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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
R
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.SRISHANANDA
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO. 100015 OF 2021
(397(CR.PC)/438(BNSS))
BETWEEN:
SMT. MAHADEVI W/O. YALLAPPA BAGI
AGE. 57 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. BANAHATTI, TQ. JAMKHANDI,
DIST. BAGALKOT, 587311.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. ASHRITH S. PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. PRASHANT F.
GOUDAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
CHANDRASHEKAR
LAXMAN
KATTIMANI
Location: High
Court of Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench.
KRISHI LAXMI AGRO INDUSTRIES 1-C, KIADB
PLOT, TARIHAL INDUSTRIAL AREA,
TARIHAL , HUBLI, TQ. HUBLI,
DIST. DHARWAD
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR
SMT.HEMA W/O. JAGADISH PATIL
AGE. 35 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS,
R/O. TARIHAL, HUBLI-580032, TQ. HUBLI, DIST.
DHARWAD.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. AKIT DESAI, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B.
HIREMATH, ,ADVOCATE)
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED U/S 397 (1) R/W
401 OF CR.P.C. 1973, PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS OF THE CASE
BEARING C.C.NO.638/2009 FROM THE COURT OF THE LEARNED JMFC,
BANAHATTI AND THE RECORDS OF CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.36/2017
FROM THE COURT OF THE LEARNED 1ST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, BAGALKOT SITTING AT JAMKHANDI AND ALLOW
THE PRESENT REVISION PETITION AND SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
AND ORDER DATED 13/03/2020 IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.36/2017
(PRODUCED VIDE ANNEXURE-A) PASSED 1ST ADDL. DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, BAGALKOT SITTING AT JAMKHANDI CONFIRMING
THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF CONVICTION DATED 08/05/2017
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PASSED BY THE LEARNED JMFC, BANAHATTI IN C.C.NO.638/2009 FOR
THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 138 OF THE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, (PRODUCED VIDE ANNEXURE-B).
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
ORAL ORDER
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.SRISHANANDA)
Heard Sri.Arshith Patil, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of Sri.Prashant F. Goudar, learned counsel for the
revision petitioner and Sri.Ankith Desai, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri.Mallikarjunswamy B. Hiremath,
learned counsel for the respondent.
2.
petitioner
Accused in CC No.638/2009 is the revision
challenging
the
conviction
of
the
revision
petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act and as against the cheque
amount of Rs.3,80,000/-, fine amount of Rs.7,65,000/- was
ordered of which sum of Rs.7,60,000/- was ordered to be
paid as compensation with default sentence of one year and
Rs.5,000/- was ordered to be paid as defraying expenses of
the State.
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3.
The order of the learned Trial Magistrate was
challenged in Crl.A.No.36/2017 and learned Judge in the
First
Appellate
Court
by
considered
judgment
dated
13.03.2020 dismissed the said appeal.
4.
Facts in brief which are utmost necessary for
disposal of the revision petition are as under:
4.1.
Section
Complainant filed a private complaint under
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure
(hereinafter
‘Cr.P.C.’ for short) alleging the commission of offence under
Section
of
the
Negotiable
Instruments
Act
by
contending that complainant is a registered manufacturer,
dealer and supplier of all types of tractor and trailers,
agricultural implements, rolling shutters, fabrication and
general engineering works in the name and style of ‘Krashi
Laxmi Agro Industries’ situated at Tarihal Industrial Area,
Hubballi.
4.2.
Accused approached the complainant for the
purpose of development of her agricultural activities and
placed order for two trailers and four wheeler bearing
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chassis Nos.KLAI-0053 and KLAI-0054 with the complainant
in a sum of Rs.3,85,000/-. The invoice was raised in that
regard and delivery challan dated 25.11.2007, in the
presence of the witnesses and promise to make the
payment within a month after the supply of the trailers.
4.3.
As per the request of the accused, complainant
gave a concession in a sum of Rs.5,000/- and a cheque
came to be issued in a sum of Rs.3,80,000/- drawn on
Vijaya Bank, Banahatti Branch, Jamakhandi Taluk towards
the payment of trailers.
4.4.
Believing the words of the accused, complainant
presented the said cheque for collection which came to be
dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’.
4.5.
Demand was made for payment of the amount
covered under the cheque, wherein accused has requested
that cheque be represented so that it would be honoured.
Therefore,
complainant
represented
the
cheque
on
08.05.2008 and again, cheque was dishonored for ‘want of
funds’ on 13.05.2008.
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4.6.
Left with no alternative, legal notice was caused
which was duly served on the accused but failed to pay the
amount covered under the cheque nor any reply was sent.
4.7.
Therefore, complainant was constrained to file
the complaint seeking recovery of the amount covered
under the cheque and suitable action against the accused.
5.
necessary
Learned
Trial
formalities,
Magistrate
recorded
the
after
completing
evidence
of
the
complainant and Bank Manager who is examined as C.W.2.
6.
On behalf of the complainant, 17 documentary
evidence were placed on record comprising of General
Power of Attorney executed by the complainant Industry in
favour of C.W.1, original cheque bearing No.035746 dated
30.12.2007,
bank
endorsement,
legal
notice,
postal
acknowledgement, signatures of the accused, tax paid
receipts,
temporary
registration
of
the
complainant
industry, Value Added Tax registration certificate of the
complainant industry, Income Tax Pan Services of the
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complainant unit, tax payers counter foil, statement of
account.
7.
record
As against the material evidence placed on
by
the
complainant,
there
was
no
oral
or
documentary evidence placed on record by the accused.
8.
Learned Trial Magistrate after recording the
accused statement, noted that the cheque belonged to the
accused and signature found therein is also belonging to the
accused and there was no money in the account of the
accused as on the date of presentation of the cheque on
two occasions vide Ex.P.17 - statement of account and
raised statutory presumption under Section 139 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act and convicted the accused and
passed the sentence as referred to supra.
9.
Being aggrieved by the same, accused filed an
appeal before the First Appellate Court in Crl.A.No.36/2017.
10.
Learned Judge in the First Appellate Court after
securing the records, heard the arguments of the parties in
detail.
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11.
During the course of hearing of the appeal,
additional evidence was sought to be placed on record by
the accused by filing an application under Section 391 of
Cr.P.C.
12.
Learned Judge in the First Appellate Court noted
that the material evidence placed on record was sufficient
enough to reappreicate the case of the appellant and did
not deem it necessary to consider the additional evidence
and therefore, dismissed the application seeking additional
evidence and consequently, dismissed the appeal.
13.
Being further aggrieved by the same, accused is
before this Court, in this revision petition on following
grounds:
“The Petitioner has not filed any other petition or
revision before any other Court, Forum or Authority.
The Petitioner did not have any other alternative
remedy than filing of the present Application for
additional evidence under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C.
The Learned Sessions Judge failed to note that, there
was a serious dispute as regards to the delivery of 2
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(two) Trailers bearing Chassis No. KLAI-0053 and KLAI0054.
The Appellate Court (Learned Sessions Judge) failed to
note that, there was not sale transaction between the
complainant and the accused and hence the question of
creation of legally recoverable outstanding debt, does
not arise.
The Learned Sessions Judge committed a grave error in
not considering the interim application filed by the
Petitioner herein under Section 391 and Section 340(2)
of the Cr.P.C.
The Learned Sessions Judge ought to have passed an
order on I.A. No. 1 filed by the present petitioner under
Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. and could have exercised his
power under Section 391 of the Cr. P.C.
The Learned Sessions Judge ought to have entertained
the additional evidence furnished by the petitioner and
either decided to take such evidence to itself or directed
the Magistrate to take the same.
The
Learned
Sessions
Judge
though
has
clearly
observed that, the application has been filed under
Section 391 of the Cr.P.C., has completely ignored the
consideration of the same while passing the impugned
order dismissing the appeal of the petitioner confirming
the Judgement of the Trial Court.
The Leaned Sessions Judge failed to consider the
endorsement given by the Regional Transport Officer
(RTO) regarding non-availability of registration details
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of Trailers bearing Chassis No. KLAR-0053 and KLAI0054 in the year 2007 and also failed to consider the
documents produced by the Petitioner showing the
issuance of Sales Certificate in Form No. 21 by the
Respondent/Complainant herself showing the sale of
Trailers bearing KLAI-0053 and KLAI-0054 to one
Mr.Siddappa Yallappa B. Patil of Nagaral village in
Mudhol Taluka of Bagalkot District on 29.03.2010 and
registered before the Assistant Regional Transport
Officer (ARTO), Jamkhandi on 29.03.2010. Here, this
particular document of Sales Certificate issued under
Rule 47(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicle Rules, has been
issued by the Assistant Regional Transport Officer
(ARTO), Jamkhandi under RTI disclosing the sale of the
Trailers bearing Chassis No. KLAI-0053 and KLAI-0054
to Mr.Siddappa Yallappa B. Patil and not the present
Petitioner/Accused and further disclosing that, both the
said Trailers having been registered and given vehicle
No. KA-48 T-6231 and KA-48 T-6232. The present
Petitioner vide Memo dated09.01.2020 placed before
the Learned Single Judge the actual status of the
Trailers bearing chassis No. KLAI-0053 and KLAI-0054
sold by the complainant. These documents would
clearly establish the fact that, the documents as Exhibit
P-10 and P11 produced by the Respondent/Complainant
as delivery challans are created and concocted.
The Learned Sessions Judge committed a grave error in
relying upon the documents of Tax Invoice marked as
Exhibit P-10 and document of Delivery Challan marked
at Exhibit P11. These 2 (two) documents does not
confirm to the requirement of the issuance of Sales
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Certificate in Form 41 under Rule 47(1) of the Motor
Vehicle Rules. If really these Trailers were sold by the
Respondent/Complainant
to
the
Petitioner/Accused,
there would have been certainly documents registered
with the registering authority on the confirmation of
sale
by the
Respondent/Complaint. Therefore, the
Learned Sessions Judge has denied the opportunity to
rebut the presumptions by the Petitioner by denying to
permit the Petitioner from producing evidence and
raising her defence.
The Learned Sessions Judge failed to note that, the Trial
Court, Learned Magistrate, Banahatti had allowed the
application filed by the Petitioner herein under Section
259 of Cr.P.C. r/w. Section 143 of N.1.Act, 1881
converting the case from Summary Trail to Warrant
Trail case on 06.07.2015.
The Learned Sessions Judge also failed to note that, the
Magistrate below has not provided any opportunity to
the Petitioner/Accused to lead evidence immediately
after
the
conclusion
of
the
evidence
of
the
Respondent/Complainant on 05.04.2017.
The Learned Sessions Judge has squarely relied upon
the
documents
produced
by
the
Respondent/Complainant vide Exhibit P10 and P11
which does not confirm to be Tax Invoice or Sales
Certificate as mandated under Rule 47 of the Motor
Vehicle Rules.
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The Learned Sessions Judge failed to note that, the
Petitioner/Accused herein has been deprived of an
opportunity to rebut the presumption by the Magistrate
while rejecting the application filed by the Petitioner
herein
seeking
for
Respondent/Complainant
to
direction
to
the
produce
the
Sales
Certificate and registration details of the 2 (two)
Trailers bearing Chassis No. KLAI-0053 and KLAI-0054
under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. on 28.12.2016.
Both the Courts below have miserably failed to note
that, there was no sale transaction between the
Respondent/Complainant and the Petitioner/Accused
herein and therefore there was no question of creation
of any outstanding debt by the Petitioner.
The Learned Sessions Judge failed to note that, there
are not valid and sufficient reasons for awarding double
cheque amount towards compensation without any
basis.
The Learned Magistrate as well as Learned Sessions
Judge have not given any reason for awarding the
double cheque amount as the compensation from
Petitioner/Accused.
It is submitted that, the Petitioner has been deprived of
valuable right to defend herself and thereby rebut the
presumption
arisen
Respondent/Complainant.
in
favour
of
the
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The Learned Session Judge ought not to have decided
the appeal bearing Criminal Appeal No. 36/2017 on
merit without deciding the interim application filed by
the Petitioner under Section 391 of Cr.P.C.
The Learned Sessions Judge as well as Magistrate have
failed to note that, there is no outstanding legally
returnable debt as against the present Petitioner from
the Respondent/Complainant. Therefore, the question
of issuance of cheque in lieu of discharge of debit
outstanding does not arise.
The Learned Sessions Judge as well as Magistrate have
failed to consider the settled position of Law declared by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. There was no fair
trial and providing an opportunity was not given to the
Petitioner/Accused to raise her defence and prove
innocence. Adducing evidence in support of the defence
is a valuable right. Denial of such right will lead denial
to a fair trial.
The Learned Sessions Judge has miserably failed to
note that, the Trial Court has not provided any
opportunity to the present Petitioner/Accused to lead
her defence evidence, on the contra the Trial Court
though was trying Warrant Trial Case, as on the
conclusion of the Respondent/Complainant witness, has
posted the matter for settlement under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C. by ignoring to provide opportunity to the
defence.
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The conduct of the Trial Court in C.C.No.638/2009 by
the JMFC, Banahatti and the hearing of the Appeal vide
Criminal Appeal No. 36/2017 by the Learned Ist
Additional District & Sessions Judge, has seriously
resulted into a graved mis-carriage of justice causing
denial of access to justice to the Petitioner.”
14.
Learned
counsel
for
the
revision
petitioner
reiterating the grounds urged in the revision petition
vehemently contended that the approach of the First
Appellate Court in not considering the additional evidence
has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice which would
actually establish that accused was innocent of the offence
alleged against her and therefore, sought for allowing the
revision petition and allow the additional evidence and remit
the matter to the First Appellate Court for fresh disposal in
accordance with law.
15.
He would emphasize that the trailers were not at
all delivered to the accused and therefore, the additional
evidence would throw light on to the defence that has been
taken by the accused and thus, sought for allowing the
revision petition.
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16.
He would also emphasize that there was no
legally recoverable debt covered under Ex.P.2 – cheque and
therefore, the order passed by the learned Trial Magistrate
confirmed by the First Appellate Court is suffering from
serious legal infirmity and thus, sought for allowing the
revision petition.
17.
Per
contra,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent/complainant supports the impugned orders.
18.
He would further contend that the material on
record would conclusively establish that the cheque at
Ex.P.2 came to be issued by the revision petitioner for
purchase of two trailers and therefore, the initial burden
was discharged by placing invoice and necessary documents
by the complainant.
19.
He
would
also
contend
that
to
rebut
the
presumption available to the complainant under Section 139
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, accused has not at all
rebutted by stepping into the witness box or by effective
cross-examination or by placing documentary evidence on
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record and therefore, the learned Trial Magistrate convicting
the accused is just and proper.
20.
It is also his contention that the First Appellate
Court did not deem it necessary to consider the additional
evidence inasmuch as the transaction stood proved and the
additional defence that was sought to be placed on record
was an afterthought and post transaction documents and
therefore, had no bearing whatsoever on the disputed
question in the lis and thus, rejection thereof is just and
proper and sought for dismissing the revision petition.
21.
In
reply,
learned
counsel
for
the
revision
petitioner places reliance on the following judgments:
i.
In
the
case
of
Brigadier
Sukhjeet
Singh
(Retired) MVC v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others reported in (2019) 16 SCC 712 wherein in
paragraph Nos.23 to 26 is held as under:
“23. The key words in Section 391(1) are “if it
thinks additional evidence to be necessary”. The
word “necessary” used in Section 391(1) is to mean
necessary for deciding the appeal. The appeal has
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been
filed
by
the
accused,
who
have
been
convicted. The powers of the appellate court are
contained in Section 386. In an appeal from a
conviction, an appellate court can exercise power
under Section 386(b), which is to the following
effect:
“386. (b) in an appeal from a conviction—
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and
acquit or discharge the accused, or order him
to be re-tried by a court of competent
jurisdiction subordinate to such appellate
court or committed for trial, or
(ii)
alter
the
finding,
maintaining
the
sentence, or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter
the nature or the extent, or the nature and
extent, of the sentence, but not so as to
enhance the same;”
24. Power to take additional evidence under Section
391 is, thus, with an object to appropriately decide
the appeal by the appellate court to secure ends of
justice. The scope and ambit of Section 391 CrPC
has come up for consideration before this Court
in Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B. [Rajeswar
Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., AIR 1965 SC 1887 :
(1965) 2 Cri LJ 817] Hidayatullah, J., speaking for
the Bench held that a wide discretion is conferred
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on the appellate courts and the additional evidence
may be necessary for a variety of reasons. He held
that additional evidence must be necessary not
because
it
would
be
impossible
to
pronounce
judgment but because there would be failure of
justice without it. Following was laid down in paras
8 and 9: (AIR p. 1892)
“8. … Since a wide discretion is conferred on
appellate
courts,
the
limits
of
that
courts'
jurisdiction must obviously be dictated by the
exigency of the situation and fair play and good
sense appear to be the only safe guides. There
is, no doubt, some analogy between the power
to order a retrial and the power to take
additional evidence. The former is an extreme
step appropriately taken if additional evidence
will not suffice. Both actions subsume failure of
justice as a condition precedent. There the
resemblance ends and it is hardly proper to
construe one section with the aid of observations
made by this Court in the interpretation of the
other section.
9. Additional evidence may be necessary for a
variety of reasons which it is hardly necessary
(even if was possible) to list here. We do not
propose to do what the legislature has refrained
from doing, namely, to control discretion of the
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appellate court to certain stated circumstances.
It
may,
however,
be
said
that
additional
evidence must be necessary not because it
would be impossible to pronounce judgment but
because there would be failure of justice without
it. The power must be exercised sparingly and
only in suitable cases. Once such action is
justified, there is no restriction on the kind of
evidence which may be received. It may be
formal or substantial. It must, of course, not be
received in such a way as to cause prejudice to
the accused as for example it should not be
received as a disguise for a retrial or to change
the nature of the case against him. The order
must not ordinarily be made if the prosecution
has had a fair opportunity and has not availed of
it unless the requirements of justice dictate
otherwise.”
25. This
Court
again
in Rambhau v. State
Maharashtra [Rambhau v. State
of
of
Maharashtra,
(2001) 4 SCC 759 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 812] had noted
the power under Section 391 CrPC of the appellate
court. Following was stated in paras 1 and 2: (SCC
p. 761)
“1. There is available a very wide discretion in
the matter of obtaining additional evidence in
terms of Section 391 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
A
plain
look
at
the
statutory
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provisions
(Section
391)
would
reveal
the
same…
2. A word of caution however, ought to be
introduced
for
guidance,
to
wit:
that
this
additional evidence cannot and ought not to be
received in such a way so as to cause any
prejudice to the accused. It is not a disguise for
a retrial or to change the nature of the case
against the accused. This Court in Rajeswar
Prasad Misra v. State of W.B. [Rajeswar Prasad
Misra v. State of W.B., AIR 1965 SC 1887 :
(1965) 2 Cri LJ 817] in no uncertain terms
observed that the order must not ordinarily be
made
if
the
prosecution
has
had
a
fair
opportunity and has not availed of it. This Court
was candid enough to record however, that it is
the concept of justice which ought to prevail and
in the event, the same dictates exercise of
power as conferred by the Code, there ought not
to be any hesitation in that regard.”
26. From the law laid down by this Court as noted
above, it is clear that there are no fetters on the
power under Section 391 CrPC of the appellate
court. All powers are conferred on the court to
secure ends of justice. The ultimate object of
judicial administration is to secure ends of justice.
Court exists for rendering justice to the people.”
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ii.
In the case of Indus Airways Private Limited v.
Magnum Aviation Private Limited and Another
reported
in
(2014)
SCC 539
wherein
paragraph Nos.9 to 15 it has been held as under:
“9. The Explanation appended to Section 138
explains the meaning of the expression “debt or
other liability” for the purpose of Section 138. This
expression means a legally enforceable debt or
other
liability.
Section
treats
dishonoured
cheque as an offence, if the cheque has been issued
in discharge of any debt or other liability. The
Explanation leaves no manner of doubt that to
attract an offence under Section 138, there should
be a legally enforceable debt or other liability
subsisting on the date of drawal of the cheque. In
other words, drawal of the cheque in discharge of
an existing or past adjudicated liability is sine qua
non for bringing an offence under Section 138. If a
cheque is issued as an advance payment for
purchase of the goods and for any reason purchase
order is not carried to its logical conclusion either
because
of
its
cancellation
or
otherwise,
and
material or goods for which purchase order was
placed is not supplied, in our considered view, the
cheque cannot be held to have been drawn for an
existing debt or liability. The payment by cheque in
in
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the nature of advance payment indicates that at the
time of drawal of cheque, there was no existing
liability.
10. In Swastik
Coaters [Swastik
Coaters
(P)
Ltd. v. Deepak Bros., 1997 Cri LJ 1942 (AP)] , the
Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
while considering the Explanation to Section 138
held:
“…
Explanation
to
Section
of
the
Negotiable Instruments Act clearly makes it
clear that the cheque shall be relatable to an
enforceable liability or debt, and as on the date
of the issuing of the cheque there was no
existing liability in the sense that the title in the
property had not passed on to the accused
since the goods were not delivered. …”
11. The
Gujarat
High
Court
in Shanku
Concretes [Shanku Concretes (P) Ltd. v. State of
Gujarat, 2000 Cri LJ 1988 (Guj)] dealing with
Section 138 of the NI Act held that to attract
Section 138 of the NI Act, there must be subsisting
liability or debt on the date when the cheque was
delivered. The very fact that the payment was
agreed to some future date and there was no debt
or liability on the date of delivery of the cheques
would take the case out of the purview of Section
138 of the NI Act. While holding so, the Gujarat
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High Court followed a decision of the Madras High
Court in Balaji Seafoods [Balaji Seafoods Exports
(India) Ltd. v. Mac Industries Ltd., (1999) 1 CTC 6
(Mad)] .
12. In Balaji Seafoods [Balaji Seafoods Exports
(India) Ltd. v. Mac Industries Ltd., (1999) 1 CTC 6
(Mad)] , the Madras High Court held: (CTC pp. 8-9,
para 7)
“7. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act makes it clear that where the cheque drawn
by a person on an account maintained by him
with a banker for payment of any amount of
money to another person from out of that
account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of
any debt or other liability, is returned by the
bank unpaid, either because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of that account is
insufficient to honour the cheque or that it
exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from
that account by an agreement made with that
bank, such person shall be deemed to have
committed an offence under Section 138 of the
Act. The Explanation reads that for the purposes
of this section, ‘debt or other liability’ means a
legally enforceable debt or liability.”
13. The
Kerala
High
Court
in Ullas [Supply
House v. Ullas, 2006 Cri LJ 4330 (Ker)] had an
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occasion to consider Section 138 of the NI Act. In
that case, the post-dated cheque was issued by the
accused along with the order for supply of goods.
The
supply
of
goods
was
not
made
by
the
complainant. The accused first instructed the bank
to stop payment against the cheque and then
requested the complainant not to present the
cheque as he had not supplied the goods. The
cheque was dishonoured. The Single Judge of the
Kerala High Court held:
“… Ext. P-1 cheque cannot be stated to be
one issued in discharge of the liability to the
tune of the amount covered by it, which was
really issued, as is revealed by Ext. D-1, as the
price amount for 28 numbers of mixies, which
the complainant had not supplied. …”
14. The reasoning of the Delhi High Court in the
impugned order [Magnum Aviation (P) Ltd. v. State,
(2010) 172 DLT 91 : (2010) 118 DRJ 505] is as
follows: (DRJ p. 508, para 8)
“8. If at the time of entering into a contract it
is one of the conditions of the contract that the
purchaser has to pay the amount in advance
then advance payment is a liability of the
purchaser. The seller of the items would not
have entered into contract unless the advance
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payment was made to him. A condition of
advance payment is normally put by the seller
for the reason that the purchaser may not later
on retract and refuse to take the goods either
manufactured for him or procured for him.
Payment of cost of the goods in advance being
one of the conditions of the contract becomes
liability of the purchaser. The purchaser who had
issued the cheque could have been asked to
make payment either by draft or in cash. Since
giving cheque is a mode of payment like any
other mode of payment, it is normally accepted
as a payment. The issuance of a cheque at the
time
of
signing
such
contract
has
to
be
considered against a liability as the amount
written in the cheque is payable by the person
on the date mentioned in the cheque. Where the
seller or manufacturer, on the basis of cheques
issued, manufactures the goods or procures the
goods from outside, and has acted upon the
contract, the liability of the purchaser gets
fastened, the moment the seller or manufacturer
acts upon the contract and procures the goods.
If for any reason, the seller fails to manufacture
the goods or procure the goods it is only under
those circumstances that no liability is created.
However, where the goods or raw material have
been procured for the purchaser by seller or
goods have been manufactured by the seller, it
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cannot be said that the cheques were not issued
against the liability. I consider that if the liability
is not construed in this manner, the sole purpose
of making dishonour of the cheque as an offence
stands defeated. The purpose of making or
enacting Section 138 of the NI Act was to
enhance
the
acceptability
of
cheque
in
settlement of commercial transactions, to infuse
trust into commercial transactions and to make
a cheque as a reliable negotiable instrument and
to see that the cheques of business transactions
are not dishonoured. The purpose of Negotiable
Instrument Act is to make an orderly statement
of rules of law relating to negotiable instruments
and
to
ensure
that
mercantile
instruments
should be equated with goods passing from one
hand to other. The sole purpose of the Act would
stand defeated if after placing orders and giving
advance
payments,
the
stop
payments
are
issued and orders are cancelled on the ground of
pricing of the goods as was done in this case.”
15. The above reasoning of the Delhi High Court
is clearly flawed inasmuch as it failed to keep in mind
the fine distinction between civil liability and criminal
liability under Section 138 of the NI Act. If at the
time of entering into a contract, it is one of the
conditions of the contract that the purchaser has to
pay the amount in advance and there is breach of
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such condition then purchaser may have to make
good the loss that might have occasioned to the
seller but that does not create a criminal liability
under Section 138. For a criminal liability to be made
out under Section 138, there should be legally
enforceable debt or other liability subsisting on the
date of drawal of the cheque. We are unable to
accept the view of the Delhi High Court that the
issuance of cheque towards advance payment at the
time of signing such contract has to be considered as
subsisting liability and dishonour of such cheque
amounts to an offence under Section 138 of the NI
Act. The Delhi High Court has travelled beyond the
scope of Section 138 of the NI Act by holding that
the purpose of enacting Section 138 of the NI Act
would stand defeated if after placing orders and
giving advance payments, the instructions for stop
payments are issued and orders are cancelled. In
what we have discussed above, if a cheque is issued
as an advance payment for purchase of the goods
and for any reason purchase order is not carried to
its logical conclusion either because of its cancellation
or
otherwise
and material or
goods for
which
purchase order was placed is not supplied by the
supplier, in our considered view, the cheque cannot
be said to have been drawn for an existing debt or
liability.”
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iii.
In the case of Sri. Veeramaheswara Credit CoOperative
Society
Ltd.
v.
Sri.
C.H.
Veerabhadrappa reported in 2013 SCC OnLine
KAR 349, in paragraph Nos.8 and 9, it has been
held as under:
“8. As there are two different cheques in both the
criminal cases and the signature on the cheque - Ex. P2
is not in dispute, a presumption arises under S. 139 of
NI Act to the effect that the cheque was issued towards
repayment
of
dues.
Anyhow,
to
rebut
the
said
presumption though the respondent has placed reliance
on the document Ex. D1. Subsequent to filing of this
appeal the appellant has produced the documents i.e.,
copy of loan application/sanction order, copy of loan
agreement, copy of promissory note and the copy of
revenue receipt. Perusal of these documents would
reveal that the respondent has raised loan of Rs.
20,000 but anyhow, these documents will have to be
proved by the appellant in accordance with law. As the
appellant is a co-operative society, it appears that in
the interest of justice, the matter requires remittal.
9. So far as service of notice is concerned, the Trial
Court has observed that on the acknowledgement - Ex.
P7, the address of respondent is on a piece of paper
which has been pasted. Therefore, it appears that it is
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not accepted as Ex. P7 is a document to prove the
service of notice to respondent, but anyhow the
endorsement made by postal official to obtain the
signature of the addressee, the words referred to
therein are on both the acknowledgment and also on
pasted address. Hence, an inference could be drawn
that the address was pasted prior to the endorsement
made
by
the
postal
official
under
Ex.
P7.
This
circumstance will have to be considered by the Trial
Court while disposing of the matter after remittal.
Anyhow, as the appellant contend that there are two
transactions, one in the name of respondent and
another in the name of his son, it is necessary to
consider the said aspect afresh and dispose of the case
in accordance with law.”
22.
This Court having heard the arguments of both
the parties, perused the material on record meticulously
including the principles of law enunciated in the aforesaid
judgments.
23.
On such perusal of the material on record, it is
crystal clear that Ex.P.2 – cheque belongs to the accused
and signature found therein is not in dispute inasmuch as
cheque is not returned with an endorsement that the
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‘signature did not tally’ but with ‘insufficient funds’ on both
the occasions.
24.
C.W.2
is
the
bank
official
who
has
been
examined on behalf of the complainant and in his crossexamination, except suggesting that the signature in Ex.P.2
is not the signature of the accused, no other materials are
found.
25.
cheque
Likewise, a suggestion is made to C.W.2 that the
is
improperly
dishonoured
though
there
was
take
into
sufficient fund in the account of the accused.
26.
Learned
Trial
Magistrate
did
consideration these two issues in the judgment wherein it is
found that Ex.P.17 being the statement of account, did not
have the balance to the tune of more than Rs.42,000/- at
any given point of time.
27.
Admittedly,
cheque
is
issued
in
a
sum
of
Rs.3,80,000/-. Cheque was presented at the first instance
and
it
was
dishonoured
and
later
on,
amount
was
demanded by the complainant and there was a request to
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represent the same and as such, cheque was again
represented
on
08.05.2008.
Again
the
cheque
was
dishonoured for ‘want of funds’ and there was no reply to
the legal notice. Non reply to the callings of the legal notice
exposes the hollowness in the claim of the accused.
28.
Complainant having examined and placed on
record necessary oral and documentary evidence,
also
examined his banker as C.W.2, discharged the initial burden
to raise the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act.
29.
No doubt, such a presumption is a rebuttable
presumption.
30.
In order to rebut the presumption, it was the
accused who was required to place such material evidence
on record or atleast establish from the effective crossexamination of C.Ws.1 and 2. As discussed supra, except
suggesting that signature of the accused is not found in
Ex.P.2, no other material is forthcoming.
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31.
On the contrary, complainant has produced
before the Court, the invoice, GST certificate and necessary
tax paid receipts in respect of the sale of trailers to the
accused.
32.
Therefore, following the dictum of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh
reported in (2023) 10 SCC 148, it was the accused who
was required to examine before the Court that there was no
legally recoverable debt covered under Ex.P.2.
33.
In the absence of any such evidence placed
before the Trial Court, learned Trial Magistrate convicting
the accused is just and proper.
34.
However, before the First Appellate Court, an
application under Section 391 of Cr.P.C. came to be filed by
the accused to place additional evidence on record.
35.
The additional evidence is the certified copy of
the extract obtained from the Regional Transport Office and
a receipt issued by the complainant to the accused on
17.11.2007 for having accepted Rs.5,000/- and Form A
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issued by the Regional Transport Office, Dharwad, seeking
for furnishing the details as to two trailers having chassis
number referred to supra.
36.
Admittedly, except the receipt dated 17.11.2007,
all other documents have come into being after initiating
the action by the complainant.
37.
The order of the Trial Court is dated 08.05.2017
and the documents sought for by the complainant is in the
year 2017 and 2020.
38.
In other words, after the appeal came to be filed,
the documents are obtained by the accused to establish
that there was no legally recoverable debt. Receipt dated
17.11.2017, issued by the complainant to the accused, is
also after the conviction order came to be passed and
document that is sought to be placed on record allegedly
obtained from the Regional Transport Office is also after
passing of the order of conviction.
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39.
In other words, though there was sufficient
opportunity for the accused to place on record, during the
trial, the documents that is now sought to be placed on
record by way of additional evidence, were available as on
the date of dishonour of the cheque itself.
40.
What efforts have been made by the accused to
place on record those documents and what prevented the
accused to place those documents before the Trial Court in
order to rebut the presumption available to the complainant
is not spelt out in the application.
41.
In other words, as an afterthought, additional
evidence is sought to be placed on record.
42.
On perusal of the additional evidence for the
sake of appreciating the arguments of learned counsel for
the revision petitioner, would make it clear that the
contention of the accused that trailer were not delivered is
not established.
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43.
In other words, who obtained the delivery of the
trailers at the first instance and thereafter, to whom it is
transferred, is not forthcoming from the records of the
Regional Transport Office.
44.
However, cross-examination to P.W.1 would only
make it clear that temporary registration and insurance
policy was not taken by the complainant in order to deliver
the same to the accused.
45.
P.W.1 has clearly denied the suggestion in cross-
examination and answered that it is not the responsibility of
the manufacturer either to obtain temporary registration or
to obtain the policy.
46.
On the contrary, there is positive evidence on
record by P.W.1 answering that it is the accused who took
delivery of two trailers which were manufactured with the
chassis number by the complainant.
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47.
In other words, when there is a delivery taken by
accused, legally recoverable debt under the invoice has
been established by the complainant by placing necessary
oral and documentary evidence on record.
48.
Therefore, taking note of all these aspects of the
matter and especially in the absence of any reply notice and
any contra evidence placed on record, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the dismissal of the appeal by the
First Appellate Court and also rejecting the additional
evidence, if not providing proper reasons, would not be a
ground to interfere with the order of the First Appellate
Court
49.
Now adverting to the decisions placed on record
by learned counsel for the revision petitioner is concerned,
in the case of Brigadier Sukhjeet Singh (Retired) MVC
referred to supra, their Lordships were of the opinion that
the word ‘necessary’ used in Section 391 of Cr.P.C. should
be construed to meet the ends of justice.
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50.
In the case on hand, the factual aspects are very
clear that accused was required to discharge his burden by
placing necessary evidence on record.
51.
He having failed to establish the said aspect of
the matter, cannot be permitted to fill in the lacuna in his
conduct of the case before the Trial Court by resorting to
Section 391 of the Cr.P.C.
52.
In the case of Indus Airways Private Limited
referred to supra, their Lordships, while dealing with the
legally recoverable debt in paragraph No.9, was of the
opinion that the expression ‘debt or other liability’ would
mean that ‘legally enforceable debt or other liability’.
53.
In the case on hand, the sale of trailers is the
transaction and invoice raised vide Exs.P.10 and 11 would
make it clear that there existed a legally recoverable debt.
54.
Likewise, in paragraph No.15, their Lordships set
aside the order of the High Court on the ground that the
High Court clearly flawed inasmuch as it failed to keep in
mind the distinction between the civil liability and criminal
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liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act.
55.
In the case on hand, no such ambiguity would
arise, inasmuch as, accused failed to establish that she did
not take delivery of the trailers and cheque issued towards
payment of cost of the trailers vide Exs.P.10 and 11 stood
dishonoured and thereby, the offence committed by the
accused is duly established by the material evidence placed
on record.
56.
Therefore, viewed from any angle, both the
decisions are not applicable to the case on hand.
57.
Now turning to the order that has been passed
by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in view of the
authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
the case of
Rajesh Jain
referred to
supra, further
discussion with regard to the principles of law enunciated in
the case of Sri. Veeramaheswara Credit Co-Operative
Society Ltd. referred to supra is not necessary.
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58.
Moreover, when no evidence is placed on record
in the trial, additional evidence would not be permitted to
be placed on record as a rule.
59.
View of this Court, in this regard, is supported by
the principles of law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of
Gujarat, reported in (2024) 4 SCC 453.
60.
Relevant paragraph of the said judgment, is
culled out hereunder:
“8. At the outset, we may note that the law is
well-settled by a catena of judgments rendered by
this Court that power to record additional evidence
under Section 391CrPC should only be exercised
when
the
party
making
such
request
was
prevented from presenting the evidence in the trial
despite due diligence being exercised or that the
facts giving rise to such prayer came to light at a
later stage during pendency of the appeal and that
non-recording of such evidence may lead to failure
of justice.”
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61.
Applying the above principle, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the accused has not made out any
ground muchless good grounds to interfere with the well
reasoned order of the Trial Court and the order passed by
the First Appellate Court.
62.
However, both the Courts have missed out a fact
that lis is between two private parties and no State
machinery is involved.
Thus, imposition of Rs.5,000/-
towards the defraying expenses of the State needs to be set
aside and to that extent, case is made out by the revision
petitioner for interference.
63.
Hence, the following:
ORDER
i.
Revision Petition is allowed in part.
ii.
While
maintaining
the
conviction
of
the
accused for the offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
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fine amount of Rs.7,65,000/- is reduced to
sum of Rs.7,60,000/-.
iii.
Entire amount of Rs.7,60,000/- is ordered to
be paid as compensation to the complainant
under due identification.
iv.
Sum of Rs.5,000/- imposed by the Trial Court
confirmed by the First Appellate Court towards
defraying expenses of the State is hereby set
aside not only on the ground that no State
machinery is involved, but also, the Trial Court
cannot impose more than double the cheque
amount as the fine amount in the trial under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
v.
The amount in deposit, if any, is ordered to be
withdrawn by the complainant under due
identification.
vi.
Balance amount to be paid by the accused on
or before 20th February, 2026.
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vii.
Office is directed to return the Trial Court
Records along with the copy of this Order
forthwith, for issue of modified conviction
warrant.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/(V.SRISHANANDA)
JUDGE
KAV
CT-CMU
LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 9
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