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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl.A.No.15 of 2024
Smt. Maya Shil @ Maya Rani Shil (58 years),
wife of Late Mihir Lal Shil,
resident of Basanta Nagar,
P.O. & P.S. Kakraban,
District-Gomati Tripura
----Convict-Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura
----Respondent (s)
For Appellant(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Ratan Datta, Adv.
Mr. Diptanu Das, Adv.
Mr. Aditya Baidya, Adv.
Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.
Date of Hearing
Date of Judgment
& Order
:
30.11.2024
:
07.12.2024
Whether fit for reporting
:
YES
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is preferred
challenging the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated
31.05.2024 delivered by Learned Sessions Judge, Gomati District, Udaipur in
connection with Case No.ST 49 of 2021 wherein the appellant has been
convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and she was sentenced
to suffer SI for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-, id to suffer further
SI for thirty days and she was further convicted under Section 498A of IPC and
was sentenced to suffer one year with fine of Rs.2000/-, id to suffer further SI
for two months and it was ordered that both the sentences shall run
concurrently.
[2]
Heard Learned counsel, Mr. Ratan Datta appearing on behalf of
the appellant and also heard Learned Addl. P.P., Mr. Rajib Saha appearing on
behalf of the State-respondent.
[3]
In course of hearing of argument, Mr. Ratan Datta, Learned
counsel appearing for the appellant first of all drawn the attention of the Court
referring Sections 2 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and submitted that on
bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions and also after bare perusal of the
evidence on record, it appears that the prosecution in this case could not place
any material before the Learned Trial Court below to sustain the charge leveled
against the appellant under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. But the
Learned Trial Court below without appreciating the evidence on record properly
misconstrued the provision of Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and
convicted her accordingly for which the interference of the Court is required by
setting aside the judgment of the appellant under Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act.
[4]
In respect of another charge, Learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the present appellant was also convicted under Section 498A of
IPC but here in the case at hand from the evidence of the parents of the
alleged victim it appears that whatever they deposed before the Court they
have heard everything from the victim but here in the given case as the victim
is no more, so, no reliance could be placed upon their evidence. Further more
from the dying declaration of the alleged victim it is clear that in the dying
declaration, the alleged victim did not whisper a single word showing
involvement of the present appellant with the alleged crime for which she was
charged and other witnesses of the prosecution heard the fact of alleged
cruelty from the parents of the victim and since there is no scope to place any
reliance upon the evidence of the parents of the victim, so, legally there is also
no scope to place any reliance upon the evidence of said independent
witnesses. But the Learned Trial Court below at the time of delivery of
judgment has failed to appreciate the evidence on record properly and
convicted her accordingly under the aforesaid provision of Section 498A of IPC
for which according to Learned counsel for the appellant, the judgment cannot
be sustained in the eye of law and urged for setting aside the judgment and for
acquitting the appellant from the charges of this case.
[5]
On the other hand, Mr. Rajib Saha, Learned Addl. P.P. appearing
on behalf of the State-respondent referring the evidence on record of the
witnesses of the prosecution stated that there was no infirmity in the judgment
delivered by the Learned Trial Court below because the Learned Trial Court
based on the evidence on record rightly and reasonably found the appellant to
be guilty and convicted her accordingly and there is no scope to interfere with
the judgment delivered by the Learned Trial Court. He further stated referring
the evidence of some of the witnesses that from the evidence of those
witnesses it is crystal clear that the victim prior to her death was subjected to
cruelty by the present appellant and her son and accordingly, the Learned Trial
Court has rightly convicted the present appellant and her son in the given
case. So, he urged for dismissal of this appeal.
[6]
Here in the case at hand, the prosecution was set into motion on
the basis of an FIR laid by one Baspi Sen to O/C, Kakraban P.S. alleging inter
alia that her daughter Smt. Souramita Sen was given in marriage with the
accused Shri Ripan Kumar Shil, a resident of Kakraban as per Hindu Marriage
and Customs.
After the marriage, i.e. from 06.07.2017 her daughter’s,
parents-in-law and her husband starting inflicting torture upon her for dowry.
Her husband at the instigation of her parents-in-law used to assault her for
hard cash and send her to her house. At the time of marriage, he gave
Rs.50,000/- in cash and 6 bhori gold and bike to her husband. Then after one
month of marriage he again gave Rs.10,000/- and after five months he further
gave Rs.20,000/-. In spite of that, the torture continued upon her and very
often her parents-in-law and husband used to give in her hand kerosene oil
asking her to burn herself to death. On 05.02.2020 in the absence of her
husband her father-in-law hold her throat and her mother-in-law beaten her
with bamboo and thereby tried to kill her. Thereafter they approached
Kakraban Panchayat when her parents-in-law and husband flouted the call of
the pradhan and upapradhan and none of them attended the adjudication
meeting on 15.03.2020. After that, on 22.04.2020 at about 11 a.m. he was
informed by someone from Kakraban that his daughter was set ablaze by her
husband and parents-in-law by pouring kerosene. Immediately, she was taken
to Tepania Hospital and hearing this information, the informant and her
husband went to Tepania Hospital and as her condition was serious, so she
was immediately referred to G.B. Hospital, Agartala. She sustained almost
90% burn injuries. Hence, the informant laid the FIR. On receipt of FIR, O/C
Kakraban P.S. registered Kakraban P.S. Case No.28/2020 under Section
498A/396/307 of IPC read with Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and the case
was endorsed to IO for investigation. During investigation, Section 304B of IPC
was added and by this time the victim expired due to her injury. However,
after completion of investigation, the IO laid charge-sheet against this
appellant and her son for their prosecution before the Court. The case was
committed to the Court of Sessions by the Learned jurisdictional Magistrate
and the Learned Sessions Judge, Gomati District, Udaipur framed the charge
against this appellant and another Shri Ripan Kumar Shil under Section
498A/302/304B of IPC read with Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and after
conclusion of trial, found the present appellant and her son guilty and
convicted them accordingly. However, against the sentence the present
appellant has preferred this appeal before the High Court and another appeal
has been preferred by her son which is pending before the Division Bench.
[7]
Now, before coming to the conclusion of this appeal, let us discuss
about the relevant synopsis of the evidence on record. To substantiate the
charge, prosecution in this case has adduced both oral and documentary
evidence on record.
[8]
PW-1, Smt. Baspi Sen is the informant of this case. She deposed
that Souramita Sen is her daughter. She married with Ripan Shil on
03.07.2017. At the time of marriage as per demand of the groom's party she
gave Rs.50,000/- in cash and a motor cycle. Immediately after the reception
by the goom-side trouble erupted between her daughter and her in-laws. Her
husband and in-laws regularly pressurized her to bring money from her. Within
first one month of marriage as per demand she gave Rs.10,000/- to her sonin-law and another Rs.20,000/- five months later. However, this did not stop
the physical torture on her daughter. They always told her to commit suicide
by pouring kerosene on herself. In the year 2020, she gave birth to a son. On
05.02.2020 her father-in-law and mother-in-law Maya Shil assaulted her with a
stick. She had made a complaint to the Kakraban panchayat but the in-laws of
her daughter did not come for reconciliation. On 15.03.2020 her daughter was
asked to bring money from her parents house and they poured kerosene on
her and threw her out of the matrimonial home. They also moved the legal
services office in respective panchayat for mediation but nothing fruitful
happened due to lock down caused by corona virus. On 22.04.2020 at around
11 am she received an information from the fire service that her daughter has
been put on fire by her in-laws and was admitted in Tepania hospital. She went
there and found her daughter badly burnt. She was referred to the GB hospital
where she breathed her last. Her husband and in-laws had poured kerosene
and put fire on her. She lodged an FIR which was written by one Sri Subrata
Das and the FIR was written as per her version. On identification the FIR was
marked as Ext.P1 and the signature was marked as Ext.P1/1.
During cross-examination, she deposed that the marriage was a
negotiated one and took place as per consent of both the parties. The accused
was a private tutor by profession. He is the only son of his parents. Sometimes
before child birth the accused and her daughter had separated their kitchen
and took meal separately. She could not say the exact date when the money
was given to the accused persons. They did not lodge any complaint to the
police or court. Her daughter was given in marriage six months before her final
examination. She further stated that the father-in-law of her daughter does
not have any landed property other than this house. She also stated that
fifteen days prior to the child birth her daughter came to her house and left
about two months later. Nothing more came out relevant.
[9]
PW-2, Sri Kajal Sen is the father of the victim. He deposed that
the deceased Souramita Sen was her only daughter. She was married with
Ripan Shil on 03.07.2017. At the time of marriage as per demand of the
groom's party they gave Rs.50,000/- in cash and a motor cycle worth
Rs.75,000/-. Immediately after the reception by the goom-side trouble erupted
between her daughter and her in-laws. Her husband and in-laws regularly
pressurized her to bring money from her parents. Within first one month of
marriage as per demand they gave Rs.10,000/- to her son-in-law and another
Rs.20,000/- five months later to her mother-in-law. But this did not stop the
physical torture on his daughter. He further stated that they always told her to
commit suicide by pouring kerosene on herself. In the year 2020 she gave
birth of a son. On 05.02.2020 her father-in-law tried to throttle her and
mother-in-law assaulted her with a bamboo stick. They had made a complaint
to the Kakraban panchayat but the in-laws of his daughter did not come for
reconciliation. Few days before the incident her daughter was asked to bring
one lakh rupees from her parents house and they poured kerosene on her and
threw her out of the matrimonial home. They also moved the legal services
office in respective panchayat for mediation but nothing fruitful happened due
to lock down caused by corona virus. On 22.04.2020 at about 11 am they
received one information from the fire service that his daughter has been put
on fire by her in-laws and was admitted in Tepania hospital. He went there and
found his daughter badly burnt. She was referred to the GB hospital where she
breathed her last. Her husband and in-laws had poured kerosene and put fire
on her. He signed the inquest report of his daughter prepared by police and
identified his signature marked as Ext.P2.
During cross-examination, he stated that he visited his daughter
around 8 to 10 times after the marriage. He cannot say about the neighbours
of his daughter's matrimonial home. He never confided with the neighbours of
his daughter's in-laws. Also nor filed any written complaint with the panchayat
or panchayat legal aid office, nor filed any complaint with the police before his
daughter’s death. Also stated that his daughter and her husband used to stay
separately from her in-laws. Nothing more came out relevant.
[10]
PW-3, Sri Bimal Saha deposed that he have a shop opposite to
the house of the accused Ripan Shil. On 22.04.2020 at about 11 am he saw
smoke coming out from the room of the accused Ripan. He rushed to the spot
and saw that Ripan and his parents are standing outside the room and his son
was in his lap. He went inside of the room and saw that his wife was sitting in
one corner and 99% of her body was burnt. Unable to bear the sight he rushed
out. The victim was later taken to the hospital by fire service and he later
heard that she died in GBP hospital. He further stated that on 2/3 occasions
the victim told him that she was physically tortured in her matrimonial house.
On the next day police seized one bottle containing kerosene from the PO. He
signed on the seizure list as witness. The witness identified his signature on
the seizure list marked as Ext.P3 and the bottle is marked Ext.MO 1.
During cross-examination, he deposed that he did not specifically
state to the police that the victim on 2/3 occasions told him about physical
torture on her. Nothing more came out relevant.
[11]
PW-4, Sri Shibudhan Bhowmik is the neighbour of accused Ripan
Shil. He deposed that on 22.04.2020 at about 11 am he saw smoke coming
out from the room of the accused Ripan. He along with Arup Shil, Rupak Saha
rushed to the spot and saw that Ripan and his parents are standing outside the
room. He went inside of the room and saw that his wife was sitting in one
corner and 90% of her body was burnt. He tried to douse the fire. The victim
was later on taken to the hospital by fire service and he later on heard that she
died in GBP hospital. He further stated that once before her death she told him
that her in-laws physically tortured her for dowry.
During cross-examination, he deposed that he did not say to
police that once before her death she told him that her in-laws physically
tortured her for dowry.
[12]
PW-5, Smt. Ratna Sen deposed that the victim Souramita is the
daughter of her elder brother-in-law. She was given in marriage with Ripan
Shil on 03.07.2017. After the marriage the victim was physically and mentally
tortured for dowry. For the peace of his daughter her brother in law paid
Rs.10,000/- within one month of the marriage and Rs.20,000/- within six
months. When the victim was pregnant her in-laws demanded Rs.1,00,000/which they could not give. After the birth of the child the in-laws of the victim
did not accept her for 2/3 months nor, they bear any expenses of child birth.
The mother in law of the victim forced her to stay separately with her husband.
She was not given access to water or kitchen. Even she had to put up cloth
line outside the house to hang her cloths after washing. About 2 months prior
to the incident her father in-law grabbed her mouth and mother-in-law beat
her with a stick. She received many injuries on her body. On this issue they
had approached the Kakraban panchayat but the in-laws of the victim refused
any attempted conciliation. They had also approached Lok Adalat but due to
lock down caused corona virus the matter could not be settled by mediation.
On 22.04.2020 her sister-in-law received information that her daughter was
severely burnt. She went to the hospital and saw her with more than 90%
burn. While she was holding the saline bottle she told her that her in-laws
brought kerosene oil and instigated her to put herself on fire. She also told her
to take care of her son.
During cross-examination, she stated that she did not say to IO
that after the birth of the child, the in-laws of the victim did not accept her for
2/3 months. They also did not bear any expenditure for child birth. The mother
in law of the victim forced her to stay separately with her husband. She was
given access to water or kitchen. Even she had to put up cloth line outside the
house to hang her cloths after washing. She also did not say to IO while she
was holding the saline bottle she told her that her in-laws brought kerosene
and instigated her to put herself on fire. She also told her to take care of her
son. She further stated that the house of the accused is about 8 km from her
house. She also stated that she did not have any chat with the neighbours of
the accused about the incident. Nothing more came out relevant.
[13]
PW-6, Sri Rakesh Shil deposed that the victim was the daughter
of Kajal Sen who is the resident of Jamjuri panchayat. She was given in
marriage to Ripan Shil. After the marriage, the parents of the victim
complained that their daughter was tortured by the husband and in-laws for
money. In fact they also told him that they had in two installments paid
Rs.30000/- to the in-laws of the victim. He informed the matter to Kakraban
panchayat but they told him that the accused Ripan Shil and his family do not
attend meetings for reconciliation. He also approached the legal cell attached
with the panchayat but before reconciliation could be attempted there was lock
down. In the year 2020 they heard that the victim had committed suicide by
pouring kerosene on herself and setting her ablaze. In the hospital she gave
statement that she put herself on fire but was forced to do so because of the
domestic violence inflicted on her.
During cross-examination he could not say the name of the
Pradhan of Kakraban panchayat. He stated that he spoke with the Upapradhan who lives next door of that of the accused persons.
[14]
PW-7, WSI Hemlata Debbarma deposed that on 23.04.2020 in
connection with GBP GD entry No. 2 she conducted inquest over the dead body
of Souramita Sen aged about 24 years. The victim had suffered burnt injury
from head to toe. The witness identified the inquest report marked as Ext.
P2/1. She also seized some burnt hair and skin of the victim vide seizure list
dated 23.04.2020 (1645 hours) marked as Ext. P4/1. She also seized the
stomach, small intestine and liver etc. of the victim collected by the doctor vide
seizure list dated 23.04.2020 marked as Ext. P4/1.
During cross-examination she stated she was directed to conduct
only inquest. She did not record any statement of parents of the victim.
[15]
PW-8, Inspector Madhabi Debbarma deposed that on 22.04.2020
she was posted at Kakraban PS and on that day this case was endorsed her for
investigation. She identified the signature of Ramesh Yadav and the same was
marked as Ext. P1/1. She identified the printed FIR form marked Ext.P5. She
examined Bapi Sen, Kajal Sen. She visited the PO, seized one 2 liter mineral
water bottle containing kerosene oil vide seizure list dated 23.04.2020 (0830
hours) marked as Ext. P3/1. She prepared hand sketch map with index marked
as Ext.P6. She arrested Mihir Lal Shil and Maya Rani Shil and forwarded them
to the Court. The victim died on 23.04.2020 at GBP hospital at Agartala and on
17.06.2020 she handed over the case docket to the SDPO, Udaipur for further
investigation.
During cross-examination, she stated that she did not record any
statement of ASI Hemlata Debbarma nor did record any statement of DCM
Animesh Dhar.
[16]
PW-9, Animesh Dhar deposed that on 22.04.2020 he was posted
as Deputy Collector and Magistrate to the of the SDM, Sadar, On that day, as
per requisition from GB TOP vide GD No.15 dated 22.04.2020 and after having
visiting doctors certification he recorded Dying Declaration of the patient
Souramita Sen, 24 years who was admitted in the hospital with burn injuries
and was expected to die soon. Before recording her statement the patient was
found conscious, oriented to time, place and person and was declared to be fit
to give statement by the doctor. As per statement the incident happened in her
own residence at Kakraban, Udaipur, Gomati District on 22.04.2020 at about 9
am. She stated that her husband Sri Ripan Shil always used to scold her and
instigated her to commit suicide. She further stated that there was a long
family dispute between her and her husband and they have a son of 9 months.
On that day, on her husband's instigation, she resorted to commit suicide by
putting herself on fire. She held her husband fully responsible for that. As per
her version he recorded her statement and also obtained her RTI in the
statement in presence of visiting doctor Jaba Dewan. Identified the report
prepared by him marked as Ext P7 (as a whole).
During cross-examination, nothing came out relevant.
[17]
PW-10, Sri Raki Deb was declared hostile by the prosecution and
his statement was marked as Exbt. P-8/PW10 subject to confirm by IO.
During cross-examination, he stated that he was not examined by
IO.
[18]
PW-11, Sri Subrata Das who scribed the ejahar of the informant
and identified the same marked as Exbt. P-1/2.
During cross-examination, he stated that he knows Baspi Deb as
he is the Pradhan of her locality.
[19]
PW-12, Sri Dhruba Nath is the second IO of this case who stated
that he re-examined the witnesses who were already examined by the first IO.
He confirmed Exbt.P/8, collected the dying declaration and SFSL report and
also the final opinion of post mortem report from the doctor and identified the
SFSL report received by him in two sheets marked as Exbt.P/8. Identified the
report of the Toxicology Division in two sheets marked as Exbt.P/9 and finally
he laid charge-sheet and identified the same marked as Exbt.P/10.
During cross-examination, nothing came out relevant.
[20]
PW-13, Dr. Pulak Chakma deposed that on 23.04.2020, he was
posted as Tutor of Dept. of FMT, AGMC and GBP Hospital, Agartala. On that
day, he along with Dr. Sutirtha Dasgupta conducted the post mortem over the
dead body of Souramita Sen aged about 24 years in reference to G.B. TOP
GDE No.02, dated 23.04.2020. The inquest report with the body was received
at 12:41 pm on the same day and Autopsy was started at 01:05 pm to 02:25
pm. These are epidermal to dermo-epidermal burn injuries are present over
the face and front of neck in patches and the nape of neck (8% of body surface
area), front of chest and abdomen (18% body surface area), back of the trunk
(18% of body surface area), right upper limb (09% of body surface area), left
upper limb (09% of body surface area), right lower limb sparing sole of foot
(17% of body surface area), left lower limb sparing sole of foot (17% of body
surface area) and external genitalia (1% of body surface area) constituting
about 97% of total body surface area. Base of the burnt areas are reddish
brown in colour. On cut section no pus is seen coming out from the burnt
surfaces. Hair lines over the forehead and body hair are singed. Age of the
above mentioned burn injuries are fresh in duration at the time of death and
ante-mortem in nature. The brief history has also mentioned of the page no.3
of the report. Time of death was 12 to 18 hours from the time of post mortem.
The opinion was given by both of us and the opinion was that the cause of
death is shock resulting from 97% total body surface area burn injuries which
are caused by flame. However, viscera have been preserved and handed over
to police to rule out any associated poisoning/intoxication. On 23-03-2021, the
report from SFSL was received and thereafter, the final opinion was given by
both of us. The final opinion was one set of xerox coples (03 sheets) of
toxicological analysis report no. SFSL484/20/TOX/150/20/5513, dated 05-082020 issued by Tripura State Forensic Science Laboratory, Govt. of Tripura
along with original postmortem reports (01 set) have been received from 1.0.
Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Udaipur, Gomati District, Tripura. As per
toxicological analysis report, preserved viscera sample were negative for the
presence
of
common
organophosphorous,
organochloro,
carbamates,
pyrethroids group of pesticides, benzodiazepines, barbiturates group of drugs
and ethylalcohol. Finally he identified the postmortem report prepared by him
along with Mr. Dasgupta containing five sheets which was marked as Exbt.P/11
and identified the final opinion report dated 23.03.2021 marked Exbt.P/12.
During cross-examination, he stated that the fresh means the
Injury within 12 hours. It depends upon the capability of a person injured that
he can speak or not with 97% of the burn injury. Nothing more came out
relevant.
These are the sum and substance of the evidence on record of the
prosecution.
[21]
In course of hearing of argument Learned counsel for the
appellant relied upon few citations. Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India in
Appasaheb & Anr. versus State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2007 SC
763 in para No.9 observed as under :
“9. Two essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, apart from
others, are
(i) death of women is caused by any burns or bodily injury or
occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, and (ii)
women is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for "dowry". The explanation appended to sub-section
(1) of Section 304-B IPC says that "dowry" shall have the
same meaning as in Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under :"2. Definition of "dowry" - In this Act "dowry" means any
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given
either directly or indirectly(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any
other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other
person, at or before or any time after the marriage in
connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not
include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the
Muslim Personal Law (shariat) applies.
In view of the aforesaid definition of the word "dowry"
any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to
be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time
after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the
said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or
valuable security must have some connection with the
marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving
or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of
the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be
strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well known social custom
or practice in India. It is well settled principle of
interpretation of Statute that if the Act is passed with
reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and
words are used which everybody coversant with that trade,
business or transaction knows or understands to have a
particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as
having that particular meaning. (See Union of India v.
Garware Nylons Ltd., AIR (1996) SC 3509 and Chemicals and
Fibres of India v. Union of India, AIR (1997) SC 558). A
demand for money on account of some financial stringency or
for meeting some urgent domestic expenses of for purchasing
manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said
word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the
prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for
"dowry" as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act
was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for
was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for
purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section
304-B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established, the
conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.”
Referring the same, Learned counsel for the appellant drawn the
attention of the Court that since from the evidence of the prosecution, no
evidence found under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. So, there is no
scope to found the appellant to be guilty under Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act but the Learned Trial Court below failed to appreciate the same
and urged for acquitting the appellant from the said charge.
[22]
He also relied upon another citation of this High Court in Prwitish
Dutta and Ors. Versus State of Tripura reported in 2014(1) TLR 848
wherein in para No.31 this High Court has observed as under :
“31. In Inderpal v. State of M.P., 2002 Crl. LJ 926, the Apex
Court considered almost a similar nature of case where the
witnesses of that case stated that the deceased told them
regarding the harassment meted out to her by her husband
and held as under :
Before deciding that question we have to point out that the
High Court came to a conclusion that the allegation that she
committed suicide was not substantiated. A dying declaration
was recorded by the Executive Magistrate in which the
deceased had stated that she got burns accidentally from a
stove. If that be so, death could not be the result of either any
harassment or any cruelty which she was subjected to. In this
context we may point out that the State has not challenged
the finding of the High Court that death of Damyanti was not
due to commission of suicide.
Unless the statement of a dead person would fall within
the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act there
is no other provision under which the same can be admitted in
evidence. In order to make the statement of a dead person
admissible in law (written or verbal), the statement must be
as to the cause of her death or as to any of the circumstances
of the transactions which resulted in her death, in a case in
which the cause of death comes into question. By no stretch of
imagination can the statement of Damayanti contained in
Exhibit P7 or Exhibit P8 and those quoted by the witnesses be
connected with any circumstance of the transaction which
resulted in her death. Even that apart, when we are dealing
with an offence under section 498A, IPC disjuncted from the
offence under section 306 IPC the question of her death is not
an issue for consideration and on that premise also section
32(1) of the Evidence Act will stand at bay so far as these
materials are concerned.”
[23]
He further referred another citation of this High Court in Biplab
Chakraborty and Ors. Versus State of Tripura reported in (2011) 6 GLR
775 wherein in para Nos.31, 35 & 38 this High Court observed as under :
“31. Dowry means 'dos muliers. Lat' otherwise called
maritagium, or marriage goods, that which the wife brings to
the husband in marriage. This word should not be founded
with dower-Co. Lift 31-Wharton's law Lexicon. The definition
of dowry will also be available in section 2 of the Dowry
(Prohibition) Act, 1961. In common parlance, dowry means
where the husband or his relations demand valuable security
from the parents and other relations of the wife after the
marriage. In simple way we want to define the meaning of
dowry then we can say a price of marriage. We can say the
article demanded by the family of the bride as a price of
marriage. In Satbir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 633;
(2001 Crl. LJ 4625), the hon'ble Apex Court considered the
definition of "dowry" as defined under section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961, with reference to the offence under
section 304B of the IPC and held that it should be any
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in
connection with the marriage. Customary gift or payment in
connection with birth of child or other ceremonies unrelated
to the marriage ceremony, held do not fall within the ambit of
"dowry". The Apex Court also stated in the same judgment
that there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before
the marriage, second is at any time after marriage, the third
occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the crucial
word is 'in connection with the marriage of the said parties'.
This means that giving or agreeing to give any property or
valuable security on any of the above three stages should
have been in connection with the marriage of the parties.
There can be many other instances for payment of money or
giving property as between the spouses. For example, some
customary payments in connection with birth of a child or
other ceremonies prevalent indifferent societies. Such
payments are not enveloped within the ambit of "dowry".
35. In the case of Durga Prasad and another vs. State of M.P. :
2010 Crl.LJ 3479 the Apex court also stated that cruelty or
harassment soon before the death has to be proved in relation
to demand of dowry. In the instant case neither the mother
nor the father, i.e., PWs 2 and 3, stated specifically about the
demand of dowry. Therefore, it cannot be said that soon
before the death of the victim she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by the appellant for/or in connection with any
demand of dowry for treating such death as a dowry death. To
prove a dowry death the prosecution cannot escape from the
burden to prove that harassment or cruelty was meted out to
the victim by the husband or any relative of her husband soon
before her death. In the instant case, such evidence is totally
missing.
38. On scrutiny of the evidence of the witnesses particularly,
PW2 and PW12 and to some extent PW7, this court is of the
opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt. Rather a doubt remains in the mind
of this court regarding the involvement of the appellants in
the alleged offence as there is no direct evidence relating to
physical and mental torture upon the victim except the
statement made by the deceased to PW12 which are not
admissible evidence in view of the provisions of sub-section
(1) of section 32 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, there is no
other option except to set aside the judgment and order dated
09.04.2009 and 13.04.2009 respectively as impugned in the
instant appeal.”
Referring the same, Learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that since in this case, the parents of the victim whatever they deposed before
the Court they stated the same after hearing the same from the victim. But,
since the victim is no more, so from her dying declaration, it is crystal clear
that the victim did not divulge any incriminating word showing involvement of
the appellant with the alleged crime and furthermore, the other witnesses who
appeared before the Court to support the prosecution case, also did not hear
anything directly from the victim rather they also heard the fact. So no reliance
could be placed upon their evidence.
[24]
So, Learned Counsel stated on the face of the evidence on record,
there is also no scope to presume the appellant to be guilty punishable under
Section 498A of IPC. But the Learned Court, according to the appellant, misappreciated the evidence on record and found the appellant guilty for the
charge punishable under Section 498A of IPC. So, Learned counsel for the
appellant also urged for allowing this appeal and to set aside the judgment
delivered by Learned Trial Court.
[25]
On the other hand, Learned Addl. P.P. taking part in the hearing
relied upon one citation Ganeshlal versus State of Maharashtra dated
10.04.1992 reported in (1992) 3 SCC 106 wherein in para Nos.11 and 12,
the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
“11. From this evidence it is clear that the accused appellant
and his family members were present in the house at the time
when the deceased was burning due to fire lit after pouring
kerosene on her and they made no attempt to save her. The
contention that the Doctor had stated that the death was
instantaneous and nothing was left for the appellant and the
other family members to save her, is unacceptable. The
normal ordinary human conduct would be that when one of
their inmates, namely Kanchana was in flames, they would
have made every endeavour to save her life, if it were a case
of suicide, and call the people to come to their rescue to save
her life or at least would have sought first aid from PW-6, who
is next door neighbour, to save the life of the deceased. No
such attempt was made nor even attempted. On the other
hand the appellant's earliest attempt was to misguide that
Kanchana died due to short circuit. This attempt was burried
fathom deep from the evidence of PW.10, Elect. Engr. Then
they set up the plea of suicide. We have Ex. 73, the first
information report, immediately lodged by A-6 with the police.
We need not go into the question as to what extend the
admission by a co-accused would be used against the
appellant. Suffice it to state that in his examination under
Section 313 Cr. P.C., the appellant admitted that A-6 went to
the Police Station and gave FIR Ex-73, to the Head Constable,
PW11 and that A-6 stated that the deceased caught fire while
she was handling the wet clothes for drying, due to short
circuit. In Ex-73, it was also stated that this information was
conveyed by the appellant himself. This admission is not only
a relevant fact under Section 8 of Evidence Act as res gestae
but a most important circumstance against the appellant. The
indifferent and hard-hearted conduct are also important
circumstances. It was also admitted that the walls in the room
became blackish due to smoke. It is settled law that the
conduct of an accused in an offence previous and subsequent
to the crime are relevant facts. Absence of any attempt to
save the life of the deceased Kanchana while she was burning
and was charred to death, their conduct in not attempting to
give any medical aid, the conduct of the appellant immediately
after the deceased was soaked with kerosene and litting fire
after clossing the door A-6 obviously opened it after ensuring
that she had died, the appellant's coming down and standing
at the grill gate on ground floor; the appellant shouted that
uncle A-6 should close down falsely proclaimed that there was
short circuit; implying to scare away the people from
attempting to save Kanchana. These are most telling and
relevant crucial facts apart from repulsive inhuman conduct.
The false plea of suicide is yet another relevant fact. When the
death had occurred in their custody the appellant is under an
obligation in Section 313 Cr. P.C. statement at least to give a
plausible explanation for the cause of her death. No such
attempt was even made excepting denying the prosecution
case. These facts completely are inconsistent with the
innocence, but consistent with the hypothesis that the
appellant is a prime accused in the commission of gruesome
murder of his wife. The circumstantial evidence thus discussed
is complete and consistent with the only conclusion that the
inmates alone committed the crime and the appellant was one
among them.
12. The evidence on record does establish that more than one
would be participants to murder Kanchana. The absence of an
appeal against acquittal of A-1 and A-3 to A-6, namely, Hiralal,
Ayodhyabai, Premlata, Aruna and Rameshwar, all of them or
who among them shared common intention with the appellant
is obviated. The appellant is the principal perpetrator of the
crime or one among the accused that shared common
intention to murder Kanchana. The conviction of the appellant
is accordingly altered to one under Section 302 read with
Section 34 I.P.C. The appellant is convicted for the murder of
his wife, Kanchana under Section 302 read with Section
34 I.P.C. and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for life. The conviction under Section 201 is set aside. The
judgment and order of the High Court is confirmed with the
above modification. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”
Referring the same, Learned Addl. P.P. submitted that from the
evidence on record it appears that the present appellant and her son
demanded dowry and caused cruelty upon the victim for which the Learned
Court below has rightly found the present appellant to be guilty and convicted
her and there is no scope to interfere with the judgment.
[26]
From the evidence on record, it appears to me that when the FIR
was laid the victim was admitted in the hospital with burn injury but later on
she succumbed to her injury. So, the evidence of the victim could not be
recorded. Now, from the evidence on record as discussed above, it appears
that none of the witnesses during their examination uttered that they had seen
to cause cruelty to the victim by the present appellant physically. But it is
expected that in mental cruelty, it is very difficult to get any direct witness of
the alleged occurrence. The parents of the victim stated that the present
appellant and her son demanded dowry. For the sake of convenience, I would
like to refer herein below the definition of “Dowry” as provided under Section 2
of the Dowry Prohibition Act which provides as under :
“2. Definition of “dowry”.- In this Act, “dowry” means any
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given
either directly or indirectly(a) by one party to marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any
other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other
person, at or before [or any time after the marriage] [in
connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not
include] dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.”
Further, the punishment provided under Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act also provides as under :
“[4. Penalty for demanding dowry.-If any person demands,
directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or
guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any
dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend
to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand
rupees:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special
reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence
of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.]”
From the aforesaid definition of “Dowry” as mentioned above and
also on perusal of the evidence on record nowhere I find that the aforesaid
ingredients of dowry as required by law could be proved by the prosecution
against the present appellant showing her punishment for the offence
punishable under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. So, in absence of
cogent evidence on record, it appears that the judgment of the Learned Trial
Court in respect of punishment provided under Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act against the appellant cannot be sustained in the eye of law.
[27]
Now, regarding charge framed under Section 498A of the IPC I
would like to refer herein below the relevant provision of Section 498A of IPC
which provides as under :
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting
her to cruelty. -Whoever, being the husband or the relative of
the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall
be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty”
means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on
account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand.”
[28]
Here, in the case at hand, from the evidence on record it appears
that none of the witnesses stated during their examination before the Court
that they have/had seen the present appellant to cause any cruelty upon the
victim for dowry at any point of time. From the evidence of the parents of the
victim it appears that whatever they deposed, they deposed everything after
hearing the same from the victim of this case and other witnesses of the
prosecution also deposed after hearing the said fact from the parents of the
victim but as the victim succumbed to her injury, so, her evidence is not on
record. Now, prosecution in this case relied upon the dying declaration which
was recorded by PW-9, Sri Animesh Dhar, DCM. From the dying declaration
which has been exhibited in this case it appears that there is not a single
whisper showing implication of the present appellant with the alleged charge
punishable under Section 498A of IPC.
[29]
Situated thus, on the face of evidence on record, and in view of
the principles of law laid down by this High Court in the afore noted cases, it
appears that the prosecution has also failed to prove the charge beyond
reasonable doubt against the present appellant also under Section 498A of
IPC. However, the Learned Trial Court below in my considered opinion has
failed to appreciate the evidence on record at the time of delivery of the
judgment for which in the considered opinion of this Court the judgment of the
Learned Trial Court below in respect of punishment of the present appellant is
liable to be interfered with.
[30]
In the result, the appeal filed by the present appellant is hereby
allowed. The judgment and order of conviction dated 31.05.2024 delivered by
Learned Sessions Judge, Gomati Tripura, Udaipur in connection with Case
No.ST 49 of 2021 in respect of this appellant is hereby set aside and she is at
liberty. Her surety also stands discharged.
JUDGE
SABYASACHI
BHATTACHARJEE
Sabyasachi B
SABYASACHI
BHATTACHARJEE
Date: 2024.12.09 15:47:19
+05'30'
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