Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page 1
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl. A (J) 36/2022
Shri Pijush Chakraborty alias Janardan
son of Sri Krishnadhan Chakraborty, resident of East Dhwajanagar,
P.S. RK Pur, District- Gomati, Tripura
----Appellant
Versus
The State of Tripura, represented by the Secretary-cum-Commissioner,
Home Department, Government of Tripura
----Respondent
For Appellant(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
Date of hearing and delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
Whether fit for reporting
:
Mr. BN Majumder, Sr. Advocate
Mr. DJ Saha, Advocate
Mr. S. Debnath, Addl. PP
05.07.2023
Yes
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
(Amarnath Goud, J)
Heard Mr. BN Majumder, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. DJ
Saha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. S. Debnath,
learned Additional PP appearing on behalf of the respondent.
2.
This appeal arises out of the judgment and order of conviction and
sentence dated 13.09.2022 passed in connection with case No. S.T. (GT-U) 74
of 2014 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gomati Judicial District,
Udaipur, Tripura, whereby and whereunder the learned Additional Sessions
Judge had convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section
304B IPC, and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years.
3.
The case of the prosecution, as projected by the learned trial court is that,
approximately two and half years back, from the date of lodging the ejahar on
18.04.2012, the daughter of informant namely Chandana Sharma was given in
marriage to Pijush Chakraborty, the appellant herein, following the Hindu rites
and customs by giving dowry, but after six months of such marriage the
Page 2
accused persons namely Pijush Chakraborty and his relatives namely Ratan
Chakraborty i.e. brother and Smt. Bakul Chakraborty i.e. mother subjected the
informant‟s daughter to cruelty both physically & mentally on demand of
further dowry. On 16.04.2012 AD morning time at around 9.00 AM all the
accused person's brutally assaulted the daughter of informant with fist and
blows as well as kick and by a lathi on demand of Rs.50,000/- to be brought
from the paternal house else to leave the matrimonial home. Then again on the
next day i.e. on 17.04.2012 AD in the noontime at about 2.00 PM all of them
again harassed upon the informant‟s daughter both physically and mentally on
demand of Rs.50,000/- to bring from her paternal house and as such finding no
other option, when harassment became unbearable, the daughter of informant
namely Chandana Sharma committed suicide after consuming poison.
Immediately she was taken to TSD Hospital, Udaipur but from there referred to
GB Hospital, Agartala wherein she expired on 18.04.2012 in the morning at
around 5:00 AM. Then complaint was lodged with the O/C of R.K. Pur P/S,
Udaipur, Gomati District narrating all facts by the informant namely Ajoy
Sharma.
4.
The said complaint was registered as RK Pur PS case no. 142 of 2012
under Section 304B of the IPC. The matter was investigated by the
investigating officer, and after completion of investigation submitted chargesheet against the convict appellant and his mother, Smt. Bakul Chakraborty
under Sections 498A/304B of the IPC. Thereafter, learned CJM, Gomati, took
cognizance of the offence under Sections 498A/304B of the IPC and
subsequently, the case was transferred to the court of leaned Judicial
Magistrate, 1st class, Court no. 2, Udaipur, South Tripura. The case was abated
against Smt. Bakul Chakraborty since she had died during pendency of the
Page 3
case. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the court of learned Sessions
Judge, Gomati, Udaipur. At the commencement of trial, the learned Sessions
Judge had framed charges against the convict appellant under Sections
498A/304B of the IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act to
which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Thereafter, the case was
transferred to the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gomati, Udaipur.
5.
During trial, the prosecution to establish the charge had adduced 19
(nineteen) witnesses and exhibited some documents. After closure of recording
evidences, the convict appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
wherein he denied all the allegations levelled against him by the prosecution
witnesses and also denied to adduce any evidence on his behalf. After hearing
arguments and on examining the evidences and materials on record, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge had acquitted the appellant from the charges levelled
against him under Sections 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 since the prosecution had failed to prove the said
charges, but had convicted and sentenced the appellant for committing offence
punishable under Section 304B IPC. Hence, this appeal before this court.
6.
Mr. BN Majumder, learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the charges
levelled against the convict-appellant. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has
submitted that the conviction has been rendered basing on the evidence of the
father, mother and brothers of the victim and the Medical Officer i.e. PW-1,
PW-2, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-3 which according to learned senior counsel are
omnibus statements. Learned senior counsel has also submitted that none of the
witnesses could have been able to mention any specific date and time. Mr.
Majumder, learned senior counsel also has argued that the oral dying
Page 4
declaration of the deceased to her mother has no evidentiary value, hence,
learned senior counsel has urged this court to set the appellant at liberty. Mr.
Majumder, learned senior counsel in support of his submission has relied upon
the judgment rendered in Rajbabu and anr. Vs. State of M.P., reported in 2008
AIR SCW 5435; Charan Singh alias Charanjit Singh vs. State of
Uttarakhand, reported in AIR 2023 SC 2095;
7.
On the other hand, Mr. S. Debnath, learned Additional PP has supported
the findings of the learned trial court while convicting the accused. Learned
Additional PP has also submitted that prior to intimating to the police, the
victim had given her declaration to her mother. Mr. Debnath, learned PP has
also submitted that if the evidences of prosecution witnesses are read
conjointly, it could safely be presumed that the convict appellant had
committed the alleged offence. Hence, learned Addl. PP has submitted to
maintain the findings of the learned trial court.
Mr. Debnath, learned
Additional PP in support of his submission has relied upon the judgment
rendered in Gurmeet Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2021) 6 SCC 108;
Kamesh Panjiyar alias Kamlesh Panjiyar vs. State of Bihar, reported in
(2005) 2 SCC 388;
8.
We have considered the submissions of learned counsel appearing for the
parties. We have also perused the evidences and materials on record and the
judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.
PW 1, the father of deceased in his deposition stated that, his daughter was
given in marriage with the appellant in the year 2009. He has also deposed that
since after the marriage the appellant used to pick quarrel with his daughter on
the demand of money and used to torture her physically and mentally for
bringing money. PW.1 further revealed that repeatedly his daughter was sent to
Page 5
his house for bringing money and sometime he used to pay money as per his
capacity, but even after payment of money by him the torture upon his daughter
continued by the appellant. PW.1 further deposed that on 20.04.2012 he
received an information about the admission of his daughter in the hospital and
accordingly his wife and sons went to the hospital and found his daughter
Chandana in the hospital bed with tied hands by a rope in the back as her
condition was very serious, on the same day she died in the hospital. PW.1 also
deposed that on 18.04.20121 he lodged an ejahar with the OC, R.K. Pur PS
under his signature which he identifed as Exhibit-1.
PW 2, one of the brothers of deceased in his deposition stated that,
deceased Chandana Sharma was his sister and she was given in marriage with
the appellant in the year 2009. PW.2 also deposed that on 20.04.2012 he
received a telephonic information from his brother that his sister was admitted
in the GB Hospital as she consumed poison and on the following day in the
morning he rushed to the GB Hospital and found his sister Chandana dead.
Thereafter inquest was done over the dead body of his sister in his presence and
PW.2 put his signature on the report which he identifed as Exhibit-2. PW.2 also
deposed that subsequently, his mother disclosed to him that the death of his
sister was caused due to administration of poison by the appellant.
PW 4, the mother of deceased in her deposition stated that, deceased
Chandana Sharma was her daughter who was given in marriage with the
appellant about nine years back and out of their wedlock her daughter gave
birth to a female child, at the time of death of Chandana, her baby was 2 and
1/2 years old. PW.4 also deposed that after marriage for about seven months
her daughter passed peacefully but thereafter her daughter disclosed her that her
husband Pijush Chakraborty used to inflict physical torture upon her and started
Page 6
to keep pressure upon her daughter to bring money from them. PW.4 also
deposed that according to their capacity they used to pay Rs.500/- to Rs.1000/to her daughter as per demand of her husband, even after that the appellant
continued torture upon her daughter. PW.4 further revealed that on 3rd
Baisakha about 6 years back the appellant started putting pressure upon her
daughter to give her chain to him, but her daughter refused to which she was
physically tortured by her husband and when the torture became unbearable
then her daughter consumed poison. Thereafter she was admitted in the GB
Hospital being referred from TSD Hospital and on hearing the news of
poisoning of her daughter, she along with her husband and son rushed to the
TSD Hospital, Udaipur but at that time Chandana was ready to be referred to
the GBP Hospital, then PW-4 accompanied her to the GBP Hospital Agartala.
PW-4 further deposed that at that time her daughter was in senseless condition,
she regained her sense at GBP Hospital Agartala and told PW-4 that for the
purpose of taking of chain, her husband and mother-in-law assaulted her. On
the following day Chandana died in the GBP Hospital. PW-4 further stated that
though there was no meeting on the issue of torture upon her daughter by
accused but PW-4 informed to the Panchayet Pradhan.
PW 5, one of the brothers of the deceased, in his deposition stated that
deceased Chandana Sharma was his sister who was given in marriage in the
year 2009 with the appellant. PW-5 further deposed that after five months of
marriage his sister was subjected to physical torture by the accused on demand
of bringing money from them and thereafter his sister consumed poison and
admitted in the TSD Hospital wherefrom she was referred to the GBP Hospital,
Agartala. PW-5 also deposed that his sister consumed poison due to her family
disturbances and she disclosed to their mother (PW-4) the reason of her
Page 7
consuming poison and his mother disclosed to him that his sister consumed
poison as she was tortured physically on the issue of procuring her chain to the
accused which she denied. PW-5 also deposed that the appellant left away after
admitting his sister in the hospital.
PW 3, is the Medical Officer who had conducted post mortem over the
dead body of the deceased. PW-3 in his deposition stated that on 18.04.2012 he
along with Dr. Ranjit Kumar Das conducted postmortem examination on the
body of deceased Chandana Sharma (Chakraborty) at AGMC & GBP Hospital,
Agartala in connection with GB TOP GDE No. 588 dated 18.04.2012 on being
identified by Shri Uttam Sharma, elder brother of the deceased and constable
Mihir Lal Das of East Agartala PS. PW-3 further deposed that while conducting
postmortem examination, they found that frothy discharge was coming out
through the mouth of the deceased, they did not find any external injury on the
body. On internal examination there was 50 ml of dark brown coloured fluid
with pungent smell inside the stomach, stomach mucosa was found congested.
They preserved the viscera and handed over to the police for arranging
Toxicological analysis in SFSL and on that day they kept pending their opinion
regarding cause of death. PW-3 further deposed that on 16.10.2012 they
received a copy of said Toxicological analysis report and based on postmortem
findings and that Toxicological analysis report they opined that cause of death
was Asphyxia as a result of Endosulfan poisoning. In their opinion the time of
death was 6 hours to 12 hours before postmortem Examination. In the crossexamination PW-3 denied the suggestion of defence side that the death of
deceased Chandana Sharma (Chakraborty) was natural.
PW 12, is a neighbour of the complainant who only stated that the deceased
once told him that she was tortured by her husband i.e. the appellant herein.
Page 8
Nothing materials came out from the evidences of PW-6, PW-7, PW-8 and
PW-10. PW9 and PW-11 were turned hostile. PW-17 and PW-19 prepared the
inquest report and PW-15 and PW-16 put their signatures on the inquest report.
PW-18 is a seizure witness. PW-13 is the 1st IO and PW-14 is the 2nd IO who
after completion of the investigation submitted the charge sheet.
9.
We have meticulously perused the evidences and materials on record
which were considered by the learned trial court.
10.
In the light of the above and the charges levelled against the appellant
and to place the matter in its correct perspective, it is necessary to take note of
the provision as contained in Section 304B of IPC which reads as follows:“304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily
injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her
marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or
relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.—For the purposes of this
sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 [28 of 1961]. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life.”
11.
On scrutiny and scanning of prosecution evidence and other materials as
well as the defence evidences and facts and circumstances on record keeping
them in juxtaposition, it transpires clearly that the deceased since after her
marriage was tortured by her husband i.e. the appellant herein and her motherin-law on demand of dowry, which she used to inform on regular basis to her
parents and brothers i.e. PWs 1, 2, 4 and 5. From the record it is also evident
that the victim had also disclosed the fact of torture on demand of dowry by the
appellant to one of her relatives i.e. PW-12. PW-1, PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5,
have categorically deposed that the appellant used to torture the victim both
mentally and physically on demand of money and that the victim on regular
instance used to disclose the said fact to them. Said PWs also had deposed that
on many occasions they have also paid money to the appellant as per their
Page 9
capacity. PW-12 has also categorically stated that the victim had disclosed to
him regarding the physical and mental tortur meted upon her by the appellant
and his mother on demand of dowry. PW-4 also had deposed that the victim
had made a dying declaration before her death to her that her daughter i.e. the
victim was tortured by the appellant on demand of a golden chain and when
such torture became unbearable she had consumed poison. From the record, it
is evident that all the PWs i.e. PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-12 have
corroborated to the statements of each other. The doctor (PW-3) who has
conducted the post mortem over the dead body of the deceased was categorical
that the cause of death was a result of Endosulfan poisoning. From the post
mortem report it is further revealed that while conducting the post mortem,
PW-3 found that frothy discharge was coming out through the mouth of the
deceased . During the trial, the defence could not shake the evidences of these
witnesses. The prosecution has succeeded in demonstrating that the victim had
been subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with demand for dowry
soon before her death, thus a presumption shall easily be drawn against the said
appellant that he has caused the dowry death, as contemplated under Section
304B IPC.
12.
Applying the ratio of the aforesaid evidences especially of PWs 1, 2, 4
and 5, it would be conclusively seen that the victim was tortured physically and
mentally by the appellant since after her marriage and lastly on demand of a
golden chain, she was tortured which prompted her to consume poison leading
to her death. It is also evident that all the PWs 1, 2, 4 and 5 have deposed
equivocally which could not be shaken by the defence in any manner
whatsoever, and also the said prosecution witnesses are very categorical to their
version. From their deposition it is clear that the deceased was subjected to
Page 10
cruelty before her death on demand of a golden chain. Further, the accused
failed to bring any defence during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
and also failed to discard the evidences of the prosecution witnesses by
producing any defence witness.
13.
In view of the foregoing discussions, it can be held that there is nothing
which could shatter the veracity of the prosecution witnesses or falsify the
claim of the prosecution. All the prosecution witnesses have materially
supported the prosecution case and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
(PWs 1, 2, 4, 5 and 12) do not suffer from any material infirmity, and are
consistent and corroborative. The prosecution witnesses have been able to build
up a continuous link. As such, the prosecution has proved the essential
ingredients of the offence for which the accused is charged with. Thus, we have
no hesitation to agree with the order of conviction passed by the learned court
below.
We, therefore, confirm the sentence passed by the learned court below.
Per Lodh,J.
14.
I have the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my
esteemed Brother, Amarnath Goud,J, and I am in complete agreement with
the view taken by my esteemed Brother while dismissing the appeal and
upholding the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge. However, in addition to the reasoning
given and conclusion arrived at by him, I would like to discuss certain legal
issues raised by Mr. Nandi Majumder, learned senior counsel firstly, on the
point that once the appellant has been discharged from the charges under
Section 498A of IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
Page 11
1961, in that event whether the conviction under Section 304-B IPC is
sustainable under the law, and secondly, there is no evidence of cruelty
towards the victim soon before her death.
15.
To advert the merits of the issue, at the outset, it would be useful to
take note of Section 304-B IPC, which reads as under:
“304 B. Dowry death.—
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that
soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be
called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her
death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as
in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.]”
16.
Again, Section 304-B IPC is correlated to Section 113-B of Indian
Evidence Act. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, reads as under:
“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a person has
committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such
woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection
with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the
dowry death. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the
same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860).]”
17.
Admitted fact is that the deceased, wife of the appellant, committed
suicide by consuming poison within seven years of marriage. Presumption
under Section 304-B IPC and also under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
would rise when the wife meet with an unnatural death within seven years of
the marriage and the deceased had been subjected to cruelty or harassment
for or in connection with demand for dowry. Further Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act lays down that if soon before her death a woman is subjected
to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry by the
person who is accused of causing her death, then, the court shall presume
that such person has caused the dowry death. The presumption under Section
113-B is a presumption of law and once the prosecution establishes the
Page 12
essential ingredients mentioned therein, it becomes the duty of the court to
raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. [State of
Rajasthan vs. Jaggu Ram, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 51]
18.
Again, it is settled proposition of law that initial burden of proof lies
on the prosecution. The burden would not shift on the accused merely on the
fact that unnatural death had occurred within seven years of the marriage
without even proving the demand of dowry prior to the incident. [State of
Rajasthan vs. Teg Bahadur and ors., reported in (2004) 13 SCC 300]
19.
Further, the expression “soon before her death” has not been defined
in either of the statutes. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions
held that what would satisfy the requirement of “soon before her death”
within the meaning of Section 304-B IPC depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. [T.Arontperunjothi vs. State through SHO,
Pondicherry, reported in (2006) 9 SCC 467;
T.Arontperunjothi vs. State
through SHO, Pondicherry, reported in AIR 2006 SC 2475; Ram Badan
Sharma vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 115; Ram Badan
Sharma vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 2006 SC 2855; Raja Lal Singh
vs. State of Jharkhand, reported in 2007 (AIR SCW) 3690]
20.
It is held that the court has to analyze the facts and circumstances of
each case leading to the death of the victim and decide whether there is any
proximate connection between the demand of dowry, the act of cruelty or
harassment and the death. [State of Rajasthan vs. Jaggu Ram, reported in
(2008) 12 SCC 51; State of A.P. vs. Raj Gopal Aswa and anr. reported in
(2004) 4 SCC 470; Arun Garg vs. State of Punjab and anr. reported in
(2004) 8 SCC 251; Kaliyaperumai and anr. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu,
Page 13
reported in (2004) 9 SCC 157;
Kamesh Panjiyar vs. State of Bihar,
reported in (2005) 2 SCC 388]
21.
“Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered
under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formulae can
be laid down by fixing any time limit. The term is not synonymous with the
term “immediately before” and is opposite to the expression “soon after”.
These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between
the time of making the statement and the death. Proximate and live link
between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential
death is required to be proved by the prosecution. [Kans Raj vs. State of
Punjab, reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207, para 15]
22.
Mere lapse of sometime by itself would not provide to an accused a
defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in
connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time
not too late and not too stale before the phrase “soon before her death” is an
elastic expression and can refer to a period immediately before her death or
within a few days or even a few weeks before it, but the legislative object in
providing such a radius of time is to emphasis the idea that her death should,
in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In
other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the
dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. It is for the court to
decide on the facts and circumstances of each case whether the interval
could be called “soon before her death”. [Satvir Singh and anr vs. State of
Punjab, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 633]
23.
It is also well settled that in a case of dowry death actual participation
of a husband or his relative in the commission of offence of death is not
Page 14
required. [Vadde Ramarao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 1990
Cr.L.J. 1666]
24.
In Om Prakash vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 212,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had observed that, in a case of death because of
torture and demand for dowry, it is the duty of the court to examine the
circumstances of each case and evidence adduced on behalf of the parties for
recording a finding on the question as to how the death took place. While
judging the evidence and circumstances of the case, the court has to be
conscious of the fact that a death connected with dowry takes place inside
the house, where outsiders who can be said to be independent witnesses in
the traditional sense, are not expected to be present.
25.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge while convicting the appellant
has referred to the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B
IPC, which are as under:
“(1) Death should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under
normal circumstances;
(2) Such death should have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances
with seven years of her marriage;
(3) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
relative of her husband;
(4) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for
dowry;
(5) The deceased death was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon
before her death;
(6) Soon before her death the woman was subject to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any other relative or her husband in connection with any demand for
dowry.”
26.
Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, in the instant case, we find
that PW-4, mother of the victim has stated in her deposition that on 3rd
Baisakha about 6 years back accused Pijush started putting pressure upon
my daughter to give her chain to her husband but my daughter refused and
so she was physically tortured by her husband and when the torture became
Page 15
unbearable, my daughter consumed poison, and thereafter, she was admitted
in GB Hospital being referred from TSD Hospital. On hearing the news of
poisoning of my daughter, I along with my husband and son rushed to the
TSD Hospital, Udaipur, but at that time she was ready to be referred to the
GBP Hospital and I accompanied her to the GBP Hospital Agartala. At that
time my daughter was in senseless condition and she regained her sense at
GBP Hospital Agartala and told me that for the purpose of taking of chain,
her husband and mother-in-law assaulted her. On the following day she died
in the GBP Hospital. The statement that PW-4 had accompanied her
daughter and on her way to GBP hospital, Agartala, she was in senseless
condition and that she regained her sense at GBP hospital, Agartala when the
victim told PW-4 that for the purpose of taking of chain, her husband and
mother-in-law assaulted her, is an evidence of res gestae as envisaged under
Section 6 of the Evidence Act, and is admissible in evidence. Furthermore,
according to me, this statement narrates the fact relevant as to the cause of
death of the victim or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which
resulted in her death, and is admissible in evidence under Section 32 of the
Indian Evidence Act.
27.
Added to it, the statements made by the victim after regaining her
sense to her mother (PW-4) is nothing but an oral dying declaration. An oral
dying declaration, no doubt, can form the basis of conviction, though the
court seeks for corroboration as a rule of prudence, but before the said
declaration can be acted upon, the court must be satisfied about the
truthfulness of the same, and that the said declaration was made by the
deceased while she was in a fit condition to make the statement.
Page 16
28.
On perusal of the evidence, particularly the cross-examination of PW-
4, it crystallizes that her evidence as regards the above oral declaration by
the victim remained unshaken by the defence. The defence could not draw
any contradiction to the said statement. I have also taken note of the
examination of the appellant recorded under Section 313 CrPC. The court
put a specific question to the appellant as regards this episode in question no.
23, which may be reproduced hereunder, in verbatim, for convenience:
“Question No. 23- PW-4 also deposed that at that time her daughter was in senseless
condition and she regained her sense at GBP Hospital, Agartala and told her that for
the purpose of taking of chain, her husband and mother-in-law assaulted her and on
the following day she died in the GBP Hospital.
Have you anything to say regarding this evidence?
Ans. Not true.”
29.
PW-5, brother of the victim, during his deposition deposed that his
mother disclosed to him that his sister consumed poison as she was tortured
physically on the issue of procuring a chain by the appellant to which she
denied. Reply to the said question (Question No. 25), the appellant only
replied „Not true’.
30.
Further, the appellant was asked to reply as regards the statements of
PW-10 that on the relevant date of incident Saraswati i.e. the deceased was
not allowed to cook foot by her mother-in-law and so there was a quarrel
between Saraswati and her mother-in-law and the appellant. The appellant
simply replied as „Not true’.
31.
Interestingly, PW-12, Sri Prankrishna Sharma, a neighbour, in his
evidence deposed that the deceased-wife of the appellant disclosed to him
during her lifetime that she was subjected to physical torture by the
appellant, Pijush Chakraborty, and his mother on the issue of payment of
dowry. The appellant was confronted with this statement of PW-12 in his
examination under Section 313 CrPC, but he only replied „False’.
Page 17
32.
Under question No. 75, the appellant was asked whether he wants to
say anything more in connection with the case. His answer was that “On the
alleged date of incident there was a quarrel between my wife and my mother.
I was on my duty about 3/4 k.m. away from my house”. However, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge has given a finding while dealing with this
question that the appellant failed to prove his statement that he was on his
duty about 3/4 k.m. away from his house.
33.
According to this court, had it been a fact that the accused was on
duty about 3/4 k.m. away from his house, then, he could easily adduce
evidence to substantiate the statement in proof of his plea of alibi, he had
taken during his examination under section 313 CrPC.
34.
On careful scrutiny of the evidences of PW-4, PW-5 and PW-12, it
comes to fore that their evidences remained unshaken by the defence. I do
not find any material to come to a finding that the appellant failed to draw
any contradiction to any of the statements made by PW-4, PW-5 and PW-12
during their cross-examinations. The evidence of the deceased that she had
been subjected to cruelty soon before her death for the purpose of taking her
chain in connection with demand of dowry, and committed suicide by
consuming poison has been aptly proved. Furthermore, the appellant was
afforded enough opportunities to raise his defence by way of offering
plausible explanations as regards the incriminating materials surfaced
against him.
35.
In my opinion, when the prosecution has been able to prove its burden
that the deceased has committed suicide on account of cruelty or harassment
in connection with demand of dowry by the appellant, then,
Page 18
the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act could easily be
drawn against the appellant. In such a case, to rebut the presumption under
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, the appellant should have given the
probable cause of her committing suicide and the plea which he would have
taken could receive credence only if any tangible evidence in support of his
plea would have been given by the appellant. In the present case, the
appellant has not made any effort to rebut the presumption under Section
113-B of the Evidence Act.
36.
Now, coming to the question raised by learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant as to whether a conviction under Section 304-B
IPC can be sustained when the accused is acquitted from the charges framed
under Section 498-A IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
the position is well-settled that the offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B
IPC and section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, are distinct offences and having
separate ingredients. Each and every offence must be proved separately by
the prosecution. I am unable to accept the analogy advanced by learned
senior counsel for the appellant that when an accused is acquitted from the
charges under Section 498-A IPC and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act,
conviction cannot be sustained under Section 304-B IPC.
37.
Here, I am gainfully refer the judgment rendered by the apex court in
Gurmeet Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 108, wherein
the apex court has observed that „Section 304-B and 498-A IPC deal with
two distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a common essential to both the
sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498-A gives
the meaning of “cruelty”. In Section 304-B there is no such Explanation
about the meaning of “cruelty”. But having regard to the common
Page 19
background to these offences it has to be taken that the meaning of “cruelty”
or “harassment” is the same as prescribed in the Explanation to Section
498-A under which “cruelty” by itself amounts to an offence. Under Section
304-B it is “dowry death” that is punishable and such death should have
occurred within seven years of marriage. No such period is mentioned in
Section 498-A. If the case is established, there can be a conviction under
both the sections’. The apex court has thus observed that offences under
Section 498-A and Section 304-B IPC are distinct in nature. Although
cruelty is a common thread existing in both the offences, however the
ingredients of each offence are distinct and must be proved separately by the
prosecution. If a case is made out, there can be a conviction under both the
sections.
In paras 19 and 20 in Gurmeet Singh (supra), the apex court referring to
its earlier decision in Kamesh Panjiyar vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2005)
2 SCC 388, further held thus [scc.p.114 paras 19,20]:
“19. Lastly, the counsel on behalf of the appellant argued that without any charges under Section
498-A IPC a conviction under Section 304-B IPC cannot be sustained. On this aspect this Court in
the case of Kamesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar, (2005) 2 SCC 388 held as under:
“12. …….It is to be noted that Sections 304- B and 498-A IPC cannot be held to be mutually
inclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a common
essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498A gives the meaning of “cruelty”. In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the
meaning of “cruelty”. But having regard to the common background to these offences it has to
be taken that the meaning of “cruelty” or “harassment” is the same as prescribed in the
Explanation to Section 498-A under which “cruelty” by itself amounts to an offence.
Under Section 304-B it is “dowry death” that is punishable and such death should have
occurred within seven years of marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A. If the
case is established, there can be a conviction under both the sections.” (emphasis supplied)
20. Therefore, the argument raised by the counsel on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted
as the offences under Section 498-A and Section 304-B, IPC are distinct in nature. Although cruelty
is a common thread existing in both the offences, however the ingredients of each offence are
distinct and must be proved separately by the prosecution. If a case is made out, there can be a
conviction under both the sections.”
38.
In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, it can easily be held that
even in absence of charge under Section 498-A, conviction under Section
304-B can be declared against an accused if the evidence justifies for such
conviction and sentence. In other words, the above proposition of law clearly
Page 20
suggests that if conviction under Section 304-B IPC can be sustained in
absence of any charge under Section 498-A IPC, then, there is absolutely no
difficulty for me to hold that conviction under Section 304-B IPC can also be
sustained in a situation when prosecution fails to prove the charges framed
under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
39.
For the reasons stated above and the principles of law discussed here-
in-above, the appeal stands dismissed.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Send down the LCRs.
JUDGE
SAIKAT
KAR
Digitally signed
by SAIKAT KAR
Date: 2023.08.03
18:14:51 +05'30'
JUDGE
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review