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IN THE
HIGH COURT
OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH
ON THE 29th OF JANUARY, 2024
SECOND APPEAL No. 41 of 2003
BETWEEN:1. SMT. SAVITRI SONI W/O LATE SHRI N.K. SONI
2. SUNIL SONI S/O LATE SHRI N.K. SONI, AGED
ABOUT 40 YEARS,
BOTH R/O LOHIYA BAZAR,
LASHKAR,
GWALIOR (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. NEERU DIXIT W/O SHRI K.K. DIXIT R/O CM - 10,
D.D. NAGAR, LASHKAR, GWALIOR (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....APPELLANTS
(BY SHRI V.K. BHARDWAJ – LEARNED SR. COUNSEL WITH SHRI ANAND
RAGHUVANSHI – ADVOCATE )
AND
NEKSE S/O JUKTIRAM VAISHYA DECEASED
THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIR (DEAD)
BENIBAI W/O LATE NEKSE R/O LOHIYA BAZAR
LASHKAR GWALIOR (DEAD) THROUGH
SMT SUDHA W/O NATHURAM (DEAD) D/O LATE
NEKSE
1. SMT MADHURI W/O RAMESHWAR DAYAL D/O
NEKSE R/O LOHIYA BAZAR, LASHKAR,
GWALIOR (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. SMT SHOBHA W/O GULABCHAND D/O LATE
NEKSE R/O LOHIYA BAZAR, LASHKAR,
GWALIOR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI A.K. JAIN - ADVOCATE )
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Reserved on
:
14.12.2023
Pronounced on
:
29.01.2024
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------This appeal having been heard and reserved for orders, coming on for
pronouncement this day, the Court passed the following:
ORDER
This second appeal has been filed by the appellants/ plaintiffs
against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Second Additional
District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 54-A/84 , judgment and decree
dated 18.08.2001 wherein the appeal filed on 9.2.1982 by which the
learned First Appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree passed
by the learned Fourth Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior in C.S. No. 532-A/75
( Navalkishore Vs Nekse), judgment and decree dated 12.01.1982
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for eviction of tenant from House No.
346/29, Lohia Bazar, Lashkar and payment of arrears of rent.
2.
It is not disputed that the suit property was originally rent to Nekse
on 01.09.1962 on a rent of Rs. 25/- per month.
3.
The trial Court, after hearing the parties and on he basis of their
pleadings and evidence adduced, held that the tenant has not encroached
upon the additional space besides the area rented out to defendant. The trial
Court further held that the plaintiff does not require rented premises for
repair or for new construction and, therefore, do not find it bonafide for the
same purpose. It further held that rent is due on defendant but on account
of the fact that plaintiff did not accept the rent.
4.
Learned First Appellate Court, during the hearing of the appeal
found that the defendant had committed delay in payment of rent but that
was for valid and genuine reasons and as per paragraph 23 and 26 of the
appeal judgment, dismissed the application of the appellant under Section
13(6) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act dated 3.8.1984 and 1.9.92
and allowed the application of the respondent/ defendant filed under
Section 151 of C.P.C. on 12.10.1993 & Section 13(1) of M.P.
Accommodation Control Act dated 28.06.2001 and in the ultimate analysis
dismissed the appeal.
5.
This appeal has been filed assailing the judgment of the trial Court
as well as First Appellate Court and on 21.01.2004, this second appeal was
admitted on the following substantial question of law :“Whether the Court below has erred in condoning several
defaults in depositing the rent ?”
6.
The appellant on 3.8.1984 filed an application under Section 13(6)
of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act that inspite of summons of
appeal, due rent has not been deposited within one month as the copy of
the application was received by the respondent on 3.8.1984. In reply to the
above application filed on 15.03.1986, the defendant submitted that he has
deposited the rent for the purpose of deciding this appeal. In reply certain
entries are more relevant which are reproduced below :Date
Amount
(Rs)
Period
8.3.83
January 82 to March 83
28.06.83
April to June
24.01.84
October to December 83
20.04.84
January 84 to March
12.07.84
April to June
22.01.86
September 85 to January 1986
At the bottom of the reply dated 15.03.1986 it is also mentioned that
it is not necessary for the respondent to deposit rent during appeal
proceeding.
7.
By filing an application under Section 151 of C.P.C. on 12.10.93,
respondent has submitted that original tenant Nekse expired and his wife
Benibai is old and ill and daughters are married, therefore, she could not
contact her advocate. On 11.10.1993 she contacted her advocate who told
her that defendant has been struck off but it is submitted that she had sent
the rent through her son-in-law and accordingly, prayed for condoning the
delay in payment of rent.
Respondents have filed following citations in support of their case ;
(i)
Sunder Prasad Pandey v. Rajaram Shukla, 1972 JLJ 759
(ii)
S.S. Harishchandra Jain v. Capt. Inder Singh Bedi, 1977 JLJ 312
(iii)
Dhanbai v. State of M.P. and others, 1978 JLJ 879
(iv)
Jagdish Kapoor v. New Education Society, AIR 1968 M.P 1
(v)
Bharatchand v. Vishnupant, 1978 JLJ 227
(vi)
Manoharlal Gopilal Pande vs. Dr. Abdul Mazid Khan, 1997(1)
MPLJ 232
(vii) Dr. Gopaldas Vs. Rajesh , 2006(1) M.P.H.T. 53
(viii) Manisha Lalwani Vs. Dr. D.V. Paul, 2007(2) M.P.L.J. 52
(ix)
Sardar @ Jayendra Rao v. Omprakash, 2008 (1) MPWN 39
(x) Nonihal Singh vs. Maya Devi, 2019 (1) MPLJ 300
On consideration of rival cases of both the parties and on the basis
of citations filed by the respondent they do not lend strength to his case or
defence for the reason that in year 1983 in M.P. Accommodation Control
Act, 1961, there was an amendment by which in Section 13 the words
“appeal and other proceedings” were added besides the word “suit”,
therefore, the citation for the period earlier to this amendment do not help
the respondents.
8.
Regarding other citation as filed by the respondent i.e. Manoharlal
Gopilal Pande (supra) wherein it has been held that delay can be
condoned when there is not much delay but looking to the reply of the
respondents before the appellate Court, in which he himself has submitted
there is delay on payment of arrears of rent, it is seen that there is too much
delay and delay is repeated again and again, therefore, this citation of
Manoharlal Gopilal Pande (Supra) does not help the appellant in factual
situation.
9.
Regarding the judgment of Sardar @ Jayendra Rao (Supra), it
can be simply stated that not only after getting the notice of the suit, the
tenant has to deposit arrears of rent but rent has to be deposited by
respondent, be it appeal or other legal proceedings.
Regarding judgment of Nonihal Singh (Supra) again this question
of fact whether delay has been properly explained when any application for
extention of time in depositing rent was filed. As per the legal position, if a
tenant is unable for any reason to deposit rent then he should file an
application before the concerned Court as the case may be and seek time
for extention in depositing rent and the legal position is not that after much
delay when the other party raises objection then the tenant can deposit the
rent as per his wish along with an application for condonation of delay. In
any case, in this appeal it is also seen that along with an application for
condonation of delay no documents were filed to substantiate the plea. It
has to be remembered that the Civil Court has a onerous duty to do justice
to the parties but strictly on the basis of settled legal position wherein it is
a settled position that if someone seeks some relief based on some facts,
then documents in support thereof should be filed along with the
application.
Proviso under Section 12 (3) of the M.P. Accommodation Act
provides that if there is default in payment of rent for the second time in
consecutive three months then the eviction shall follow and looking to the
chart as mentioned above, respondents/ defendants committed defaults
many times and no application for extention of time in depositing rent was
filed along with documents.
10.
In Ashok Kumar Mishra v. Goverdhan Bhai (D) through Lrs
and another, AIR 2017 SC 1819, Supreme Court has held in para 13 :“13…….. Accordingly, it provides a locus poenitentiae
to the tenant. Sub-Section 13(5) of the Act reiterates the
protection by stating that if the tenant makes payment payment
post-suit in accordance with the provisions of sub-section
13(1) and 13(2) of the Act, he shall not be liable for eviction.
This Section does not confer the power on the court to condone
the defaults in payment of rent after the suit is filed.”
11.
The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Tarunveer Singh vs.
Mahesh Prasad Bhargava, 2018 (I) MPJR 49 in paragraphs 48 and 49
has held that in Sayeda Akhtar Vs. Abdul Ahad, (2003) 7 SCC 52 that
the Court has been conferred power to extend time for depositing rent on
an application made to it as the trial Court did not have suo moto power to
extend time for depositing rent, therefore, the trial Court did not have any
discretion to condone delay, without there being any application for the
said purpose. Therefore, in considered view of this Court a very fine and
subtle distinction can be made between application for extention of time
and for condoning delay. In the first case, the party comes to the Court,
expresses its difficulty in depositing rent whereas in the second case, party
never approaches the Court for extention of time to deposit rent and makes
a prayer for that purpose but when it deposits the rent then seeks
condonation. In any case, as per Section 12(3) of the M.P. Accommodation
Control Act when there is delay for the second time in depositing rent
consecutively for three months then the consequences are fatal to the
tenant.
12.
In Rajendra Kumar and others Vs. Smt. Kasturi Bai and others,
2009(2) M.P.H.T. 115 in paragraphs 7 the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
has held as under :“ 7. As far as the application for condonation of delay filed by the
appellants is concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of Aayeda
Akhtar Vs. Abdul Ahad (supra) has held that the application for
condonation of delay cannot be entertained after lapse of a long period
of time of committing the default in the following terms, in Paragraph
9 :“9. The High Court in its impugned judgment did not point out as to
how the court of appeal committed an error of records in arriving at
the said finding. Admittedly, there had been two defaults i.e. rent for
the month of November 1985 and rents for the months of May and
June 1988. The High Court purported to have recorded that the
appellant had applied for condonation of delay in payment of rent on
5-2-1990 in relation to default to deposit rent for the month of
November 1985 and for the months of May and June 1988. An
application for condonation of delay could not have been entertained
on 5-2-1990 for commission of default in depositing the rent. We,
therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court was not correct in
interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate
court.”
13.
Recently, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Heera Traders Vs. Kamla
Jain, AIR Online 2022 SC 186 has held in paragraphs 16, 19, 25, 27, 29,
32 to 34 as thus :“16. The provisions of Section 13, as it stood prior to substitution in the year
1983, did not embrace a situation where any Appeal or other proceeding was
filed by a tenant. On the other hand, under the erstwhile avatar, the LawGiver confined the provision to a situation where a Suit or proceeding was
instituted by the landlord.
*****
19. Let us first analyse the impact of Section 13, as it stood prior to its
substitution in the year 1983. Section 12(1)(a) confers a right upon the
landlord to seek eviction on the ground of the tenant falling into arrears of
rent and remaining in arrears even after service of a notice of a demand. The
default should persist for two months from the service of demand. The
demand must relate to arrears of rent not barred by time. This is a ground
available under Section 12(1)(a). It constitutes a cause of action for seeking
eviction. However, Section 12(3) provided and continues to provide that no
Order for the Eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground under Section
12(1)(a), if the tenant makes payment or deposit, as contemplated in Section
13. The proviso to Section 13, however, tabooed and continues to prohibit the
invocation of the protection under Section 12(3) read with Section 13, more
than once, in respect of any accommodation. The tenant, in other words,
stands shielded from eviction despite the availability of the ground under
Section 12(1)(a), leading to an Eviction proceeding being filed. But, in
respect of the same accommodation, in respect of which, the default took
place, the tenant does not get insulated from eviction, if he defaults in
payment of rent for the same accommodation for three consecutive months.
This was the protection, which was actually contemplated under Section 13,
prior to Section 13 being substituted in the year 1983. Till 1983, thus, the
protection could not be availed by any tenant on the ground of payment of
rent by him during the proceeding for eviction or Appeal.
**********
25. What is, however, relevant from a reference to Chapter IIIA, which
provides for eviction on the grounds of bonafide requirement, is that, vide
Section 23H, Section 13 has been made applicable 'mutatis mutandis'.
Section 23H makes Section 13 applicable, not only in an application for
recovery of possession under Section 23A, but it also is made applicable in
respect of a proceeding for Revision under Section 23E against a Final Order
by the Authority under Section 23C and Section 23D, as they apply to a
proceeding instituted under Section 12. It must be noticed that Chapter IIIA
was inserted vide the very same amendment (Act 27 of 1983), which also
resulted in Section 13 being substituted. In other words, Section 13, as
substituted, was intended to apply mutatis mutandis, undoubtedly, to a
Revision maintained against a Final Order under Section 23C or Section
23D. Section 23C contemplates an Order of Eviction, being passed against
the tenant, if the conditions in the said provision are satisfied. Section 23F
also contemplates a stay being granted by the High Court in a Revision under
Section 23E of the Order of Eviction. Therefore, when Section 13 is made
applicable to a Revision filed against an Order of Eviction under Section
23C, the Revision would be a Revision filed by the tenant, who has suffered
an Order of Eviction under Section 23C. What is, however, more important is
that, under the scheme of Chapter IIIA, that is the fast-track procedure, as it
were, contemplated for the special categories of landlords falling under
Section 23J, it provides only for bonafide requirement as the ground for
seeking eviction. If eviction is sought, in other words, on the ground of
arrears of rent, it may be open to the landlord to invoke the provisions of
Section 12. The special right, however, to invoke the shorter and faster route
to obtain an Order of Eviction, is available to the landlord, falling under
Section 23J, only in respect of grounds of bonafide requirement. The
relevance of this lies in concluding that, by the insertion of Chapter IIIA
along with the substitution of Section 13, and by virtue of Section 23H,
making Section 13 applicable even to the proceeding under Chapter IIIA,
when an Order for Eviction is passed under Section 23C and the tenant
challenges such an Order of Eviction by a Revision, he is expected to pay the
amount, as provided in Section 13(1), during the pendency of the Revision.
******
27. As already noticed, as far as a proceeding contemplated under Chapter III
by the ordinary landlord is concerned, if we may use that expression, falling
under Section 2(b), Section 13, as such, applies. We have only attempted to
divine the impact of Section 23H, to find that, even in a proceeding by the
special category of landlords, falling under Section 23J, and what is more,
where eviction cannot be sought under Chapter IIIA, on the ground of arrears
of rent, Section 13 applies even after the passing of the Order for Eviction,
when the matter is pending in a Revision. This aspect helps to reveal the
mind of the Legislature, and the ambiguity shrouding its real intention, is to
some extent, effaced.
******
29. The opening words of Section 13 provide that, on a Suit or any other
proceeding, being instituted by a landlord on any of the grounds referred to in
Section 12, the tenant is to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord, the amount
equal to the rent. Can it, therefore, be contended that the words "any of the
grounds", referred to in Section 12, is to apply only to a situation where Suit
or any other proceeding is instituted by the landlord? To expatiate, after the
above opening words in Section 13, by virtue of the substitution effected by
Act 27 of 1983, can it mean that the words "or in an Appeal or in any other
proceeding by a tenant against any Decree or Order for his eviction", is not to
be read along with "on of the grounds referred to in Section 12"? To put it in
a different manner, can it be said that the substituted provisions of Section 13
contemplated that the Appeal or any other proceeding by the tenant, must be
in a proceeding instituted only under Section 12(1)(a), i.e., on the ground of
arrears of rent, for the reason that the construction of the provision, which
consists of an elongated sentence to which meaning cannot be attached,
except by bearing in mind the statutory duty of the tenant to deposit the
amount for the period for which the tenant may have made default. In other
words, if the words "for the period for which the tenant may have made
default" is an indispensable requirement to apply Section 13, then the
substituted provisions, extending the protection in an Appeal or other
proceeding by a tenant, would be confined to a proceeding under Section
12(1)(a). In this regard, we may also look for any inkling available in Section
13 for the proposition that Section 13 is attracted in an Appeal or other
proceeding by the tenant, on any of the grounds under Section 12. In this
regard, in Sobhagyamal (supra), this Court, we may recapitulate, has held as
follows:
"Striking out the defence of the tenant, on an application moved by the
landlord, the provision applicable in the Suit for ejectment on any of the
grounds mentioned under Section 12, inclusive of under Section 12(1)(a)
of the Act, whereas sub-Section (5) of Section 13 would apply only when
the Suit is instated for ejectment on the ground of arrears of rent under
Section 12(1)(a) of the Act."
This would mean that Section 13 would apply even if the ground of
eviction is not one under Section 12(1)(a).
32. The problem persists in the form of the logical culmination of the
command to the tenant in an Appeal or other proceeding, against any
Decree of Eviction, to deposit the rent or pay for the period, for which the
tenant may have made default. Undoubtedly, in the context of Section
12(1)(a) read with Section 12(3), the words "for the period for which the
tenant may have made default", is perfectly apposite. In other words,
when Section 12(3) provides that no Decree shall be passed for eviction
under Section 12(1)(a), if the tenant makes the deposit or payment of the
amount of rent, under Section 13, it is intended to mean that, even if the
tenant has invited the wrath of Section 12(1)(a), he would be protected
under Section 12(3), if he complied with Section 13, made the deposit
within a period of one month or the extended period of the service of
summons and made further deposits/payment.
33. However, Section 13 clearly is intended to apply in a Suit or
proceeding instituted by the landlord on any other grounds under Section
12. If that be so, the words, "for the period, for which, the tenant may
have made default", may not apply, as the tenant may not be in default
and no ground under Section 12(1)(a) may even be pleaded. Therefore, in
such a proceeding by the landlord, the words, "for the period, for which,
the tenant may have made default", pales into insignificance and
irrelevance. It would then mean that, in a proceeding under Section 12,
which does not involve Section 12(1)a), or in other words, when there is
no default within the meaning of Section 12(1)(a), the protection would
be available to the tenant, only if, he makes a deposit or payment for the
period during the pendency of the proceeding. In other words, throughout
the proceeding by the landlord, on any of the grounds under Section 12,
the tenant is obliged to deposit the amount of rent. The failure to do so,
would attract Section 13(6) and it is open to the Court to strike off the
defence and proceed further in the matter.
34.
If that be so, in an Appeal or any other proceeding by the tenant
against an Order of Eviction, which does not involve Section 12(1)(a), the
intention of the Law- Giver appears to be that the tenant, so described,
despite the Order of Eviction and the definition of the word "tenant" in
Section 2(i), is obliged to pay or deposit the amount of rent under Section
13(1) or Section 13(2), as the case may be, in the manner provided, till the
termination of the Appeal or proceeding.”
14.
Therefore, on the basis of discussion as above, it is found that
respondents/ defendants committed multiple (more than two times) delay
in depositing rent. No application was filed for extention of time in the
concerned Court for payment of rent and after long time deposited rent
along with application for condonation of delay, which has not been
decided by the learned First Appellate Court strictly on merits but
nevertheless condoned by the learned First Appellate Court on wrong
ground. Accordingly, regarding substantial question finding is in
affirmative i.e. to say that the learned First Appellate Court erred in
condoning delay in payment of rent.
15.
As a consequence, this second appeal is allowed and it is directed
that the respondents/ defendants shall hand over rented premises situated at
House No. 346/29, Lohia Bazar, Lashkar, Gwalior to the appellants/
plaintiffs within three months along with payment of arrears of rent till the
possession of suit premises is given.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, both the parties shall bear
their own cost throughout.
Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed.
(AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH)
JUDGE
VSG
Date: 2024.01.30 18:21:00 +05'30'
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