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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT: HYDERABAD
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
AND
HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
APPEAL SUIT No.482 OF 2024
(CNR No. HBHC010481592024)
Reserved on: 13.08.2026
Pronounced on:09-09-2026
Uploaded on :10-09-2026
Between:
Mrs. Usha Harishingani @ Ushaben & another
.. Appellants
Vs.
Mr. Y. Praneeth
.. Respondent
The Court delivered the following:
JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice K. Lakshman)
Heard Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel representing
Mr. Pramod Malgi, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Shiva
Santosh Yelamanchili, learned counsel representing Mr. S. Samba
Siva Rao, learned counsel for the respondent.
2. This appeal is preferred under Section 96 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘CPC’), assailing the order dated
21.06.2024 in I.A. No.617 of 2023 in O.S. No.14 of 2023 passed by
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AS No.482 of 2024
learned I Additional District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.
Nagar, wherein learned trial Court allowed an application filed by the
defendant under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and rejected the plaint.
3. The appellants herein are the plaintiffs in O.S. No.14 of
2023, while the respondent is the defendant therein. They filed the
said suit against the respondent herein seeking declaration of title,
recovery of possession, and to declare sale deed bearing document
No.8536 of 2003, dated 31.12.2002 as null and void and also not
binding on them in respect of the agricultural land admeasuring
Acs.14.29 guntas in Survey No.308, situated at Poppalguda Village,
Rajendranagar
Mandal
(Old)
and
Gandipet
Mandal
(New),
Rangareddy District, which is hereinafter referred to as ‘suit schedule
land’.
4.
For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter
referred to as they were arrayed in O.S. No.14 of 2023.
5. In the said suit, the respondent herein - defendant filed an
Interlocutory Application vide I.A. No.617 of 2023 under Order VII
Rule 11 (a) & (d) of the CPC, to reject the plaint contending as
follows:
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AS No.482 of 2024
i.
As per Section 3 read with Articles - 56, 58, 59 and 65 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, the suit was not filed within the time from
the date of knowledge of the plaintiff as is evident from the
plaint document Nos.1, 2, 3 and 10, which are of the year 2003
and 2006 respectively. Thus, suit is barred by limitation.
ii.
The alleged Will filed as document No.4 along with the plaint
was executed in Bombay, Maharashtra. Therefore, probation of
Will is mandatory. It was not probated in terms of Section 57
(a) read with 213 (1)(i) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for
short ‘Act, 1925’). No right as executor or legatee can be
established in any Court of Justice, unless a Court of Competent
jurisdiction in India (in this case, the High Court at Bombay)
grants a probate of the said Will.
Thus, a probate had to
necessarily be obtained before the High Court at Bombay in
respect of the said Will before filing the suit.
iii.
There is no cause of action and the plaintiffs have no right of
whatsoever over the suit schedule property. The plaintiffs have
resorted to clever drafting of the plaint by creating an illusion of
cause of action by setting up a stranger i.e., the plaintiffs alleged
predecessor-in-title whose name Santdas is similar to that of the
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Sanad Holder, but the said Sanad Holder is Santdas Lekhraj as
per document Nos.1 and 2 appended to the plaint and not
Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani as alleged in the plaint and in the
Will filed along with plaint as document No.4. Moreover, there
is no whisper or description of the suit schedule property in the
Will dated 12.10.1992 filed along with plaint as document
No.4. The said Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani mentioned about
his flat in Bandra specifically with details and explained how
and when it is to be enjoyed and there is no reason to not
mention
about
land
admeasuring
Acs.14.29
guntas
at
Poppalguda Village. The said Will does not refer about any
property in Poppalguda Village or in Hyderabad or Andhra
Pradesh State to even allow the plaintiffs to plead that the
Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani owned the suit schedule
property. Therefore, the plaintiffs have no cause of action to
file the suit to claim any rights over the suit schedule property.
6.
The plaintiffs filed counter opposing the aforesaid
application contending as follows:
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AS No.482 of 2024
i.
With regard to limitation, the plaintiffs have specifically
mentioned in the plaint that for the first time in first week of
August, 2022, they came to know that the defendant had
obtained a sale deed dated 05.07.2003 in respect of the suit
schedule property, and on learning the same, they obtained copy
of sale deed and mutation proceedings. The sale deed dated
31.12.2002 and registered on 05.07.2003 reveals that the same
was executed by fictitious persons in a fraudulent manner and
fraud vitiates everything. Therefore, the suit is filed within time
from the date of knowledge.
ii.
With regard to cause of action, the plaintiffs have specifically
mentioned that firstly when Santdas Lekhraj was granted Sanad
on 21.11.1967 and the plaintiffs for the first time in first week
of August, 2022 came to Hyderabad and on their visit, they
were surprised to notice that the defendant erected the
compound wall taking advantage of COVID-19 pandemic
situation and earlier to that, it was all along open and vacant
land and thereby encroached the suit schedule land. The cause
of action also arose when the plaintiffs obtained the sale deed
dated 31.12.2002, which fact was learnt for the first time by
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AS No.482 of 2024
them only in the first week of August, 2022. Further, on
15.12.2022, when they tried to enter the suit schedule property,
the defendant’s security personnel on the basis of a fraudulent
sale deed, did not allow them to visit the suit schedule property.
Hence, the said pleadings constitute a valid cause of action for
filing the suit.
iii.
Further, the suit schedule property is situated within the State of
Telangana. Therefore, the proceedings of probate are not
applicable to the State of Telangana as the property is situated
within the limits of this Court, and not within the limits of
Bombay.
iv.
Santdas is the son of Lekhraj Chaitramani and Chaitramani is
their surname. All these facts can be considered only during the
course of trial.
v.
Cause of action is purely bundle of facts and, therefore, the
same can be looked into only during the course of trial.
7.
After hearing both sides, vide order dated 21.06.2024,
learned trial Court allowed the said I.A. No.617 of 2023, rejecting the
plaint holding that:
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AS No.482 of 2024
i.
Without getting the subject Will probated, plaintiff No.1 would
not be in a position to establish her right under the Will.
Plaintiff No.1, now, is barred from obtaining Probate as the
period of limitation has elapsed. Therefore, the plaintiffs may
not be able to file the suit based on the Will dated 12.10.1992.
It is doubtful as to whether the probate would be granted at all
in respect of the suit schedule property as the same is not
mentioned in the said Will.
ii.
Though the suit for cancellation of registered sale deed
executed in favour of the defendant is not barred by law of
limitation, obtaining of Probate of the Will, which is mandatory
for filing the suit, is not possible as the same is barred by law of
limitation.
iii.
The cause of action for the suit, based on Will exists only when
the Probate is obtained for the said Will and in the absence of
such Probate, it cannot be said that cause of action exists for the
plaintiffs to file the suit. The simple test is whether the plaintiffs
can claim any right without obtaining the Probate. If they
cannot, the Court shall hold that there exists no cause of action
for the suit.
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AS No.482 of 2024
8. Challenging the said order dated 21.06.2024, the plaintiffs
preferred the present appeal.
9. Both learned counsel for the appellants - plaintiffs and the
respondent - defendant made their submissions extensively.
10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs placed
reliance on the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Binapani Kar Chowdhury v. Sri Satyabrata Basu1 and Sanjay
Sharma alias Sanjay Bhardwaj v. Krishnadhan Khaware.2
11. Like-wise, learned counsel appearing for the defendants
placed reliance on the principle laid down in Ravinder Nath Agarwal
v. Yogender Nath Agarwal3; Clarence Pais v. Union of India4;
Mrs. Chandra (died) v. Komala5; Dhiraj Dutta v. Anirban Sen6;
Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur v. Kirandeep Kaur7; T. Kaliamurthi
v. Five Gori Thaikkal Wakf8; Thirumalai Chemical Ltd. v. Union
of India9; Km. Kr. Kr.Ramanathan Chettiar v. N. M. Kandappa
. (2006) 10 SCC 442
. 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1337
. (2021) 15 SCC 282
. (2001) 4 SCC 325
. A.S. No.132 of 2013 (Mad-DB)
. 2026 SCC OnLine SC 996
. (2008) 8 SCC 463
. (2008) 9 SCC 306
. (2011) 6 SCC 739
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AS No.482 of 2024
Goundan (D)10; Rajendra Bajoria v. Hemant Kumar Jalan11;
Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable
Society represented by its Chairman v. Ponnaimman Educational
Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee12; Shri
Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje
Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle13; Ramisetty Venkatamma v.
Nasyam Jamal Saheb14 and T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal15.
12. In view of the aforesaid rival submissions, as discussed
above, it is apt to note that the defendants filed the aforesaid I.A. to
reject the plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation;
there is no cause of action; and that the alleged Will based on which
the plaintiffs have laid their claim is not probated, which is mandatory
in terms of Section 57 (a) read with 213 (1) of the Act, 1925, since it
was executed and registered in Bandra, Bombay, Maharashtra.
13. In view of the aforesaid rival submissions, the point that
arises for determination in this appeal is:
. 1950 SCC OnLine Mad. 166
. (2022) 12 SCC 641
. (2012) 8 SCC 706
. (2024) 15 SCC 675
. (2024) 18 SCC 426
. (1977) 4 SCC 467
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AS No.482 of 2024
Whether the order passed by learned trial Court is
correct and does not warrant any interference by this
Court?
14. In the light of the said submissions, it is apt to note that the
plaintiffs herein have filed the aforesaid suit in O.S. No.14 of 2023
against the defendant seeking declaration of title, recovery of
possession and declaration of sale deed bearing document No.8536 of
2003 dated 31.12.2002 as null and void and also not binding on them
in respect of the suit schedule property. The Plaintiffs contended that
originally Santdas Lekhraj S/o Lekhraj was a displaced person from
Pakistan having verified claim for compensation under the Provisions
of Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1954.
The Union of India, represented by the Regional Settlement
Commissioner (Bombay) had allotted the suit schedule property to the
said Santdas S/o Lekhraj vide Allotment Order No.HYD-52 vide
Claim
Index
No.S/DD-1/1295,
CAF
No.B3/11171/3171,
PC
No.41367, dated 13.09.1967/14.09.1967. Consequently, the Regional
Settlement Officer granted SANAD (Title Deed) to the said Santdas
vide SANAD, dated 21.11.1967. Thus, by virtue of the said allotment
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and consequential grant of Sanad, he has become the absolute owner
and possessor of the suit schedule property.
i)
It is further contended that Santdas was also known as
Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani, as the Choithramani is the surname of
Santdas and father’s name is Lekhraj.
The said Santdas died on
29.12.1994; his wife is predeceased him and both of them died
issueless. The mother of plaintiff No.1, namely Smt. Padma, wife of
of G. Kishinchand Harsinghani is the real sister of the said Santdas’s
wife and plaintiff No.2 is the daughter of plaintiff No.1. Upon the
death of Santdas’s wife, he resided with the parents of plaintiff No.1
till his death. The plaintiffs being the close relatives used to look after
his well-being.
Out of love and affection, the said Santdas had
executed a registered Will dated 12.10.1992 bearing document No.714
of 1992 registered at the office of the Joint Sub-Registrar, Bandra,
bequeathing all his movable and immovable properties in favour of
plaintiff No.1 and her mother, Smt. Padma in equal shares.
ii) It is also contended that the father of plaintiff No.1, namely
G. Kishinchand Harsinghani was a popular Ex-Test Cricketer. Smt.
Padma died on 11.08.2008 and Kishinchand Harsinghani died on
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16.04.1997. Plaintiff No.1 being the sole surviving legal heir and
successor-in-interest of her mother’s half share. Thus, plaintiff No.1
has become the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and other
properties left by late Santdas. Plaintiff No.2 being the only child of
plaintiff No.1 joined as co-plaintiff.
iii) It is also pleaded in the plaint that in the first week of
August, 2022, the plaintiffs learnt through their known persons that
the defendant has created a forged and fabricated registered sale deed
in his favour. Soon after, on verification of revenue records and
encumbrance certificate, it is learnt that on the basis of a collusive and
fraudulent unregistered General Power of Attorney, a sale deed was
executed in favour of the defendant bearing document No.8536 of
2003, dated 31.12.2002 by one Mr. Gulabrai Ramchand Balani. The
said sale deed discloses that one Gulabrai Ramchand Balani executed
a sub-GPA dated 24.03.1990 in favour of Kishin Ramchand Balani
based on the alleged GPA dated 15.12.1966.
The said Santdas
Lekhraj is a fictitious person and is totally a stranger to the Santdas
Lekhraj and to the suit schedule property. The defendant in collusion
with Kishin Ramchand Balani and Gulabrai Ramchand Balani created
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a GPA and sub-GPA in collusion with each other and thereby got
registered the aforesaid sale deed in favour of the defendant. The said
alleged GPA dated 15.12.1996 was stated to be attested at Bombay by
the Registrar and Presidency Magistrate, Esplanade Court, Bombay.
The plaintiffs being native of Gujarat State enquired the same, and on
enquiry, it was revealed that the said Registrar and Presidency
Magistrate, Esplanade Court, Bombay did not attest the said document
and there is no endorsement to that effect in their records. Thus, it is
clear that the said documents are fraudulent documents.
iv)
On the basis of the aforesaid fabricated documents
including sale deed, the defendant obtained mutation proceedings
No.D/8291/2005, dated 27.02.2006 from the office of the Deputy
Collector and Mandal Revenue Officer, Rajendranagar Mandal. The
said Santdas Lekhraj died on 29.12.1994, whereas the sale deed was
registered on 05.07.2003. The defendant taking advantage of COVID19 pandemic situation raised the compound wall. The plaintiffs came
to know about the fabricated sale deed dated 05.07.2003 only in the
first week of August, 2022, they obtained the certified copies of the
same and filed the suit, which is within limitation from the date of
knowledge.
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AS No.482 of 2024
15. Thus, the defendant filed the aforesaid application under
Order VII Rule 11 (a) & (d) of the CPC, seeking rejection of the
plaint. The same is relevant and it is extracted as under:
“11. Rejection of plaint.— The plaint shall be
rejected in the following cases:—
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and
the plaintiff, on being required by the Court
to correct the valuation within a time to be
fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued,
but the plaint is returned upon paper
insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on
being required by the Court to supply the
requisite stamp-paper within a time to be
fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in
the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the
provisions of rule 9:
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for
the correction of the valuation or supplying of the
requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless
the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied
that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an
exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or
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supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case
may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that
refusal to extend such time would cause grave
injustice to the plaintiff.”
16.
Rejection of plaint and factors to be considered for
rejection of plaint is no more res integra. In Kum. Geetha v.
Nanjundaswamy16, the Apex Court held that true and correct
application of the principle underlying the ‘rejection of plaints’ under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, to the facts of the case.
17. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi17, the Apex Court held
that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under Order VII Rule
11 of the CPC is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless and
bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to waste judicial time
of the Court.
18.
Placing reliance on the principle laid down in Azhar
Hussain17, the Apex Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji
Bhanusali (Gajra), dead through legal representatives18 considered
the scope and ambit of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and held as
under:
. (2024) 14 SCC 390
. (2001) 8 SCC 233
. (2020) 7 SCC 366
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AS No.482 of 2024
“23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an
independent and special remedy, wherein the
court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit
at the threshold, without proceeding to record
evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of
the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the
action should be terminated on any of the
grounds contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is
that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed,
or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule
11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to
unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the
suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put
an end to the sham litigation, so that further
judicial time is not wasted.
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a
civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the
conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are
required to be strictly adhered to.”
19. In T. Arivandandam15, the Apex Court held that if on a
meaningful not formal-reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexatious,
and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the
Court should exercise its power under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of the
CPC taking care so as to see that the ground mentioned therein is
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AS No.482 of 2024
fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of
action, it should be nipped in the bud.
20. Referring to the principle laid down in T. Arivandandam15
and other judgments in Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust
Association v. Sri Bala & Co.19, the Apex Court held that the Court
while dealing with an application filed under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of
the CPC has to consider the whole plaint. It has to be read as a whole
and not only any particular plea is to be considered. The averments in
the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether Clause - (d)
of Rule - 11, Order - VII of the CPC is applicable. The relevant facts
which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder
are the averments in the plaint which are germane. The pleas taken by
the defendant either in the affidavit filed in support of an application
filed under Order - VII, Rule -11 of the CPC or in the written
statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. Under Order - VII,
Rule -11 of the CPC, the Court has to take a decision looking at the
pleadings of the plaintiff only and not on the rebuttal made by the
defendant or any other material produced by the defendant.
. 2025 INSC 42
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21. In Rajendra Bajoria11, the Apex Court held that only on
the basis of the averments made in the plaint, it could be ascertained as
to whether a cause of action is made out or not. It is equally true that
for finding out the same, the entire pleadings in the plaint will have to
be read and that too, at their face value. At this stage, the defence taken
by the defendants cannot be looked into.
22. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra20, the Apex Court
also held that if on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that
the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not
disclose a right to sue, the Court would be justified in exercising the
power under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of the CPC. The power under
Order - VII, Rule - 11 of the CPC may be exercised by the Court at
any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after
issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial.
23. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal21, the
Apex Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates
illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right
must be made out in the plaint.
. (2003) 1 SCC 557
. (1998) 2 SCC 70
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24. In Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal22,
the Apex Court further held that if, however, by clever drafting of the
plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, it should be
nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage.
The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression,
and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse
of the process of Court.
25. In Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational
Charitable Society12, the Apex Court held that omission to mention
the date of material fact is fatal and on the said ground plaint has to be
rejected.
26. Thus, the sum and substance of the principle laid down in
the aforesaid judgments is that the trial Court while dealing with an
application under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of the CPC has to consider
the pleadings of the plaint and the documents filed along with the
plaint. While deciding an application under Order - VII, Rule - 11 of
the CPC, the pleas taken by the defendant in written statement and
. (2017) 13 SCC 174
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application for rejection of plaint cannot be adverted to or taken into
consideration.
SECTION 8 OF THE HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956:
27. In the light of the aforesaid principles, coming to the case
on hand, it is apt to note that Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, vehemently contended
that though the plaintiffs laid the claim on the basis of Will, dated
12.10.1992, they being Class-II heirs, cognates of Santdas Lekhraj
Choithramani in terms of Section - 8 of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 (for short ‘Act, 1956’) are absolute owners of the suit schedule
property.
Except the plaintiffs, there are no other legal heirs to
Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani, therefore, they are the absolute owners
and possessors of the suit schedule property.
28. Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel, fairly submits
that the plaintiffs did not specifically plead with regard to their right as
Class-II legal heirs of Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani in terms of
Section - 8 of the Act, 1956 in the plaint. He would further contend
that in paragraph No.2 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have pleaded that
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Santdas died on 29.12.1994, his wife pre-deceased him and both of
them died issueless.
The mother of plaintiff No.1, namely Smt.
Padma, wife of G.Kishinchand Harsinghani is the real sister of
Santdas’s wife and plaintiff No.2 is the daughter of plaintiff No.1.
Upon the death of Santdas’s wife, he resided with the parents of
plaintiff No.1 till his death. The plaintiffs being the close relatives
used to look after his well-being. Out of love and affection, the said
Santdas executed a registered Will dated 12.10.1992 bearing
document No.714 of 1992 registered at the office of the Joint SubRegistrar, Bandra bequeathing all his movable and immovable
properties in favour of plaintiff No.1 and her mother, Smt. Padma in
equal shares.
Mr. G. Kishinchand Harsinghani, father of plaintiff
No.1, died on 11.08.2008. Plaintiff No.1 being the sole surviving
legal heir and successor-in-interest of her mother’s half share. Thus,
plaintiff No.1 has become absolute owner of the suit schedule
property and other properties left by Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani.
Plaintiff No.2 being the only child of plaintiff No.1 joined as coplaintiff. Therefore, there is a pleading in the plaint. As such, the
plaintiffs are the absolute owners and possessors of the suit schedule
property.
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29. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, it is apt to note
that Section - 8 of the Act, 1956 deals with “General rules of
succession in the case of males”.
It is relevant and the same is
extracted as under:
“8. General rules of succession in the case of
males.—
The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall
devolve according to the provisions of this
Chapter—
(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives
specified in class I of the Schedule;
(b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then
upon the heirs, being the relatives specified
in class II of the Schedule;
(c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two
classes, then upon the agnates of the
deceased; and
(d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the
cognates of the deceased.”
Thus, as per Section - 8 (d) of the Act, 1956, the property of a male
Hindu dying intestate shall devolve upon cognate of the deceased if
there is no agnate. Even according to the plaintiffs, plaintiff No.1 is
Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani wife sister’s daughter. Plaintiff No.2 is
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the daughter of plaintiff No.1. Admittedly, they are not Class-II legal
heirs of Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani in terms of Section - 8 of the
Act, 1956.
30. As discussed above, Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned Senior
Counsel, fairly submits that there is no pleading in the plaint with
regard to the same. It is a legal ground and can be pleaded at any
stage. In the light of the said submission, it is apt to note that the
plaintiffs had filed the aforesaid suit in O.S. No.14 of 2023 against the
defendant for declaration of title etc.
Therefore, they have to
necessarily plead and prove their claim by producing cogent evidence.
31. It is also apt to note that Order - VI of the CPC deals with
“Pleadings”. The object of Rule of Pleading is two-fold. First is to
afford the other side intimation regarding the particular facts of his
case so that they may be met by the other side. Second is to enable
the Court to determine what is really the issue between the parties.
The object of pleadings is to enable the Court to decide true rights of
parties. Pleadings of the parties are required to be read as a whole.
The defendants are entitled to raise alternative and inconsistent pleas
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but are not permitted to raise pleas which are mutually destructive of
each other.
32.
In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity
Commissioner23, the Apex Court considered the construal of
pleadings, scope and ambit of Order VI Rule 2(1) of the CPC and held
that the basic and cardinal rule of pleadings that every pleading shall
contain and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material
facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the
case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. The
Apex Court also considered the distinction between “material facts”
and “particulars” and held that the words “material facts” show that
the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be
stated. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause
of action and the statement or plaint becomes bad. The function of
particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with
such further information in detail as to make the opposite party
understand the case he will have to meet.
. (2004) 3 SCC 137
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33. It is also apt to note that Order - VI, Rule - 2 of the CPC
deals with “Pleadings to state material facts and not evidence, and
Order - VI, Rule - 3 of the CPC deals with ‘”Forms of Pleadings”.
34. In Ranganayakamma v. K.S. Prakash (dead) by LRs24,
the Apex Court held that parties are bound to base their contentions
before Court on their pleadings.
35.
A
Three-Judge
Bench
of
the
Apex
Court
in
Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar v. Union of India25 considered
the scope and relevancy of pleadings and held that no relief can be
granted in a case not founded in the pleadings. The Apex Court
cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage at the
behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate the issues
arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the parties. The
Apex Court further held that such rule has been consistently affirmed
across time and is rooted in the very purpose of pleadings—namely, to
define the scope of the dispute and enable the court to adjudicate upon
the rights of the parties. Pleadings, together with the issues framed
thereon, serve to crystallize the points of conflict, ensure that each
side is apprised of the case it has to meet, and afford both parties a fair
. (2008) 15 SCC 673
. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2064
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opportunity to lead evidence and advance submissions. To allow a
party to depart from this framework at a belated stage would not only
prejudice the opposite side but also undermine the principles of
predictability and consistency that the adjudicatory process seeks to
avow. It is also apt to note that basing on the pleadings, the trial Court
has to frame issues, conduct trial and decide the same.
36. Therefore, the plaintiffs have to specifically plead that they
are seeking declaration to declare them as absolute owners of the suit
schedule
property
being
the
cognates
of
Santdas
Lekhraj
Choithramani in terms of Section 8 of the Act, 1956. In the light of
the aforesaid discussion, the contention of Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs that the claim of the
plaintiffs over the suit schedule property being cognates of Santdas
Lekhraj Choithramani is a legal plea/submission, which can be raised
in any proceeding at any stage, is unsustainable.
37. As discussed above, at the cost of repetition, it is apt to note
that the plaintiffs laid the claim basing on the registered Will dated
12.10.1992 bearing document No.714 of 1992. There is no pleading
that they laid the claim to declare them as absolute owners of the suit
KL,J & SKS,J
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schedule property being cognates of Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani.
There would not be any possibility of framing an issue for the trial
Court in the absence of pleadings. Therefore, the said contention of
the plaintiffs cannot be considered.
38. As discussed above, Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned Senior
Counsel, contended that the plaintiffs are cognates of Santdas Lekhraj
Choithramani in terms of Section 8 of the Act, 1956. In the light of
the said submission, it is apt to note that Section 3 (a) and 3 (c) of the
Act, 1956 deals with ‘agnate’ and ‘cognate’ respectively. The same
are relevant and are extracted as under:
“3. Definitions and interpretation .—
(1) In
this
Act,
unless
the
context
otherwise
requires,—
(a)“agnate”—one person is said to be an “agnate” of
another if the two are related by blood or adoption
wholly through males;
(b) xxxxx
(c)“cognate” — one person is said to be a cognate of
another if the two are related by blood or adoption
but not wholly through males;”
39. As discussed above, according to the plaintiffs, Santdas
Lekhraj Choithramani died on 29.12.1994, his wife - Sushila Santdas
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Choithramani died on 03.07.1992. After the death of his wife, he
resided with the parents of plaintiff No.1 till his death. The parents of
plaintiff No.1 also died. Therefore, according to the plaintiffs, they
are cognates of Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani in terms of Section - 8
of the Act, 1956. Even according to the plaintiffs, except them, there
are no other legal heirs to Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani including his
parents, brother and brother’s children etc. He and his wife died
issueless. It is also contended by learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the plaintiffs that the suit schedule property is self-acquired
property of Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani.
40. In the light of the above, it is apt to note that under Section
8 of the Act, 1956, when a male Hindu died intestate, succession
proceeds in the following order:
a) Class I heirs;
b) Class II heirs;
c) Agnates;
d) Cognates.
The widow is a Class - I heir. Therefore, even assuming that though
Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani had no parents, brothers, sisters or
children, his wife was alive and she succeeded to his property. Thus,
the wife of the Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani became the owner of
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the property. Therefore, the suit schedule property was inherited by
wife of Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani from Santdas Lekhraj
Choithramani. Section 15(2)(b) of the Act, 1956 creates a specific
exception to the general order in Section 15 (1) of the Act, 1956. It
provides that property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband
or father-in-law, where she dies without children, devolves upon the
heirs of the husband.
41. Section - 15 of the Act, 1956 deals with ‘General Rules of
Succession in the case of female Hindu. The same is relevant and it is
extracted as under:
“15. General rules of succession in the case of
female Hindus.— (1) The property of a female
Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to
the rules set out in section 16,—
(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including
the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter)
and the husband;
(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;
(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;
(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1),—
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(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu
from her father or mother shall devolve, in
the absence of any son or daughter of the
deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other
heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the
order specified therein, but upon the heirs of
the father; and
(b) any property inherited by a female Hindu
from her husband or from her father-in-law
shall devolve, in the absence of any son or
daughter of the deceased (including the
children of any pre-deceased son or daughter)
not upon the other heirs referred to in subsection (1) in the order specified therein, but
upon the heirs of the husband.”
42. In Dandapani Chettiar v. Balasubramanian Chettiar
(Dead) by LRs.26, the Apex Court held in paragraph No.10 as under:
“10. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 carves out an
exception in case of a female dying intestate
without leaving son, daughter or children of a
predeceased son or daughter.
In such a case, the rule prescribed is to
find out the source from which she has inherited
the property.
If it is inherited from her father or mother,
it would devolve as prescribed under Section
15(2)(a).
If it is inherited by her from her
husband or father-in-law, it would devolve
. (2003) 6 SCC 633
KL,J & SKS,J
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upon the heirs of her husband under Section
15(2)(b).
The clause enacts that in a case where the
property is inherited by a female from her father or
mother, it would devolve not upon the other heirs,
but upon the heirs of her father. This would mean
that if there is no son or daughter including the
children of any predeceased son or daughter, then
the property would devolve upon the heirs of her
father. Result would be -- if the property is
inherited by a female from her father or her
mother, neither her husband nor his heirs would
get such property, but it would revert back to the
heirs of her father.”
The said principle was reiterated in Durga Prasad v. Narayan
Ramchandaani27.
43. In the light of the aforesaid principle, the mother of plaintiff
No.1 is the sister of wife of Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani and she is
not an heir to the suit schedule property.
44. A “cognate” means a person related by blood or adoption
but not wholly through male links. An “agnate” is also a person
related by blood or adoption, with the relationship being wholly
. (2017) 5 SCC 331
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through males in terms of Section - 3 (1) (c) of the Act, 1956.
Therefore, both concepts presuppose a blood or adoption relationship
with the deceased. A relationship merely through marriage does not
make a person an agnate or cognate. There is a marital link between
Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani and his wife. Therefore, the plaintiffs
are not related to the Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani by blood merely
because plaintiff No.1 is the daughter of Santdas Lekhraj
Choithramani’s wife’s sister.
Therefore, she is not an agnate or
cognate of Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani. Thus, the plaintiffs cannot
claim that they are cognates of Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani and,
therefore, they have inherited the suit schedule property.
45. It is apt to note that in Nana Saheb Vishwasrao Deore v.
Parwatibai28, a Division Bench of Bombay High Court held as under:
“18. A submission was made that this would lead to
enlarging the class of heirs even from wife's side and
difficulties would arise in applying Rule 12, for whoever
upon this interpretation is related to the wife would also be
related to the husband. This submission is fallacious for
two reasons. Firstly, we have held that in the case of a
female married into the family, relationship by blood arises
because of the marriage and secondly, she becomes kin in
. MANU/MH/0283/1979
KL,J & SKS,J
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the family. Her relations in her original family would not
answer any of these tests. Hardly, therefore, there is any
scope for any such apprehension……”
46.
Placing reliance on the judgment in Nana Saheb
Vishwasrao Deore28, learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in
Reshma G. Bhandari v. Yesubai H. Koli29 held as under:
“The words emphasised clearly indicate that the relations
of a wife in her original family would not be entitled to
inherent the property that she may in turn have inherited
from her husband’s side. Thus even assuming that Sonibai
was alive, the Petitioner would not have been entitled to
any interest in her husband’s estate Sonibai having
predeceased her husband her relations in her original
family would not be entitled to any interest in the estate of
her predeceased husband by virtue of Section 15 of the said
Act. There is nothing in the Division Bench judgment
which interprets Section 15 of the said Act in a manner
contrary to the view taken by me.”
47. In the light of the above, wife’s sister’s daughter and her
daughter are not ‘Cognates’ in terms of Section - 8 of the Act, 1956.
Therefore, the contention of Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs being cognates
. MANU/MH/0892/2007
KL,J & SKS,J
AS No.482 of 2024
of Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani are entitled to succeed the suit
schedule property cannot be accepted.
48. As discussed above, there is no pleading in the plaint and
the plaintiffs did not lay a claim contending that they are cognates of
Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani.
Viewed from any angle, the said
contention of Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs are cognates of Santdas Lekhraj
Choithramani cannot be accepted.
PROBATION OF WILL
49. It is the specific contention of learned counsel for the
defendant that the aforesaid registered Will dated 12.10.1992 bearing
document No.714 of 1992 executed by Santdas Lekhraj Choithramani
in Bandra, Mumbai, Maharashtra State. Therefore, in Maharashtra,
probation of Will is mandatory. In the present case, the subject Will is
not probated in terms of Section 213 of the Act, 1925. Therefore, the
plaintiffs cannot lay claim basing on the said Will.
50. In the light of the said submission, it is apt to note that
Section 213 of the Act, 1925 deals with ‘Right as executor or legatee
when established’. It is relevant and the same is extracted as under:
KL,J & SKS,J
AS No.482 of 2024
“213. Right as executor or legatee when
established.—
(1) No right as executor or legatee can be
established in any Court of Justice, unless a
Court of competent jurisdiction in India has
granted probate of the Will under which the
right is claimed, or has granted letters of
administration with the Will or with a copy of
an authenticated copy of the Will annexed.
(2) This section shall not apply in the case of
Wills made by Muhammadans or Indian
Christians, or and shall only apply—
(i) in the case of Wills made by any Hindu,
Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina where such Wills
are of the classes specified in clauses (a)
and (b) of section 57; and
(ii) in the case of Wills made by any Parsi
dying, after the commencement of the
Indian Succession (Amendment) Act,
1962 (16 of 1962), where such Wills are
made within the local limits of the
ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the
High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and
Bombay, and where such Wills are made
outside those limits, in so far as they
relate to immoveable property situated
within those limits.”
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AS No.482 of 2024
51. Section 57 of the Act, 1925 deals with ‘application of
certain provisions of Part to a class of Wills made by Hindus, etc,’.
The same is relevant and is extracted as under:
“57. Application of certain provisions of Part to
a class of Wills made by Hindus, etc.—
The provisions of this Part which are set out in
Schedule III shall, subject to the restrictions and
modifications specified therein, apply—
(a) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu,
Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first
day of September, 1870, within the territories
which at the said date were subject to the
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the
local limits of the ordinary original civil
jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature
at Madras and Bombay; and
(b) to all such Wills and codicils made outside
those territories and limits so far as relates to
immoveable property situate within those
territories or limits; and
(c) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu,
Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first
day of January, 1927, to which those
provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and
(b):
Provided that marriage shall not revoke
any such Will or codicil.”
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52.
Admittedly, in the present case, the subject Will was
executed in Mumbai, Probation of the said Will is mandatory. It is apt
to note that no right can be established by a legatee before any Civil
Court without obtaining probate of the said Will from a competent
Court since the said Will was executed within the territorial limits of
High Court of Bombay. The mandatory requirements of probate is
applicable for a Will executed within such limits, regardless of the
situs of any property bequeathed thereunder, such property is required
to be within the said territorial limits only in case of the Will is made
outside such limits. The said principle was also laid down by the
Apex Court in Ravinder Nath Agarwal3, Clarence Pais4; and a
Division Bench of Madras High Court in Mrs. Chandra (died)5.
53.
Relevant paragraph Nos.36 to 38 in Ravinder Nath
Agarwal3 are relevant and the same are extracted as under:
“36. A cumulative reading of Sections 57, 213 and
264 would show : (i) that a person claiming to be
an executor or legatee under a will cannot rely
upon the will, in any proceeding before a court of
justice, unless he has obtained probate (if an
executor has been appointed) or letters of
administration with the will annexed, if such a will
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has been executed by certain classes of persons;
and (ii) that the jurisdiction to grant probate or
letters of administration vests only in courts
located within the towns of Calcutta, Madras or
Bombay and the courts in any local area notified
by the State Government in the Official Gazette.
37. Therefore, what follows is that : (i) unless the
testator belongs to any of the classes of persons
specified in the Act; and (ii) unless the will is
made or some of the properties covered by the will
are located, within the local limits of a notified
area, there is no necessity for an executor or a
legatee under a will to seek probate or letters of
administration. In fact, the decision in Balbir Singh
Wasu [Balbir Singh Wasu v. Lakhbir Singh, (2005)
12 SCC 503] did not take note of the bar under
Section 264(2) when it opined in general terms in
para 5 of the judgment that : (SCC pp. 504-05)
“5. … We do not read Section 213 as prohibiting
the executor from applying for probate as a matter of
prudence or convenience to the courts in other parts
of the country not covered by Section 213.”
(emphasis supplied)
38. By virtue of Section 213(2)(i) read with
clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57, the mandatory
requirement
to
seek
probate
or
letters
of
administration for establishing a right as executor
or legatee under a will, is applicable only to
wills made by
a
Hindu,
Buddhist,
Sikh
or
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AS No.482 of 2024
Jaina within the local limits of the ordinary
original
civil
jurisdiction
of
certain
High
Courts and to wills made outside those territories,
to the extent they cover immovable property
situate within those territories. Therefore, there is
no prohibition for a person whose case falls
outside the purview of these provisions, from
producing, relying upon and claiming a right under
a will, in any proceeding instituted by others
including the other legal heirs for partition or other
reliefs.”
54. Paragraph Nos.6 and 7 in Clarence Pais4; are relevant and
the same are extracted as under:
“
6. The scope of Section 213(1) of the Act is that it
prohibits recognition of rights as an executor or
legatee under a will without production of a
probate and sets down a rule of evidence and
forms really a part of procedural requirement of
the law of forum. Section 213(2) of the Act
indicates that its applicability is limited to cases of
persons mentioned therein. Certain aspects will
have to be borne in mind to understand the exact
scope of this section. The bar that is imposed by
this section is only in respect of the establishment
of the right as an executor or legatee and not in
respect of the establishment of the right in any
other capacity. The section does not prohibit the
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will being looked into for purposes other than
those mentioned in the section. The bar to the
establishment of the right is only for its
establishment in a court of justice and not its being
referred
to
in
other
proceedings
before
administrative or other tribunals. The section is a
bar to everyone claiming under a will, whether as a
plaintiff or defendant, if no probate or letters of
administration are granted. The effect of Section
213(2) of the Act is that the requirement of probate
or other representation mentioned in sub-section
(1) for the purpose of establishing the right as an
executor or legatee in a court is made inapplicable
in case of a will made by Muhammadans and in
the case of wills coming under Section 57(c) of the
Act. Section 57(c) of the Act applies to all wills
and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or
Jaina, on or after the first day of January, 1927
which does not relate to immovable property
situate within the territory formerly subject to the
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal or within the local
limits of the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High
Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay, or in
respect of property within those territories. No
probate is necessary in the case of wills by
Muhammadans. Now by the Indian Succession
(Amendment) Act, 1962, the section has been
made applicable to wills made by Parsis dying
after the commencement of the 1962 Act. A
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combined reading of Sections 213 and 57 of the
Act would show that where the parties to the will
are Hindus or the properties in dispute are not in
territories falling under Sections 57(a) and (b),
sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act applies
and sub-section (1) has no application. As a
consequence, a probate will not be required to be
obtained by a Hindu in respect of a will made
outside
those
immovable
territories
properties
or
situate
regarding
the
outside
those
territories. The result is that the contention put
forth on behalf of the petitioners that Section
213(1) of the Act is applicable only to Christians
and not to any other religion is not correct.
7. We have shown above that it is applicable to
Parsis after the amendment of the Act in 1962 and
to Hindus who reside within the territories which
on 1-9-1870 were subject to the Lt. Governor of
Bengal or to areas covered by original jurisdiction
of the High Courts of Bombay and Madras and to
all wills made outside those territories and limits
so far as they relate to immovable property situate
within those territories and limits. If that is so, it
cannot be said that the section is exclusively
applicable only to Christians and, therefore, it is
discriminatory. The whole foundation of the case
is thus lost. The differences are not based on any
religion but for historical reasons that in the British
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Empire in India, probate was required to prove the
right of a legatee or an executor but not in Part ‘B’
or ‘C’ States. That position has continued even
after the Constitution has come into force.
Historical
reasons
treatment
of
may
separate
justify
differential
geographical
regions
provided it bears a reasonable and just relation to
the matter in respect of which differential
treatment is accorded. Uniformity in law has to be
achieved, but that is a long-drawn process.
Undoubtedly, the States and Union should be alive
to this problem. Only on the basis that some
differences arise in one or the other States in
regard to testamentary succession, the law does not
become discriminatory so as to be invalid. Such
differences are bound to arise in a federal set-up.”
55. Paragraph Nos.15 and 16 in Mrs. Chandra (died)5 of the
Division Bench of Madras High Court are relevant and the same are
extracted as under:
“15. A combined reading of the provisions of
Sections 57 (a) and 213 (2) (i) would make it
crystal clear that a Will executed within the
original jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras
in respect of all the properties mentioned therein
situate
anywhere
requires
Probate.
A
Will
executed outside those territories would require
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Probate in respect of properties, which are situate
within those territories. In an attempt to tide over
the
difficulties
faced,
the
learned
counsel
appearing for the appellants would invite our
attention to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Clarence Pais and others Vs. Union of
India reported in (2001) 4 SCC 325. He would
invite our attention to the following observations
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made at paragraph 6
of the judgment, which reads as follows:“6. ................... A combined reading of Sections
213 and 57 of the Act would show that where the
parties to the will are Hindus or the properties in
dispute are not in territories falling under Sections
57(a) and (b), sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act
applies and sub-section (1) has no application. As a
consequence, a probate will not be required to be
obtained by a Hindu in respect of a will made outside
those
territories
or
regarding
the
immovable
properties situate outside those territories. The result
is that the contention put forth on behalf of the
petitioners that Section 213(1) of the Act is applicable
only to Christians and not to any other religion is not
correct.”
16. The learned counsel laying emphasis on the
words “as a consequence, a probate will not be
required to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of a
Will made outside those territories or regarding the
immovable
properties
situate
outside
those
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territories”, would submit that if a Will made
within the territories relates to immovable property
situate outside the territories, probate is not
required. We are unable to persuade ourselves to
agree with the contention of the learned counsel. A
proper reading of the pronouncement of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court is to the effect that probate
is not required for a Will, which is made outside
the territories with reference to properties situate
outside the original jurisdiction of High Court of
judicature at Madras. If a Will is made/executed
within the original jurisdiction of High Court of
Judicature at Madras, in view of the clear language
of Section 57(a), the same will have to be probated
de hors the fact that the properties are situate
outside the jurisdiction. We are unable to read the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the way
the counsel suggests or wants us to read. In view
of the above, in the absence of a probate, the Will
cannot be relied upon. Therefore, point no.2 is
answered against them.”
56. In the light of the aforesaid principle, as discussed above, in
the present case, the subject Will was executed within the territorial
jurisdiction of Bombay High Court, therefore, probation of the said
Will is mandatory. In the present case, the plaintiffs failed to get the
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subject Will probated. Therefore, they cannot lay claim over the suit
schedule property basing on the said Will in the absence of probation.
57. Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the plaintiffs, brought to the notice of this Court with regard to the
Gazette No.61, published in the Gazette of India on 21.12.2025, to
contend that Section - 213 of the Act, 1925 was repealed by the
Repealing and Amending Act, 2025 (Act No.37 of 2025). Therefore,
according to him, there is no need of probating the said Will.
58. Whereas, Mr. Shiva Santosh Yelamanchili, learned counsel
for the defendant, referring to Section 4 of the Repealing and
Amending Act, 2025 is prospective and moreover, the plaintiffs have
filed the aforesaid suit in the year 2023. Therefore, they cannot claim
the benefit under the said Repealing Act.
59. In view of the aforesaid submission, Section - 4 of the
Repealing and Amending Act, 2025 deals with ‘Savings’ and the same
is relevant and extracted as under:
“4. The repeal by this Act of any enactment shall
not affect any other enactment in which the
repealed enactment has been applied, incorporated
or referred to;
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and this Act shall not affect the validity,
invalidity, effect or consequences of anything
already done or suffered, or any right, title,
obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or
incurred, or any remedy or proceeding in respect
thereof, or any release or discharge of or from any
debt, penalty, obligation, liability, claim or
demand, or any indemnity already granted, or the
proof of any past act or thing;
nor shall this Act affect any principle or rule
of law, or established jurisdiction, form or course
of pleading, practice or procedure, or existing
usage, custom, privilege, restriction, exemption,
office or appointment, notwithstanding that the
same respectively may have been in any manner
affirmed or recognised or derived by, in or from
any enactment hereby repealed;
nor shall the repeal by this Act of any
enactment revive or restore any jurisdiction, office,
custom, liability, right, title, privilege, restriction,
exemption, usage, practice, procedure or other
matter or thing not now existing or in force.”
In view of the aforesaid provision, there is force in the contention of
learned counsel for the defendant that the plaintiffs cannot claim the
benefit under the aforesaid provision.
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AS No.482 of 2024
60. It is the specific contention of learned counsel for the
defendant that the right to seek probate which is governed by Article
137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must be exercised three (03) years
from the accrual of the right to apply. According to him, the said right
accrued either in 2003 i.e., when the sale deed in favour of the
defendant stood registered, or in 2006, upon the consequential
mutation, and hence stood barred by limitation. Even if the date of
knowledge pleaded by the plaintiff i.e. August 2022 is considered, the
right to seek probate stood barred in August 2025. Therefore, he
further contended that such a right cannot be taken away by way of a
subsequent
enactment,
unless
the
same
is
made
expressly
retrospective in operation. Evidently, the omission of Section 213 of
the Act, 1925 w.e.f. 20.12.2025 by virtue of the Repealing and
Amending Act, 2025, does not affect the effect of ‘anything done or
suffered’, and does not ‘revive or restore’ any ‘matter or thing not
now existing or in force’. Therefore, the bar on the plaintiffs’ right
remains absolute. In support of the aforesaid contentions, reliance was
placed on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Dhiraj
Dutta6;
Kunvarjeet
Singh
Khandpur7;
T.
Kaliamurthi8;
Thirumalai Chemical Ltd.9 and Km. Kr. Ramanathan Chettiar10.
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AS No.482 of 2024
61. In Dhiraj Dutta6, the Apex Court held that the application
for revocation of probate filed beyond three (03) years therefrom, is
hopelessly barred by limitation.
62.
In Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur7, the Apex Court
considered the scope of right to apply, Article 137 of the Limitation
Act and held that application filed for grant of letters of administration
within three (03) years from the date of withdrawal of probate petition
is not barred by limitation; and however the application filed beyond
three (03) years is barred by limitation.
63. T. Kaliamurthi8, the Apex Court held as under:
“
41. At this juncture, we may again note Section
6 of the General Clauses Act, as reproduced
hereinearlier. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act
clearly provides that unless a different intention
appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in
force or existing at the time at which the repeal
takes effect, or affect the previous operation of any
enactment so repealed or anything duly done or
suffered thereunder, or affect any right, privilege,
obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or
incurred under any enactment so repealed.
42. From the above, it is clear that the right of
action, which is barred by limitation at the time
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AS No.482 of 2024
when the new Act comes into force, cannot be
revived by the change in the law subsequently.
In Ram Murti v. Puran Singh [AIR 1963 Pun 393]
, it has been held that Section 107 renders the
Limitation Act, 1963 inapplicable to suits for
possession of immovable properties comprised in
any wakf or any interest therein but the right of a
person to institute such a suit which is already
barred at the commencement of this Act cannot
revive. It was further held that his title is
extinguished and a good title is acquired by the
person in possession and that where the title of the
true owner is extinguished in favour of the
wrongdoer, it is not revived by that person again
getting into possession. There is no remitter to the
old title.”
64. In Thirumalai Chemical Ltd.9, the Apex Court
held as under:
“32. Limitation provisions therefore can be
procedural in the context of one set of facts but
substantive in the context of different set of facts
because rights can accrue to both the parties. In
such a situation, test is to see whether the statute, if
applied retrospectively to a particular type of case,
would impair existing rights and obligations. An
accrued right to plead a time bar, which is acquired
after the lapse of the statutory period, is
KL,J & SKS,J
AS No.482 of 2024
nevertheless a right, even though it arises under an
Act which is procedural and a right which is not to
be taken away pleading retrospective operation
unless a contrary intention is discernible from the
statute. Therefore, unless the language clearly
manifests in express terms or by necessary
implication, a contrary intention a statute divesting
vested rights is to be construed as prospective.”
65. In Km. Kr. Ramanathan Chettiar10, the Division Bench
of Madras High Court, referring to the principle laid down by the
Apex Court in several judgments, held that in the absence of anything
to the contrary, if a claim is within limitation according to the old Act,
on the date when the new Act comes into force and a proceeding is
commenced, after coming into force of the new Act, it is the new Act
which would govern all decisions on the point of limitation. If,
however, the right to sue or the right to apply had already been barred
by the provisions of the Limitation Act then in force, then unless there
was something in the latter Act which could be deemed to apply
retrospectively to revive claims which had already become barred, the
new Act could not be availed of for the purpose of saving limitation.
66. In the light of the aforesaid principle, contention of Mr. A.
Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs that
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AS No.482 of 2024
there is no need of getting the subject Will probate in view of
repealment of Section 213 of the Act, 1925 by virtue of the Repealing
and Amending Act, 2025 w.e.f. 20.12.2025 cannot be accepted.
67. It is apt to note that learned trial Court considered the said
principle and also the principle laid down by the Apex Court in a
catena of decisions and held that without getting the subject Will
probated, the plaintiffs cannot lay claim and file suit for declaration to
declare them as absolute owners of the suit schedule property and
accordingly rejected the plaint.
68. Moreover, perusal of the Will dated 12.10.1992 would
reveal that it was in respect of Flat at 18, Jeevansukh Co-operative
Housing Society Limited, 2nd floor Plot No.420/421, T.P.S. III, 14th
Road, Bandra, Bombay. It is also mentioned that Santdas Lekhraj
Choithramani bequeathed the rest and residue of all his properties of
whatsoever kind and wherever situated including his ownership block
after disbursement of funeral expenses, donation to Shirdi Trust, and
after paying his taxes, dues and other liabilities to 1) Mrs. Padma, wife
of Mr. G. Kishinchand, Ex-Test Cricketer, residing at Nazar Baug
Palace, Mandvil, Baroda and 2) Mrs. Usha G. Khatri, daughter of G.
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AS No.482 of 2024
Kishinchand Harisinghani, now residing at Nazar Baug Palace,
Mandvi, Baroda in equal shares. If Mrs. Padma, wife of Mr. G.
Kishinchand Harisinghani, at serial No.1 pre-deceases him, he
bequeath rest and residue of all his properties of whatsoever and
wherever situated including his ownership block to Mrs. Usha G.
Khatri,
daughter
of
Kishinchand
Harisinghani
after
making
disbursement as already stated therein. Therefore, there is no reference
to the suit schedule property in the said Will also.
LIMITATION:
69. It is the specific contention of learned counsel for the
defendant that the suit is barred by limitation and there is no cause of
action to file the said suit. In the light of the said submission, it is apt
to note that in the plaint filed by the plaintiffs, they have specifically
pleaded that they came to know about the registered sale deed bearing
document No.8536 of 2003, dated 31.12.2002 executed by one
Santdas Lekhraj represented by its Power of Attorney Holders in the
month of August 2022 through known persons. It is also his specific
contention that in the present suit, the plaintiffs are represented by
their Special Power of Attorney Holder, Mr. Madas Dayanand. The
said Power of Attorney is dated 10.12.2022.
He would further
KL,J & SKS,J
AS No.482 of 2024
contend Mr. Madas Shivanand, son of Madas Dayanand, as Power of
Attorney of the plaintiffs in O.S. No.952 of 2018, filed the said suit
with regard to the suit schedule property and sought identical reliefs.
In the said suit in O.S. No.952 of 2018, the plaintiffs represented by
Mr. Madas Shivanand S/o Madas Dayanand pleaded knowledge of the
said registered sale deed of the defendant in June 2018, plaintiffs
therein as “lineal descendants” of the Sanad Holder. In the present
suit in O.S. No.14 of 2023, the plaintiffs represented by Madas
Dayanand claimed knowledge as August, 2022. Madas Shivanand
and Madas Dayanand son and father and they are residing in the same
house, which is not disputed by either side. Thus, the son of Madas
Dayanand claimed knowledge of the aforesaid registered sale deed
bearing document No.8536 of 2003, dated 31.12.2002 of the
defendant in June 2018 and, therefore, the father, who is also residing
in the same house cannot claim the date of knowledge of the said
registered sale deed as August 2022. The said suit in O.S. No.952 of
2018 filed by the plaintiffs therein represented by their GPA holder,
Mr. Madas Shivanand, was dismissed for default on 22.10.2024 i.e.,
during pendency of the present suit in O.S. No.14 of 2023.
KL,J & SKS,J
AS No.482 of 2024
70. Mr. A. Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the plaintiffs, would contend that this Court has to consider the
contents of the plaint and documents filed by the plaintiffs along with
the plaint. This Court cannot consider other aspects.
71. Whereas, learned counsel for the defendant would contend
that the plaintiffs represented by GPA - Madas Dayanand,
intentionally suppressed the said fact in the plaint and did not file copy
of the plaint in O.S. No.952 of 2018. Therefore, bona fides of the said
Madas Dayanand, power of attorney holder of the plaintiffs, are
doubtful.
72. In the light of the aforesaid submission, it is apt to note that
there is no reference to the filing of O.S. No.952 of 2018 by the
plaintiffs therein represented by their power of attorney holder, Mr.
Madas Shivanand son of Madas Dayanad in the plaint in O.S. No.14
of 2023. However, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs
did not dispute the contention of learned counsel appearing for
defendant that both Mr. Madas Dayanand and Mr. Madas Shivanand
are residing in the very same house. There is no denial of plaintiffs
represented by Mr. Madas Shivanand filed O.S. No.952 of 2018
against the defendant claiming knowledge of the aforesaid registered
KL,J & SKS,J
AS No.482 of 2024
sale deed of the defendant as June, 2018. The GPA of Mr. Madas
Shivanand is dated 29.07.2018, whereas the GPA of Mr. Madas
Dayanand is dated 10.12.2022. Therefore, the father and son, who are
residing in the very same house, cannot claim different dates of
knowledge of execution of registered sale deed bearing document
No.8536 of 2003, dated 31.12.2002 in favour of the defendant herein.
73. In C.S. Ramaswamy v. V.K. Senthil30, the Apex Court
considered that a suit was filed by minor boy in the year 2006, in
which some of the plaintiffs were also party to the said suit and in the
said suit, there was a specific reference to the Sale Deed dated
19.09.2005 and the said suit came to be dismissed in the year 2014.
Immediately thereafter, the other suits have been filed.
Upon
consideration of the said aspects, the Apex Court held that from the
averments in the plaint and the bundle of facts stated in the plaint, it
was clever drafting, the plaintiffs therein tried to bring their suits
within the period of limitation, which otherwise are barred by
limitation. Considering the principle laid down by the Apex Court in
T. Arivandandam15 and Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram
. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1330
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AS No.482 of 2024
Prasanna Singh31, and in Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat Mehal
Kalan32, considered the fact that when the suit is barred by any law,
the plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent that provision by means
of clever drafting so as to avoid mention of those circumstances, by
which the suit is barred by law of limitation. Placing reliance on the
said principle and also principle laid down in T. Arivandandam15 and
Raghwendra Sharan Singh31, the Apex Court further held that both
the plaints in the said suits are liable to be rejected in exercise of
powers under Order - VII Rule - 11 of the CPC.
74. Referring to the said principle, it is the specific contention
of learned counsel for the defendant that both father and son are
staying in the very same residence. Power of attorney holder of the
plaintiffs in the present case intentionally suppressed the said fact and
claimed knowledge of the aforesaid registered sale deed of the
defendant as August, 2022. There is force in the said submission. In
the light of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in C.S.
Ramaswamy30, the said aspect can be considered.
75.
As discussed above, the plaintiffs did not dispute that
Madas Shivanand son of Madas Dayanad, GPA Holder of the
. (2020) 16 SCC 601
. (1986) 4 SCC 364
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AS No.482 of 2024
plaintiffs are staying in the very same house. There is no denial with
regard to filing of suit in O.S. No.952 of 2018 by the plaintiffs therein
represented by Mr. Madas Shivanand, son of Madas Dayanad, GPA
holder of the plaintiffs herein. Therefore, father cannot claim date of
knowledge of the registered sale deed of the defendant as August
2022.
76. As discussed above, the defendant is claiming right over
the suit schedule property on the strength of registered sale deed
bearing document No.8536 of 2003, dated 31.12.2002. The plaintiffs
filed the present suit in the month of December, 2022 i.e., after elapse
of 20 years. Thus, the plaintiffs drafted the suit cleverly suppressing
the earlier suit in O.S. No.952 of 2018 filed by the plaintiffs therein
represented by their power of attorney holder, son of power of
attorney holder of the plaintiffs herein. Therefore, the suit is barred
by limitation.
77. It is apt to note that the object of Order VII Rule 11 of the
CPC is if the Court comes to a conclusion that the suit is barred by
law or suit is filed based on vexatious claim, it should be nipped in the
bud and reject the plaint in exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11
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AS No.482 of 2024
of the CPC. The trial Court considered the said aspects and rightly
rejected the plaint filed by the plaintiffs.
78. On consideration of the aforesaid principle, learned trial
Court rejected the plaint vide impugned order. It is a reasoned order
and well-founded. There is no error in it. The appellants - plaintiffs
failed to make out any case to interfere with the order. Therefore, the
present appeal fails and the same is liable to be dismissed.
79. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.
In the
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending
in the present appeal, shall stand closed.
__________________
K. LAKSHMAN, J
__________________
K. SUJANA, J
9th September, 2026
Mgr
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