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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK RUSIA
ON THE 2nd OF JANUARY, 2024
SECOND APPEAL No. 2478 of 2023
BETWEEN:SMT. BINA W/O SHRI JITENDRA KUMAR AGRAWAL, AGED ABOUT 54
YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE R/O HANUMAN RUNDI, NEAR
PUROHIT BHAWAN, RATLAM (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPELLANT
(BY SHRI AMIT RAJ, ADVOCATE.)
AND
BHAGWAN SHRI NARSINGH JI KA MANDIR DEVSTHAN NYAS
AMRITSAGAR TALAB KI PAL RATLAM THROUGH PRESIDENT AND
MAHANT SHRI MOUNI KRISHNADASJI GURU MAHANT 1008 SHRI
MANOHARDAS JI MAHARAJ AGE 72 YEARS OCCUPATION PRIEST R/O
NARSINGH JI KA MANDIR AMRITSAGAR TALAB KI PAL RATLAM
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENT
(NONE PRESENT FOR THE RESPONDENT.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This appeal coming on for orders this day, the court passed the
following:
ORDER
This is an appeal filed by the appellant / defendant against
the judgment dated 16.02.2022 passed by First Civil Judge, Senior
Division, Ratlam in RCSA No.2600018/2016 and judgment dated
08.09.2023 passed by Principal District Judge, Ratlam in Civil Appeal
No.RCA-18/2022.
Facts of the case in short are as under:
02.
The respondent / plaintiff filed the suit for eviction, arrears
of rent, means profit against the defendant / appellant. The plaintiff is a
Signed by: DIVYANSH
SHUKLA
Signing time: 09-01-2024
18:25:45
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registered Trust having registration No.1/1976 dated 12.03.1976. Out of
the total property, 4 rooms in first floor were given on rent @ Rs.700/per month to the defendant. The rent was payable from first date of
every month.
02.
According to the plaintiff, the defendant was irregular in
payment of rent, the last rent was paid on 31.08.2003 Rs.700/-,
therefore, there is arrears of rent from 01.09.2003 to 31.10.2011
Rs.68,600/-. The defendant is not using the rented premises and put the
lock since last six months. According to the plaintiff, now the
accommodation is required for staying the Saints, therefore, they are in
bonafide need of the accommodation. The plaintiff also claimed the
means profit from 01.11.2011 till the eviction @ Rs.2,800/- per month.
03.
After summons, the defendant appeared and filed the
written statement contending that the President has no authority to file
the suit on behalf of the Trust, suit is based on bundle of false and
incorrect facts and the same is liable to be dismissed. The present suit
property is out of the purview of M.P. Accommodation Control Act,
1961 (for brevity “Act of 1961”).
04.
It is further submitted that the defendant is liable to take
Rs.90,000/- from the plaintiff and in order to forfeit the aforesaid
amount, the present suit has been filed. On the basis of pleadings, the
learned Civil Court framed 9 issues for adjudication which are as under:
1D;k oknh vkSj izfroknh ds e/; Hkou Lokeh vkSj fdjk;snkj ds
lac/a k gS\
2D;k izfroknh VªLV ds oknxzLr edku esa 700@& :Ik;s izfrekg
dh nj ls fdjk;snkj gS\
3D;k izfroknh fdjk;s nsus esa vfu;fer gksdj mldh vksj ls
fnukad 01-09-2023 ls fdjk;k cdk;k gS\
4D;k izfroknh }kjk lwpuk i= feyus ds ckn Hkh fogr vof/k ds
Hkhrj oknh dks lai.w kZ fdjk;k vnk ;k fufonRr ugha fd;k x;k\
Signed by: DIVYANSH
SHUKLA
Signing time: 09-01-2024
18:25:45
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5D;k oknh dks oknxzLr LFkku lk/kq] larks dks Bgjkus gsrq
ln~HkkoukiwoZd o okLrfod vko’;drk gS\
6;fn gka rks D;k bl iz;kstu gsrq oknh ds fjDr vkf/kiR; esa vU;
dksbZ lqfo/kk;qDr LFkku jryke uxj fuxe lhek {ks= esa ugha gS \
7D;k izfroknh }kjk HkkM+k Hkkx dk mi;ksx can dj foxr 6 ekg
ls vf/kd le; ml ij rkyk yxk dj j[kk x;k\
8D;k nkok orZeku Lo:Ik esa izpyu’khy gS\
9lgk;rk ,oa O;;\
05.
In support of the plaint, the plaintiff examined Govindram
as PW/1 Umesh Kumar (PW/2), Govid Patidar (PW/3), Mahant Moni
Krishnadas (PW/4) and exhibited 11 documentary evidence as Exhibit
P/1 to P/11. In defence, the respondent examined herself as DW/1,
Jitendra Kumar Agrawal as DW/2 and exhibited registered notice dated
30.05.2011 as Exhibit D/1. The defendant has not filed any counter suit
for return of Rs.90,000/-. After appreciating the evidence that came on
record, vide judgment dated 16.02.2022, the learned Civil Judge has
decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff by directing appellant /
defendant to vacate and handover the vacant possession to the plaintiff,
the defendant has also been directed to pay the rent of Rs.700,/- per
month.
06.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the
defendant filed the first appeal before the District Judge, Ratlam which
came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 08.09.2023. Hence, this
second appeal before this Court.
07.
Shri Amit Raj, learned counsel for the appellant submits that
the learned Courts below have wrongly granted the decree of eviction
and means profit in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff being a public
Trust cannot seek a decree under the provisions of Act of 1961 in view
of the exemption granted under the Act of 1961 hence, this appeal is
Signed by: DIVYANSH
SHUKLA
Signing time: 09-01-2024
18:25:45
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liable to be admitted only on this sole question of law. The learned
appellate Court has wrongly rejected the application filed under Order
41 Rule 7 of CPC alongwith which the defendants filed important
documents, therefore, this appeal is liable to be admitted on the
following substantial questions of law:
a) Whether the courts below have committed error in
interpreting the exemption to applicability of M.P.
Accommodation Control Act, 1961 in terms of exemption
granted under Section 3 (2) of the Act of 1961?
b) Whether on facts & circumstances, the impugned order
suffers from perversity of approach?
c) Whether both the courts below have fallen in error by
deciding the whole suit under the provisions of M.P.
Accommodation Control Act, 1961 by simply saying that they
alternately having jurisdiction to decide such suits under the
provision of Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act?
d) Whether the First Appellate court committed error on the
settled position of law that the legal question can be raised at
any stage of proceedings and the same can even be raised in
absence of pleadings?
e) Whether the First Appellate court committed error in
dismissing the application preferred by the appellant under the
provision of Order 41 Rule 27 of Code of Civil Procedure,
1908?
f) Whether both the courts below has mis interpreted the
provision of Section 20 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act,
1961?
08.
The following facts are not in dispute that plaintiff is a
public Trust registered under The M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951. The
defendant is in possession of four rooms by way of tenancy. It is also not
in dispute that the plaintiff has stopped paying the rent from 01.09.2003
on the ground that Rs.90,000/- has been paid in advance to the plaintiff.
In the evidence, the plaintiff has admitted the tenancy as well as default
of payment of rent. The plaintiff served the notice dated 31.10.2011 for
terminating the tenancy hence, the tenancy has come to an end under
Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
09.
Signed by: DIVYANSH
SHUKLA
Signing time: 09-01-2024
18:25:45
The defendant has not filed any document to establish that
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Rs.90,000/- was given as advance to the plaintiff and he has also not
filed any receipts or documentary evidence, therefore, arrears of the rent
has been adjusted and there was no default in payment of the rent. The
plaintiff has not filed any counter claim in return. Hence, under the
provisions of Act of 1961, the plaintiff has made out the case for default
of rent. So far as the bona fide need is concerned, the plaintiff has
averred that the accommodation is required for staying the Saints who
come from outside of Ratlam City for the purpose of worship, therefore,
the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the trial Court as well as
First Appellate Court are not liable to be interfered with.
10.
The only question of law on which this appeal is filed is that
the suit was not maintainable by virtue of Section 3 of Act of 1961
because the plaintiff is a religious public Trust. This Court in case of
Vidhichand Dharmshala Trust Gwalior V/s Shyam Singh reported in
(2010) 3 MPLJ 428 has held that the exemption granted to the public
Trust is not a blanket exemption, benefit of exemption would be
available so long as if income is utilized for the trust itself in a suit for
eviction if it is established that the entire income of the Trust is not
utilized for the Trust itself the plaintiff would no more be entitled to
seek benefit of exemption. In case of Betibai V/s Nathuram reported in
AIR 1999 SC 1767 the Apex Court has held that where properties
exempted from operation of Act of 1961 the landlord may terminate the
tenancy of the tenant straightway under Section 106 of the T.P. Act.
11.
In the present case also, the First Appellate Court has held
that the tenancy of this appellant was terminated vide notice dated
31.10.2011, therefore, the ground which are available under Act of 1961
for eviction are also available to the plaintiff to justify the termination of
tenancy and file a suit for eviction. The learned Civil Court as well as
learned First Appellate Court has considered the scope of Section 3(2),
Signed by: DIVYANSH
SHUKLA
Signing time: 09-01-2024
18:25:45
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12 & 20 of Act of 1961 and by relying on a judgment passed in a case of
Shri 1008 Shri Nityanand Aashram Trust, Dhar V/s Radheshyam
[(2006) 1 MPLJ 260] has granted the decree of eviction. Section 20 of
Act of 1961 clearly provides that the public Trust in order to fulfill the
need of the accommodation in order to achieve the object if the
accommodation is found in unauthorized use.
12.
The defendant admittedly did not pay the rent since
31.08.2003, therefore, she came in an authorized possession. Even after
termination of pregnancy, she was on an authorized possession,
therefore, decree by virtue of Section 20 of Act of 1961 can be passed
under the provisions of Act of 1961. There are concurrent findings
recorded by both the Courts which are not liable to be interfered in
second appeal as held by Apex Court in following cases:
13.
Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar : (1999)
3 SCC 722, has held as under:
5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the
grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court
of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower
appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by
the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has
rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no
ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the
appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a
case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are
possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the
High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not
permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the
opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the
conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous
being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or
its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the
Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived
at without evidence.
6. If the question of law termed as a substantial ques-tion stands
already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned
or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the
Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of the
case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law.
Signed by: DIVYANSH
SHUKLA
Signing time: 09-01-2024
18:25:45
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Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be
arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a
litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a
substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere
appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the
meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be
held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is
found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction
which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the
second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where
the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion
in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of
law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This
Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey
[AIR 1976 SC 830]held that whether the trial court should not
have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law
justifying interference.
14.
In case of Laxmidevamma v. Ranganath : (2015) 4 SCC
264, again the Apex court has held as under:
16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts
below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the
light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions
of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial
ground for reappreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court
proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A
schedule property for road and that she could not have fullfledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that
declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. In exercise
of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of
fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so
recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the
High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings
recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary
evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be
sustained.
15.
Recently, the Apex Court in case of Adiveppa & Others Vs.
Bhimappa & Others : (2017) 9 SCC 586 has held as under:
"17. Here is a case where two Courts below, on appreciating
the entire evidence, have come to a conclusion that the Plaintiffs
failed to prove their case in relation to both the suit properties.
The concurrent findings of facts recorded by the two Courts,
which do not involve any question of law much less substantial
question of law, are binding on this Court.
18. It is more so when these findings are neither against the
pleadings nor against the evidence and nor contrary to any
provision of law. They are also not perverse to the extent that no
such findings could ever be recorded by any judicial person. In
Signed by: DIVYANSH
SHUKLA
Signing time: 09-01-2024
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other words, unless the findings of facts, though concurrent, are
found to be extremely perverse so as to affect the judicial
conscious of a judge, they would be binding on the Appellate
Court."
16.
In view of the above, Second Appeal stands dismissed.
(VIVEK RUSIA)
JUDGE
Divyansh
Signed by: DIVYANSH
SHUKLA
Signing time: 09-01-2024
18:25:45
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