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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Uploaded on 27.02.2026
CJ Court
Case :LPA No. 237/2024 in
(WP(C) No. 303/2021)
….. Appellant/Petitioner(s)
Shrivallabh Datt
Through: Mr. Ajay Vaid, Advocate
vs
.…. Respondent(s)
U. T. of J&K and others
Through: Ms. Monika Kohli, Sr. AAG
Mr. Suneel Malhotra, GA
Coram:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE
ORDER
24.02.2026
1.
The appellant had filed a writ petition bearing WP(C) No. 303/2021, titled,
„Shrivallab Datt vs. U. T. of J&K and others‟ for commanding the
respondents to retrieve the land measuring 103 kanals 15 marlas comprising
khasra No. 367 and land measuring 48 kanals 15 marlas comprising khasra
No. 369 in Village Pouni Chak Wand Waziran, Tehsil Jammu and handover
the same to the appellant or in the alternative, directing the respondents to
pay the compensation to the appellant for deemed acquisition of the aforesaid
land of the appellant at the prevailing market rate in the interest of justice and
to pay the rent to the appellant for the utilization of abovementioned land
from 1962 till the same is retrieved and handed over to the appellant.
2.
The respondents resisted the writ petition on various counts; notably,
respondent No. 4 raised a preliminary objection asserting that the petition
deserves dismissal because as per the Limitation Act, the right to property is
extinguished if the aggrieved party fails to take appropriate legal recourse for
the recovery of possession within 12 years.
3.
Vide judgment dated 02.09.2024, the learned Writ Court dismissed the
petition as being barred by the doctrine of delay and laches.
4.
The appellant has come up with this intra court appeal thereby assailing
judgment of the Writ Court dated 02.09.2024 on the grounds that the learned
Writ Court has not appreciated the controversy in its right perspective and
wrongly observed that the judgments of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Vidya
Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 2020 SC 4709 and
Coordinate Bench this Court in Amina Begum vs. State of J&K and
others, 2023 (2) JK[HC] are not applicable in the present facts and
circumstances of the case.
5.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6.
In paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment, the learned Writ Court has
observed that the petitioner/appellant has preferred the writ petition in the
year 2021, and has sought reliefs for a cause originating in 1962;
accordingly, the Court dismissed the same as being hit by the doctrine of
delay and laches.
7.
The appellant contends that the doctrine of delay and laches cannot be used
as a shield in the hands of the State to justify the unauthorized deprivation of
private property. Judicial precedents establish that delay is not an absolute
LPA No.237/2024
bar to the grant of relief, especially when the violation involves a continuing
wrong. In the present case, the appellant has alleged that he has been
deprived of his land without following the due process of law, thereby
resulting in a clear violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.
The learned writ court ought to have examined the merits of the case instead
of dismissing the same on the ground of delay and laches. Dismissal of a
petition involving allegation of fundamental constitutional violation solely on
the grounds of delay and laches would result in a miscarriage of justice and
would effectively reward the State for its own high-handed conduct, if the
same is established. The State cannot be permitted to rely upon the doctrine
of laches to legitimise an ongoing illegality, as a citizen‟s belated approach
to the Court does not grant legitimacy to an otherwise unconstitutional
action. To dismiss this petition on the ground of delay would be amount to
condone the State's illegalities. In this context, it would be proper to take note
of the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi and
others v. M. I. D. C. and others, (2013) 1 SCC 353, relevant paragraphs are
extracted as under:
9. The right to property is now considered to be not only a
constitutional or a statutory right but also a human right.
Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a
fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm
of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to
livelihood, the right to shelter and employment, etc. Now
however, human rights are gaining an even greater
multifaceted dimension. The right to property is considered
very much to be a part of such new dimension.
10. In the case at hand, there has been no acquisition. The question
that emerges for consideration is whether, in a democratic body
polity, which is supposedly governed by the rule of law, the
State should be allowed to deprive a citizen of his property,
without adhering to the law. The matter would have been
different had the State pleaded that it has right, title and interest
over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and
LPA No.237/2024
interest of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of
delay and laches as grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal.
11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches
extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities
pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong
done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for
educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc.
Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down
that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy,
even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article
32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a
different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State
took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants
without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly
for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either
comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition,
or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a
true and concrete distinction, between the principle of “eminent
domain” and “police power” of the State. Under certain
circumstances, the police power of the State may be used
temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case
clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised.
A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under
which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of
the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of “absolute power”
which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of
muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that
the authorities have treated the landowner as a “subject” of
medieval India, but not as a “citizen” under our Constitution.
12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by
the rule of law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one
that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an
organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode
of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief.
There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise
judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts
and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the
facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute
impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of
cause action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the
judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the
discretion more so, when no third-party interest is involved.
Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay
and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the
cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly
shocks judicial conscience.
(emphasis added)
8.
Further, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Urban Improvement Trust v Smt.
Vidhya Devi and others, 2024 INSC 980, while placing reliance upon
various of its earlier pronouncements, has observed as under:
LPA No.237/2024
“46. As regards the appellant‟s challenge to the inordinate delay of
21 years in filing of the writ petitions by the respondents, we are of
the view that the same needs to be considered in the facts and
circumstances of the case. While it is true that the courts have
consistently held that undue delay in approaching the court can
be a ground for refusing relief, the courts have also recognized
that in exceptional cases, where the impugned action is patently
illegal or affects fundamental rights, the delay must be
condoned.
47. It is pertinent for us to consider the judgment of this Court in
Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2020) 2
SCC 569, wherein it was held, inter alia, as follows:
“12.12. The contention advanced by the state of delay and
laches of the appellant in moving the court is also liable to be
rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a
continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the
judicial conscience of the court. Condonation of delay is a
matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised
judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of
a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental
rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the
delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for
the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to
do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a
constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to
promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State
of T.N., ]”
[Emphasis supplied]
48. The aforesaid view has also been reiterated by this Court in
Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2022) 7
SCC 508 wherein the court opined that there cannot be a
„limitation‟ to doing justice. The relevant observations are
reproduced below:
“16. Given the important protection extended to an individual
vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31,
and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high
threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the
question remains – can the State, merely on the ground of
delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those
from whom private property has been expropriated? In
these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to
be unacceptable,
and
warranting
intervention
on
the grounds of equity and fairness.”
[Emphasis supplied]
49. Similarly, this Court in its decision in Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service reported
in 1969 (1) SCR 808 held that:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent
to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has,
LPA No.237/2024
though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party
in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if
the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every
case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity
of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the
one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
[Emphasis supplied]
50. This Court in its decision in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v.
State of Maharashtra, reported in (1974) 1 SCC 317 held that:
“10. … There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in
filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint,
and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to
disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article
32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should
prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the
rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and
stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on
sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no
inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must
necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must
depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by
Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi
[(1969) 1 SCC 110, 116 : (1969) 2 SCR 824] “is one of
discretion for this court to follow from case to case. There is no
lower limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all depend on
what the breach of the fundamental right and the
remedy claimed are and how the delay arose”. …”(Emphasis
supplied)
51. The decisions of this Court have consistently held that the
right to property is enshrined in the Constitution and requires
that procedural safeguards be followed to ensure fairness and
non-arbitrariness in decision-making especially in cases of
acquisition by the State. Therefore, the delay in approaching
the court, while a significant factor, cannot override
the necessity to address illegalities and protect right to property
enshrined in Article 300A. The court must balance the need for
finality in legal proceedings with the need to rectify injustice.
The right of an individual to vindicate and protect private
property cannot be brushed away merely on the grounds of
delay and laches.
(emphasis added)
9.
It is a settled principle of law that the State and its instrumentalities cannot
adopt the posture of a private litigant to justify the illegal seizure of property
LPA No.237/2024
through the plea of delay. Given the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
present case, the learned Writ Court fell in error in dismissing the writ
petition solely on the ground of delay and laches, and instead ought to have
adjudicated the matter on its merits.
10.
After having gone through the judgment impugned, we are of the considered
view that the same cannot sustain.
11.
Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed and the judgment impugned is set
aside. The matter is remitted to the learned Writ Court for disposal afresh in
accordance with law. Writ petition bearing WP(C) No. 303/2021 shall be
listed before the learned Single Judge having the roster on 24.03.2026.
12.
Needless to say, we have not examined the merits of the claims of the parties.
(RAJNESH OSWAL)
JUDGE
(ARUN PALLI)
CHIEF JUSTICE
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JAMMU:
24.02.2026
Rakesh PS
Rakesh Kumar
2026.02.27 09:40
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integrity of this document
Jammu
LPA No.237/2024
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