seniority subject to rejection of unfit as specified
in the schedules.
Provided that suitability test for promotion to certain posts
may be taken as may be prescribed by the Chief Justice.
15. Seniority—
(1) The members of the service appointed or promoted in
accordance with these rules, on regular basis shall be senior to persons
appointed on ad hoc or temporary basis.
(2) The inter se seniority of the members of the service
appointed on the basis of the result of the competitive examination shall
be determined according to the merit list and where two or more
members are placed at the same position in the merit list, the person
senior in age shall be senior to the other(s).
(3) The inter se seniority of the members of the service
appointed by direct recruitment or promotion in the same/grade in any
English calendar year shall be determined from the date of their
appointment/promotion, as the case may be.
(4) Where more than one member is promoted in any cadre of
the service by the same order, the inter se seniority of persons, so
promoted, shall be determined by their inter se seniority in the lower
grade of the respective cadre, unless directed otherwise.”
22.
On going through the above Rules, it reveals that there is no
disclosure of any method for providing marks upon any employees of the
High Court in determining their promotion.
23.
However, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Tripura adopted
a mechanism of allocating/distributing marks to the eligible employees in the
feeder posts for promotion to the post of Head Clerk grade and exercised his
power under Rule 26 of the Service Rules, 2014 to determine the merits of
such employees including the petitioners and the private respondents.
24.
Before I advert into the legality of exercising such residuary
power in determining the merits of the employees in the feeder posts, it would
be apposite to revisit the provision embodied in Rule 26 of the Service Rules,
2014, which is encapsulated here-in-below:
―26. Residuary Power—
(1) Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to affect the power of the Chief
Justice to make such order from time to time as he may deems fit in
regard to all matters, incidental or ancillary to these rules not
specifically provided for herein or in regard to the matters as have not
been sufficiently provided for.
\
Provided, that if any such order relates to salary, allowances, leave or
pension of the member of the service, the same shall be made with the
approval of the Governor.
(2) The Chief Justice shall have power to relax age or qualification and
experience for appointment to the service in appropriate case according
to his discretion.
Provided that no person shall get the benefit of relaxation more than
once in his service life.”
25.
On bare perusal of Rule 26, it would indicate that the Chief
Justice can execute his residuary power in regard to all matters and make such
order incidental or ancillary to the provisions embodied in the Service Rules,
2014 where no specific Rule is made for a particular subject and in regard to
the matters which have not been sufficiently provided for.
26.
In the instant case, Service Rules, 2014 specifically prescribes the
mode of promotion to the post of Head Clerk from the post of Senior
Administrative Assistant under Schedule 1(7) of the Service Rules, 2014. It is
specifically provided that the posts in the Grade of Head Clerk will be filled
up by promotion from Senior Administrate Assistant having 3(three) years of
experience in that grade on the basis of ‘seniority-cum-merit’.
27.
The principle of the criterion ‘seniority-cum-merit’ is well
settled. In the State of Kerala Vrs. N.M. Thomas, reported in (1976) 2 SCC
310 explaining the criterion of „seniority-cum-merit’ the Supreme Court held
that -- with regard to promotion the normal principles are either merit-cumseniority or seniority-cum-merit. Seniority-cum-merit means that given the
minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency of administration, the
senior though the less meritorious shall have priority. It was further observed
at Para 18 that –we thus arrive at the conclusion that the criterion of
“seniority-cum-merit” in the matter of promotion postulates that—
Given the minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency
of administration, the senior, even though less
meritorious, shall have priority and a comparative
assessment of merit is not required to be made.
For assessing the minimum necessary merit, the competent
authority can lay down the minimum standard that is
required and also prescribe the mode of assessment of
merit of the employee who is eligible for consideration for
promotion.
Such assessment can be made by assigning marks on the
basis of appraisal of performance on the basis of service
record and interview and prescribing the minimum marks
which would entitle a person to be promoted on the basis
of seniority-cum-merit.
27.1
In the case of K. Samantaray Vrs. National Insurance Co. Ltd.,
reported in (2004) 9 SCC 286, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that –the
principles of „seniority-cum-merit‟ and „merit-cum-seniority‟ are conceptually
different. For the former, greater emphasis is laid on seniority, though it is not
the determinative factor, while in the latter, merit is the determinative factor.
27.2
In B.V. Sivaiah Vrs. K. Addhanki Babu & Ors., reported in
(1998) 6 SCC 720, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that --as
between the two principles of „seniority-cum-merit‟, the criterion of „senioritycum-merit‟ lays a greater emphasis on seniority.
27.3
In B.V.Sivaiah (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court referring to
the case of State of Mysore Vrs. C.R. Shesadri [(1974) 4 SCC 308] has
explained the criterion of ‘seniority-cum-merit’, which reads thus:
―15. In C.R. Sheshadri [(1974) 4 SCC 308 : 1974 SCC (L&S)
264] the Court was considering the question whether the High Court
could have given a direction to the State to give to the respondent
therein notional promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary with effect
from the date on which his junior secured such promotion. This Court
said that such a direction could not be given by the High Court
because promotion of a government servant was basically in the
Government's discretionary power and that in the absence of positive
proof of the relevant service rules, it was hazardous to assume that by
efflux of time, the respondent would have spiralled up to Deputy
Secretaryship and that the proper direction could only be that the
Government would reconsider the case of the respondent afresh for the
purpose of notional promotion. In that context, this Court pointed out
that if the rule of promotion is one of “sheer seniority”, it may well be
that promotion is a matter of course and that if seniority-cum-merit is
the rule, promotion is problematical. Since the relevant Rule
governing promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary had not been
placed before it, the Court was not required to define the criterion of
“seniority-cum-merit” and to delineate the fine distinction between the
criterion of “seniority-cum-merit” and the criterion of “merit-cumseniority” in the matter of promotion. In the observations on which
reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the rural banks
and the promoted officers, the distinction between “seniority-cummerit” and “merit-cum-seniority” has been obliterated and both the
criteria have been equated. Since comparative assessment of merit is
required to be made while applying the criterion of “merit-cum-
seniority” and for “seniority-cum-merit” no such comparative
assessment is required, the aforementioned observations in the case
of C.R. Sheshadri [(1974) 4 SCC 308 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 264] on
which reliance has been placed cannot be regarded as correctly
reflecting as to what is meant by the criterion of “seniority-cummerit”.
27.4
Having observed thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.M.
Thomas (supra) has ultimately held that—―the principle of equality is
applicable to employment at all stages and in all respects, namely, initial
recruitment, promotion, retirement, payment of pension and gratuity. With
regard to promotion the normal principles are either merit-cum-seniority or
seniority-cum-merit. Seniority-cum-merit means that given the minimum
necessary merit requisite for efficiency of administration, the senior though
the less meritorious shall have priority. This will not violate Articles 14,
16(1) and 16(2). A rule which provides that given the necessary requisite
merit, a member of the backward class shall get priority to ensure adequate
representation
will
not
similarly
violate
Article
14 or Article
16(1) and (2)....”
27.5
In the case of Haryana State Electronics Development Corpn.
Ltd. Vrs. Seema Sharma, reported in (2009) 7 SCC 311, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court had discussed the distinguishable features for the criterion of ‘senioritycum-merit’ and the requirement to consider the entirety of the candidate’s
service record and held that—the principle of merit-cum-seniority puts greater
emphasis on merit and ability and where promotion is governed by this
principle seniority plays a less significant role. However, seniority is to be
given weightage when merit and ability more or less are equal among the
candidates who are to be promoted.
27.6
In so far as the principle of ‘seniority-cum-merit’ is concerned,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, had made reference to the case of
Jagathigowda, C.N. Vrs. Cauvery Gramina Bank, reported in (1996) 9 SCC
677 held that – the criterion „seniority-cum-merit‟ gives greater importance to
seniority and promotion to a senior person cannot be denied unless the person
concerned is found totally unfit on merit to discharge the duties of the higher
post. The totality of the service of the employee has to be considered for
promotion on the basis of „seniority-cum-merit‟.
28.
What has emerged out of the aforesaid decisions is that the
principle of equality is applicable to all stages of employment including
promotion where the promotion is to be made on the basis of criterion
„seniority-cum-merit‟, then, a senior person though the less meritorious shall
have priority to his senior unless and until such senior person is totally
declined unfit for promotion. To apply the principle of „seniority-cum-merit‟
for the purpose of promotion, the inter se seniority of the employees in the
feeder post who are eligible for consideration of promotion are to be taken
into account. Determination of seniority confers certain rights and the
principle of „seniority-cum-merit‟ gives effect to such rights, flowing from
seniority. Comparative assessment of merits of each individual employee
under the consideration zone for promotion is not required.
[Emphasis supplied]
29.
In the instant case, it is surfaced that the Chief Justice has made a
comparative assessment of merits of the employees holding the feeder post of
Senior Administrative Assistant for promotion to the post of Head Clerk grade
and in doing so, the junior employees had been given higher marks on the
basis of their ACRs which virtually frustrates the principle of ‘seniority-cummerit’. The Chief Justice had allotted 25 marks for seniority and 25 marks for
merit. The Chief Justice had allotted 5 marks for an employee having his ACR
‘outstanding’, 4 marks for ‘very good’, 3 marks for ‘good’ 2 for ‘fair’ and for
poor ‘0’ marks. It is found from the comparative merit list that the petitioner
Sri Abhijit Das had obtained three ‘goods’ and two ‘very goods’ and the
petitioner Sri Hiralalhrisi Das had obtained four ‘goods’ and one ‘very good’
in their respective ACRs. Since the private respondents had better ACR
grading, i.e. found to be meritorious than the two writ petitioners herein, it
was decided to promote the private respondents.
30.
In view of the principles laid down in the authoritative
discussions as regards the principles of ‘seniority-cum-merit’, in the opinion
of this court, allocation of equal marks for seniority and merit is illegal and
arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
31.
In the opinion of this Court, Hon’ble the Chief Justice ought to
allocate lesser marks for merits because of the well established principle of
‘seniority-cum-merit’. The writ petitioners were never declared as ‘unfit’ to
hold the promotional post. Only they were found less meritorious but,
admittedly they obtained the benchmark for promotion since they were having
at least one ‘good’ and never graded as ‘poor’ in the last 5(five) assessment
years. The note of the Chief Justice dated 17.02.2016 is very relevant where
he observed that –Head Clerk posts belonged to Group „C‟ non-gazetted and
those posts had to be filled up on the basis of „seniority-cum-merit‟ but none
of them had completed three years of service in the feeder post of Senior
Administrative Assistant which is an essential qualification to fill up those
posts. However, it was necessary to fill up those posts because the High
Court‟s work was suffering. The Hon’ble Chief Justice had further observed
that while making promotions, merit could not be ignored because he found a
lot of disparity in the overall gradings of the employees and thus, he had
considered the meritorious candidates for promotion to the post of Head Clerk
grade.
32.
As I said earlier that Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court
had deviated from the principle of ‘seniority-cum-merit’ and given primacy to
the merits of the candidates without considering the fact that the petitioners
though found less meritorious but were never declared as unfit or unsuitable
for promotion to the next higher post by the Chief Justice. It is contended by
learned counsel appearing for the High Court that the Chief Justice had ample
power to adopt certain procedures and ignored the criterion ‘seniority-cummerit’ as envisaged in Schedule 1(7) of the Service Rules, 2014 in view of the
power vested upon him under 26 of the Service Rules, 2014 and under Article
229 of the Constitution of India.
33.
It is already stated that Schedule 1(7) of Service Rules, 2014 has
specifically provided the criterion of ‘seniority-cum-merit’ for promotion to
the post of Head Clerk from its feeder post of Senior Administrative Assistant.
So, the residuary power cannot be exercised in a matter where there is specific
provision provided in the Rules itself.
34.
The discretionary and residuary power upon the Chief Justice
under Rule 26 of the Rules, 2014 and the exercise of power under Article 229
of the Constitution of India have to be considered and exercised only in
exceptional cases and that too, in a just and equitable manner without
obliterating fundamental principles of equality as enshrined under Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution of India.
35.
Residuary powers given to the Chief Justice does not include the
powers to amend the Rules and, therefore, invoking the said Rules to
restructure the seniority of the employees possessing the same post in the High
Court cannot be sustainable. Furthermore, in my considered view, the
residuary power provided under Rule 26 is not meant to be exercised when it
would be in direct conflict with what has been expressly provided for in the
statute dealing with the subject. The Rule of ‘seniority-cum-merit’ in a statute
relating to promotion from a feeder post to the next higher grade being a
statutory provision dealing with the subject-matter, as in the instant case,
cannot be altogether ignored by the Hon’ble Chief Justice since such action
will offend the equality clauses laid down in Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India.
36.
The principle emerged from the aforesaid discussions is that the
residuary power vested upon the Chief Justice in the Service Rules, 2014
cannot be or should not be construed to mean that it can be exercised
notwithstanding the fundamental rights and obligation under the Constitution
and this power has to be exercised inconsonance with the provisions of Article
14 and Article 16 of the Constitution. Similarly, the powers conferred upon
the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution of India are also subject
to the fundamental principles of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India
in view of the law as propounded by the Apex Court in Renu & Ors. Vrs.
District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi & Anr. [(2014) 14 SCC
50] wherein, it is further held that the Chief Justice of the High Court has no
unfettered power and his power is subject to fundamental principles of Article
14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The relevant observations of the
larger bench of the Supreme Court in Renu (supra) may be reproduced herein.
“19. In Som Raj v. State of Haryana [(1990) 2 SCC 653 : 1990 SCC
(L&S) 380 : (1990) 13 ATC 702 : AIR 1990 SC 1176] this Court held as
under : (SCC pp. 658-59, para 6)
“6. … The absence of arbitrary power is the first postulate of
rule of law upon which our whole constitutional edifice is based.
In a system governed by rule of law, discretion when conferred
upon an executive authority must be confined within clearly
defined limits. The Rules provide the guidance for exercise of the
discretion in making appointment from out of selection lists
which was prepared on the basis of the performance and
position obtained at the selection. The appointing authority is to
make appointment in the order of gradation, subject to any other
relevant rules like, rotation or reservation, if any, or any other
valid and binding rules or instructions having force of law. If the
discretion is exercised without any principle or without any rule,
it is a situation amounting to the antithesis of rule of law.
Discretion means sound discretion guided by law or governed by
known principles of rules, not by whim or fancy or caprice of the
authority.”
20. In making the appointments or regulating the other service
conditions of the staff of the High Court, the Chief Justice exercises an
administrative power with constitutional backing. This power has been
entrusted to the safe custody of the Chief Justice in order to ensure the
independence of the Judiciary, which is one of the vital organs of a
Government and whose authority is to be maintained. The discretion
exercised by the Chief Justice cannot be open to challenge, except on
well-known grounds, that is to say, when the exercise of discretion is
discriminatory or mala fide, or the like(s).
21. Even under the Constitution, the power of appointment granted to
the Chief Justice under Article 229(1) is subject to Article 16(1), which
guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to
employment. “Opportunity” as used in this article means chance of
employment and what it guaranteed is that this opportunity of
employment would be equally available to all.
***
***
***
23. Article 235 of the Constitution provides for power of the High
Court to exercise complete administrative control over the subordinate
courts. This control, undoubtedly, extends to all functionaries attached to
the subordinate courts including the ministerial staff and servants in the
establishment of the subordinate courts. If the administrative control
cannot be exercised over the administrative and ministerial staff i.e. if the
High Court would be denuded of its powers of control over the other
administrative functionaries and ministerial staff of the District Court
and subordinate courts other than judicial officers, then the purpose of
superintendence provided therein would stand frustrated and such an
interpretation would be wholly destructive to the harmonious, efficient
and effective working of the subordinate courts. The courts are
institutions or an organism where all the limbs complete the whole system
of courts and when the constitutional provision is of such wide amplitude
to cover both the courts and persons belonging to the judicial office, there
would be no reason to exclude the other limbs of the courts, namely,
administrative functionaries and ministerial staff of its establishment from
the scope of control. Such control is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in
extent and effective in operation. (Vide State of W.B. v. Nripendra Nath
Bagchi [AIR 1966 SC 447] , Baradakanta Mishra v. High Court of
Orissa [(1974) 1 SCC 374 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 128] , Yoginath D.
Bagde v. State of Maharashtra [(1999) 7 SCC 739 : 1999 SCC (L&S)
1385] , Subedar Singh v. District Judge, Mirzapur [(2001) 1 SCC 37 :
2001 SCC (L&S) 141] , High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan v. P.P.
Singh [(2003) 4 SCC 239 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 424] and High Court of
Judicature of Madras v. R. Perachi [(2011) 12 SCC 137 : (2011) 2 SCC
(L&S) 643] .)
24. In M. Gurumoorthy v. Accountant General, Assam and
Nagaland [(1971) 2 SCC 137 : AIR 1971 SC 1850] the Constitution
Bench of this Court held : (SCC p. 143, para 11)
“11. The unequivocal purpose and obvious intention of the
framers of the Constitution in enacting Article 229 is that in the
matter of appointment of officers and servants of a High Court it
is the Chief Justice or his nominee who is to be the supreme
authority and there can be no interference by the executive
except to the limited extent that is provided in the article. …
12. … Thus, Article 229 has a distinct and different scheme
and contemplates full freedom to the Chief Justice in the matter
of appointments of officers and servants of the High Court and
their conditions of service.”
In that case, this Court spelt out the powers of the Chief Justice
of the High Court in the matters of appointment of staff of the
High Court, but this Court did not lay down in any way that the
Chief Justice can exercise such powers in contravention of the
provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution while making
appointments in the establishment of the High Court.
25. In H.C. Puttaswamy v. High Court of Karnataka [1991 Supp (2)
SCC 421 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 53 : (1992) 19 ATC 292 : AIR 1991 SC 295]
, while dealing with a similar situation and interpreting the provisions of
Article 229(2) of the Constitution and the Karnataka State Civil Services
(Recruitment to Ministerial Posts) Rules, 1966, this Court held the
appointments made by the Chief Justice of the High Court without
advertising the vacancies as invalid being violative of Articles 14 and
16(1) of the Constitution. The Court came to the said conclusion as the
appointments were made without following the procedure prescribed in
the Rules. The Court further observed : (SCC pp. 426-27, paras 10-11)
“10. While the administration of the courts has perhaps never
been without its critics, the method of recruitment followed by
the Chief Justice appears to be without parallel. … The
methodology adopted by the Chief Justice was manifestly wrong
and it was doubtless deviation from the course of law which the
High Court has to protect and preserve.
11. The judiciary is the custodian of constitutional principles
which are essential to the maintenance of rule of law. It is the
vehicle for the protection of a set of values which are integral
part of our social and political philosophy. Judges are the most
visible actors in the administration of justice. Their case
decisions are the most publicly visible outcome. But the
administration of justice is just not deciding disputed cases. It
involves great deal more than that. Any realistic analysis of the
administration of justice in the courts must also take account of
the totality of the Judges' behaviour and their administrative
roles. They may appear to be only minor aspects of the
administration of justice, but collectively they are not trivial.
They constitute in our opinion, a substantial part of the mosaic
which represents the ordinary man's perception of what the
courts are and how the Judges go about their work. The Chief
Justice is the prime force in the High Court. Article 229 of the
Constitution provides that appointment of officers and servants
of the High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice or such
other Judge or officer of the court as may be directed by the
Chief Justice. The object of this article was to secure the
independence of the High Court which cannot be regarded as
fully secured unless the authority to appoint supporting staff with
complete control over them is vested in the Chief Justice. There
can be no disagreement on this matter. There is imperative need
for total and absolute administrative independence of the High
Court. But the Chief Justice or any other Administrative Judge is
not an absolute ruler. Nor is he a free wheeler. He must operate
in the clean world of law, not in the neighbourhood of sordid
atmosphere. He has a duty to ensure that in carrying out the
administrative functions, he is actuated by same principles and
values as those of the court he is serving. He cannot depart from
and indeed must remain committed to the constitutional ethos
and traditions of his calling. We need hardly say that those who
are expected to oversee the conduct of others, must necessarily
maintain a higher standards of ethical and intellectual rectitude.
The public expectations do not seem to be less exacting.”
(emphasis supplied)
(See also State of Assam v. Bhubhan Chandra Dutta [(1975) 4
SCC 1 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 186] .)
26. In Binod Kumar Gupta v. Ram Ashray Mahoto [(2005) 4 SCC 209
: 2005 SCC (L&S) 501] this Court did not accept the contention that
appointment could be made to Class IV post in subordinate courts under
the Civil Court Rules without advertisement in the newspapers inviting
applications for the posts as that would lead to lack of transparency and
violation of the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution. The Court
terminated the services of such appointees who had worked even for 15
years observing that the Court otherwise “would be guilty of condoning a
gross irregularity in their initial appointment”.
27. To say that the Chief Justice can appoint a person without
following the procedure provided under Articles 14 and 16 would lead to
an indefinite conclusion that the Chief Justice can dismiss him also
without holding any inquiry or following the principles of natural
justice/Rules, etc. for as per Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
power to appoint includes power to remove/suspend/dismiss.
(Vide Pradyat Kumar Bose v. High Court of Calcutta [AIR 1956 SC 285]
and Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu [(1979) 2 SCC 34 : 1979 SCC
(L&S) 99] .) But as no employee can be removed without following the
procedure prescribed by law or in violation of the terms of his
appointment, such a course would not be available to the Chief Justice.
Therefore, the natural corollary of this is that the Chief Justice cannot
make any appointment in contravention of the statutory rules, which have
to be in consonance with the scheme of our Constitution.
28. In State of W.B. v. Debasish Mukherjee [(2011) 14 SCC 187 :
(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 869] this Court again dealt with the provisions of
Article 229 of the Constitution and held that the Chief Justice cannot
grant any relief to the employee of the High Court in an irrational or
arbitrary manner unless the Rules provide for such exceptional relief. The
order of the Chief Justice must make reference to the existence of such
exceptional circumstances and the order must make it so clear that there
had been an application of mind to those exceptional circumstances and
such orders passed by the Chief Justice are justiciable. While deciding
the matter, the Court placed reliance on its earlier judgment of the
Constitution Bench in State of U.P. v. C.L. Agrawal [(1997) 5 SCC 1 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 1100] .
29. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect
that the powers under Article 229(2) of the Constitution cannot be
exercised by the Chief Justice in an unfettered and arbitrary manner.
Appointments should be made giving adherence to the provisions of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and/or such rules as made by the
legislature.”
37.
After analyzing various facets and extent of power conferred
upon the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court had passed certain directions in Renu (supra) and one
of such directions appears to have crucial relevance to the context of the
instant case which may be reproduced here-in-below:
―35. In view of the above, the appeal stands disposed of with the
following directions:
“35.1. (i) *****
******
35.2. (ii) To fill up any vacancy for any post either in the High Court
or in courts subordinate to the High Court, in strict compliance with the
statutory rules so made. In case any appointment is made in
contravention of the statutory rules, the appointment would be void ab
initio irrespective of any class of the post or the person occupying it.
35.3. (iii) *****
*****
35.4. (iv) *****
*****
35.5. (v) *****
*****”
38.
So, the law what is emerged in the case of Renu (supra) that
statutory authority including the Chief Justice exercising his power under
Article 229 of the Constitution of India has no unfettered power on the
subject, and must strictly adhere to statutory rule. Added to it, any
contradiction to such rule would be void ab initio irrespective of any class
of posts or the person occupying it.
[Emphasis supplied]
38.1
It is true that under Rule 26 of Service Rules, 2014, the Chief
Justice can pass any order incidental or ancillary to the Rules laid down in the
Service Rules, 2014. In the instant case, the Chief Justice of this Court had
correctly exercised his power which was found to be incidental or ancillary
when he relaxed the requisite essential qualification of three years’ experience
for promotion to the post of Head Clerk grade from Senior Administrative
Assistant. There is no quarrel that the Chief Justice can invoke the residuary
power clause and to pass necessary order in regard to all matters incidental or
ancillary to the Rules laid down in the Service Rules, 2014 to enhance or
to bring efficiency in administration of the High Court. In the instant case,
the Chief Justice thought it necessary that to bring efficiency in administration
vacant posts of Head Clerk grade were necessarily be filled up, but, none of
the employees in the feeder posts were found to be eligible since they had not
completed three years of service, which is one of the essential criteria for
promotion to the post of Head Clerk.
39.
In my considered view, incidental and ancillary power could be
exercised only to subvert and abrogate the statutory rules prescribing the
essential criterion of ‘seniority-cum-merit’ for promotion to the post of Head
Clerk grade from Senior Administrative Assistant.
40.
To appreciate the scope of exercise of residuary power, I have
also simultaneously examined the scope of exercising the power incidental
and ancillary to the power of the Chief Justice as encapsulated in Rule 26 of
the Service Rules, 2014.
41.
The doctrine of incidental or ancillary powers is well recognized
in the Indian Law. The said doctrine postulates that, everybody, be it a Court
or a Tribunal vested with judicial or quasi judicial power is endowed with
ancillary and incidental powers as are necessary to discharge the functions
effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties.
41.1
Incidental or ancillary powers can be exercised when the
statute itself would become impossible of its enforcement and the
statutory provision would become a dead letter and cannot be enforced
unless the ancillary power is exercised. In other words, incidental or
ancillary power can be exercised only to enforce a provision effectively
but not to usurp [Ref. AIR 1962 SC 486].
[Emphasis supplied]
41.2
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.S. Joshi , STO Vrs. Ajit Mills
Ltd., (1977) 4 SCC 78 had delineated the principle that the doctrine of
incidental or ancillary power cannot overreach the main statutory provision.
42.
In the present case, without relaxation of criterion of 3 years’ of
essential service for promotion to the post of Head Clerk grade would have
been an absurdity to effectuate the principal statutory provision of ‘seniority
cum merit’ as embodied in Schedule 1(7) of the Service Rules,2014. The
residuary power was exercised by the Chief Justice in relaxing 3 (three) years’
essential criterion and the order thereof was itself said to be incidental and
ancillary power conferred upon the Chief Justice to enforce the rule of
‘seniority cum merit’ as contemplated in the Service Rules,2014.
43.
That apart, the order of the Chief Justice to award equal marks of
25 against both ‘seniority-cum-merit’; and out of 25 marks awarded against
merit, distribution of higher marks on the basis of comparative assessment of
merits of the employees under consideration zone purportedly defeats the very
object of the rule making authority who wanted to achieve in embodying the
criterion of ‘seniority-cum-merit’ instead ‘merit-cum-seniority’ for the
employees working or holding certain category of posts.
44.
Furthermore, the authorities/executives performing administrative
functions while exercising such power should not forget that the principle of
‘seniority-cum-merit’ cannot be intermingled with or allowed to be tinkered
by the principle of ‘merit-cum-seniority’, which would not only be prejudicial
affecting a very valuable and substantive right of the employees, but also
counterproductive to the institutional morality.
45.
In the opinion of this court, true it is, that the claim of seniority or
promotion thereof is not a fundamental right, but it is a civil right; however,
when such right is regulated by a statute, then any departure would be
arbitrary resulting hostile discrimination, thus to offend Articles 14 and 16(2)
of the Constitution of India. Strict observance to such statutory provision with
some advisories would keep up morale of the employees in the organization
they work.
46.
In the instant case, the fundamental principles of seniority-cum-
merit have been obliterated, and in my opinion, it needs reconsideration.
Accordingly, I remit the matter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court
to revisit the challenge posed by the petitioners vis-a-vis reconstruction of the
seniority position of the petitioners and the private respondents impleaded in
the above two writ petitions.
The matter be placed accordingly before Hon’ble the Chief
Justice.
The instant writ petitions, accordingly, stand disposed.
JUDGE
SAIKAT KAR
sanjay
Date: 2024.04.05 14:20:53 +05'30'
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