The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
04. 05.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (NDPS), Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala in Agartala GR PS case no.07 of 2022 registered under sections 21(c)/29 of NDPS Act, whereby the learned Special Judge allowed the prayer of the learned Special P.P by extending the period of detention of the petitioner in custody beyond 180 days under Section 36A(4) of the said Act. [3] On 26.04.2022, the FIR was lodged by one Rajib Saha, Inspector of Police (Anti Narcotics), Tripura Police Crime Branch, Agartala to the O.C., Agartala, GR PS against some accused persons including one Abhijit Nama of Agartala, inter-alia, with the allegations that on the basis of a secret information they recovered 4792 bottles of Phensedyl and 4520 bottle of Eskuf syrup from the parcel van of Sealdah to Agartala Kanchanjhanga Express and the said 4520 Nos. bottle of Eskuf syrup were booked by M/S Sristi Enterprise, B.G road, Kolkata for the accused person, namely Abhijit Nama. [4] Mr. Biswas, learned counsel submits that Abhijit Nama surrendered before the court and he was in custody from 07.11.2023. On
04. 05.2024 the learned Special P.P submitted a report under Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act before the Ld. Special Judge for extending the detention of the accused Abhijit Nama beyond 180 days. On that day, the accused himself was also produced before the court and a separate bail application was filed on his behalf. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel submits that the copy of said petition/report of the learned Special PP was never served upon the accused or to his learned counsel and without hearing them, the impugned order was passed. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel further argues that similar petition was also filed by the investigating officer on the same day [Annexure-2 of the writ petition] before the Ld. Special Judge and simultaneously learned Special PP also submitted his petition. The three points as raised Mr. Biswas, learned counsel in support of his challenges to the impugned order are that – (i) the copy of the petition of Ld. P.P. was not furnished to the accused or to his Ld. Counsel for which they were in dark about such petition and there is also no indication in the impugned order that Ld. Defence Counsel was heard on that petition and (ii) the petition submitted by the learned Special PP was a mere a “copypaste version” of what the investigating officer mentioned in his petition submitted before the learned Special Judge and there was no independent application of mind by …
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
W.P.(Crl.) No.04 of 2024
Smt. Ritu Parna Sen,
Daughter of Sri Manash Sen,
wife of Sri Abhijit Nama, R/OSiddhi Ashram, Agartala, P.S.
Amtali, P.O. Amtali, West Tripura
on behalf of:
Sri Abhijit Nama
Son of Sri Ajit Nama, R/OSiddhi Ashram, Agartala, P.S.
Amtali,
P.O.
Amtali,
West
Tripura.
1.
2.
……… Petitioner(s)
–Versus–
The State of Tripura,
to be represented by the Principal
Secretary, (Home) to the Government
of Tripura
The Investigating Officer
of GRPS Case No.07/2022,
GRPS, Agartala, Tripura (W).
…….. Respondent(s)
For the Petitioner (s)
:
Mr. D. Biswas, Adv.
For the Respondent (s)
:
Mr. R. Datta, PP
Date of hearing & delivery of :
Judgment & order
20.02.2025
Whether fit for reporting
YES
:
NO
√
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. D. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner and Mr. R. Datta, learned PP appearing for the State.
[2]
The writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated
04.05.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (NDPS), Court No.2, West
Tripura, Agartala in Agartala GR PS case no.07 of 2022 registered under
sections 21(c)/29 of NDPS Act, whereby the learned Special Judge allowed
the prayer of the learned Special P.P by extending the period of detention
of the petitioner in custody beyond 180 days under Section 36A(4) of the
said Act.
[3]
On 26.04.2022, the FIR was lodged by one Rajib Saha,
Inspector of Police (Anti Narcotics), Tripura Police Crime Branch, Agartala
to the O.C., Agartala, GR PS against some accused persons including one
Abhijit Nama of Agartala, inter-alia, with the allegations that on the basis of
a secret information they recovered 4792 bottles of Phensedyl and 4520
bottle of Eskuf syrup from the parcel van of Sealdah to Agartala
Kanchanjhanga Express and the said 4520 Nos. bottle of Eskuf syrup were
booked by M/S Sristi Enterprise, B.G road, Kolkata for the accused person,
namely Abhijit Nama.
[4]
Mr. Biswas, learned counsel submits that Abhijit Nama
surrendered before the court and he was in custody from 07.11.2023. On
04.05.2024 the learned Special P.P submitted a report under Section
36A(4) of the NDPS Act before the Ld. Special Judge for extending the
detention of the accused Abhijit Nama beyond 180 days. On that day, the
accused himself was also produced before the court and a separate bail
application was filed on his behalf. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel submits
that the copy of said petition/report of the learned Special PP was never
served upon the accused or to his learned counsel and without hearing
them, the impugned order was passed. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel further
argues that similar petition was also filed by the investigating officer on the
same day [Annexure-2 of the writ petition] before the Ld. Special Judge
and simultaneously learned Special PP also submitted his petition. The
three points as raised Mr. Biswas, learned counsel in support of his
challenges to the impugned order are that – (i) the copy of the petition of
Ld. P.P. was not furnished to the accused or to his Ld. Counsel for which
they were in dark about such petition and there is also no indication in the
impugned order that Ld. Defence Counsel was heard on that petition and
(ii) the petition submitted by the learned Special PP was a mere a “copypaste version” of what the investigating officer mentioned in his petition
submitted before the learned Special Judge and there was no independent
application of mind by learned Special PP. Therefore, according to Ld.
Counsel, Mr. Biswas, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
[5]
Mr. R. Datta, learned PP, on the other hand, appearing for the
State submits that there is no legal requirement to supply of the copy of
the petition filed under Section 36A(4) of the Act by to the concerned
accused person or to his engaged counsel. Mr. Datta, learned PP further
submits that the writ petition has become infructuous as already the
accused, Abhijit Nama has been released on bail and the charge-sheet has
also been laid by the investigating officer in this case. Mr. Datta, learned
PP tries to gain support on a decision of Calcutta High Court (3-Judge
Bench) in the case of Subhas Yadav vs. the State of West Bengal
reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 313 wherein the High Court held that
a written notice and copy of the report of the Public Prosecutor submitted
under section 36A(4) of NDPS Act may not be required to be supplied to
the accused, but the accused is required to be produced physically or
through the video linkage before the court when the prayer for extension is
considered and he must be made aware of such consideration. It was
further observed that in that case, the accused will also be entitled to raise
objection, if any, with regard to the compliance of the mandatory
requirements of law. The High Court in said case also relied on the ratio
laid down by the Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt vs. State through CBI,
(1994) 5 SCC 410, Jigar alias Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya vs.
State of Gujarat (Criminal Appeal No.1656 of 2022 arising out of
SLP (Cri) No.7696 of 2021 decided on 23.09.2022) and in Sanjay
Kumar Kedia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau,
(2009) 17 SCC 631. The relevant paragraph regarding conclusions
reached by the Calcutta High Court in the above said case is extracted
hereunder:
“As noted earlier, the only modification made by the larger
Bench in the case of Sanjay Dutt to the decision in the case of
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is about the mode of service of notice
of the application for extension. If so many words, in
paragraph 53(2)(a) of the Judgment, this Court in the case of
Sanjay Dutt held that it is mandatory to produce the accused
at the time when the Court considers the application for
extension and that the accused must be informed that the
question of extension of the period of investigation is being
considered. The accused may not be entitled to get a copy of
the report as a matter of right as it may contain details of the
investigation carried out. But, if we accept the submission of
the respondents that the accused has no say in the matter,
the requirement of giving notice by producing the accused
will become an empty and meaningless formality. Moreover,
it will be against the mandate of clause (b) of the proviso to
sub-section (2) of section 167 Cr.P.C. It cannot be accepted
that the accused is not entitled to raise any objection to the
application for extension. The scope of the objections may be
limited. The accused can always point out to the Court that
that the prayer has to be made by the Public Prosecutor and
not by the investigating agency. Secondly, the accused can
always point out the twin requirements of the report in terms
of proviso added by sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015
Act to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of Cr.P.C. The accused
can always point out to the Court that unless it is satisfied
that full compliance is made with the twin requirements, the
extension cannot be granted.”
The first point as raised by Mr. Biswas, learned counsel is
answered accordingly that written notice or furnishing of copy of the
petition or report of the Public Prosecutor under section 36A(4) of the Act
to the accused or his engaged counsel is not compulsory, however, the
accused or his counsel must be present personally or through virtual mode
at the time of consideration or hearing of such petition and they should be
aware of such consideration, so that they may raise objection, if any, with
regard to compliance of mandatory requirements of law.
[6]
Regarding the second point of challenge that there was no
independent application of mind of learned PP while submitting the petition
under Section 36A(4) of the Act, it appears that the maximum paragraphs
of the petition submitted by the investigating officer were carried forward
in the petition filed by learned PP with certain addition of further facts and
therefore, it is not correct that the exact „copy-paste version‟ of the petition
submitted by the investigating officer before the learned Special Judge.
Law is settled by the Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kedia (supra) and
earlier thereto in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra,
(1994) 4 SCC 602. The relevant paragraph no.23 of Hitendra Thakur’s
case as referred to in Sanjay Kedia is extracted hereunder:
23…………..A public prosecutor is an important officer of the
State Government and is appointed by the State under the
Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not a part of the
investigating agency. He is an independent statutory
authority. The public prosecutor is expected to independently
apply his mind to the request of the investigating agency
before submitting a report to the court for extension of time
with a view to enable the investigating agency to complete
the investigation. He is not merely a post office or a
forwarding agency. A public prosecutor may or may not agree
with the reasons given by the investigating officer for seeking
extension of time and may find that the investigation had not
progressed in the proper manner or that there has been
unnecessary, deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the
investigation. In that event, he may not submit any report to
the court under clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus,
for seeking extension of time under clause (bb), the public
prosecutor after an independent application of his mind to
the request of the investigating agency is required to make a
report to the Designated Court indicating therein the
progress of the investigation and disclosing justification for
keeping the accused in further custody to enable the
investigating agency to complete the investigation. The
public prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating
officer along with his request or application and report, but
his report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must disclose on
the face of it that he has applied his mind and was satisfied
with the progress of the investigation and considered grant of
further time to complete the investigation necessary. The use
of the expression “on the report of the public prosecutor
indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific
reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said
period” as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-section (2) of
Section 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and
indicative of the legislative intent not to keep an accused in
custody unreasonably and to grant extension only on the
report of the public prosecutor. The report of the public
prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a formality but a very
vital report, because the consequence of its acceptance
affects the liberty of an accused and it must, therefore,
strictly comply with the requirements as contained in clause
(bb).
[7]
In view of above position, it is also incumbent upon the Ld.
Special Judge to be satisfied that Ld. Special Public Prosecutor while
submitting report through a petition or otherwise, has independently
applied his mind while making such report and that the twin test as
enumerated in proviso to section 36A(4) of the Act about the progress in
the investigation and the specific reasons justifying detention of the
accused beyond said 180 days, are indicated in the said report. The Court
cannot mechanically or casually deal with such a report.
[8]
What disturbs the Court is that in the impugned order there is
no mention whether the accused or his learned counsel was made aware of
submission of such petition by learned Special PP and whether the accused
person or his learned counsel was heard on that petition. The order passed
by the learned Special Judge also appears to be very cryptic in nature and
no reasoning was assigned by him as to how he became satisfied about the
necessity of further detention of the accused person in the custody beyond
180 days. Learned Special Judge simply observed that there were
reasonable and sufficient grounds to extend the period of detention of the
accused Abhijit Nama beyond such period of 180 days and therefore, the
petition was allowed. The relevant paragraph of the impugned order is
excerpted herein below:
“Considering the petition so filed by the Ld. Special PP
accompanied by the report of the IO of the case, I find there
is reasonable and sufficient ground to extend the period of
detention in respect of the accused person namely, Sri Abhijit
Nama beyond the period of 180 days. Hence the petition so
filed by the Ld. Special PP U/S 36A(4)of the NDPS Act stands
allowed in respect of accused person, namely Sri Abhijit
Nama.”
[9]
Time and again it has been reiterated by the Apex Court that
reasoning is the very sole of a judicial order which not only manifests the
application of judicial mind of a Judge but also bears clarity in the decision
making process. It is the basic foundation of just and fair decision and
therefore, omission or failure on the part of a Judge to give reasoning in
support of his decision otherwise amounts to denial of justice to the
parties. It is a method of communication of the thought process and
wisdom of the court in such decision making exercise. It also generates
satisfaction in the mind of the litigant that the court is conscious and
careful about their causes and the same are being dealt within the arena of
law.
[10]
In this regard, the relevant paragraph no.24 of a decision of
the Apex Court in case of Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax
Department, Works Contract & Leasing, Kota vs. Shukla and
brothers, (2010) 4 SCC 785 is being profitably quoted hereunder:
“24. Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law
once ceases, the law itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law
Lexicon). Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of
law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as
avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps in the
observance of law of precedent. Absence of reasons on the
contrary essentially introduces an element of uncertainty,
dissatisfaction and give entirely different dimensions to the
questions of law raised before the higher/appellate courts. In
our view, the court should provide its own grounds and
reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the
very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular
hearing, howsoever precise they may be.”
[11]
In the case in hand, apart from what were mentioned by the
investigating officer in his petition, Ld. Special P.P. while submitting his
petition before Ld. Special Judge also mentioned that earlier the accused
Abhijit Nama was released on interim bail in the case on medical ground
and he had also submitted some documents of his dialysis done at Holy
Mission Hospital, Patna which on enquiry later on were found to be fake.
Ld. Special P.P. also mentioned that the investigation was not completed
and raid was being conducted to arrest the co-accused and moreover, the
accused being a habitual offender, if released on bail he would commit
similar offence. He also gave references of two other such cases under
NDPS Act wherein said Abhijit Nama was a FIR named accused. Anyway
considering the changed circumstances that the accused has already been
released on bail and the charge-sheet has also been laid by the
investigating officer, the writ petition has practically become infructuous
and therefore, no further scrutiny is being done by this Court as to whether
such twin conditions as enumerated in proviso to section 36A(4) of the Act
have been satisfied in this case or not. Doing of such exercise will now be
futile. However, direction is given to the learned Special Judge to deal with
such a petition filed under Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act in future strictly
in accordance with the settled principle of law as discussed above.
With such observations, the writ petition is disposed of
accordingly.
Interim application(s), if any, shall also stands disposed of.
The Registry is directed to circulate this judgment and order to
all the learned Special Judges immediately.
JUDGE
Sujay
signed by SUJAY GHOSH
SUJAY GHOSH Digitally
Date: 2025.02.25 15:59:04 +05'30'
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