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-1NC: 2026:KHC-D:788
RSA No. 1357 of 2008
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C M JOSHI
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 1357 OF 2008 (SP)
BETWEEN:
1.
SMT. BALAWWA
W/O. MALLAPPA KARATAGI,
SINCE DECEASED BY HER LRS.
AMENDED AS PER ORDER DATED 17.04.2023
2.
SHRI BALAPPA
S/O. MALLAPPA KARATAGI,
AGE: 43 YEARS,
3.
SHRI MAHALING
S/O. MALLAPPA KARATAGI,
AGE: 38 YEARS,
4.
SHRI SHIVALING
S/O. MALLAPPA KARATAGI,
AGE: 38 YEARS,
Digitally signed
by NAGARATHNA
TEKAL
SUBBARAO
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
APPELLANT NOS.1 TO 4 ARE
R/O. NIDASOSI, TQ. HUKKERI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591309.
5.
SMT. SHIVAKKA
W/O. BHIMAGOUDA PATIL,
SINCE DECEASED BY HER LRS.
5A.
BHIMANAGOUDA
S/O. RAMAGOUDA PATIL,
AGE: 65 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. MANGANUR, TQ. CHIKKODI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591201.
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RSA No. 1357 of 2008
HC-KAR
5B.
SHANKARAGOUDA
S/O. BHIMAGOUDA PATIL,
AGE: 43 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. MANGANUR, TQ. CHIKKODI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591201.
5C.
KALAGOUDA
S/O. BHIMAGOUDA PATIL,
AGE: 40 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. MANGANUR, TQ. CHIKKODI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591201.
AMENDED AS PER ORDER DATED 25.10.2024.
6.
SMT. NEELAWWA
W/O. SHANKAR KANKANWADI,
AGE: 30 YEARS, R/O. KESTI,
TQ. HUKKERI, DIST. BELAGAVI-591309.
7.
SMT. CHANDRAWWA
W/O. NEELAKANTA ADISHERE,
AGE: 27 YEARS, R/O. UMARANAI,
TQ. CHIKKODI, DIST. BELAGAVI-591201.
8.
SMT. MAHADEVI
W/O. RAMAGOUDA PATIL,
AGE: 22 YEARS,
R/O. KONANKERI, TQ. HUKKERI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591201.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. V.P. KULKARNI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
DUNDAPPA
S/O. BHIMAPPA KARATAGI,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS.
1A.
SMT. NEELAWWA
W/O. DUNDAPPA KARATAGI,
AGE: 65 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. RAJPUR, TQ. GOKAK,
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RSA No. 1357 of 2008
HC-KAR
DIST. BELAGAVI-591224.
1B.
SHRI MALLASHI
S/O. DUNDAPPA KARATAGI,
AGE: 45 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. RAJPUR, TQ. GOKAK,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591224.
1C.
SMT. BASAWWA
W/O. KEDARI KATTIMANI,
AGE: 43 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. RAJPUR, TQ. GOKAK,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591224.
1D.
SHRI BHIMAPPA
S/O. DUNDAPPA KARATAGI,
AGE: 41 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. RAJPUR, TQ. GOKAK,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591224.
1E.
SMT. KEMPA @ MADAVI
W/O. RAJU KILLEDAR,
AGE: 39 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. RAJPUR, TQ. GOKAK,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591224.
AMENDED AS PER ORDER DATED 15.11.2023.
2.
SHRI ASHOK DUNDAPPA GALAGI
AGE: 34 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDASOSI, TQ. HUKKERI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591309.
3.
SHRI SIDAGOUDA MALAGOUDA PATIL
AGE: 57 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDASOSI, TQ. HUKKERI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591309.
4.
SHRI SHIVASHANKAR SHIVAMURTI PADMAI
AGE: 67 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDASOSI, TQ. HUKKERI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591309.
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RSA No. 1357 of 2008
HC-KAR
5.
SHRI DUNDAPPA SHIVAMURTHI HEDDURI
AGE: 55 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDASOSI, TQ. HUKKERI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591309.
6.
SHRI MALIKARJUN BALAPA HUDDAR
AGE: 31 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDASOSI, TQ. HUKKERI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591309.
7.
SHRI IRANNA BALAPPA HUDDAR
AGE: 34 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDASOSI, TQ. HUKKERI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591309.
8.
SHRI RAFIQ S/O. BABU ATTAR,
AGE: 37 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDASOSI, TQ. HUKKERI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591309.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIRMEATH, ADVOCATE FOR R2 - R8;
R1(A), R1(B), R1(C) AND R1(E)-NOTICE SERVED;
R1(D)-NOTICE HELD SUFFICIENT)
THIS RSA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC, PRAYING TO
SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE PASSED BY THE CIVIL JUDGE
(SR.DN.) HUKKERI PASSED IN R.A.NO.64 OF 2006 DATED 26TH
FEBRUARY 2008 AND CONFIRM THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE PASSED
BY
THE
CIVIL
JUDGE
(JR.DN.)
SANKESHWAR
PASSED
IN
O.S.NO.153/2000 DATED 31ST JULY 2006 BY ALLOWING THE PRESENT
APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS RSA APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
24.11.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS
DAY, COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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RSA No. 1357 of 2008
HC-KAR
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C M JOSHI)
This appeal arises out of
O.S.No.153/2000
by
the
the
learned
divergent findings
Civil
Judge
in
(Jr.Dn.),
Sankeshwar and in R.A.No.64/2006 by the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.),
Hukkeri, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs for specific
performance of agreement of sale came to be dismissed.
2.
The plaintiffs had filed a suit in O.S.No.153/2000
seeking specific performance of contract and O.S.No.126/2000
seeking permanent injunction against the defendants before the
Trial Court. The Trial Court, by common judgment, decreed both
the suits directing the defendants to execute the sale deed in
respect of the suit schedule properties. It also decreed the suit
restraining
the
defendants
by
permanent
injunction
from
interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
suit schedule properties by the plaintiffs. The said common
judgment in both the suits was challenged before the First
Appellate Court in R.A.No.64/2006 and R.A.No.65/2006. The
First Appellate Court, after hearing, allowed the appeals and
dismissed both the suits. The plaintiffs have filed this appeal only
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RSA No. 1357 of 2008
HC-KAR
against the judgment and decree in R.A.No.64/2006, which
arises out of O.S.No.153/2000.
3.
The suit schedule properties are agricultural land
bearing R.S.No.40 measuring 5 acres 21 guntas situated at
Nidasosi village and the house property bearing VPC No.528 New
VPC No.774 situated at Nidasosi Village of Hukkeri Taluk.
4.
The factual matrix that is relevant for the purpose of
this appeal may be summarized as below:
(a)
The defendant No.1 was the tenant of the agricultural
land and he applied for occupancy rights, which came to be
granted by the Land Tribunal [under Karnataka Land Reforms Act
– 1964] on 05.05.1982 and Form No.10- Occupancy Certificate
was issued to him. The said grant of occupancy rights was
subject to certain conditions and one among them was that the
land should not be alienated for a period of 15 years without
permission of the concerned competent authority.
(b)
The defendant No.1 for his family necessity and to
repay the loans, agreed to sell the suit schedule property in
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HC-KAR
favour of the husband of the plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff
No.2 viz., Mallappa for a consideration of ₹40,000/- and received
earnest money of ₹38,000/- and executed agreement of sale
dated 25.01.1988.
(c)
The said Mallappa died on 19.07.1998 leaving behind
the plaintiffs as his legal heirs. The deceaed-Mallappa was in
possession of the suit schedule properties and after his death,
the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule properties.
(d)
The
defendant No.1
has agreed to
obtain the
necessary permission from the government authorities for selling
the suit land since there was a condition while granting the land
not to alienate the properties for a period of 15 years.
(e)
Since the defendant No.1 tried to obstruct the
possession of Mallappa over the suit schedule properties he had
filed a suit for permanent injunction in O.S.No.135/1992 and
same came to be dismissed on 17.08.1996 for non-prosecution.
Mallappa had filed Civil Miscellaneous Petition No.20/1997 for
restoration of the said suit and when the present suit came to be
filed, the said Civil Miscellaneous Petition was pending. Later, the
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HC-KAR
said Miscellaneous Petition also came to be dismissed. Again the
defendant No.1 tried to obstruct the plaintiffs’ possession on
17.07.2000
and
therefore,
the
plaintiffs
had
to
file
O.S.No.126/2000 seeking a permanent injunction and in the said
suit, the Court had directed plaintiff No.2 to file a suit for specific
performance of contract within one month from the date of order
i.e.,
19.08.2000.
Consequently,
the
present
suit
O.S.No.153/2000 came to be filed seeking specific performance
of the contract of agreement of sale.
(f)
The plaintiffs averred that they were always ready
and willing to perform their part of the contract by paying
balance consideration of ₹2,000/- and had requested the
defendant No.1 to execute the registered sale deed.
(g)
It is alleged that, on the other hand, the defendant
No.1 created hollow sale deeds in favour of defendant No.2 to 4,
which are null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. The
defendant No.2 to 4 knowing fully well that the defendant No.1
had executed the agreement of sale in favour of Mallappa and in
spite of the prohibitory orders, have entered into the sale deeds
and in turn the defendant No.5 to 8 have also entered into such
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RSA No. 1357 of 2008
HC-KAR
sale deeds in respect of some pieces of the suit schedule
properties. Therefore, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants
No.2 to 8 are also liable for execution of the registered sale deed
in favour of the plaintiffs.
(h)
On the above grounds, the plaintiffs sought a
direction to the defendants to execute the registered sale deed in
favour of the plaintiffs by obtaining the necessary permission
from the Government Authorities and to declare that the sale
deeds created in the name of the defendant No.2 to 8 are not
binding upon the plaintiffs. Alternatively, the plaintiffs have also
sought for refund of the earnest money of ₹38,000/- along with
interest at 21% per annum and damages of ₹1,50,000/- for
breach of contract and costs of the suit.
(i)
It is to be noted that the cause of action for the suit
is stated to be in the first week of September 2000, when the
defendants refused to take legal notice issued by the plaintiffs
through their counsel.
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and
5.
On service of summons, defendant No.1 appeared
filed
the
written
statement
delineating
the
following
contentions:
(a)
He denied the case of the plaintiffs that there was
legal necessity for the defendant No.1 and therefore, he had
agreed to sell the suit schedule property to the plaintiffs [i.e.,
Mallappa] for a sum of ₹40,000/- and in pursuance to it, after
receiving ₹38,000/-, entered into an agreement of sale. All other
contentions, including the possession of the plaintiffs over the
suit schedule property in pursuance to the agreement of sale is
vehemently and specifically denied by the defendant No.1.
(b)
It is the contention of the defendant that since there
was family necessity, he has sold portions of the suit schedule
properties for valuable consideration. He contends that 2 acres
10 guntas in the suit schedule property was sold to defendant
No.2 for ₹47,500/- under a sale deed dated 11.05.2000.
(c)
He further stated that an area measuring 20 guntas
in the suit schedule property was sold to defendant No.3 for a
consideration of ₹10,500/- on 11.05.2000. He further stated that
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he had sold an area measuring 2 acres 10 guntas in favour of the
defendant No.4 for a consideration of ₹49,500/- on 22.05.2000.
He further stated that he had sold an area measuring 21 guntas
in the suit survey number for a consideration of ₹11,000/- to
defendant No.5 on 22.05.2000. Therefore, he denies that the
defendant No.1 entering into an agreement of sale with the
plaintiffs on 25.01.1988 is improbable and the alleged agreement
is false and concocted.
(d)
injunction
The defendants have contended that the suit for
filed
by
the
original
plaintiff
Mallappa,
in
O.S.No.135/1992 came to be dismissed for non-prosecution and
later the Civil Miscellaneous No.20/1997 was also dismissed for
default on 21.10.2000. It is contended that the VPC No.528, New
No.774 of Nidasosi village is occupied by the defendant No.1, he
is residing in the same with his family.
(e)
Thereafter, the defendant No.5 has sold a portion of
the property measuring 11 guntas to defendant Nos.6 and 7 for
a consideration of ₹34,000/- on 16.06.2001 and as such, they
are in possession of the same. It is contended that defendant
Nos.6 and 7 have prepared to construct a building on a property
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purchased by them. Therefore, it is contended that the alleged
agreement of sale is concocted and as such, the suit deserves to
be dismissed.
6.
The defendants Nos.2 to 8 have filed a memo
adopting the written statement of the defendant No.1 and in
addition, the defendant Nos.2 and 8 have also filed their
respective written statements reiterating the contention taken by
defendant No.1. In these written statements, they have not
stated that they are the bonafide purchasers of the suit schedule
property, but on the other hand, they have denied the contention
of the plaintiff.
7.
On the basis of the above contentions, the Trial Court
has framed the following issues and additional issues:
“ISSUES
1) Do
the
plaintiffs
prove
the
execution
of
agreement of sale dated 25.01.1988 in respect
of
suit
properties
infavour
of
Mallappa
Shidalingappa Karatagi (father of plaintiffs 2 to 8
and husband of plaintiff No.1 for a consideration
or Rs.40,000?
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2) Do the plaintiffs further prove that, defendants
No.1
has
received
an
earnest
amount
of
Rs.38,000/- as on the date of agreement of
sale?
3) If
so,
do
possession
the
plaintiffs
over
the
prove
suit
their
actual
properties
as
prospective purchasers?
4) Do the plaintiffs prove their readiness and
willingness to perform their part of the contract?
5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for main relief
of Specific Performance of contract as prayed?
6) If not, do the plaintiffs are entitled for alternative
relief of refund of earnest money of Rs.38,000/with damages as prayed?
7) What order or Decree ?
Addl. Issue dt: 22.1.2005.
1) Whether the plaintiff proves that sale deed
executed by Deft No.1 in favour of Deft.No.8 dated
11.5.2000 is concocted and bogus as contended?
Addl. Issue dated 12.7.05.
1) Whether the plaintiff proves that defendant
Nos.2 to 8 are liable to execute the sale deed in
favour
of
plaintiff
after
receiving
the
consideration as contended in the plaint?
Addl. Issue
balance
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1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the sale deed
executed by def. No.1 is a bogus and fabricated one
and not binding on he plaintiff is contended in the
plaint?”
8.
The
O.S.No.153/2000
was
clubbed
with
O.S.No.126/2000 and common evidence was led. The plaintiff
was examined as PW1 and two witnesses were examined as PW2
and PW3. Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.46 were marked in evidence. On behalf
of the defendants, DW1 to DW7 were examined and Ex.D1 to
Ex.D.8 were marked in evidence.
9.
After hearing the arguments by both the sides, the
Trial Court decreed both the suits as prayed by the plaintiff
granting the relief of specific performance of the agreement of
sale and directed the defendants to execute the sale deed in
favour of the plaintiff.
10.
Being
aggrieved,
the
defendant
Nos.1
to
approached the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.64/2006 and
R.A.No.65/2006. The First Appellate Court framed the following
points for consideration:
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RSA No. 1357 of 2008
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“Points
1. Whether the defendants prove that the learned
trial judge has not framed the proper issues?
2. Whether defendants prove that the impugned
judgment and decree of the learned trial judge
is perverse, illegal and capricious?
3. What order?”
11.
The First Appellate Court, after hearing both the
sides, by impugned judgment dated 26.02.2008, allowed the
appeal and set aside the judgment of the Trial Court in both the
suits.
12.
Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs are before this Court in
second appeal.
13.
While admitting the appeal, this Court has framed
the following substantial questions of law on 15.09.2009 and
18.11.2025:
Substantial question of law dated: 15.09.2009:
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RSA No. 1357 of 2008
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“Whether
the
Lower
Appellate
Court
has
committed error in law while coming to the
conclusion that the suit itself was barred by
limitation and in that context in reversing the
judgment and decree of the Trial Court?”
Substantial question of law dated 18.11.2025:
“Whether the First Appellate Court erred in
allowing the application filed under Order XLI
Rule 27 of CPC, but not considered the same in
the judgment?”
14.
The arguments by learned Senior Counsel, Sri.V. P.
Kulkarni, appearing for the appellants and learned Counsel,
Sri.Mallikarjunaswami Hiremath, appearing for the respondents
were heard.
15.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellants, in his
elaborate arguments, has touched upon three aspects.
16.
He firstly argued concerning the limitation, which is
pertaining to the first substantial question of law. He also argued
regarding the application filed by the appellants under Order XLI
Rule 27 of CPC, which is concerning the second substantial
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question of law. Then he argued on the ready and willingness of
the plaintiffs and regarding the bar contained in Section 61 of the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act and as to whether the bar operates
even for an agreement of sale.
17.
Regarding the limitation, it is submitted that the
question of limitation was not raised in the pleadings of the
defendants and as such, there were no issues framed concerning
the limitation. It is submitted that an issue regarding limitation is
a mixed question of law and facts and when there was no issue
framed by the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court had erred in
dealing with the question of limitation holding that the suit of the
plaintiffs is barred by time. It is submitted that there is no
material to show that when the order of the Land Tribunal was
passed and occupancy rights were granted and therefore unless
such documents were produced by the defendants, they could
not have dealt with the question of limitation. It is submitted
that the plaintiffs came to know about the permission granted by
the competent authority to alienate the suit schedule property
when the defendant No.1 had applied for permission to sell. It is
submitted that the limitation would start when the defendant
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informs the plaintiff about the permission granted by the
competent authority to alienate the property and therefore the
refusal to execute the sale deed has to be inferred only when the
legal notice issued by the plaintiff was refused by the defendant.
Therefore, he contends that the conclusion of the First Appellate
Court that the suit is hit by the law of limitation is erroneous and
as such, the same is not sustainable. He further submitted that
producing the permission of the Tahsildar, who was a competent
authority, was very much essential. It is submitted that a mere
lapse of 15 years after the occupancy rights were granted in the
form of Form No.10, being issued to the defendant No.1 on
05.05.1982, would not be the starting point for limitation. He
buttresses his argument by contending that the ceiling limits
prescribed under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act and
Registration Act are to be relaxed or to be examined by the
competent authority while granting permission to alienate the
property. Therefore, mere efflux of time of 15 years from the
date of grant of the occupancy rights, would not suffice. Hence,
he contends that the suit filed on 15.09.2000 was very much in
time and therefore, the views of the First Appellate Court are
flawed.
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the
18.
Regarding the question of seeking all the reliefs when
suit
in
O.S.No.126/2000
was
filed
or
earlier
to
it
O.S.No.135/1997 was filed, is concerned, he submits that the
plaintiff could not have sought the relief of specific performance
since the express permission to alienate the property was not
issued when those suits were filed. Therefore, he reiterated that
the efflux of time of 15 years would not result in automatic
commencement of the time for limitation. Thus, he submits that
at no stretch of imagination the suit filed by the plaintiff can be
said to be hit by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of CPC.
19.
Regarding readiness and willingness, he submits that
the plaintiff had paid substantial consideration amount and he
was waiting for the permission. The defendant No.1 never
informed the plaintiffs about the permission granted by the
competent authority. Therefore, when there is no rebuttal
evidence by the defendant No.1, who had personal knowledge of
the enquiries made by the plaintiff to perform his part of the
contract, the testimony of defendant No.1, who was a GPA
holder of defendant No.1, cannot be relied. Obviously, the
defendant No.1 had no personal knowledge of the requests made
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by the plaintiff to Defendant No.1. Hence, he contends that the
readiness and willingness had been established by the plaintiffs
all along.
20.
He further submitted that the purchasers of the piece
of the properties from defendant No.1, nowhere contend that
they were diligent and they purchased the property only after
verification of the records. The written statement filed by
defendant No.2 to 8 does not contain any averment that they are
the bona fide purchasers without notice and therefore, they are
entitled to retain the portions purchased by them.
21.
Lastly, he contends that the provisions of Section 61
of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act would not come in the way of
granting a decree. He vehemently submits that the judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of Narayanamma and another v.
Govindappa and others1 cannot be applied to the case on
hand. He submits that on facts involved in the case of
Narayanamma
(referred
supra),
it
can
very
well
be
distinguished from the facts of the present case. The facts in that
case were relating to question of mortgage as well as an
(2019) 19 SCC 42
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agreement of sale coupled with handing over of the possession
and the agreement of sale being within one month of the
mortgage was involved, and as such, the Apex Court had come
to the conclusion that it was an alienation and is hit by the
provisions of Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
22.
He further relies on the judgment in the case of
B.S.Lakshman S/o B.R.Saganshetty v. Puttashetty S/o
Muddashetty, rendered by a Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in
RSA No.1358/2022 (D.D.27.06.2025), where the case of
Narayanamma (referred supra) was distinguished.
23.
The appellants, during pendency of this appeal, have
also filed I.A.No.1/2025 under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC seeking
to produce the true copy of the notification under Section 22-A of
the Registration Act dated 23.04. 1998. It is contended that it is
the same document, which was sought to be produced by the
plaintiffs before the First Appellate Court under Order XLI Rule
27 of CPC and though the application was allowed, the document
was not considered by the First Appellate Court. In the affidavit
accompanying the application, it is stated that the said document
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was not traced earlier and therefore, he may be permitted to
produce the same.
24.
Despite service of notice, respondent No.1(a) to 1(e)
have not appeared.
25.
The learned counsel appearing for the respondent
No.2 to 8 has contended that the Land Tribunal passed an order
granting the occupancy rights in favour of defendant No.1 on
29.12.1976 and the Form No.10 was issued on 05.05.1982 as
per Ex.P.22. The agreement of sale deed relied by the plaintiff
was on 25.01.1988. Clearly the condition not to alienate the
property for a period of 15 years had been violated when the
agreement was entered into. Therefore, he submits that the suit
is hit by the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of
Narayanamma (referred supra). He submits that the dictum of
the Apex Court is applicable to the case on hand in its fullest
form. Regarding limitation, he contends that the question of
limitation need not be raised in the written statement in view of
Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It is the Court, which has to look
into the question of limitation and therefore, the First Appellate
Court is justified in considering the question of limitation.
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26.
He submits that the plaintiff-Mallappa had filed
O.S.No.135/1992 seeking injunction and it was dismissed for
non-prosecution. In the said suit, written statement was filed
and the agreement was denied. Therefore, on 22.06.1994 when
the written statement came to be filed in O.S.No.135/1992, the
plaintiffs came to know that the agreement is denied and as such
the limitation starts to run from 22.06.1994. Obviously, the
present suit is filed in the year 2000 and is hit by the law of
limitation.
27.
He also submits that the Civil Miscellaneous case was
filed for restoration of the said suit and it also came to be
dismissed and the present suit is filed only when a direction was
issued in O.S.No.126/2000. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the
suit was barred by limitation.
28.
In other words, he submitted that the limitation could
be held to commence from 04.05.1997 when the 15 years
moratorium to alienate the property ended and therefore, the
suit should have been filed on or before 04.05.2000. The present
suit has been filed on 15.09.2000 and therefore on both the
counts, the suit is barred by the law of limitation.
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29.
His second prong of the argument is that, the
provisions of Order II Rule 2 of CPC come into operation since
the plaintiff had not sought all the relief that he could make in
O.S. No.135/1992 or in O.S.No.126/2000. On both these
occasions, the plaintiff/s knew that the defendant had denied the
agreement and therefore he should have filed the suit for specific
performance. He should have prayed for the relief of specific
performance and in the said suit he could have sought for an
injunction. A suit for injunction simpliciter could not have been
filed. In this regard, he places reliance on the judgment in the
case of Vurimi Pullarao S/o. Satyanarayana v. Vemari
Vyantaka Radharani W/o.Dhankoteshwarrao and another2.
30.
He points out that filing of O.S.No.135/1992 has not
been disclosed by the plaintiff in the plaint. Therefore, the
plaintiff has suppressed these facts in order to overcome the
limitation and an illusory cause of action has been shown in the
plaint. On these contentions, the learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.2 to 8 seeks dismissal of the suit.
(2020) 14 SCC 110
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A. Reg: second substantial question of law:
31.
Before entering into the merits of the case, the
application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of Code of Civil
Procedure, is to be decided. The affidavit filed in support of the
application states that such an application was filed by the
appellant before the First Appellate Court and even though, it
was on record, such document was not considered by the
Appellate Court. The affidavit filed in support of the application
states that the appellant had filed such an application before the
First Appellate Court on 04.12.2007 seeking to produce the order
of Tahsildar, Hukkeri dated 23.04.1998. It is the grievance of the
appellant that such application was never considered by the
Appellate Court while deciding the appeal.
32.
The provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of Code of Civil
Procedure, indicate that if such production of the additional
evidence falls within the scope of the Rule, the application
deserves to be allowed. It was incumbent upon the First
Appellate Court to decide such application while considering the
appeal. The document sought to be produced is order of the
Tahsildar which permitted the holder to alienate the property.
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When the affidavit filed in support of the application before the
First Appellate Court narrates that when the burden was on the
defendant to obtain such permission from the competent
authority to alienate the property as per the clauses of the
agreement, he doesn’t say anything about such permission
having obtained by him. Therefore, the production of such
document is essential to know the intent of the defendants.
33.
The affidavit also mention that the plaintiff is kept in
ignorance about such permission being granted, he had to search
for the same and then, secure it and produce the same before
the First Appellate Court. Under these circumstances, the
application falls within the purview of the provisions of Order 41
Rule 27 of Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, this Court does not
see any reason to reject the said application and the certified
copy of the order dated 23.04.1998 by Tahsildar, Hukkeri is
permitted to be produced. The document is taken on record.
34.
For above reasons, it is clear the the First Appellate
court erred in not considering the documents produced by the
appellant. Hence the second Substantial question of law is
answered in the affirmative.
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B. Ancillary question of law reg bar under Section 61 of
KLR Act:
35.
Before we go into the first substantial question of law
involved, it is necessary to look into the question of law which
operates in the present appeal. The first contention is regarding
the provisions of Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
It is worth to note that Section 61 of the Karnataka Land
Reforms
Act
prohibits
certain
alienations.
For
better
understanding the Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act
is extracted below.
“61. Restriction on transfer of land of which
tenant
has
become
occupant.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, no
land of which the occupancy has been granted to
any person under this Chapter shall, within [fifteen
years] [from the date of the final order passed by
the Tribunal under sub-section (4) or sub-section
(5) or
sub-section (5-A) of section 48A] be
transferred by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease
or assignment; but the land may be partitioned
among members of the holder’s joint family.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), it shall be lawful for the occupant
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registered as such or his successor-in-title to take a
loan and mortgage or create a charge on his
interest
in
the
land
in
favour
of
the
State
Government, [a financial institution, a co-operative
land development bank, a co-operative society] or
a
company
as
defined
in
section
of
the
Companies Act, 1956 in which not less than fifty
one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by
the State Government or a Corporation owned or
controlled by the Central Government or the State
Government or both for development of land or
improvement
of
agricultural
practices;
[or
for
raising educational loan to prosecute the higher
studies of the children of such person] and without
prejudice to any other remedy provided by any law,
in the event of his making default in payment of
such loan in accordance with the terms and
conditions on which such loan was granted, it shall
be lawful to cause his interest in the land to be
attached and sold and the proceeds to be utilised in
the payment of such loan.
[Explanation.- For the purpose of this subsection, “Higher studies” means the further studies
after Pre-university Examination or 12th Standard
Examination conducted by CBSE or ICSE or any
Diploma courses.]
Any
transfer
or
partition
of
land
in
contravention of sub-section (1) shall be invalid
[and such land shall vest in the State Government
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free from all encumbrances and shall be disposed in
accordance with the provisions of section 77.”
36.
The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Narayanamma (referred supra) has dealt the issue concerning
Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. The facts
involved in the case of Narayanamma (referred supra), may be
found in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment, which reads as
below:
“8. The facts in the present case are not in
dispute. On 20-10-1976, the suit property i.e. 1
acre 6 guntas bearing Survey No. 57 situated at
Mutkur
Village,
Angondanahalli
Hobli,
Hoskote
Taluk, Bangalore District, was given as a grant in
favour of Bale Venkataramanappa. The said grant
was under the provisions of the Reforms Act. On
13-9-1983,
the
premium
was
paid
by
Bale
Venkataramanappa and the grant was confirmed in
his favour with a non-alienation clause of 15 years.
On 15-9-1983, there was a mutation entry in the
revenue records entering the name of said Bale
Venkataramanappa with an endorsement that the
land shall not be alienated for a period of 15 years.
On 23-4-1990, Bale
Venkataramanappa, by a
registered mortgage deed, mortgaged the suit land
in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs 20,000.
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The mortgage deed recites about the receipt of the
entire
mortgaged
amount
by
Bale
Venkataramanappa. Under the mortgage deed,
Bale Venkataramanappa had agreed to repay the
loan within a period of one year. However, within a
period of one month, Bale Venkataramanappa
executed an agreement to sell dated 15-5-1990 in
favour of the plaintiff. The agreement to sell recites
that he was in need of money for his legal
necessities and to repay his hand loans and for his
domestic needs and, therefore, he had agreed to
sell the suit property for a sum of Rs 46,000. He
acknowledges the receipt of entire amount of
consideration i.e. Rs 46,000. The recital in the
agreement to sell reads that at the time of
execution of the agreement, the possession of the
suit property is handed over to the plaintiff.
Further, the recital reads that the plaintiff shall take
the consent of the officers of the Tribunal or the
officers concerned at his own cost for transferring
the property in the name of the plaintiff.
9. It could thus be seen that, initially the
property was mortgaged on 23-4-1990, and within
a period of one month the agreement to sell is
executed. At the time of the agreement itself, the
entire consideration amount is said to have been
received by Bale Venkataramanappa and also the
possession is handed over to the plaintiff.”
(emphasis supplied)
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37.
The Apex Court finds that the question of law that
arise for consideration in the said case is as to whether the
agreement
to
sell
dated
15.05.1990
executed
by
Bale
Venkataramanappa in favour of the plaintiff would be enforceable
in law or not. After elaborated discussion and after noting the
various decisions in this regard, it comes to the conclusion that
the agreement of sale involved in that case is unenforceable. It
relied on the principles laid down in the case of Immani Appa
Rao and Others v. Gollapalli Ramalingamurthi and Otehrs3
in coming to such conclusion. In the said case of Narayanamma
(referred supra), the Apex Court had the occasion to consider
two doctrines, which are applicable. In paragraphs 17, 18, 20
and 24, the Apex Court discussed the issue involved as under:
“17. Subsequently, another three-Judge Bench of
this
Court
in Immani
Appa
Rao v. Gollapalli
Ramalingamurthi [Immani
Appa
Rao v. Gollapalli
Ramalingamurthi, (1962) 3 SCR 739 : AIR 1962 SC
370] again had an occasion to consider the issue with
regard to applicability of the aforesaid two maxims.
This Court speaking through P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.
(as his Lordship then was) observed thus: (AIR p. 375,
paras 12-14)
AIR 1962 SC 370
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“12. Reported decisions bearing on this question
show that consideration of this problem often gives
rise to what may be described as a battle of legal
maxims.
The
appellants
emphasised
that
the
doctrine which is pre-eminently applicable to the
present case is ex dolo malo non oritur actio or ex
turpi causa non oritur actio. In other words, they
contended that the right of action cannot arise out
of fraud or out of transgression of law; and
according to them it is necessary in such a case
that possession should rest where it lies in pari
delicto potior est conditio possidentis; where each
party is equally in fraud the law favours him who is
actually in possession, or where both parties are
equally guilty the estate will lie where it falls. On
the other hand, Respondent 1 argues that the
proper maxim to apply is nemo allegans suam
turpitudinum audiendum est, whoever has first to
plead turpitudinum should fail; that party fails who
first has to allege fraud in which he participated. In
other words, the principle invoked by Respondent 1
is that a man cannot plead his own fraud. In
deciding the question as to which maxim should
govern the present case it is necessary to recall
what Lord Wright, M.R. observed about these
maxims in Berg v. Sadler & Moore [Berg v. Sadler
& Moore, (1937) 2 KB 158 (CA)] , at KB p. 162.
Referring to the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur
actio Lord Wright observed that:
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‘[this maxim], though veiled in the dignity of
learned language, is a statement of a principle
of great importance; but like most maxims it is
much too vague and much too general to admit
of application without a careful consideration of
the circumstances and of the various definite
rules
which
have
been
laid
down
by
the
authorities.’
Therefore, in deciding the question raised in the
present appeal it would be necessary for us to
consider carefully the true scope and effect of the
maxims pressed into service by the rival parties,
and to enquire which of the maxims would be
relevant and applicable in the circumstances of the
case. It is common ground that the approach of the
Court in determining the present dispute must be
conditioned
solely
by
considerations
of
public
policy. Which principle would be more conducive to,
and more consistent with, public interest, that is
the crux of the matter. To put it differently, having
regard to the fact that both the parties before the
Court
are
confederates
in
the
fraud,
which
approach would be less injurious to public interest.
Whichever approach is adopted one party would
succeed and the other would fail, and so it is
necessary to enquire as to which party's success
would be less injurious to public interest.
13. Out of the two confederates in fraud
Respondent 1 wants a decree to be passed in his
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favour and that means
he
wants
the
active
assistance of the Court in reaching the properties
possession of which has been withheld from him by
Respondent 2 and the appellants. Now, if the
defence raised by the appellants is shut out
Respondent 1 would be entitled to a decree
because there is an ostensible deed of conveyance
which purports to convey title to him in respect of
the
properties
in
question;
but,
in
the
circumstances, passing a decree in favour of
Respondent
would
be
actively
assisting
Respondent 1 to give effect to the fraud to which
he was a party and in that sense the Court would
be allowed to be used as an instrument of fraud,
and that is clearly and patently inconsistent with
public interest.
14. On the other hand, if the Court decides to
allow the plea of fraud to be raised the Court would
be in a position to hold an enquiry on the point and
determine whether it is a case of mutual fraud and
whether the fraud intended by both the parties has
been effectively carried out. If it is found that both
the parties are equally guilty and that the fraud
intended by them has been carried out the position
would be that the party raising the defence is not
asking the Court's assistance in any active manner;
all that the defence suggests is that a confederate
in fraud should not be permitted to obtain a decree
from the Court because the document of title on
which the claim is based really conveys no title at
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all. It is true that as a result of permitting
Respondent 2 and the appellants to prove their
plea they would incidentally be assisted in retaining
their possession; but this assistance is of a purely
passive character and all that the Court is doing in
effect is that on the facts proved it proposes to
allow possession to rest where it lies. It appears to
us that this latter course is less injurious to public
interest than the former.”
18. This Court held that, which principle is to be
applied in the facts of the case would depend upon the
question, as to which principle is more consistent with
public interest. The Court finds that, when both the
parties before the Court are confederates in the fraud,
the Court will have to find out which approach would
be less injurious to public interest. The Court observed
that, whichever approach is adopted, one party would
succeed and the other would fail and, therefore, it is
necessary to enquire as to which party's success would
be less injurious to public interest. The Court in the
facts of the said case finds that if the decree was to be
passed in favour of Respondent 1 (who was the
plaintiff), it would be actively assisting Respondent 1
to give effect to the fraud to which he was a party and
it has been held that in that sense the Court would be
allowed to be used as an instrument of fraud and that
is clearly and patently inconsistent with public interest.
19. xxxx
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20. It could thus be seen that, although illegality is
not pleaded by the defendant nor is relied upon by him
by way of defence, yet the court itself, upon the
illegality appearing upon the evidence, will take notice
of it, and will dismiss the action ex turpi causa non
oritur actio. It has been held, that no polluted hand
shall touch the pure fountain of justice. It has further
been held, that where parties are concerned in illegal
agreements or other transactions, courts of equity
following the rule of law as to participators in common
crime will not interpose to grant any relief, acting upon
the maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio defendetis
et possidentis.
21. xxxx
22. xxxx
23. xxxx
24. The
transaction
between
the
late
Bale
Venkataramanappa and the plaintiff is not disputed.
Initially the said Bale Venkataramanappa had executed
a registered mortgage deed in favour of the plaintiff.
Within a month, he entered into an agreement to sell
wherein, the entire consideration for the transfer as
well
as
handing
acknowledged.
It
over
of
the
could
thus
be
possession
was
seen,
the
that
transaction was nothing short of a transfer of property.
Under Section 61 of the Reforms Act, there is a
complete prohibition on such mortgage or transfer for
a period of 15 years from the date of grant. Sub-
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section (1) of Section 61 of the Reforms Act begins
with a non-obstante clause. It is thus clear that, the
unambiguous
legislative
intent
is
that
no
such
mortgage, transfer, sale, etc. would be permitted for a
period
of
years
from
the
date
of
grant.
Undisputedly, even according to the plaintiff, the grant
is of the year 1983, as such, the transfer in question in
the year 1990 is beyond any doubt within the
prohibited period of 15 years. Sub-section (3) of
Section 61 of the Reforms Act makes the legislative
intent very clear. It provides, that any transfer in
violation of sub-section (1) shall be invalid and it also
provides
for
the
consequence
for
such
invalid
transaction.”
(emphasis supplied)
38.
It is pertinent to note that, the Apex Court notes that
both the parties before the Court are confederates in the fraud
and the Court will have to find out which approach would be less
injurious to the public interest. Therefore, it holds that it is
necessary to enquire as to which party the success would be less
injurious to the public interest. This is the principle which is
followed by the Apex Court in holding that there was an
alienation of the property contrary to the prohibiting provisions
of law. In paragraph 24, it notices that the transaction between
Venkataramanappa and the plaintiff was nothing short of transfer
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of the property. In holding so, it is to be remembered that the
agreement of sale was executed within one month from the date
of the mortgage. The intention of the parties was to alienate. The
entire sale consideration was paid to the vendor. In addition,
mortgage was also executed one month prior to the agreement
of sale. It is this circumstance which prevailed over the Apex
Court in holding that the transaction is hit by the provisions of
Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. It is in the light
of these facts, which were involved, that the dictum of the Apex
Court needs to be seen.
39.
Hon’ble Apex Court in Maharaj Singh and Others
v. Karan Singh and Others,4 clarified that statutory prohibition
applies to execution of sale deeds and not to agreements for
sale, which do not transfer any interest in property. It held as
below:
“17. We have perused Section 154-B of the Zamindari
Abolition Act. Sub-section (1) prohibits the sale or
transfer of agricultural lands to a person who is not an
agriculturalist. Clause (h) of sub-section (2) of Section
154-B permits the sale of agricultural land to a nonagriculturalist
(2024) 8 SCC 83
with
the
permission
of
the
State
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Government for the purposes specified in clause (i) to (v)
of clause (h). What is prohibited is the sale of agricultural
land to a non-agriculturalist. In view of Section 54 of the
TP Act, an agreement for sale does not transfer the
property
subject
matter
of
the
agreement
to
the
purchaser. It does not create any interest in the property
subject matter of the agreement. Therefore, the embargo
created by sub-section (1) of Section 154-B will apply
only to the execution of the sale deed and not to the
execution of the agreement for sale.”
(emphasis supplied)
40.
In
Rojasara
Ramjibhai
Dahyabhai
v.
Court
that
an
contingent
or
Narottamdas
Lallubhai5,
the
Apex
agreement
sell
not
become
to
does
a
held
Jani
unenforceable contract merely because the vendor’s title or
statutory approval was initially imperfect, particularly when
subsequent events remove such impediments. It held as below:
“9. We do not see any basis for the submission that
the contract between the parties as embodied in
the suit banakhat (Ex. 25) was a contingent
contract, the performance of which was dependent
upon fulfilment of the condition under the earlier
agreement (Ex. 26) by which the appellant's vendor
Rana Mohabat Singh had undertaken upon himself
(1986) 3 SCC 300
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the obligation of procuring the necessary sanction
from the Collector. As to the appellant having an
imperfect title the question is purely hypothetical.
May be, initially the two transactions were not
independent
of
each
interdependent,
for
depended
the
upon
the
other
but
were
performance
fulfilment
of
of
the
one
other
agreement. If there was no abolition of proprietary
rights, it could well be said that the suit banakhat
(Ex. 25), being subject to the fulfilment by Rana
Mohabat
Singh
of
the
terms
of
the
earlier
agreement (Ex. 26), the appellant had an imperfect
title and therefore the contract between the parties
was contingent on Rana Mohabat Singh obtaining
the approval of the Collector and as he could not
secure such approval and execute a conveyance in
favour of the appellant, no effective agreement
came into being which could be ordered to be
specifically enforced. But the contention that unless
the
appellant's
conveyed
title
vendor
by
Rana
execution
Mohabat
Singh
of
proper
a
conveyance, the contract as between the parties
became impossible of performance and further that
for want of such conveyance the appellant had an
imperfect title, does not take into account the
subsequent events.”
41.
In
Indian
Overseas
Bank
vs.
M.A.S.
Subramanian, Civil Appeal No. 282/2025 the Apex Court
reiterated the settled principle that an agreement for sale does
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not by itself transfer title or create any interest in immovable
property. It held as below:
6. It is well settled that an agreement for sale in
respect of an immovable property does not transfer
title
in
favour
of
the
purchaser
under
the
agreement. In view of Section 54 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, an agreement for sale does not
create any interest in the property. The only mode
by which an immovable property worth more than
Rs.100/- (Rupees one hundred) can be sold is by a
sale deed duly registered in accordance with the
Indian Registration Act, 1908.
(emphasis supplied)
42.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharma Naika v. Rama
Naika6, interpreted the definition of “transfer” under the PTCL
Act to include agreements for sale to protect SC/ST granted
lands. It held as below:
“21. We have already considered the scheme of the
Act as also the objects and reasons for which it was
introduced. It is an admitted position that the Act
was introduced to help and protect the right, title
and
interest
of
the
Scheduled
Castes
and
Scheduled Tribes, in respect of the granted lands,
(2008) 14 SCC 517
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whose poverty and status in the society was taken
advantage of by some rich and affluent persons
who took their lands either by paying a paltry sum
or even without paying anything to them.
22. As noted hereinearlier, it is true that in this
case, admittedly, the parties had entered into an
agreement for sale in respect of the granted land
before the commencement of the Act. It is also an
admitted
position
belong/belonged
to
that
the
respondents
the
Scheduled
Caste
community. As already noted hereinearlier, for the
purposes of this Act, “transfer” has been defined to
include an “agreement for sale” although under the
general law, an “agreement for sale” will not by
itself transfer the granted land automatically to the
appellant purchaser. From an overall consideration
of the objects and reasons for which this Act was
introduced viz. to protect the right and interest of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in
respect of the granted lands and the relevant
provisions of the Act, it is pellucid that the
definition of “transfer” under Section 3(1)(e) of the
Act includes an agreement for sale also and
“transfer” has been so defined to protect the right,
title and interest of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes so that possession of the lands
could be restored to them even if they had entered
into an agreement for sale.”
(emphasis supplied)
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43.
A Co-ordinate Bench of this court, in the case of
B.S.Lakshman (referred supra) holds that the prohibition under
Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act is applicable only
if there is an alienation or transfer. In paragraph 25, it observes
as below:
“25. It is also important to note that having
read Section
61 of the Act and also the
judgment
the
of
First
Appellate
Court, it
discloses that the First Appellate Court while
answering fourth point for consideration comes
to the conclusion that Ex.P1 agreement of sale
was executed within 15 years from the date of
grant and the same is hit by Section 61 of
the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
No doubt,
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
NARAYANAMMA referred supra referred by the
counsel for the respondents is very clear with
regard to hit by Section 61 of the Karnataka
Land Reforms Act. In that judgment, it has to
be noted that predecessor-in-title executed the
registered mortgage deed in favour of the
plaintiff but in the case on hand, there is no
any such mortgage deed and there was no
any transfer and only an agreement is executed
and in the said judgment, having executed the
registered mortgage deed in
favour of the
plaintiff, again executed the sale agreement
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when already there was a mortgage deed. But
in the case on hand, only sale agreement is
executed.”
44.
Though a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court did not go
into the background in which the case of Narayanamma
(referred supra) was dealt by the Apex Court, it holds that
agreement of sale is not hit by the judgment of Apex Court in
Narayanamma (referred supra). The resultant effect would be
that the Court has to find out whether substantially the
agreement amounts to an alienation in violation of the intent of
Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act; only if there is an
alienation and an ad-idem between the confederates of the fraud
on law that the Court should hold that, such transfer is non-est
and is hit by Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. It is
in this background that the facts involved in the present case
need to be considered.
45.
This Court in the case of Uma vs Muni Reddy and
Others7 laid down that agreements entered into in violation of
2021 SCC Online Kar 15034
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statutory restrictions on alienation are void and unenforceable in
law, as below:
“15. In the light of the law declared by this Court
and by the Hon’ble Apex Court, and applying the
provision of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act,
1992, it is not in dispute that no alienation of land
including the land to which agreement of sale has
been entered into between the parties, and if any
such agreement is entered into, it amounts to
nullity and not sustainable under Contract Law. In
this aspect, the recital in the Agreement of Sale
(Ex.P1)
which
provides
for
conclusion
of
the
transaction through execution of registered sale
deed only after obtaining permission from the
Government i.e. after completion of 15 years, is not
an Agreement of Sale in the eye of law and same is
void.
16. In view of the rulings referred to above, any
agreement of sale for alienation of land made by
the owner of the land in question, contrary to the
period of non-alienation stipulated in the grant is
null and void. Therefore, the Agreement of SaleEx.P1 is not an agreement within the purview of
law and therefore,
the
contentions
raised by
learned counsel appearing for the appellant cannot
be accepted. In the light of the law declared by the
Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court referred to
above, though appropriate issue has not been
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raised
before
the
trial
Court
with
regard
to
alienation of the land made in derogation of the
provisions contained under the grant certificate and
same has not been questioned by the defendant
before the First Appellate Court, however, the said
submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant cannot be accepted. Suffice it to say that,
though the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant placed reliance on the judgment passed
in
the
case
of R.
Nagaraja v. Chikka
Venkataramma decided on 22.07.2013 in Review
Petition No. 82 of 2013 in RSA No. 1244/2004,
however, in view of the later judgment of this Court
and
the
Hon'ble
Apex
Court
in
the
case
of NARAYANAMMA's v. Govindappa reported
in (2019) 19 SCC 42, the relief sought for specific
performance of contract under the provisions of the
Specific Relief Act, 1923 cannot be granted and
therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned
counsel for the appellant would not enure to the
benefit of the appellant.”
46.
In the case of Sri Annappa Patil and Others vs
Smt. Bhagawwa in RSA 5863/2013 this Court addressed the
legal consequence of an agreement of sale accompanied by
delivery of possession in the context of statutory prohibition. It
observed as below:
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“10. Though, the agreement for sale without
possession is not a transfer of property, under the
agreement the plaintiffs claims to have taken
possession. Thus, the plaintiffs cannot urge that the
agreement
is
not
an
agreement
evidencing
transfer. This being the position, this Court is of the
view that the substantial question of law relating to
validity of the agreement for law under Section 61
of the Act of 1961 is squarely covered in terms of
the law laid down in the case of Narayanamma
(supra). And the Court need not answer other
questions”
47.
In V. Nagaraja vs Purushothama and Others in
RSA 190/2010 clarified that the precedent relied upon by the
appellants was found inapplicable due to materially different
facts and the statutory bar under the Karnataka Land Reforms
Act. It opined as below:
“25. Even though learned counsel for the appellants
placed reliance on Smt.Narayanamma (supra), the
facts and circumstances of the said case is entirely
different from the present one. As per facts
narrated in the said case, initially a mortgage deed
was executed in favour of the plaintiff within the
period of restriction for alienation and thereafter
within a month, the plaintiff and the defendants
have entered into agreement for sale. Under such
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circumstances,
the
Trial
Court
held
that
the
transaction is hit by Section 61 of the Land Reforms
Act, which was upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court.”
48.
Nagaraja
In Smt. Chikka Venkatamma (Dead) vs. R.
and
Others
in
RSA
No.1244/2004,
while
considering the issue relating to a sale agreement, the Court
observed as follows:
“20. The reading of the above section makes it clear
that, what is prohibited is the transfer of land by sale,
gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment. In
Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court relying on Section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act and the earlier Judgment of
the Supreme Court in Ramba vs Narain Bapujhi
(2004(8) SCC 614) held that transfer of immovable
property by way of sale can only be made by deed of
conveyance (sale deed). It was further held that in the
absence of deed of conveyance duly stamped and
registered as required by law, no right title or interest
in an immovable property can be transferred. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in para.11 of the judgment
held as follows:
11. Section 54 of TP Act makes it clear that a
contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does
not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on
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such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v.
S.A.Kamtam and Anr. (1977) SCC 247, observed:
A contract of sale does not of itself create
any interest in, or charge on the property.
This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act.”
49.
While dealing with the scope of interference under
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court in
Smt.Prathima and Others vs. Smt. Vinaya Achar in RSA
No.1417/2023, held as follows:
“13. The principles laid in the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of SMT. NARAYANAMMA’s case is
not helpful to learned counsel for the appellants,
since there was no sale transaction between the
period of bar and only an agreement was entered
and the defendants have consciously entered into
an agreement of sale knowing the fact that there
was a bar to execute the sale deed and the time
stipulated is also to execute the sale deed after the
period of 15 years. When such being the factual
aspects, I do not find any ground to come to a
conclusion that there was a perversity in the finding
of the Trial Court to invoke Section 100 of CPC to
frame the substantial question of law as contended
by the learned counsel for the appellants.”
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50.
In
Parvatagouda
Ninganagouda
Patil
v.
Guddappa,8 this Court examined whether statutory restrictions
under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act prohibit entering into an
agreement of sale.
“29. Now the question is as to whether the bar
under Section 61 would come into play even in respect
of agreement of sale. We see no substance in the
contention of the learned Counsel for the defendants
that the defendants in the light of prohibition under
Section 61 could not have entered into agreement of
sale. The prohibition provided under Section 61 of the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, is from transferring the
property by way of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage,
lease or assignment. The prohibition under Section 61
does not apply to agreement of sale. Therefore,
Section 61 does not prohibit the tenants to whom
occupancy rights have been granted from entering into
an agreement of sale. The agreement of sale does not
amount to transfer of interest or right in the property.
It merely creates a right to seek enforcement of
contract Under the agreement no interest or right in
the property is transferred in favour of the prospective
buyer. Therefore, Section 61 does not come in the way
of tenant entering into an agreement to sell the
property.
(2009) 1 Kant LJ 547
It
is
for
that
reason
only
under
the
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agreement the defendants agreed to execute the sale
deed after the expiry of 15 years from 1983. Under
these circumstances there is no substance in this
contention also.
30. The next contention that as the plaintiff was a
non-agriculturist, he could not purchase agricultural
land and therefore the agreement cannot be enforced
by him as it is barred under Sections 79 and 80 of the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act also has no substance.
Two Division Bench of this Court have clearly held that
agreement to sell agricultural lands even to a nonagriculturist is not a contract in contravention of the
Karnataka
Land
Reforms
Act.
In Shivannappa
Sidramappa Prantur v. Virupaxappa Allappa Bagi [ILR
1980 KAR 702 (DB).] , a Division Bench of this Court
has
clearly
stated
that
an
agreement
to
sell
agricultural land even to a non-agriculturist is not a
contract in contravention of the Karnataka Land
Reforms Act and it is further held that there is no bar
in the Act for entering into an agreement to sell
agricultural lands even in favour of a non-agriculturist.
It has been further observed in this decision that the
question as to whether the intending purchaser is an
agriculturist or not is not at all a relevant issue for
consideration in a suit for specific performance of the
agreement to sell agricultural lands. Again in the case
of Mrs. Sushila A. Dass v. Mrs. Mary Bolger [1988 (1)
Kar. L.J. 563 (DB) : ILR 1988 KAR 1413 (DB).] , this
view has been reiterated. In the light of these two
decisions of the Division Bench of this Court and in the
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light of the provisions of Sections 79, 80 and 83 of the
Act, there is no substance in the contention of the
learned Counsel for the defendants with regard to
legality of the agreement-Ex. P. 1.
(emphasis supplied)
51.
The above catena of decisions show that the Courts
have consistently relied on Section 54 of the Transfer of Property
Act to hold that the word ‘transfer’ connotes the transfer of the
title. When Karnataka Land Reforms Act imposes a condition that
any such transfer is prohibited, it cannot be stretched to mean
that it includes the agreement of sale also. It is relevant to note
that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act defines the
transfer and the Apex Court in its previous judgments and
various High Courts have held that agreement of sale does not
amount to a transfer. Therefore, the contention of the appellants
that the agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the
defendant was not a transfer holds good.
52.
In the case of Narayanamma (referred supra), the
Apex Court had held that the mortgage was followed by an
agreement of sale and therefore, such agreement which was
subsequent to the transfer, which is prohibited under Section 61
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of the Act, is void. It is also pertinent to note that the Apex Court
had gone into the intention of the parties and it concluded that
they were the confederates in a fraud on law.
53.
In the case on hand, it is evident that though the
agreement of sale mentioned that the plaintiff is in possession
and enjoyment of the property, such possession has not been
recognized by the Court in O.S.No.135/1992 as it was dismissed.
It is pertinent to note that the defendants No.2 to 8 contend that
they are in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule
property pursuant to the sale deeds executed by the power of
attorney holder of the defendant No.1. The defendant No.1 has
not entered the witness box. Learned counsel appearing for the
appellant has taken exception to this conduct on the part of the
defendant No.1, who did not enter the witness box to say about
the manner in which the agreement of sale came into effect. The
cross-examination of DW1 show that he doesn't know what had
transpired between defendant No.1 and the plaintiff-Mallappa at
the time of the agreement. Therefore, the say of DW1, who is
only a power of attorney holder cannot be of much relevance in
respect of the manner in which the agreement was entered into.
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In view of the above, it is evident that the trial Court below had
recognized the possession of the plaintiff.
54.
The records reveal that the photographs of the suit
schedule property, including the house property, have been
produced by the plaintiff at Exs.P40 and P41. These photographs
show that there is nothing which is discernible to assert the
possession of the plaintiff. The house property is in a dilapidated
condition. Under these circumstances, it is evident that though
the plaintiff asserts his possession and enjoyment of the property
as per the agreement of sale, he had not improved the same and
had not constructed any building over it.
55.
The sale deeds produced by the defendant No.2 to 8
show that they are claiming possession over the pieces of lands,
which they have purchased from the defendant No.1 on the basis
of the sale deeds. Though these sale deeds mention that the
possession of such pieces of lands have been given to them,
there is nothing on record to show that they have constructed
any structure over it. Though there is scanty oral evidence in this
regard, nothing discernible in the form of permission for
construction of the building, and such other licences etc.,
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obtained for enjoying the constructions made in those properties
or the conversion of the lands etc., have been placed on record.
Therefore, it appears that the suit schedule property is in the
same condition as it was in the hands of the defendant No.1 at
the time of the agreement of sale. It may be true that a
constructive possession of the suit schedule property was with
the plaintiff as averred in the agreement of sale, but the same
did not culminated in favour of the plaintiff in O.S.No.135/1992.
Under these circumstances, reverting back to the question of law
regarding the effect of Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms
Act, it is evident that the alleged transfer of the possession from
defendant No.1 to the plaintiff’s predecessor [Mallappa] appears
to be a possession, which remained on papers. In other words,
the animus that could be found in the parties in the case of
Narayanamma (referred supra) cannot be found in the present
case on hand. This would lead this Court to hold that, in the case
on hand, the agreement of sale as per Ex.P.8 though mentioned
about the transfer of the possession by the defendant No.1 in
favour of the agreement holder-Mallappa, there was no such
improvement to the suit schedule properties. Under these
circumstances,
the
background
in
which
the
case
of
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Narayanamma (referred supra) was dealt with is not available
in the case on hand.
56.
It is pertinent to note that the circumstances under
which the Apex Court came to the conclusion that an agreement
of sale is also hit by the provisions of Section 61 of the
Karnataka
Land
Reforms
Act,
is
distinguished
by
many
judgments. While there can be no reversal of the principle that
transfer of ownership as defined under Section 61 of the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act limits to the modes of transfer
mentioned therein, and there being catena of judgments to hold
that the agreement of sale never can be held to be a valid
transfer, the judgment in the case of Narayanamma (referred
supra) has to be held that it was in the background of the
mortgage and the agreement, which was entered into within one
month. Moreover, in the case on hand, though there is transfer
of the possession as mentioned in the agreement, there was no
such improvement which was carried out by the plaintiff in the
suit schedule property. Thus, the ratio laid down in the case of
Narayanamma (referred supra) cannot be made applicable to
the case on hand.
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57.
With this background, let us examine the question of
limitation.
First Substantial Question of law: Limitation
58.
Though the plaint does not specifically say as to
when the cause of action arose, it only says that the cause of
action arose in first week of September, when the defendant
refused to accept the legal notice issued by the plaintiffs. It is
pertinent to note that as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the
time begins to run from the date when specific performance was
refused. Therefore, it is such refusal to adhere to the contractual
terms of Ex.P8 which constitutes the date of cause of action.
59.
Hon’ble Apex Court in Banarsi Das v. Kanshi Ram9
held that limitation being a mixed question of law and fact
cannot be raised for the first time without affording opportunity
to the parties. It held as below:
“15. The High Court has overlooked the fact that
even upon the argument addressed before it on
behalf of Kanshi Ram, the question of limitation
was not one purely of law but was a mixed question
AIR 1963 SC 1165
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of fact and law and, therefore, it was not proper for
it to be raised for the first time in argument. We
are satisfied that what the High Court has done has
caused prejudice to some of the parties to the suit
and on that ground alone, we would be justified in
setting aside its decision. If the High Court felt
overwhelmed by the provisions of Section 3 of the
Limitation Act, it should at least have given an
opportunity to the parties which supported the
decree of the trial court to meet the plea of
limitation
by
amending
their
pleadings.
After
allowing the pleadings to be amended, the High
Court should have framed an issue and remitted it
for a finding to the trial court. Instead of doing so,
it has chosen to treat the pleading of one of the
defendants as conclusive not only on the question
of fact but also on the question of law and
dismissed the suit. It is quite possible that had an
opportunity been given to the defendants, they
could have established, in addition to proving the
dates on which the summonses were served, that
the suit was not barred by time because of
acknowledgments. In the course of the discussion,
the High Court has said that it was not suggested
before it by anyone that the claim was not barred
by reason of acknowledgments. Apparently, no
such argument was advanced before it on behalf of
the plaintiff and the defendant Banarsi Das because
the counsel were apparently taken by surprise and
had no opportunity to obtain instructions on this
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aspect of the case. We are clearly of opinion that
the High Court was in error in allowing the plea of
limitation to be raised before it particularly by
defendants who had not even filed a written
statement in the case. We do not think that this
was a fit case for permitting an entirely new point
to be raised by a non-contesting party to the suit.”
(emphasis supplied)
60.
In the case on hand the cause of action for the
present suit to initiate action for specific performance had arisen
from the date when there was refusal. Obviously, the written
statement filed by the defendant in O.S.135/1992 has not been
produced by the defendants. Evidently, permission was granted
by Tahsildar only in the year 1998 and the condition not to
alienate the property was relaxed. Therefore, in the absence of
anything to show that the refusal of the defendant to execute the
sale deed was made known to the plaintiff after such permission
dated 23.04.1998 was granted to the defendant, it cannot be
said that the limitation had begun to run.
61.
Even if we assume that in O.S.No.135/1992, the
defendant had refused to comply with the agreement as per
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Ex.P8, the condition imposed by the Land Tribunal not alienate
for 15 years had not come to an end. Therefore, at any rate, the
right to enforce the contract of agreement of sale does not
accrue
till 1997. Clandestinely
permission
to
alienate
the
the
defendant obtains the
property
from
Tahsildar
on
23.04.1998 and sells pieces of the lands to defendant No.2 to 8.
However, he doesn’t inform the plaintiff about obtaining such
permission. Therefore, it cannot be said that the cause of action
had arisen immediately after the 15 years period was completed
as per the conditions in Form No.10.
62.
Therefore, it is evident that the contention of the
plaintiff that he only came to know about the refusal to perform
his part of the contract by the defendant when the defendant
filed the written statement in O.S.No.126/2000 has to be
accepted. The defendant has not shown any material to establish
that plaintiff knew about refusal to execute the sale deed by the
defendant, it cannot be said that the limitation had begun to run
on the date of expiry of the 15 years period on 04.05.1997. The
contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the
defendant had denied the agreement and had refused to execute
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the sale deed in the year 1994 in the written statement filed in
O.S.No.135/1992 has not been established.
63.
It may be noted that the question of limitation was
not at all raised by the defendants in the written statement. The
said issue of limitation being question of law and fact, I find
considerable force in the submission made by the learned
counsel for the appellant that in the present case, it is not the
question of law alone, which could have been raised in the
appeal, but it was question of fact also, which should have been
pleaded in the written statement.
64.
In the light of the above discussions, this Court
comes to the conclusion that the finding of the First Appellate
Court that the suit was barred by limitation is perverse and it
does not stand to reason to say that plaintiff had the knowledge
of the refusal of the defendant was known to him much earlier to
three years from the date of filing of the suit. Thus, it is to be
held that the suit is not barred by limitation.
65.
Insofar as the contention of the defendant that the
suit is hit by the provision of Order II Rule 2 of Code of Civil
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Procedure, it is to be noted that the pleadings in the earlier suit
are essential to decide the said question. The judgment of
Supreme Court in Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta10
reiterated that a bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC must be
specifically pleaded and tried as an issue. It held as below:
“7. Xxxxx. For the reasons following, we are of the
view that the orders of the learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench which ignore several basic
principles of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be
sustained.
I. A suit cannot be dismissed as barred by Order 2
Rule 2 of the Code in the absence of a plea by the
defendant to that effect and in the absence of an
issue thereon.
8. The object of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code is twofold. First is to ensure that no defendant is sued
and vexed twice in regard to the same cause of
action. Second is to prevent a plaintiff from splitting
of claims and remedies based on the same cause of
action. The effect of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code is
to bar a plaintiff who had earlier claimed certain
remedies in regard to a cause of action, from filing
a second suit in regard to other reliefs based on the
same cause of action. It does not however bar a
AIR 2011 SC 9
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second suit based on a different and distinct cause
of action.
9. This Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhoora Lal [AIR
1964 SC 1810] held :
"In order that a plea of a bar under O. 2, R.
2(3), Civil Procedure Code should succeed the
defendant who raises the plea must make out
(1) that the second suit was in respect of the
same cause of action as that on which the
previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of
that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to
more than one relief; (3) that being thus
entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff
without leave obtained from the Court omitted
to sue for the relief for which the second suit
had been filed. From this analysis it would be
seen
that
the
defendant
would
have
to
establish primarily and to start with, the
precise
cause
of
action
upon
which
the
previous suit was filed for unless there is
identity between the cause of action on which
the earlier suit was filed and that on which the
claim in the latter suit is based there would be
no scope for the application of the bar."
II. The cause of action for the second suit being
completely different from the cause of action for
the first suit, the bar under order 2 Rule 2 of the
Code was not attracted.”
(emphasis supplied)
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66.
In Vurimi Pullarao (referred supra), the Apex Court
examined whether the omission to seek specific performance in
an earlier suit for injunction attracts the bar under Order II Rule
2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and considered the contention
that the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC cannot be applied without
the pleadings of the earlier suit being proved on record. It
observed as below:
“20. In the present case, the earlier suit for
injunction was instituted on 30-10-1996. Para 2 of
the plaint in the suit for injunction contained a
recital of the agreement to sell dated 26-10-1995;
the price fixed for the bargain between the parties;
the payment of earnest money; the handing over of
possession; the demand for performance and the
failure of the defendant to perform the contract.
Indeed, the plaintiff also asserted that she was
going to institute a suit for specific performance of
the
agreement
dated
26-10-1995.
Under
the
agreement dated 26-10-1995, time for completion
of the sale was reserved until 25-10-1996. Notice
of performance was issued on 11-10-1996 to which
the defendant had replied on 13-10-1996. The
cause of action for the suit for specific performance
had arisen when the plaintiff had notice of the
denial by the defendant to perform the contract. On
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30-10-1996 when the suit for injunction was
instituted, the plaintiff was entitled to sue for
specific performance. There was a complete identity
of the cause of action between the earlier suit (of
which para 2 of the plaint has been reproduced in
the earlier part of the judgment) and the cause of
action for the subsequent suit. Yet, as the record
indicates, the plaintiff omitted to sue for specific
performance. This is a relief for which the plaintiff
was entitled to sue when the earlier suit for
injunction was instituted. Having omitted the claim
for relief without the leave of the Court, the bar
under Order 2 Rule 2(3) would stand attracted.
21.
But the case of the plaintiff in appeal is that in
order that the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 be
attracted, it is necessary that the plaint in the
earlier suit must be proved in evidence. In the
present case, it was submitted that this was not
done.
The
basis
of
above
submission is
the
judgment of the Constitution Bench in Gurbux
Singh [Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC
1810]. Now it is necessary to analyse the facts
which led to the decision of the Constitution Bench.
The respondent had instituted a suit against the
claimant for possession of certain property and for
mesne profits. The allegation in the plaint was that
the plaintiff was the absolute owner of the property
of which the defendant was in wrongful possession
and that despite a demand he had failed to vacate
the property, thereby attracting the liability to pay
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mesne profits. The plaint contained a reference to a
previous suit instituted by the plaintiff and his
mother in which a claim had been made against the
defendant for the recovery of mesne profits in
regard to the same property. It was also stated
that mesne profits had been decreed in the suit. In
the written statement, the appellant-defendant
raised a plea to the maintainability of the suit on
the ground of the bar under Order 2 Rule 2. As an
issue was struck it was argued as a preliminary
issue. The Court recorded a finding that the suit
was barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2. The
Court held that without the pleadings in the earlier
suit being made a part of the record, the trial court
decided the issue as a matter of deduction.
Consequently, the District Judge held that the bar
under Order 2 Rule 2 could not have been
entertained without the plaint in the earlier suit
being made a part of the record. However, the first
appellate court also held that if the point did arise
for consideration, it would have decided it in favour
of the plaintiff and treated the cause of action for a
suit for mesne profit as distinct from a cause of
action for the relief of possession of a property
from a trespasser. However, on the first point that
there was no material on the record to justify the
plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2, the District
Judge did not rest his decision on his view of the
law as regards the construction of Order 2 Rule
2(3). Accordingly, he set aside the dismissal of the
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suit and remanded it to the trial court for a decision
on merits. The High Court dismissed the second
appeal as a consequence of which proceedings
came up before this Court.”
67.
In Rathnavathi v. Kavita Ganashamdas11, the
Supreme Court explained why the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC
was held inapplicable due to distinct causes of action for
injunction and specific performance. It observed as below :
“25.
In
the
aforementioned
instant
case
principle,
we
when
find
we
that
apply
the
the
bar
contained in Order 2 Rule 2 CPC is not attracted
because of the distinction in the cause of action for
filing the two suits:
25.1. So far as the suit for permanent injunction
is concerned, it was based on a threat given to the
plaintiff by the defendants to dispossess her from the
suit house on 2-1-2000 and 9-1-2000. This would be
clear from reading Para 17 of the plaint. So far as the
cause of action to file suit for specific performance of
the agreement is concerned, the same was based on
non-performance of agreement dated 15-2-1989 by
Defendant 2 in the plaintiff’s favour despite giving legal
notice dated 6-3-2000 to Defendant 2 to perform her
part.
(2015) 5 SCC 223
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25.3. In case of former, the plaintiff is required
to make out the existence of prima facie case, balance
of convenience and irreparable loss likely to be suffered
by the plaintiff on facts with reference to the suit
property as provided in Section 38 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 read with Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC.
Whereas, in case of the latter, the plaintiff is required
to plead and prove her continuous readiness and
willingness to perform her part of the agreement and to
further prove that the defendant failed to perform her
part of the agreement as contained in Section 16 of the
Act.
26. One of the basic requirements for successfully
invoking the plea of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC is that the
defendant of the second suit must be able to show that
the second suit was also in respect of the same cause
of action as that on which the previous suit was based.
As mentioned supra, since in the case on hand, this
basic requirement in relation to cause of action is not
made out, the defendants are not entitled to raise a
plea of bar contained in Order 2 Rule 2 CPC to
successfully non-suit the plaintiff from prosecuting her
suit for specific performance of the agreement against
the defendants.”
(emphasis supplied)
68.
It is evident that in the year 1992, when the suit for
injunction was filed by the plaintiff, a prayer for specific
performance could not have been made by him. The condition
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imposed by the Land Tribunal not to alienate the suit schedule
property for 15 years had not lapsed. Permission was not
available to sell the property. Evidently, the defendant No.1 had
several other properties, which may be seen from Ex.P43 to 46.
Therefore, the question of ceiling limits about the extent of
property to be held by a person was also to be cleared by the
competent authority. Learned counsel for the appellant draws
the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 63 to 66
of KLR Act, which imposes certain limits on the extent of the land
that may be held by a person.
69.
Hence, this court comes to the conclusion that the
finding of the First Appellate Court that the suit is hit by law of
limitation cannot be sustained and the first substantial question
of law is answered in the affirmative.
C. Regarding Ready and willingness:
70.
Having answered both the substantial questions of
law and regarding the statutory bar under section 61 of the KLR
Act, let us consider the question of ready and willingness. In Sri
Thammannagowda vs Ramegawda [RSA 1082/2022] this
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Court held that where the entire sale consideration has been paid
and possession has been delivered, the requirement of readiness
and willingness and the plea of limitation must be examined in
light of the admitted factual matrix and the terms of the
agreement.
“27. In the case on hand, when there was a nonalienation clause and entire sale consideration is
paid, the question of readiness and willingness to
pay the balance consideration money is not of
much importance in view of the admitted factual
aspects of the judgment reported in ILR 2003
KAR 3533 and the said judgment aptly applies to
the facts of the case on hand and there is no
obligation on the part of the plaintiff either by
making
any
payment
of
balance
sale
consideration, since already paid the entire sale
consideration and possession was also delivered
in favour of the plaintiff as on the date of
execution of the sale agreement and the recitals
in the power of attorney is also very clear that, all
powers are applicable to the facts of the case on
hand having considered the discussions made in
Para No.15 of the judgment, wherein there was
an endorsement by the plaintiff himself that he
consents for defendant to sell plot Nos.198 and
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199 which he had intended to purchase. When
such materials are available before the Court, the
very contention of the learned counsel for the
respondent that Article 54 of the Limitation Act
applies cannot be accepted and Article 54 of the
Limitation Act applies when no time period is
fixed in the agreement to have the sale deed and
time was already fixed for execution of the
document
and
not
performing
any
part
of
contractual terms.”
71.
The First Appellate Court as well as the Trial Court
have come to the conclusion that the agreement between the
parties as per Ex.P8 has been proved. Both the Courts relied on
the testimony of the DW5 and the testimony of the PWs1 to 3 to
come to the conclusion that the plaintiff-Mallappa and the
defendants had entered into the agreement. The said question of
fact, being concurrent findings, it is not necessary for this Court
to re-examine the same.
72.
The First Appellate Court holds that the PW1 has
unequivocally admitted that prior to the institution of the suit,
notice was not issued to the defendant No.1 and the plaintiffs
have not approached the defendant No.1 with balance sale
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consideration amount. Therefore, it holds that the ready and
willingness is not proved. It also adds that the plaintiffs have not
filed suit for cancellation of the sale deeds executed by
defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No.2 to 8.
the
73.
The Trial Court while dealing with the issue regarding
ready
and
willingness
(issue
No.4)
notices
that
the
moratorium of fifteen years from the date of issue of Form No.10
by the Tribunal expires on 05.05.1997 and for all those years,
the plaintiff had not approached the defendant. However, it
notices that a legal notice as per Ex.P3 had been issued to the
defendant but it was refused. This would show that the reasoning
of the First Appellate Court is incorrect. It also notices that it was
the bounden duty of the defendant to obtain the permission from
the concerned authority for transfer of the property and
therefore, it holds that the plaintiff had shown ready and
willingness.
74.
Since, the First Appellate Court had not bestowed its
attention on the legal notice issued as per Ex.P3, it cannot be
said that there was no such ready and willingness. A perusal of
Ex.P8, the agreement shows that the defendant had agreed to
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execute the sale deed whenever the Government permits him to
alienate
the
property.
The
defendant
had
accepted
the
responsibility to obtain such permission to alienate the property.
Obviously, the written statement do not state when the
defendant No.1 had obtained such permission. It is relevant to
note that the additional document now produced by the appellant
under Order 41 Rule 27 of Code of Civil Procedure, shows that
such permission was granted on 23.04.1998. The defendant has
not informed the plaintiff about such permission being granted
by Tahsildar. There is no averment of such permission being
granted to him in the written statement. Therefore, it is evident
that when the plaintiff came to know about the alienation made
by the defendant No.1, he issued a legal notice as per Ex.P3 and
thereafter, instituted the suit for specific performance.
75.
Not only that, it appears that the defendant in his
written statement in O.S.No.126/2000 had contended that he
has sold the property to defendants No.2 to 8. Therefore, the
Court had directed to file a suit for specific performance. When
the plaintiff was in possession of the property as per the
agreement at Ex.P8 and when the burden of securing the
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permission to alienate was on the defendant, it was not
necessary for the plaintiff to go on making enquires about the
permission to alienate. In that view of the matter, the cryptic
findings of the First Appellate Court that there was no such ready
and willingness on the part of the plaintiff appears to be perverse
and it could not have replaced its findings to that of the Trial
Court
without
referring
to
the
written
statement
on
O.S.No.126/2000 and Ex.P3. Therefore, this finding of the First
Appellate Court is patently perverse and arbitrary.
76.
It is also relevant to note that the Trial Court initially
discusses and holds that the question of ready and willingness
has not been proved by the plaintiff but at the end of paragraph
20 (Page 33), it holds that the ready and willingness has been
proved. It seems that the Trial Court was unsure about the ready
and willingness of the plaintiff. However, after noting that the
defendant had not stepped into the witness box, it changes its
mind and holds the issue No.4 in the affirmative.
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77.
The Apex Court in Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh
Sangha12, emphasized strict compliance with Section 16(c) of
the Specific Relief Act regarding readiness and willingness. It
held as below:
“21. The plaintiff who ought to have given
evidence never appeared and gave evidence. As
his attorney-holder PW 1 had no knowledge of the
transaction, the
plaintiff solely relied on the
evidence of the property dealer Balraj Singh (PW
2) to prove the execution of the agreement, the
terms
of
the
agreement,
his
readiness
and
willingness to perform the agreement and the
alleged breach by the defendant. But Balraj Singh
cannot become a substitute for the plaintiff to give
evidence about the finances or intentions or the
readiness and willingness of the plaintiff which
were within the personal knowledge of the plaintiff.
Balraj Singh was a property dealer engaged by the
plaintiff and supporting the plaintiff. He was not an
attorney-holder acting on behalf of the plaintiff.
Therefore, neither the evidence of Jagtar Singh
(PW 1) nor the evidence of Balraj Singh (PW 2)
can be relied upon to prove that plaintiff was
always ready and willing to perform his obligations
under the contract, in terms of the contract.
Therefore, it has to be held that though there were
(2010) 10 SCC 512
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necessary averments in the plaint about the
readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, and
though PW 1 and PW 2 gave evidence about his
readiness and willingness, the suit has to fail for
failure to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific
Relief Act, as there was no acceptable or valid
evidence of such readiness and willingness of the
plaintiff to perform his part of the obligations in
terms of the contract.
78.
The question of ready and willingness which is held
against the plaintiff by the First Appellate Court is perverse and
the same needs to be set aside. The resultant effect would be
whether the discretion has to be exercised in favour of the
plaintiffs or the defendant No.1.
D. Reg:
Discretion
of
the
Court
to
grant
Specific
Performance
79.
The evidence on record shows that as per the
photographs produced at Ex.P.40 and Ex.P.41 there is no such
discernible improvement in the land or investment made by the
plaintiff in the suit schedule property. It is not the case of the
plaintiff
that
he
has
made
certain
improvements
and
constructions and has put the suit schedule property to better
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use. It is also relevant to note that the defendant No.1, in the
year 1994, as per Ex.D.1 had executed power of attorney in
favour of DW1 to deal with the suit schedule property and
Survey No.43, in a manner he likes. On the basis of such power
of attorney, DW1 had executed various sale deeds in favour of
other defendants and in turn there have been transactions
between them. The cross-examination of PW1 shows that the
house property has been dilapidated. The testimony of DW2
shows that the piece of land purchased by him to the extent of
21 guntas is improved by him. Similarly, the testimonies of the
other witnesses also show that the property is adjoining Chikkodi
road and therefore, they have improved the lands purchased by
them.
80.
The manner in which discretion has to be exercised
by the Court while granting the relief of specific performance is
dealt by the Apex Court in the decision of Satya Jain (Dead)
through Lrs. & Others v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie (Dead)
through Lrs13.
(2013) 8 SCC 131
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81.
It is evident that the Apex Court deviated from the
provisions of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and held that
the relief of specific performance cannot be denied on the ground
of efflux of time and escalation of the price of the property, but
however in order to balance both the issues based on the
plaintiff's offer, an additional compensation was awarded to the
vendor by granting market value than what had been stipulated
in the agreement. In the case on hand, the agreement had taken
place in the year 1988. The issue is being finally decided by this
Court in this appeal in the year 2026 it is evident that more than
3½ decades have passed after the agreement was entered into.
The valuation of the suit schedule property measuring 5½ Acres
in the year 1988 was ₹40,000/-. The subsequent sale deeds
entered into between the GPA holder of defendant No.1 and the
other
defendants
was
for
a
higher
value.
Evidently, the
defendants are claiming that they have improved the lands, and
there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiffs had
improved the lands and any value additions made by them.
Moreover, except the agreement, there is nothing to show that
they are in possession.
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82.
The other aspect which is borne out from the records
is that, it appears that defendant No.1 was in deep financial
trouble and therefore, he had sold both the properties granted to
him by the Land Tribunal i.e., Survey No.40 and 43 to various
purchasers. Though an agreement was executed in the year
1988, the permission to alienation was obtained in the year
1998. By that time, the valuation had increased. There were no
value additions that had been made to the suit schedule property
by the plaintiff and as such, it appears that the defendant No.1
alienated pieces of lands to the various other purchasers and
evidently the value is on the higher side. Therefore, granting a
relief of specific performance after about 37 years would not be
justifiable in the interest of justice and equity.
83.
Taking clue from the judgment of the Apex Court in
the case of Satya Jain (referred supra), it would not be proper
to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff. The
First Appellate Court, since it came to the conclusion that the
plaintiff is not entitled for the relief of specific performance on
the ground of there being no readiness and willingness on his
part, did not go into the question of the discretion to be
exercised. The Trial Court, in paragraph 22 of its judgment,
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notes that discretion has to be exercised cautiously and noting
that the defendant No.2 to 8 had not pleaded that they are bona
fide purchasers of the suit schedule property without notice, it
grants the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff. The
question whether the defendant No.2 to 8 are the bona fide
purchasers or not, had nothing to do in respect of the judicial
discretion, which had to be considered by it. The comparative
hardship of the defendant No.1 and the plaintiffs would be the
criteria for considering the discretion to be exercised. Therefore,
when there is no material on record to show that the plaintiffs
had made any value additions to the suit schedule property,
which would place them in a disadvantageous position if the
specific performance is not ordered, there will not be any
hardship to them. However, if the lands which are sold by
defendant No.1 to defendant No.2 to 8 are to be reverted back to
the plaintiffs, then obviously the contentions of these defendants
that there have been improvements which would put them in
disadvantageous position would come to fore. Of course, it is
true that the defendants No.2 to 8 have not contented that they
are bona fide purchasers, but the evidence on record show that
the property was not improved by the plaintiff. Moreover, after
37 years, it would not be proper to exercise the discretion in
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favour of the plaintiff and allow him to purchase the suit
schedule property measuring 5½ Acres for a meager sum of
₹40,000/-. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the discretion
cannot be exercised in favour of the plaintiff for:
(a)
The issue is being decided after 37 years;
(b)
The escalation in the price of the land is manifold;
(c)
No improvement has been made by the plaintiff in
the suit schedule property;
(d)
The land has been sold by the defendant No.1 to the
defendant No.2 to 8 in bits and pieces.
84.
Hence, this is a fit case where the discretion has to
be declined. In the result, the appeal deserves to be allowed in
part. The defendant No.1 (now represented by LRs), either by
himself or collectively, with the help of other defendants to
whom he has sold the property, are to be directed to refund the
sum of ₹38,000/- to the plaintiff along with interest rate 18%
per annum from the date of the agreement till the date of
payment, which would also cover the damages claimed. Hence
the following:
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ORDER
(i) The appeal is allowed in part.
(ii) The suit filed by the appellant for specific
performance of the contract is dismissed.
(iii) The judgment of the First Appellate Court is
hereby set aside. The judgment of the Trial Court
in O.S.No. 153/2000 is modified.
(a) The defendant No.1 to 8 jointly or severally are
liable to refund the sum of ₹38,000/- along with
interest @ 18% per annum from the date of
agreement i.e., 25.01.1988 till the date of
payment. There shall be a charge over the suit
property until the payment is fully made.
(b) The appellant is also entitled for the costs
throughout.
Sd/(C M JOSHI)
JUDGE
tsn*/List No.: 19 Sl No.: 4
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