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M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
M.Cr.C. No.14484 of 2012
(J.B.S. Chandel Vs. State of M.P.)
M.Cr.C. No.4368 of 2013
(J.B.S. Chandel and others Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh and another)
&
M.Cr.C. No.34749 of 2019
(Arvind Dubey and another Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh and another)
Date of Order
14.01.2022
Bench Constituted
Single Bench
Order delivered by
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay
Dwivedi, J.
Whether approved for
reporting
Name of counsels for
the parties
Yes
For Petitioners : Shri Manish
Datt, Senior Advocate with
Shri
Sameer
Agrawal,
Advocate.
For Respondent No.1/State :
Shri Devendra Gangrade,
Panel Lawyer.
For respondent No.2: Shri
R.P. Mishra, Advocate.
Law laid down
The object of giving
protection under Section 197
of the Code of Criminal
Procedure-To take sanction for initiating
prosecution against public
servant for protecting them
from needless harassment
so as to render protective
assurance to honest officer
to perform public duty
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
honestly and to best of their
abilities because threat of
prosecution demoralises the
honest officer.
Real test to determine
applicability of Section 197 of
Cr.C.P.
and
obtaining
sanction
from
the
Government are:(i) That the accused must be
a public servant and can
be removed from his
office only with the
sanction of the State
Government
or
the
Central Government;
(ii) He must be an accused
of an offence alleged to
have been committed by
him while acting or
purporting to act in
discharge of his official
duty.
If required parameters
are fulfilled then previous
sanction of the competent
authority
to
initiate
prosecution against a public
servant is a pre-requisite
condition.
Significant Paragraphs 25, 26, 29 and 30
Reserved on : 24.11.2021
Delivered on : 14.01.2022
O R D E R
(14.01.2022)
Considering the facts and circumstances of
these petitions and the issue involved in the same since
interconnected with each other, therefore, all these
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
petitions are heard and decided analogously by this
common order.
These petitions have been filed by the
petitioners under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure for quashing of the entire proceedings
pending in the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge,
Shahdol vide S.T. No.184/2012 and also for quashing
the order dated 08.03.2013 passed by the said Court
framing charges against the petitioners under Sections
302, 120-B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code and also order dated 08.11.2012 passed by the
First Additional Sessions Judge, Shahdol whereby the
application filed by the petitioners under Section 197 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure has been rejected.
2.
Laconic facts of the case are that respondent
No.2 had filed a complaint in the Court of Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Shahdol inter alia on the ground that her son
Rajkumar @ Chhota Gudda was on the way to his
sister’s house on 29.11.2006 along with his friend
Bhupendra Sharma and when they were crossing the
Mudna river, the petitioners along with other subordinate
police personnel intercepted them and on the order of
the petitioners, the police personnel shot fire upon
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
Chhota Gudda, resultantly, he succumbed. As per the
complainant/respondent
No.2,
to
cover-up
their
wrongdoings, the petitioners and other police personnel
converted the story by faking it as an encounter, but in
fact they have murdered the son of respondent
No.2/complainant.
(2.1) The complainant filed a complaint under
Section 200 of Code of Criminal Procedure
praying
for
initiation
of
appropriate
proceedings against the petitioners and other
accused persons for the offence punishable
under Sections 302, 120-B read with Section
34 and 149 of Indian Penal Code.
(2.2) Thereafter, the statements of complainant/
respondent No.2 and other witnesses were
recorded and after recording the statements,
CJM, Shahdol dismissed the complaint vide
order dated 04.03.2010 inter alia on the
ground that the petitioners and other accused
persons are government servants and their
alleged conduct comes within the parameters
of discharge of their official duties. The trial
Court in its order has held that before filing the
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
complaint, no sanction under Section 197
Cr.P.C.
has
been
obtained
by
the
complainant/respondent No.2, which is a
mandatory requirement and in absence of
valid sanction from the competent authority,
the petitioners cannot be prosecuted.
(2.3) Against the order passed by the CJM,
Shahdol, a criminal revision was filed before
the
Sessions
Court,
Shahdol
and
the
Additional Sessions Judge by its order dated
17.05.2010
allowed
the
revision
and
remanded the matter back to the Court of
CJM directing that the complainant be heard
afresh and then appropriate order be passed.
Thereafter, the order passed by the Additional
Sessions Judge on 17.05.2010 was assailed
by the petitioners by filing a revision before
this Court which got dismissed vide order
dated 13.12.2010.
(2.4) Thereafter, an enquiry was conducted and the
Magistrate
vide
order
dated
20.01.2011
directed for registration of offence under
Sections 302/34 and 120-B of IPC against the
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
petitioners. Hence, these petitions have been
filed challenging the order dated 20.01.2011
and
also
seeking
quashment
of
the
proceedings.
(2.5) The complainant/respondent No.2 represented
the matter to various authorities asking proper
inquiry and on her representation, the matter
was referred for Magisterial enquiry. The
National Human Rights Commission has also
conducted an inquiry at their own level, in
which allegation of murder against the present
petitioners
was
found
incorrect
and
no
substance was found in the complaint made
by the complainant/respondent No.2 (mother
of the deceased). In the inquiry conducted by
the
Magistrate,
examined
and
several
witnesses
were
after
appreciating
the
statements and material collected during the
course of inquiry, a report was submitted,
which
reveals
that
an
information
was
conveyed by the informant about the location
of absconding criminal Chhota Gudda on
29.11.2006,
therefore,
police
team
was
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
formed in two groups and after reaching the
spot, they encircled the deceased and he was
asked to surrender, but he started unbridled
fire and not only the deceased but his
accomplice also fired upon the police team.
Resultantly, in self-defence the police also
opened fire and in the cross-firing deceased
Chhota Gudda sustained injuries, due to
which he died whereas other associates ran
away from the spot. The Magistrate while
conducting an inquiry also examined the
medical evidence and took an opinion from
the expert sending collected material to FSL
and finally arrived at conclusion that the
allegation regarding murder of deceased
Chhota Gudda by the police was not correct
and the said encounter cannot be considered
to be illegal, paradoxically it was found
genuine.
Considering
Magistrate,
the
the
report
of
the
National
Human
Rights
Commission also thwarted the inquiry by
approving the report of the Magistrate.
3.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
drawn attention of this Court towards the report of
Magisterial enquiry and also the opinion of the National
Human Rights Commission and submitted that the son
of the complainant/respondent No.2 was convicted for
an offence punishable under Section 302/34 of IPC and
Section 25 & 27 of the Arms Act registered vide Crime
No.442/1994 and in a Sessions Trial No.3/1995, the First
Additional Sessions Judge awarded sentence for life to
the deceased (son of the complainant). The deceased
was in jail since 07.03.1998. Although, he was released
on parole for a period from 28.10.2005 to 21.11.2005,
but thereafter, he did not surrender and remained
absconded. He submits that an order of arrest was also
passed against the deceased. He further submits that
the petitioners and their subordinate police personnel
received
an
information
complainant/respondent
about
No.2
the
and
son
of
the
therefore,
they
intercepted him. He submits that the petitioners are
government servants and they cannot be prosecuted
without taking sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C.
In fact, there is no absolute material available for
constituting offence under Sections 302, 120-B read with
Section 34 and 149 of Indian Penal Code against the
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
petitioners. He further submits that sanction under
Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is required for initiation of criminal
proceedings and to proceed further with the matter.
Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that there were
several weapons seized from the spot viz. .315 bore
Katta, 1 revolver .38, 18 live cartridges of 12 bore, 2
span cartridges, 8 live cartridges 315 bore, 5 cartridges
of 315 bore and as per the report those cartridges were
used in the weapons seized from the spot. In support of
his submission that the petitioners being police officers
committed alleged act while discharging their official
duties therefore, cannot be prosecuted that too when
sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C has not been
obtained, has relied upon the following decisions of the
Supreme Court :(2016) 6 SCC 734 (Amal Kumar Jha v. State of
Chhattisgarh and another), (1997) 5 SCC 326
(Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P. and others),
(1997) 10 SCC 772 (State through the CBI v. B.L.
Verma and another), (1998) 1 SCC 205 (Suresh
Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. Pandey Ajay Bhushan
and others), (2000) 8 SCC 500 (Abdul Wahab Ansari
v. State of Bihar and another), (2001) 6 SCC 704 (P.K.
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
Pradhan v. State of Sikkim represented by the
Central Bureau of Investigation), (1998) 5 SCC 91
(Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar and another),
(2000) 5 SCC 15 (Gauri Shankar Prasad v. State of
Bihar and another), (1998) 5 SCC 690 (State of Bihar
v. Kamla Prasad Singh and others), (2001) 5 SCC 7
(Rizwan Ahmed Javed Shaikh and others v Jammal
Patel and others), (2005) 4 SCC 512 (K. Kalimuthu v.
State by DSP), (2005) 8 SCC 202 (Centre for Public
Interest Litigation and another v. Union of India and
another), and (2015) 12 SCC 231 (D.T. Virupakshappa
v. C. Subash).
4.
Shri
Gangrade,
learned
Panel
Lawyer
appearing for respondent No.1/State has stated that in
fact the State has no direct role in the matter because it
is a complaint case filed by the private respondent
(mother of the deceased), therefore, the onus to prove
the case lies on respondent No.2.
5.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent
No.2 has opposed the submissions made by the counsel
for the petitioners and tried to justify the order passed by
the Court below which is impugned in these petitions
framing charges against the petitioners. He has also
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
given written-submissions relying upon the judgment of
Devender Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab
through CBI passed in Criminal Appeal No.190/2003,
AIR 2009 SC 1404 (Choudhury Praveen Sultana v.
State of West Bengal & Anr.), AIR 2009 SC 2015 (M.P.
Gopalakrishnan v. State by Addl. S.P. CBI, B.S. & F.C,
Bangalore), AIR 2008 SC 1375 (State of Maharasthra
v. Devahari Devasingh Pawar & Ors.) and also in the
case of Ratan Tiwari & Ors. Vs. State of M.P & Anr.
passed in M.Cr.C. No.10880/20211 and submits that in
view of the aforesaid judgments, the sanction under
Section
is
not
required
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case.
6.
Shri Datt, learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioners has confined his stand and argued the
matter seeking quashment of the complaint on the
ground that without obtaining sanction as required under
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from the
Government, the Court cannot take cognizance of the
offence alleged to have been committed by the present
petitioners who are public servants and acted in
discharge of their official duties. According to Shri Datt
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
admittedly sanction has not been granted so far and as
such, the complaint is not maintainable.
7.
Accepting the submissions made by the
counsel for the parties confining their claim to the extent
of maintainability of complaint in absence of sanction
from the State Government as per requirement of
Section 197 of Cr.P.C., this Court is deciding these
petitions in the following manner.
8.
As per the undisputed fact, the deceased
Chhota Gudda was a known hardcore criminal facing as
many as 36 cases and was absconder despite the fact
that he was released on parole suffering sentence of life
as he has been convicted for the offence punishable
under Section 302/34 of IPC and Section 25 and 27 of
the Arms Act in S.T. No.3/1995 passed by the First
Additional Judge. The parole was granted to him for the
period from 28.10.2005 to 21.11.2002 but even after
completion of said period, he did not surrender.
The present petitioners, who are the police
personnel and public servants, were part of the team
constituted in pursuance to the order of higher police
officer for arresting the accused Chhota Gudda. Reward
of Rs.10,000/- was announced on his arrest.
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
It is undisputed that on the basis of complaint made
by
respondent
No.2/mother
of
the
deceased,
a
Magisterial inquiry was conducted and report has been
submitted by the Magistrate with an opinion that the
death of the son of the complainant occurred due to
encounter took place between the police team and
accused party headed by deceased Chhota Gudda. The
Human Rights Commission also took cognizance in the
matter and finally came to conclusion that the allegations
regarding fake encounter in the guise of murder by
police of the son of the complainant were without any
substance and the Human Rights Commission has also
approved the report submitted by the Magistrate.
9.
Shri
Datt,
learned
senior
counsel
has
submitted that under the circumstance, in which, the son
of the complainant had died is nothing but an act of the
petitioners done while discharging their official duties
and, therefore, in view of the language used in Section
197 of Cr.P.C. and has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court and the High Court time and again, sanction is a
mandatory requirement to be fulfilled before taking
cognizance of an offence said to have been committed
by public servant in discharge of their official duties. He
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
submitted that under the existing facts of this case, nonobtaining prior sanction from the Government to initiate
prosecution against the present petitioners makes the
proceedings illegal and as such, is liable to be quashed.
10.
Shri
Datt
has
submitted
the
written-
submissions on behalf of the petitioners placing reliance
upon several decisions of the Supreme Court quoted
hereinabove and respondent No.2/complainant has also
submitted his written-submissions placing reliance upon
several decisions of the Supreme Court and basically
took a stand that prior sanction for initiating prosecution
or taking cognizance against public servant is not
prerequisite condition, but sanction can be obtained by
the Court even during trial or at later stage of trial and
therefore, the order passed by the Court below does not
call for any interference and as such, asking dismissal of
the petitions.
11.
I have gone through the judgments relied
upon by the parties. To separate the wheat from chaff, I
find it necessary to dwell upon all relatable aspects
before reaching to a firm conclusion. Per force, it is
imperative to mention Section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which reads as under:-
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.
(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or
Magistrate or a public servant not removable from
his office save by or with the sanction of the
Government is accused of any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty,
no Court shall take cognizance of such offence
except with the previous sanction [save as
otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas
Act, 2013](a)
in the case of a person who is employed or,
as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of
the Union, of the Central Government;
(b)
in the case of a person who is employed or,
as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of a
State, of the State Government:
[Provided that where the alleged offence
was committed by a person referred to in
clause (b) during the period while a
Proclamation issued under clause (1) of
article 356 of the Constitution was in force
in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the
expression "State Government" occurring
therein,
the
expression"
Central
Government" were substituted.]
(2)
No Court shall take cognizance of any
offence alleged to have been committed by
any member of the Armed Forces of the
Union while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty, except with the
previous
sanction
of
the
Central
Government.
(3)
The State Government may, by notification,
direct that the provisions of sub-section (2)
shall apply to such class or category of the
members of the Forces charged with the
maintenance of public order as may be
specified therein, wherever they may be
serving, and thereupon the provisions of
that sub-section will apply as if for the
expression "Central Government" occurring
therein, the expression "State Government"
were substituted.
[(3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub- section (3), no court shall take cognizance of
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
any offence, alleged to have been committed by any
member of the Forces charged with the
maintenance of public order in a State while acting
or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty during the period while a Proclamation issued
under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution
was in force therein, except with the previous
sanction of the Central Government.]
[(3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby
declared that any sanction accorded by the State
Government or any cognizance taken by a court
upon such sanction, during the period commencing
on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the
date immediately preceding the date on which the
Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act,
1991, receives the assent of the President, with
respect to an offence alleged to have been
committed during the period while a Proclamation
issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the
Constitution was in force in the State, shall be
invalid and it shall be competent for the Central
Government in such matter to accord sanction and
for the court to take cognizance thereon.]
(4) The Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be, may determine
the person by whom, the manner in which, and the
offence or offences for which, the prosecution of
such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be
conducted, and may specify the Court before which
the trial is to be held.”
12.
Now adverting to the decision rendered by the
Supreme Court in case of P.K. Pradhan (supra) wherein
the Supreme Court has dealt with scope of Section 197
of Cr.P.C. and also the intention of legislature for making
the provision mandatory to take previous sanction of the
Government and observed as under :“5. The legislative mandate engrafted in sub
section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from
taking cognizance of an offence except with the
previous sanction of the Government concerned in a
case where the acts complained of are alleged to
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
have been committed by a public servant in
discharge of his official duty or purporting to be in
the discharge of his official duty and such public
servant is not removable from office save by or with
the sanction of the Government touches the
jurisdiction of the court itself. It is a prohibition
imposed by the statute from taking cognizance.
Different tests have been laid down in decided
cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of the
relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code;
“any offence alleged to have been committed by him
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
his official duty”. The offence alleged to have been
committed must have something to do, or must be
related in some manner, with the discharge of
official duty. No question of sanction can arise under
Section 197, unless the act complained of is an
offence; the only point for determination is whether it
was committed in the discharge of official duty.
There must be a reasonable connection between
the act and the official duty. It does not matter even
if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the
discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only
at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the
merits. What a court has to find out is whether the
act and the official duty are so inter-related that one
can postulate reasonably that it was done by the
accused in the performance of official duty, though,
possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of
the situation.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
15. Thus, from a conspectus of the aforesaid
decisions, it will be clear that for claiming protection
under Section 197 of the Code, it has to be shown
by the accused that there is reasonable connection
between the act complained of and the discharge of
official duty. An official act can be performed in the
discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of
it. For invoking protection under Section 197 of the
Code, the acts of the accused complained of must
be such that the same cannot be separated from the
discharge of official duty, but if there was no
reasonable connection between them and the
performance of those duties, the official status
furnishes only the occasion or opportunity for the
acts, then no sanction would be required. If the case
as put forward by the prosecution fails or the
defence establishes that the act purported to be
done is in discharge of duty, the proceedings will
have to be dropped. It is well settled that question of
sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be
raised any time after the cognizance; may be
immediately after cognizance or framing of charge
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
or even at the time of conclusion of trial and after
conviction as well. But there may be certain cases
where it may not be possible to decide the question
effectively without giving opportunity to the defence
to establish that what he did was in discharge of
official duty. In order to come to the conclusion
whether claim of the accused, that the act that he
did was in course of the performance of his duty
was reasonable one and neither pretended nor
fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial
by giving opportunity to the defence to establish it.
In such an eventuality, the question of sanction
should be left open to be decided in the main
judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion
of the trial.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
13.
Further, in case of Gauri Shankar Prasad
(supra), the Supreme Court has also dealt with Section
197 of Cr.P.C. and observed as under:“7. Section 197 Cr.P.C. affords protection to a
judge or a magistrate or a public servant not
removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the Government against any offence
which is alleged to have been committed by him
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
his official duty. The protection is provided in the
form that no Court shall take cognizance of such
offence except with the previous sanction of the
Central Government or the State Government as the
case may be. The object of the section is to save
officials from vexatious proceedings against judges,
magistrates and public servants but it is no part of
the policy to set an official above the common law. If
he commits an offence not connected with his
official duty he has no privilege. But if one of his
official acts is alleged to be an offence, the State will
not allow him to be prosecuted without its sanction.
Section 197 embodies one of the exceptions to the
general rules laid down in section 190 Cr.P.C., that
any offence may be taken cognizance of by the
Magistrates enumerated therein. Before this section
can be invoked in the case of a public servant two
conditions must be satisfied i.e., (1) that the
accused was a public servant who was removable
from his office only with the sanction of the State
Government or the Central Government; and (2) he
must be accused of an offence alleged to have been
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duty.
(Emphasis Supplied)
8. What offences can be held to have been
committed by a public servant while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duties is a vexed question which has often troubled
various courts including this Court. Broadly
speaking, it has been indicated in various decisions
of this Court that the alleged action constituting the
offence said to have been committed by the public
servant must have a reasonable and rational nexus
with the official duties required to be discharged by
such public servant.
14. Coming to the facts of the case in hand, it
is manifest that the appellant was present at the
place of occurrence in his official capacity as SubDivisional Magistrate for the purpose of removal of
encroachment from government land and in
exercise of such duty, he is alleged to have
committed the acts which form the gravamen of the
allegations contained in the complaint lodged by the
respondent. In such circumstances, it cannot but be
held that the acts complained of by the respondent
against the appellant have a reasonable nexus with
the official duty of the appellant. It follows, therefore,
that the appellant is entitled to the immunity from
criminal proceedings without sanction provided
under Section 197 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the High Court
erred in holding that Section 197 Cr.P.C. is not
applicable in the case.”
14.
In case of Abdul Wahab Ansari (supra), the
Supreme Court has dealt with Section 197 of Cr.P.C. and
expressed the view as under :“7. Previous sanction of the competent
authority being a pre-condition for the Court in
taking cognizance of the offence if the offence
alleged to have been committed by the accused can
be said to be an act in discharge of his official duty,
the question touches the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate in the matter of taking cognizance and,
therefore, there is no requirement that an accused
should wait for taking such plea till the charges are
framed. In Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain vs.
Pandey Ajay Bhushan and Ors., 1998(1) SCC, 205,
a similar contention had been advanced by Mr.
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
Sibbal, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants in that case. In that case, the High Court
had held on the application of the accused that the
provisions of Section 197 get attracted. Rejecting
the contention, this court had observed: (SCC pp.
217-18 para 23)
(Emphasis Supplied)
“The legislative mandate engrafted in
sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court
from taking cognizance of an offence except
with a previous sanction of the Government
concerned in a case where the acts complained
of are alleged to have been committed by a
public servant in discharge of his official duty or
purporting to be in the discharge of his official
duty and such public servant is not removable
from his office save by or with the sanction of
the Government touches the jurisdiction of the
court itself. It is a prohibition imposed by the
statute from taking cognizance, the accused
after appearing before the Court on process
being issued, by an application indicating that
Section 197(1) is attracted merely assists the
court to rectify its error where jurisdiction has
been exercised which it does not possess. In
such a case there should not be any bar for the
accused producing the relevant documents and
materials which will be ipso facto admissible, for
adjudication of the question as to whether in
fact Section 197 has any application in the case
in hand. It is no longer in dispute and has been
indicated by this Court in several cases that the
question of sanction can be considered at any
stage of the proceedings."
The Court had further observed: (SCC pp. 218-19,
para 24)
“The question of applicability of Section
197 of the Code and the consequential ouster
of jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance
without a valid sanction is genetically different
from the plea of the accused that the averments
in the complaint do not make out an offence
and as such the order of cognizance and/or the
criminal proceedings be quashed. In the
aforesaid premises we are of the considered
opinion that an accused is not debarred from
producing the relevant documentary materials
which can be legally looked into without any
formal proof, in support of the stand that the
acts complained of were committed in exercise
of his jurisdiction or purported jurisdiction as a
public servant in discharge of his official duty
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
thereby requiring sanction of the appropriate
authority.”
9. Coming to the second question, it is now
well settled by the Constitution Bench decision of
this Court in Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari, 1955 (2)
SCR 925, that in the matter of grant of sanction
under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure the offence alleged to have been
committed by the accused must have something to
do, or must be related in some manner, with the
discharge of official duty. In other words, there must
be a reasonable connection between the act and the
discharge of official duty; the act must bear such
relation to the duty that the accused could lay a
reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful
claim, that he did it in the course of the performance
of his duty. In the said case it had been further held
that where a power is conferred or a duty imposed
by statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said
expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power or the
performance of the duty by any limitations or
restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries
with it the power of doing all such acts or employing
such means as are reasonably necessary for such
execution, because it is a rule that when the law
commands a thing to be done, it authorises the
performance of whatever may be necessary for
executing its command. This decision was followed
by this Court in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jains
case, 1998(1) SCC 205, and in a recent judgment of
this Court in the case of Gauri Shankar Prasad vs.
State of Bihar and Anr., 2000 (5) SCC 15. The
aforesaid case has full force even to the facts of the
present case inasmuch as in the said case, the
Court had observed: (SCC p. 21, para 14)
“It is manifest that the appellant was
present at the place of occurrence in his official
capacity as Sub-Divisional Magistrate for the
purpose of removal of encroachment from
government land and in exercise of such duty,
he is alleged to have committed the acts which
form the gravamen of the allegations contained
in the complaint lodged by the respondent. In
such circumstances, it cannot but be held that
the acts complained of by the respondent
against the appellant have a reasonable nexus
with the official duty of the appellant. It follows,
therefore, that the appellant is entitled to the
immunity from criminal proceedings without
sanction provided under Section 197 Cr.P.C.”
It is not necessary for us to multiply authorities on
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this point and bearing in mind the ratio of the
aforesaid cases and applying the same to the facts
of the present case as indicated in the complaint
itself, we have no hesitation to come to the
conclusion that the appellant had been directed by
the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to be present with
police force and remove the encroachment in
question and in course of discharge of his duty to
control the mob, when he had directed for opening
of fire, it must be held that the order of opening of
fire was in exercise of the power conferred upon him
and the duty imposed upon him under the orders of
the Magistrate and in that view of the matter the
provisions of Section 197(1) applies to the facts of
the present case. Admittedly, there being no
sanction, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate is
bad in law and unless the same is quashed qua the
appellant, it will be an abuse of the process of Court.
Accordingly, we allow this appeal and quash the
criminal proceeding, so far as the appellant is
concerned.”
15.
Then, in case of K. Kalimuthu (supra), the
Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of Section 197
of Cr.P.C. and also the stage at which such requirement
is attracted. The Supreme Court in this case has also
dealt with the situation as to how it would be determined
the reasonable connection between the act complained
of and the official duty and observed “even if the public
servant acts in excess of his duty, if there exists the said
reasonable connection, the excess will not deprive him
of the protection.” The aforesaid view of the supreme
Court is as under:“7. The protection given under Section 197 is to
protect responsible public servants against the
institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings
for offences alleged to have been committed by
them while they are acting or purporting to act as
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public servants. The policy of the legislature is to
afford adequate protection to public servants to
ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything
done by them in the discharge of their official duties
without reasonable cause, and if sanction is
granted, to confer on the Government, if they
choose to exercise it, complete control of the
prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is
available only when the alleged act done by the
public servant is reasonably connected with the
discharge of his official duty and is not merely a
cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his
official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there
is a reasonable connection between the act and the
performance of the official duty, the excess will not
be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant
from the protection. The question is not as to the
nature of the offence such as whether the alleged
offence contained an element necessarily
dependent upon the offender being a public servant,
but whether it was committed by a public servant
acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge
of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be
invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned
was accused of an offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty
which requires examination so much as the act,
because the official act can be performed both in the
discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction
of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of
the official duties of the public servant concerned. It
is the quality of the act which is important and the
protection of this section is available if the act falls
within the scope and range of his official duty. There
cannot be any universal rule to determine whether
there is a reasonable connection between the act
done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay
down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this
regard would be to consider if the omission or
neglect on the part of the public servant to commit
the act complained of could have made him
answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official
duty, if the answer to his question is in the
affirmative, it may be said that such act was
committed by the public servant while acting in the
discharge of his official duty and there was every
connection with the act complained of and the
official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes
it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get
immediately attracted on institution of the complaint
case.
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9. Section 197(1) and (2) of the Code reads as
under:
"197. (1) When any person who is or was a
Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not
removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the Government is accused of any
offence alleged to have been committed by him
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of
such offence except with the previous sanction-(a) in the case of person who is
employed or, as the case may be, was at the
time of commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of the
Union, of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is
employed or, as the case may be, was at the
time of commission of the alleged offence
employed, in connection with the affairs of a
State, of the State Government.
*
*
*
(2) No Court shall take cognizance of any
offence alleged to have been committed by any
member of the Armed Forces of the Union while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty, except with the previous sanction of
the Central Government."
The section falls in the chapter dealing with
conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings.
That is if the conditions mentioned are not made out
or are absent then no prosecution can be set in
motion. For instance no prosecution can be initiated
in a Court of Sessions under Section 193, as it
cannot take cognizance, as a court of original
jurisdiction, of any offence unless the case has been
committed to it by a Magistrate or the Code
expressly provides for it. And the jurisdiction of a
Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is
provided by Section 190 of the Code, either on
receipt of a complaint, or upon a police report or
upon information received from any person other
than police officer, or upon his knowledge that such
offence has been committed. So far public servants
are concerned the cognizance of any offence, by
any court, is barred by Section 197 of the Code
unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate
authority, if the offence, alleged to have been
committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The
section not only specifies the persons to whom the
protection is afforded but it also specifies the
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conditions and circumstances in which it shall be
available and the effect in law if the conditions are
satisfied. The mandatory character of the protection
afforded to a public servant is brought out by the
expression, 'no court shall take cognizance of such
offence except with the previous sanction'. Use of
the words, 'no' and 'shall' make it abundantly clear
that the bar on the exercise of power by the court to
take cognizance of any offence is absolute and
complete. Very cognizance is barred. That is the
complaint, cannot be taken notice of. According to
Black's Law Dictionary the word 'cognizance' means
'jurisdiction' or 'the exercise of jurisdiction' or 'power
to try and determine causes'. In common parlance it
means 'taking notice of'. A court, therefore, is
precluded from entertaining a complaint or taking
notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect
of a public servant who is accused of an offence
alleged to have committed during discharge of his
official duty.”
16.
From the view taken by the Supreme Court as
aforesaid, it is clear that the Court is precluded from
entertaining a complaint or taking notice of it or
exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of public servant
who is an accused of an offence alleged to have been
committed during discharge of his official duty. This view
of the Supreme Court makes it clear that if a public
servant during the discharge of his official duties
commits an offence for which complaint is made, the
sanction from Government or competent authority is
prerequisite condition.
17.
In case of Rizwan Ahmed Javed Shaikh
(supra), the Supreme Court has also considered the
protection provided to public servant as per Section 197
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of Cr.P.C. and has also taken note of the fact that the
alleged conduct said to be an offence whereby the police
officer has taken custody of suspected offenders and
has not produced them before the Magistrate within 24
hours of arrest. The Supreme Court has observed, since
the initial arrest of suspected offenders was legal but
later conduct of the police officer of not producing them
within 24 hours of their arrest before the Magistrate
became illegal, but even otherwise the offence allegedly
committed by the police officer was considered within
the ambit of discharge of duties in their official capacity.
“14. The question of applicability of Section 197
(2) of the Code is not free of difficulty. In S.B. Saha
and Ors. Vs. K.S. Kochar - AIR 1979 SC 1841 this
Court on a review of the case law available on the
point held as under :“17. The words any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty employed in Section 197(1) of the Code,
are capable of a narrow as well as a wide
interpretation. If these words are construed too
narrowly, the Section will be rendered
altogether sterile, for, it is no part of an official
duty to commit an offence, and never can be. In
the wider sense, these words will take under
their umbrella every act constituting an offence,
committed in the course of the same
transaction in which the official duty is
performed or purports to be performed. The
right approach to the import of these words lies
between two extremes. While on the one hand,
it is not every offence committed by a public
servant while engaged in the performance of
his official duty, which is entitled to the
protection of Section 197 (1), an act constituting
an offence, directly and reasonably connected
with his official duty will require sanction for
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prosecution under the said provision. As
pointed out by Ramaswami, K. in Baijnath v.
State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 220 at p
222 it is the quality of the act that is important
and if it falls within the scope and range of his
official duties, the protection contemplated by
Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will
be attracted.
18. In sum, the sine qua non for the
applicability of this section is that the offence
charged be it one of commission or omission,
must be one which has been committed by the
public servant either in his official capacity or
under colour of the office held by him.
19. While the question whether an
offence was committed in the course official
duty or under colour of office, cannot be
answered hypothetically, and depends on the
facts of each case, one broad test for this
purpose first deduced by Varadachariar J. of
the Federal Court in Hori Ram v. Emperor 1939
FCR 159 is generally applied with advantage.
After referring with approval to those
observations of Varadachariar J., Lord Simonds
in H.B. gill v. The King AIR 1948 PC 128 tersely
reiterated that the test may well be whether the
public servant, if challenged, can reasonably
claim, that what he does, he does in virtue of
his office.
20. Speaking for the Constitution Bench
of this Court, Chandrasekhar Aiyer J., restated
the same principle, thus :
‘In the matter of grant of sanction
under Section 197, the offence alleged to
have been committed by the accused
must have something to do or must be
related in some manner, with the
discharge of official dutythere must be a
reasonable connection between the act
and the discharge of official duty; the act
must bear such relation to the duty that
the accused could lay a reasonable claim,
but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that
he did it in the course of the performance
of his duty.’ ”
15.
The real test to be applied to attract the
applicability of Section 197 (3) is whether the act
which is done by a public officer and is alleged to
constitute an offence was done by the public officer
whilst acting in his official capacity though what he
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did was neither his duty nor his right to do as such
public officer. The act complained of may be in
exercise of the duty or in the absence of such duty
or in dereliction of the duty, if the act complained of
is done while acting as a public officer and in the
course of the same transaction in which the official
duty was performed or purports to be performed, the
public officer would be protected.
16. In the case at hand cognizance against the
accused persons has not been taken under Section
323 of the IPC. It appears that the complaint stated
the complainants to have been beaten mercilessly
by one of the accused persons whilst in custody but
when one of the complainants was examined by the
learned Magistrate he stated only this much that one
of the police officers had assaulted him. The
statement was too vague to be acted upon and
hence cognizance for causing hurt to any of the
complainants has not been taken by the learned
Magistrate. None of the complainants has made any
grievance about it. The cognizance taken is only
under Section 220 (commitment for trial or
confinement by person having authority who knows
that he is acting contrary to law) and Section 342
(wrongful confinement) of Indian Penal Code.
Cognizance has also been taken for offences under
Section 147 (Vexatious injury, search, arrest etc. by
police officer) and Section 148 (Vexatious delay in
forwarding a person arrested) of the Bombay Police
Act, 1951. Cognizable and non-bailable offences
were registered against the appellants. They were
liable to be arrested and detained. The gravamen of
the charge is the failure on the part of the accused
persons to produce them before a Magistrate within
24 hours of arrest. The complainants were in the
custody of the police officers and at the police
station. It cannot be denied that the custody which
was legal to begin with became illegal on account of
non-production of the complainants before the
Magistrate by the police officers officially detaining
the appellants at a place meant for detaining the
persons suspected of having committed an offence
under investigation. The act constituting an offence
alleged to have been committed by the accusedrespondents was certainly done by them in their
official capacity though at a given point of time it had
ceased to be legal in spite of being legal to begin
with. On the totality of the facts and circumstances
of the case in our opinion the learned Magistrate
and the High Court have not erred in holding the
accused-respondents entitled to the benefit of
protection under Section 197 (2) of the Cr.P.C. We
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have felt it unnecessary to deal with the allegation
made in the complaint relating to beating of the
appellants whilst in police custody because no
cognizance has been taken for an offence in that
regard and no cognizance can now be taken
because of the bar of limitation enacted by Section
468 of Cr.P.C.”
18.
In case of D.T. Virupakshappa (supra), the
Supreme Court has considered the fact that if an offence
alleged to have been committed by the public servant
while discharging his official duties, the previous
sanction is necessary before taking cognizance of the
said offence. The observation made by the Supreme
Court is as follows:“6. In the case before us, the allegation is that
the appellant exceeded in exercising his power
during investigation of a criminal case and assaulted
the respondent in order to extract some information
with regard to the death of one Sannamma, and in
that connection, the respondent was detained in the
police station for some time. Therefore, the alleged
conduct has an essential connection with the
discharge of the official duty. Under Section 197 of
CrPC, in case, the Government servant accused of
an offence, which is alleged to have been committed
by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge
of his official duty, the previous sanction is
necessary.
7. The issue of ‘police excess’ during
investigation and requirement of sanction for
prosecution in that regard, was also the subject
matter of State of Orissa Through Kumar
Raghvendra Singh and others v. Ganesh Chandra
Jew[2], wherein, at paragraph-7, it has been held as
follows: (SCC pp. 46-47)
“7. The protection given under Section
197 is to protect responsible public servants
against the institution of possibly vexatious
criminal proceedings for offences alleged to
have been committed by them while they are
acting or purporting to act as public servants.
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The policy of the legislature is to afford
adequate protection to public servants to
ensure that they are not prosecuted for
anything done by them in the discharge of
their official duties without reasonable cause,
and if sanction is granted, to confer on the
Government, if they choose to exercise it,
complete control of the prosecution. This
protection has certain limits and is available
only when the alleged act done by the public
servant is reasonably connected with the
discharge of his official duty and is not merely
a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in
doing his official duty, he acted in excess of
his duty, but there is a reasonable connection
between the act and the performance of the
official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient
ground to deprive the public servant of the
protection. The question is not as to the
nature of the offence such as whether the
alleged offence contained an element
necessarily dependent upon the offender
being a public servant, but whether it was
committed by a public [pic]servant acting or
purporting to act as such in the discharge of
his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be
invoked, it must be shown that the official
concerned was accused of an offence alleged
to have been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duties. It is not the duty which requires
examination so much as the act, because the
official act can be performed both in the
discharge of the official duty as well as in
dereliction of it. The act must fall within the
scope and range of the official duties of the
public servant concerned. It is the quality of
the act which is important and the protection
of this section is available if the act falls within
the scope and range of his official duty. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. In Om Prakash (supra), this Court, after
referring to various decisions, particularly pertaining
to the police excess, summed-up the guidelines at
paragraph-32, which reads as follows:
“32. The true test as to whether a public
servant was acting or purporting to act in
discharge of his duties would be whether the
act complained of was directly connected with
his official duties or it was done in the
discharge of his official duties or it was so
integrally connected with or attached to his
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office as to be inseparable from it (K. Satwant
Singh). The protection given under Section
197 of the Code has certain limits and is
available only when the alleged act done by
the public servant is reasonably connected
with the discharge of his official duty and is
not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable
act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in
excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable
connection between the act and the
performance of the official duty, the excess will
not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public
servant of the protection (Ganesh Chandra
Jew). If the above tests are applied to the
facts of the present case, the police must get
protection given under Section 197 of the
Code because the acts complained of are so
integrally connected with or attached to their
office as to be inseparable from it. It is not
possible for us to come to a conclusion that
the protection granted under Section 197 of
the Code is used by the police personnel in
this case as a cloak for killing the deceased in
cold blood.” (Emphasis supplied)
9. In our view, the above guidelines squarely apply
in the case of the appellant herein. Going by the
factual matrix, it is evident that the whole allegation
is on police excess in connection with the
investigation of a criminal case. The said offensive
conduct is reasonably connected with the
performance of the official duty of the appellant.
Therefore, the learned Magistrate could not have
taken cognizance of the case without the previous
sanction of the State Government. The High Court
missed this crucial point in the impugned order.
19.
In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that if the
alleged offence said to have been committed while
discharging of official duty by a public servant then
previous sanction is a mandatory requirement for taking
cognizance of the said case by the Magistrate. The
Supreme Court has deprecated that order of the High
Court rejecting the petition without considering the said
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crucial point that the public officer cannot be made an
accused for a conduct or an offence alleged to have
been committed by him while discharging his official
duties without taking prior sanction of the Government.
20.
In case of Amal Kumar Jha (supra), the
Supreme Court has further reiterated the same view that
if a public servant is made an accused for an offence
committed by him while discharging his official duties,
the previous sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is
indispensable. Although, the Supreme Court has also
observed in this case with regard to nexus with
discharge of official duties his alleged act is not
established then previous sanction or protection as
provided under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is not required to
be invoked before taking cognizance. But the Supreme
Court in this case has very categorically observed that
Section 197 Cr.P.C. can be invoked at initial stage before
taking cognizance if the aforesaid nexus is established
that the alleged offence has been committed by the
police officer or public servant while discharging his
official duties. The Supreme Court in the said case has
observed as under:“5.This
Court
in
Shreekantiah
Ramayya
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Munipalli v. The State of Bombay [1955 (1) SCR
1177] has observed thus :
“18. Now it is obvious that if
section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is construed too narrowly it can
never be applied, for of course it is no part of
an official’s duty to commit an offence and
never can be. But it is not the duty we have
to examine so much as the act, because an
official act can be performed in the discharge
of official duty as well as in dereliction of it.
The section has content and its language
must be given meaning. What it says is :
‘197. (1) ...“when any public
servant ….. is accused of any offence
alleged to have been committed by him
while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty……”
We have therefore first to concentrate on the
word ‘offence’.
19. Now an offence seldom consists of a
single act. It is usually composed of several
elements and, as a rule, a whole series of
acts must be proved before it can be
established. In the present case, the
elements alleged against the second
accused are, first, that there was an
“entrustment” and/or “dominion”; second,
that the entrustment and/or dominion was “in
his capacity as a public servant”; third, that
there was a “disposal”; and fourth, that the
disposal was “dishonest”. Now it is evident
that the entrustment and/or dominion here
were in an official capacity, and it is equally
evident that there could in this case be no
disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act
done or purporting to be done in an official
capacity.
Therefore, the act complained of, namely
the disposal, could not have been done in
any other way. If it was innocent, it was an
official act; if dishonest, it was the dishonest
doing of an official act, but in either event the
act was official because the second accused
could not dispose of the goods save by the
doing of an official act, namely officially
permitting their disposal; and that he did. He
actually permitted their release and
purported to do it in an official capacity, and
apart from the fact that he did not pretend to
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act privately, there was no other way in
which he could have done it. Therefore,
whatever the intention or motive behind the
act may have been, the physical part of it
remained unaltered, so if it was official in the
one case it was equally official in the other,
and the only difference would lie in the
intention with which it was done: in the one
event, it would be done in the discharge of
an official duty and in the other, in the
purported discharge of it.
20. The act of abetment alleged against
him stands on the same footing, for his part
in the abetment was to permit the disposal of
the goods by the doing of an official act and
thus “willfully suffer” another person to use
them dishonestly: section 405 of the Indian
Penal Code. In both cases, the “offence” in
his case would be incomplete without
proving the official act.
21. We therefore hold that section 197 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure applies and
that sanction was necessary, and as there
was none the trial is vitiated from the start.
We therefore quash the proceedings against
the second accused as also his conviction
and sentence.” (emphasis in original)
6. This Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [1955
(2) SCR 925] has also considered when sanction is
necessary. This Court has laid down thus : (AIR pp.
49-50, para 20)
“20.Is the need for sanction to be
considered as soon as the complaint is lodged
and on the allegations therein contained? At
first sight, it seems as though there is some
support for this view in Hori Ram’s case and
also in Sarjoo Prasad v. The King-Emperor
(1945) F.C.R. 227. Sulaiman, J. says that as
the prohibition is against the institution itself,
its applicability must be judged in the first
instance at the earliest stage of institution.
Varadachariar, J. also states that the question
must be determined with reference to the
nature of the allegations made against the
public servant in the criminal proceeding.
But a careful perusal of the later parts of
their judgments shows that they did not intent
to lay down any such proposition. Sulaiman, J.
refers (at page 179) to the prosecution case
as disclosed by the complaint or the police
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report and he winds up the discussion in these
words: (Hori Ram case, SCC OnLine FC)
‘... “Of course, if the case as put
forward fails or the defence establishes
that the act purported to be done is in
execution of duty, the proceedings will
have to be dropped and the complaint
dismissed on that ground”.
The other learned Judge also states at page 185 :
“... At this stage we have only to see
whether the case alleged against the
appellant or sought to be proved against
him relates to acts done or purporting to be
done by him in the execution of his duty”.’
It must be so. The question may arise at any
stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not
disclose that the act constituting the offence was
done or purported to be done in the discharge of
official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light
on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course
of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may
establish the necessity for sanction.
Whether sanction is necessary or not may
have to be determined from stage to stage. The
necessity may reveal itself in the course of the
progress of the case.” (emphasis in original)
7. In Bhappa Singh v. Ram Pal Singh & Ors.
1981 (Supp) SCC 12 this Court considered the grant
of protection to an officer for official act done in good
faith thus :
“6. In view of the circumstances
mentioned in the last paragraph, there is little
room for doubt that the Customs party was not
out to commit dacoity either in the jewellery
shop or the chaubara, that they also
committed no trespass into either of those
places, but that the purpose of the raid was to
find out if any illegal activity was being carried
on therein. The presence of two licensed
Gold-smiths in the chaubara speaks volumes
in that behalf. It may further be taken for
granted that the Customs party was
manhandled before they themselves resorted
to violence, because there was no reason for
them to open fire unless they were resisted in
the carrying out of the raid peacefully.
7. Even though what we have just stated
is a general prima facie impression that we
have formed at this stage on the materials
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
available to us at present, it may not be
possible to come to a conclusive finding about
the falsity or otherwise of the complaint. But
then we think that it would amount to giving a
go-by to Section 108 of the Gold (Control) Act,
if cases of this type are allowed to be pursued
to their logical conclusion, i.e., to that of
conviction or acquittal. In this view of the
matter we do not feel inclined to upset the
impugned order, even though perhaps the
matter may have required further evidence
before quashing of the complaint could be
held to be fully justified. The appeal is
accordingly dismissed.”
8. In State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota
Subbarao 1993 (3) SCC 339, this Court has
considered the meaning of the ‘official act’ thus :
“6. Such being the nature of the provision the
question is how should the expression, ‘any
offence alleged to have been committed by him
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge
of his official duty’, be understood? What does it
mean? ‘Official’ according to dictionary, means
pertaining to an office. And official act or official
duty means an act or duty done by an officer in
his official capacity. In S.B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar
(1979) 4 SCC 177 it was held: (SCC pp. 184-85,
para 17)
“17. The words “any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty’ employed in Section 197(1) of
the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as
a wide interpretation. If these words are
construed too narrowly, the section will be
rendered altogether sterile, for, ‘it is no part of
an official duty to commit an offence, and
never can be’. In the wider sense, these
words will take under their umbrella every act
constituting an offence, committed in the
course of the same transaction in which the
official duty is performed or purports to be
performed. The right approach to the import
of these words lies between these two
extremes. While on the one hand, it is not
every offence committed by a public servant
while engaged in the performance of his
official duty, which is entitled to the protection
of Section 197(1), an act constituting an
offence, directly and reasonably connected
with his official duty will require sanction for
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
prosecution under the said provision.”
Use of the expression, ‘official duty’ implies that the
act or omission must have been done by the public
servant in course of his service and that it should
have been in discharge of his duty. The section does
not extend its protective cover to every act or
omission done by a public servant in service but
restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or
omissions which are done by a public servant in
discharge of official duty. In P. Arulswami v. State of
Madras (1967) 1 SCR 201 this Court after reviewing
the authorities right from the days of Federal Court
and Privy Council held:
“6. … It is not therefore every offence
committed by a public servant that requires
sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1)
of the Criminal Procedure Code; nor even
every act done by him while he is actually
engaged in the performance of his official
duties; but if the act complained of is directly
concerned with his official duties so that, if
questioned, it could be claimed to have been
done by virtue of the office, then sanction
would be necessary. It is the quality of the act
that is important and if it falls within the scope
and range of his official duties the protection
contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal
Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence
may be entirely unconnected with the official
duty as such or it may be committed within
the scope of the official duty. Where it is
unconnected with the official duty there can
be no protection. It is only when it is either
within the scope of the official duty or in
excess of it that the protection is claimable.”
It has been widened further by extending protection
to even those acts or omissions which are done in
purported exercise of official duty. That is under the
colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that
the act or omission must have been done by the
public servant in course of his service and such act
or omission must have been performed as part of
duty which further must have been official in nature.
The section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while
determining its applicability to any act or omission in
course of service. Its operation has to be limited to
those duties which are discharged in course of duty.
But once any act or omission has been found to
have been committed by a public servant in
discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal
and wide construction so far its official nature is
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
concerned. For instance a public servant is not
entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that
extent the section has to be construed narrowly and
in a restricted manner. But once it is established
that act or omission was done by the public servant
while discharging his duty then the scope of its
being official should be construed so as to advance
the objective of the section in favour of the public
servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording
protection to a public servant without sanction shall
stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in
discharge of duty may have to use force which may
be an offence for the prosecution of which the
sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer
commits an act in course of service but not in
discharge of his duty then the bar under Section
197 of the Code is not attracted. To what extent an
act or omission performed by a public servant in
discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official
was explained by this Court in Matajog Dubey v.
H.C. Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44 thus:
“17. ... The offence alleged to have been
committed (by the accused) must have
something to do, or must be related in some
manner with the discharge of official duty.
*
*
*
19. ... There must be a reasonable
connection between the act and the discharge
of official duty; the act must bear such relation
to the duty that the accused could lay a
reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or
fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of
the performance of his duty*.”
If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that
the act or omission for which the accused was
charged had reasonable connection with
discharge of his duty then it must be held to be
official to which applicability of Section 197 of
the Code cannot be disputed.” (emphasis
supplied)
9. In State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta 2004 (2) SCC
349 this Court in regard to official duty has laid down
thus :
“11. Such being the nature of the
provision, the question is how should the
expression, “any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to
act in the discharge of his official duty”, be
understood? What does it mean? “Official”
according to the dictionary, means pertaining
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
to an office, and official act or official duty
means an act or duty done by an officer in his
official capacity.”
10. In State of Orissa & Ors. v. Ganesh
Chandra Jew 2004 (8) SCC 40 this Court has laid
down that protection under section 197 would be
available only when the act done by the public
servant is reasonably connected with the discharge
of his official duty. This Court has laid down thus :
“7. The protection given under Section
197 is to protect responsible public servants
against the institution of possibly vexatious
criminal proceedings for offences alleged to
have been committed by them while they are
acting or purporting to act as public servants.
The policy of the legislature is to afford
adequate protection to public servants to
ensure that they are not prosecuted for
anything done by them in the discharge of their
official duties without reasonable cause, and if
sanction is granted, to confer on the
Government, if they choose to exercise it,
complete control of the prosecution. This
protection has certain limits and is available
only when the alleged act done by the public
servant is reasonably connected with the
discharge of his official duty and is not merely
a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in
doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his
duty, but there is a reasonable connection
between the act and the performance of the
official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient
ground to deprive the public servant of the
protection. The question is not as to the nature
of the offence such as whether the alleged
offence contained an element necessarily
dependent upon the offender being a public
servant, but whether it was committed by a
public servant acting or purporting to act as
such in the discharge of his official capacity.
Before Section 197 can be invoked, it must be
shown that the official concerned was accused
of an offence alleged to have been committed
by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty
which requires examination so much as the
act, because the official act can be performed
both in the discharge of the official duty as well
as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within
the scope and range of the official duties of the
public servant concerned. It is the quality of the
act which is important and the protection of this
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
section is available if the act falls within the
scope and range of his official duty. There
cannot be any universal rule to determine
whether there is a reasonable connection
between the act done and the official duty, nor
is it possible to lay down any such rule. One
safe and sure test in this regard would be to
consider if the omission or neglect on the part
of the public servant to commit the act
complained of could have made him
answerable for a charge of dereliction of his
official duty. If the answer to this question is in
the affirmative, it may be said that such act
was committed by the public servant while
acting in the discharge of his official duty and
there was every connection with the act
complained of and the official duty of the public
servant. This aspect makes it clear that the
concept of Section 197 does not get
immediately attracted on institution of the
complaint case.”
11. In K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP 2005 (4)
SCC 512 this Court has observed that official duty
implies that an act or omission must have been
done by the public servant within the scope and
range of his official duty for protection. This Court
has laid down thus :
“12. If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie
found that the act or omission for which the
accused was charged had reasonable
connection with discharge of his duty then it
must be held to be official to which
applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot
be disputed.
*
*
*
15. The question relating to the need of
sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not
necessarily to be considered as soon as the
complaint is lodged and on the allegations
contained therein. This question may arise at
any stage of the proceeding. The question
whether sanction is necessary or not may
have to be determined from stage to stage.
Further, in cases where offences under the
Act are concerned, the effect of Section 197,
dealing with the question of prejudice has also
to be noted.”
12. In Manorama Tiwari & Ors. v. Surendra
Nath Rai 2016 (1) SCC 594, it was held that the
appellants were discharging public duties while
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
performing surgery in a Government hospital, hence
prosecution was not maintainable without sanction
from the State Government.
13. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sheetla
Sahai & Ors. 2009 (8) SCC 617, this Court has laid
down thus :
“59. For the purpose of attracting the
provisions of Section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, it is not necessary that
they must act in their official capacity but even
where public servants purport to act in their
official capacity, the same would attract the
provisions of Section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. It was so held by this
Court in Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das
(2006) 4 SCC 584. The question came up for
consideration before this Court in Matajog
Dobey v. H.C. Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44 wherein
it was held: (AIR pp. 48-49, para 17)
“17. Slightly differing tests have been laid
down in the decided cases to ascertain the
scope and the meaning of the relevant
words occurring in Section 197 of the Code;
‘any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting
to act in the discharge of his official duty’.
But the difference is only in language and
not in substance.
The offence alleged to have been
committed must have something to do, or
must be related in some manner, with the
discharge of official duty. No question of
sanction can arise under Section 197,
unless the act complained of is an offence;
the only point to determine is whether it was
committed in the discharge of official duty.
There must be a reasonable connection
between the act and the official duty. It does
not matter even if the act exceeds what is
strictly necessary for the discharge of the
duty, as this question will arise only at a
later stage when the trial proceeds on the
merits.
What we must find out is whether the act
and the official duty are so interrelated that
one can postulate reasonably that it was
done by the accused in the performance of
the official duty, though possibly in excess
of the needs and requirements of the
situation. In Hori Ram Singh v. Crown 1939
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
FCR 159 Sulaiman, J. observes:
“... The section cannot be confined
to only such acts as are done by a public
servant directly in pursuance of his public
office, though in excess of the duty or
under a mistaken belief as to the
existence of such duty. Nor is it
necessary to go to the length of saying
that the act constituting the offence
should be so inseparably connected with
the official duty as to form part and parcel
of the same transaction.”
The interpretation that found favour with
Varadachariar, J. in the same case is stated by him
in these terms at pp. 187-88:
“... There must be something in the
nature of the act complained of that
attaches it to the official character of the
person doing it....”
In affirming this view, the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council observed in Gill case : AIR 1948 PC
128 (IA pp. 59-60)
“... A public servant can only be said to
act or to purport to act in the discharge of
his official duty, if his act is such as to lie
within the scope of his official duty. … The
test may well be whether the public
servant, if challenged, can reasonably
claim that, what he does, he does in virtue
of his office.’
Hori Ram case 1939 FCR 159 is referred to
with approval in the later case of Lieutenant Hector
Thomas Huntley v. King Emperor 1944 FCR 262 but
the test laid down that it must be established that
the act complained of was an ‘official’ act appears to
us unduly to narrow down the scope of the
protection afforded by Section 197 of the Criminal
Procedure Code as defined and understood in the
earlier case. The decision in Albert West Meads v.
R. AIR 1948 PC 156 does not carry us any further; it
adopts the reasoning in Gill case AIR 1948 PC 128.”
60. The said principle has been reiterated by this
Court in B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar (1979) 4 SCC 177
in the following terms: (SCC pp. 184-85, paras 1718)
“17. The words ‘any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty’ employed in Section 197(1) of the Code,
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
are capable of a narrow as well as a wide
interpretation. If these words are construed
too narrowly, the section will be rendered
altogether sterile, for, ‘it is no part of an official
duty to commit an offence, and never can be’.
In the wider sense, these words will take
under their umbrella every act constituting an
offence, committed in the course of the same
transaction in which the official duty is
performed or purports to be performed. The
right approach to the import of these words
lies between these two extremes. While on
the one hand, it is not every offence
committed by a public servant while engaged
in the performance of his official duty, which is
entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an
act constituting an offence, directly and
reasonably connected with his official duty will
require sanction for prosecution under the
said provision. As pointed out by Ramaswami,
J. in Baijnath v. State of M.P. AIR 1966 SC
220 : (AIR p. 227, para 16)
‘16. … It is the quality of the act
that is important, and if it falls within the
scope and range of his official duties the
protection contemplated by Section 197 of
the Criminal Procedure Code will be
attracted’.
18. In sum, the sine qua non for the
applicability of this section is that the offence
charged, be it one of commission or omission,
must be one which has been committed by
the public servant either in his official capacity
or under colour of the office held by him.”
(emphasis in original)”
14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is
clear that the omission complained of due to which
offence is stated to have been committed, was
intrinsically connected with discharge of official duty
of the appellant, as such the protection under
section 197 Cr.PC from prosecution without sanction
of the competent authority, is available to the
appellant. Thus, he could not have been prosecuted
without sanction. It would be for the competent
authority to consider the question of grant of
sanction in accordance with law. In case sanction is
granted only then the appellant can be prosecuted
and not otherwise. Resultantly, the impugned orders
are set aside, the appeal is allowed.”
21.
In the case of Centre For Public Interest
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
Litigation (supra), the Supreme Court has elucidated
the intention for giving protection under Section 197 of
Cr.P.C. to public servant and expressed the “Official
Duty” and observed the applicability of Section 197
Cr.P.C. in case prima facie it is found the act or omission
for which the accused was charged had reasonable
connection with regard to discharge of official duties.
The view of the Supreme Court expressed in the said
case is as under :“9. The protection given under Section 197 is to
protect responsible public servants against the
institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings
for offences alleged to have been committed by
them while they are acting or purporting to act as
public servants. The policy of the legislature is to
afford adequate protection to public servants to
ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything
done by them in the discharge of their official duties
without reasonable cause, and if sanction is
granted, to confer on the Government, if they
choose to exercise it, complete control of the
prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is
available only when the alleged act done by the
public servant is reasonably connected with the
discharge of his official duty and is not merely a
cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his
official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there
is a reasonable connection between the act and the
performance of the official duty, the excess will not
be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant
from the protection. The question is not as to the
nature of the offence such as whether the alleged
offence contained an element necessarily
dependent upon the offender being a public servant,
but whether it was committed by a public servant
acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge
of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be
invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned
was accused of an offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
which requires examination so much as the act,
because the official act can be performed both in the
discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction
of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of
the official duties of the public servant concerned. It
is the quality of the act which is important and the
protection of this section is available if the act falls
within the scope and range of his official duty. There
cannot be any universal rule to determine whether
there is a reasonable connection between the act
done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay
down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this
regard would be to consider if the omission or
neglect on the part of the public servant to commit
the act complained of could have made him
answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official
duty. If the answer to this question is in the
affirmative, it may be said that such act was
committed by the public servant while acting in the
discharge of his official duty and there was every
connection with the act complained of and the
official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes
it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get
immediately attracted on institution of the complaint
case.
10. Use of the expression “official duty” implies
that the act or omission must have been done by the
public servant in the course of his service and that it
should have been in discharge of his duty. The
section does not extend its protective cover to every
act or omission done by a public servant in service
but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts
or omissions which are done by a public servant in
discharge of official duty.
11. If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that
the act or omission for which the accused was
charged had reasonable connection with discharge
of his duty then it must be held to be official to which
applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be
disputed.”
22.
In case of B.L. Verma (supra), the Supreme
Court has observed that even though the offence alleged
to have been committed by the accused (public servant)
amount to abuse of power, but if it is found that said
offence has been committed by the public officer in
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purported discharge of his official duties, therefore, in
absence of sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. taking
cognizance of the said offence is not proper. The High
Court
in
the
aforesaid
case
had
dropped
the
proceedings against the accused persons for want of
sanction and appeal preferred against the said order
was dismissed by the Supreme Court with direction that
first sanction should be obtained then cognizance can be
taken against the public servant. The Supreme Court in
the said case has observed as under:“5. We agree with the reasons given by the
High Court and are of the opinion that in the
established facts and circumstances of the case as
noticed by the High Court the allegations made
against the respondent who was a public servant at
the time of the commission of the alleged offence,
no cognizance of the offence could have been taken
against him in the absence of sanction under
Section 197 CrPC. It is not disputed that the actions
alleged against him lay within the scope of his
official duties or at any event were allegedly
committed in the purported discharge of his duties
as Director of Enforcement, though it is canvassed
that he had abused his official position while
discharging his official duties. The High Court has
rightly found that that would not oust the necessity
of sanction under Section 197 CrPC to take
cognizance of the offence. The expression “no court
shall take cognizance of such offence except with
the previous sanction” occurring in Section 197
CrPC unmistakably shows that the bar on the
exercise of powers by the court to take cognizance
is mandatory and the previous sanction from the
competent authority for prosecution of the public
servant, who is accused of having committed an
offence either in the execution of his duties or in the
purported execution of his duties is essential to take
cognizance. Thus in the absence of sanction under
Section 197 CrPC the court of the Chief
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
Metropolitan Magistrate could not have taken
cognizance of the offence against the respondent
and the High Court, therefore, committed no error in
directing the dropping of proceedings against him, in
the absence of such a sanction.”
23.
In case of Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain
(supra), the Supreme Court has reiterated the scope of
applicability of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. and observed that
if alleged offence has been committed by a pubic
servant while discharging official duties, sanction under
Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is a mandatory requirement. The
observation made by the Supreme Court is as under:“24. In Matajog case [AIR 1956 SC 44 : (1955)
2 SCR 925 : (1955) 28 ITR 941] the Constitution
Bench held that the complaint may not disclose all
the facts to decide the question of applicability of
Section 197, but facts subsequently coming either
on police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of
prosecution evidence may establish the necessity
for sanction. In B. Saha case [B. Saha v. M.S.
Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 939]
the Court observed that instead of confining itself to
the allegations in the complaint the Magistrate can
take into account all the materials on the record at
the time when the question is raised and falls for
consideration. In Pukhraj case [(1973) 2 SCC 701 :
1973 SCC (Cri) 944] this Court observed that
whether sanction is necessary or not may depend
from stage to stage. In Matajog case [AIR 1956 SC
44 : (1955) 2 SCR 925 : (1955) 28 ITR 941] the
Constitution Bench had further observed that the
necessity for sanction may reveal itself in the course
of the progress of the case and it would be open to
the accused to place the material on record during
the course of trial for showing what his duty was and
also the acts complained of were so interrelated with
his official duty so as to attract the protection
afforded by Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. This being the position it would be
unreasonable to hold that the accused even though
might have really acted in discharge of his official
duty for which the complaints have been lodged yet
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
he will have to wait till the stage under sub-section
(4) Section 246 of the Code is reached or at least till
he will be able to bring in relevant materials while
cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. On the
other hand it would be logical to hold that the matter
being one dealing with the jurisdiction of the court to
take cognizance, the accused would be entitled to
produce the relevant and material documents which
can be admitted into evidence without formal proof,
for the limited consideration of the court whether the
necessary ingredients to attract Section 197 of the
Code have been established or not. The question of
applicability of Section 197 of the Code and the
consequential ouster of jurisdiction of the court to
take cognizance without a valid sanction is
genetically different from the plea of the accused
that the averments in the complaint do not make out
an offence and as such the order of cognizance
and/or the criminal proceedings be quashed. In the
aforesaid premises we are of the considered opinion
that an accused is not debarred from producing the
relevant documentary materials which can be legally
looked into without any formal proof, in support of
the stand that the acts complained of were
committed in exercise of his jurisdiction or purported
jurisdiction as a public servant in discharge of his
official duty thereby requiring sanction of the
appropriate authority.”
24.
In case of Mohd. Hadi Raja (supra), the
Supreme Court has again taken the same view which is
as under:“8. In support of the contention that sanction
under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is warranted in the case of officers of
public undertakings and government companies
having deep and pervasive control of the
Government, it has been submitted that the object of
sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is to guard against vexatious
proceedings against judges, magistrates and public
servants and to secure the opinion of superior
authority whether it is desirable that there should be
prosecution against public servants satisfying the
requirements of Section 197(1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. In this connection, reference
has been made to the decision of this Court in
Director of Inspection & Audit v. C.L. Subramaniam
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
[1994 Supp (3) SCC 615 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 121] and
in Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P. [(1997) 5
SCC 326 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 676] In the said
decisions, this Court has indicated that sanction by
appropriate authority as contemplated in Section
197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is
intended to protect a public servant from needless
harassment. Such protection by way of sanction
renders assurance and protection to the honest
officer to perform public duties honestly and to the
best of his abilities because the threat of
prosecution demoralises the honest officer.”
25.
In view of the consistent view taken by the
Supreme Court, it is crystal clear that the provision of
Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is a mandatory requirement to
initiate prosecution against a public servant if it is found
that the alleged act said to have been performed by the
public servant while discharging his official duties. The
aforesaid verdicts also throw sufficient light that even
otherwise if the alleged offence said to have been found
committed by the public servant in excess of power of
public servant or found illegal even though the umbrella
as provided under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is available to
public servant. Therefore, to determine the said
contention, the only necessity is to see nexus between
the alleged offence and the fact that same has been
committed in discharge of official duties by the accused
(public servant).
26.
Here in this case, there is no dispute that the
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
petitioners are public servants working in the Police
Department and further there is no dispute that the
deceased was a convicted accused released on parole
and was proclaimed absconder as he did not surrender
after the expiry of parole period. 36 cases of heinous
crime including murder, dacoity and attempt to murder
registered against him, reward of Rs.10,000/- on his
arrest had been announced. It is needless to note that if
an accused is an absconder and the police personnel
are trying to arrest him, the said act is considered to be
an act done during discharge of their official duties. In
the present case, even the complainant/respondent No.2
is not disputing the fact that his son Chhota Gudda was
a convicted accused, released on parole and also facing
myriad criminal cases. Indisputably, a reward was
announced for arrest of the deceased and with the order
of senior officer i.e. Inspector General of Police, a team
was
constituted
to arrest
the deceased and
in
furtherance to the said order accused party was
intercepted by the police team and then deceased
sustained injuries by the police weapons and eventually
succumbed. Therefore, openly and undoubtedly the
nexus is fully established that the alleged offence and its
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
commission is within the discharge of official duties by
the police personnel. The object of Section 197 of
Cr.P.C., is to save officials from vexatious proceedings
against judges, magistrates and public servant and to
protect public servant from needless harassment so as
to provide them protection so that they may perform
public duty honestly and to the best of their abilities
because threat of prosecution demoralises the honest
officer.
27.
The cases on which respondent No.2 has
placed reliance i.e. Choudhury Praveen Sultana
(supra), the Supreme Court has observed that prima
facie alleged offence and the act committed by the
accused (public servant) cannot be said to be the duty of
the Investigating Officer and its commission while
discharging the official duties and therefore, sanction
under Section 197 is not required and the protection is
not applicable to such public servant. Further in case of
M. Gopalakrishnan (supra), the Supreme Court has
observed that when alleged offence prima facie does not
appear to be an act committed during discharge of
official duties then sanction at initial stage before taking
cognizance is not material and that requirement can be
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
determined even at later stage.
28.
Further in case of Devahari Devasingh
Pawar (supra), relied upon by respondent No.2, the
Supreme Court has observed that the alleged act
committed against the accused does not relate to their
official duties and as such, there is no nexus or
connection to discharge of their official duties and the
alleged offence is made out and in such situation,
Section 197 of Cr.P.C. was not said to be a mandatory
requirement before taking cognizance.
29.
However, here in this case, the cases on
which respondent No.2 has relied upon and the analogy
laid down by the Supreme Court is not disputed even by
the petitioners. But the question is whether such analogy
is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the
present case or not. In my opinion, the discussion as has
been made hereinabove and looking to the facts existing
in the present case when deceased was a convicted
accused suffering sentence of life; released on parole for
a specific period; did not get himself surrendered; and
was declared as an absconder; the police was in search
of said accused; tried to arrest him and then there was
fight between the police team and the accused party in
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
which injuries were sustained by the deceased, needless
to say that the petitioners are public servants and
discharging their official duties making endeavours to
arrest accused (the deceased), as such, required nexus
is fully established and therefore, compliance of Section
197 of Cr.P.C. was a mandatory requirement for taking
cognizance by the Magistrate on the complaint made by
complainant/respondent No.2 (mother of the deceased).
It is also indisputable that the Magisterial enquiry was
conducted and in the said enquiry the Magistrate
recorded the statements of the witnesses and also taken
note of the weapons and other things seized from the
spot and then arrived at conclusion that it was not a fake
encounter, but opined that due to cross-firing between
the police team and accused party, the deceased
sustained injuries and succumbed and it was a valid
encounter on the part of police. The Human Rights
Commission also took cognizance of the same and
ultimately approved the inquiry report of the Magistrate
then under such circumstances, it is a fit case in which
protection of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. can be provided to
the petitioners, else the very purpose and object of
giving protection to the public servant would be
M.Cr.C. No.14484/2012, 4368/2013 & 34749/2019
frustrated.
30.
In view of the above discussion, the order
passed by the Court below is not sustainable in the eyes
of law and the Magistrate concerned has not considered
the material aspect and basic object of Section 197 of
Cr.P.C. as has been considered by the Supreme Court
consistently, which got discussed hereinabove. Thus, the
impugned order being not sustainable, is liable to be set
aside. Consequently, the prosecution as has been
initiated
by
the
Magistrate
taking
cognizance
of
complaint of respondent No.2, is not sustainable and,
therefore, all proceedings initiated against the petitioners
in pursuance to the complaint filed by respondent No.2,
are hereby set aside.
31.
The petitions filed by the petitioners are,
accordingly, allowed.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
Sushma
ac/-
ANIL CHOUDHARY
2022.01.17
11:11:14 +05'30'
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