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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl.A.(J) 27 of 2022
Shri Badal Baishnab
S/o Late Gopi Ballav Baishnav,
Resident of Kishoreganj, PS: kakraban,
District: Gomati Tripura.
---Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura
---Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
For Respondent(s)
Date of hearing
& date of delivery of
judgment and order
Whether fit for reporting
: Mr. S. Sarkar, Sr. Advocate
Mr. V. Poddar, Advocate.
: Mr. S. Debnath, Addl. PP.
: 13.09.2023.
: No.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
Judgment & Order (Oral)
(T. Amarnath Goud), J
Heard Ms. V. Poddar, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant as well as Mr. S. Debnath, learned Addl. PP appearing for
the state-respondent.
[2]
This is an appeal under Section 374 of the Cr.P.C, 1973
against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated
08.09.2022 & 12.09.2022 respectively passed by the Ld. Addl.
Session’s Judge, Gomati Judicial District, Udaipur in connection with
Case No. S.T (T-I) 04 of 2019 against the instant accused person
and thereby sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
life with fine of Rs.10,000/- under Section 302 of the IPC in default
to pay the fine shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six
(6) months only for the commission of the offence under Section
302 IPC.
[3]
The prosecution story as unfolded is that on 10.04.2018
an ejahar was lodged by one Shri Litan Das, S/O Shri Nitai Das
Baishnab of Kishoreganj, PS: Kakraban, District: Gomati, Tripura
stating inter alia to the facts that about 10 years back his younger
sister namely Adari Das Baishnab was married to accused Badal
Baishnab, S/O – Gopi Ballab Baishnab of Garjanmura as per Hindu
rites & customs. After marriage the sister of informant led her
conjugal life peacefully and begotten one daughter namely Miss
Anindita Das aged about 8 years and one son namely Master Dweep
Das aged about 3 years. Since one year back from the date of
lodging the ejahar the accused Badal Baishnab started a bicycle and
motor cycle repairing shop at Shilghati bazaar and there he
developed an illicit relation with one neighbouring woman namely
Smt. Sangita Das Majumder. After that accused started harassing
both in mentally and physically and assaulting upon the sister of
informant. The matter was informed by the sister of informant to
her parents and other relative but harassment upon her continued.
Lastly on 09.04.2018 during night time accused Badal Baishnab on
being abetted by said Sangita Das Baishnab killed the sister of
informant namely Adari Das Baishnab by strangulation. On that
night at around 3.00 am one Kajal Das Baishnab informed the
informant and other family members of deceased over phone that
the sister of informant has died. Then informant and others rushed
to the matrimonial house of deceased and found her dead on bed.
[4]
The SI of Police namely Ranjit Kr. Datta received the
ejahar on 10.04.2018 at around 1220 hours and self took up its
investigation pending formal registration of case number as the
offence designed was cognizable in nature. The O/C of Kakraban
PS, Gomati District subsequently on that date at around 14.05
hours registered a formal case vide Kakraban PS Case No.
2018KKB054 under Sections 498A/120B/302 of IPC and directed
the SI of police namely Ranjit Kumar Dutta to complete the
investigation.
[5]
During
investigation
the
IO
visited
the
place
of
occurrence, prepared hand sketch map with index, examined the
available witnesses by recording their statements under Section
161 of Cr.P.C., prepared inquest report over the dead body of
deceased Adari Das Baishnab, arranged for PM examination of the
dead body of deceased and seized saree, blouse, tulsi mala,
bangles, plastic jars containing viscera of deceased. On 10.04.2018
accused Badal Baishnab was arrested and forwarded to the court on
the next date but before forwarding to the Court the IO has
recorded the declaratory statement of accused Badal Baishnab in
presence of one Executive Magistrate and other independent
witnesses. The second IO collected the Toxicology report from the
SFSL and Histopathology report of deceased, seized one DVD-R in
compact disc by preparing seizure memo containing disclosure
statement of accused Badal Baishnab with one certificate as per
section 65(B) of the Evidence Act from one Pranoy Debnath,
obtained the final report from the concerned Doctor namely Nani
Gopal Das in the PM report after collecting report from the SFSL
and after completion of investigation he laid down the CS vide KKB
PS CS No. 74 of 2018 dated 25.09.2018 u/sec. 302 of IPC against
accused namely Badal Baishnab.
[6]
On 05.10.2018 the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Udaipur, Gomati Judicial District received the charge sheet
and on 19.11.2018 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gomati
District, Udaipur has taken cognizance of offence under section 302
of IPC. On 22.01.2019 the case has been committed to the Court of
Learned Sessions Judge, Gomati Judicial District, Udaipur and
subsequently, this case has been transferred to this Court vide
order dated 29.01.2019 for trial according to law.
[7]
After receiving the case record, the court below has
framed the charge on 19.03.2019 for commission of offence
punishable under Section 302 of IPC against the accused person
namely Badal Baishnab to which he pleads not guilty.
[8]
The charge against the accused Badal Baishnab is as
follows:“That you on 09.04.2018 any time at night did commit
murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of
your wife Adari Das Baishnab at your house at Garjanmura,
under PS – Kakraban, Gomati, Tripura and that you thereby
committed an offence punishable under section 302 of IPC
and within the cognizance of this Court.”
[9]
To prove the charge, prosecution has examined as
many as 21 (twenty one) witnesses including the IO of this case.
After the closure of prosecution evidences the accused person
namely Badal Baishnab was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C to
which he claimed to be innocent and also declined to adduce any
DW’s on his behalf.
[10]
After
hearing
arguments
and
on
examining
the
evidences and materials on record, the Additional Sessions Judge,
Gomati Judicial District, Udaipur had convicted and sentenced the
appellant for committing offence, as aforestated. Hence, this appeal
before this court.
[11]
It is contended by Ms. V. Poddar, learned counsel for
the appellant that that PW-1 the informant of this case i.e the
brother of the deceased victim one of the material witness, who
during his cross examination has categorically stated that the
appellant Badal Baishnab was not present on the date of incident
and also stated that the contents of the Ezahar was not read over
to him as well as the Scribe of the Ejahar was not Known to him
and nowhere in his examination he stated that the accused person
has committed murder of his sister, which tends to prove that the
allegations in the FIR was nothing but a misconception of the PW-1
i.e. the informant of this case but the Ld.
[12]
P.w.5 (Sri Nimai Das), P.W.7 (Gita Rani Das), P.W.14
(Smt. Sajal Rani Baishnab) (these witnesses who were hostile by
the prosecution) in their cross examination they did not disclose
anything regarding the involvement of the appellant but the Ld.
Trial Court considering the version of the statement recorded u/s
161 Crpc statement convicted the appellant which is totally
perverse and not admissible in the eye of law. It is crystal clear in
the catena of judgments that statement of the witness recorded u/s
161 Crpc does not fall within the ambit of evidence and in fact the
Hon'ble apex court has reiterated that a statement recorded under
section 161 CrP.C is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be relied
upon or used to convict the accused.
[13]
For that, PW-20, the I.O. of the case in his cross
examination accepted the fact that after arrest accused on
10.04.2018 at around 17.10 hrs and before forwarding the accused
on 11.04.2018 he recorded the disclosure statement of the accused
in presence of one Executive Magistrate and other independent
witness and without any permission from the Ld. Court and without
written consent from the accused that he wants to make any
disclosure statement which proves any that the statement was
made under threat and coercion and was made in a hurry on the
next date of arrest before production in the Ld. Trial Court as the
same was a false case and without such a statement under threat,
the police will never be able to make out any case against the
accused on the basis of no evidence against him and hence, the
finding of the Ld-trial Court is highly illegal & perverse in nature
and hence the order of conviction and sentence is liable to be setaside/quashed.
[14]
In course of submission, Ms. V. Poddar, learned counsel
for the appellant has placed her reliance on a judgment of the apex
court in Satye Singh And Another vs State of Uttarakhand reported in
(2022) 5 SCC 438,
the relevant portion of which is extracted
hereunder:
“6. However, the learned advocate Mr Krishnam Mishra appearing
for the respondent State of Uttarakhand submitted that there
being concurrent findings of the facts recorded by the two courts,
this Court exercising limited jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India may not reappreciate the evidence and come
to a different conclusion. Mr Mishra further submitted that the
prosecution had examined the witnesses to prove that there was a
harassment to the deceased by the accused and on the previous
day of the incident also a quarrel had taken place between the
deceased and the accused, which had resulted into the deceased
Shashi leaving the house. According to him, the accused had tried
to mislead the investigating officer by propounding the story that
Shashi had committed suicide, however, from the evidence of the
doctor viz. Sanjay Kavdwal (PW 9) and the injuries mentioned in
the post-mortem report, it was duly proved that the injuries found
on the dead body of Shashi were ante-mortem, and her death was
caused due to haemorrhage and shock on account of ante-mortem
injuries. He, pressing into service Section 106 of the Evidence Act,
submitted that there was no explanation given by the accused in
their further statement as to why did Shashi leave their home the
previous day and what they did they do for the whole night, when
Shashi was not found.”
[15]
On the other hand, Mr. S. Debnath, learned Addl. PP
appearing for the state-respondent has submitted before this court
that the impugned order of conviction is just and proper and needs
no interference from this court. To support his contention, counsel
for the respondent has placed his reliance on a judgment of the
apex court in State of Rajasthan vs. Jaggu Ram reported in (2008) 12
SCC 51. The
relevant portion of which has been extracted herein
under:
27. In our considered view, this was a fit case for invoking Section
106 of the Evidence Act, which lays down that when any fact is
especially within the knowledge of the any person, the burden of
proving that fact is upon him. In Ram Gulam Chaudhary vs. State
of Bihar [2001 (8) SCC 311] this Court considered the applicability
of Section 106 of the Evidence Act in a case somewhat similar to
the present one. This Court noted that the accused after brutally
assaulting a boy carried him away and thereafter the boy was not
seen alive nor his body was found. The accused, however, offered
no explanation as to what they did after they took away the boy.
It was held that for the absence of any explanation from the side
of the accused about the boy, there was every justification for
drawing an inference that they had murdered the boy. It was
further observed that even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act
may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the
section would apply to cases like the present, where the
prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a
reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. The accused
by virtue of their special knowledge must offer an explanation
which might lead the court to draw a different inference.
28. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra [2006 (1)
SCC 681], a two judge-bench of which one of us (G.P.Mathur,J.)
was a member, considered the applicability of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act and observed:
“13. The demand for dowry or money from the parents of
the bride has shown a phenomenal increase in the last few
years. Cases are frequently coming before the courts,
where the husband or in-laws have gone to the extent of
killing the bride if the demand is not met. These crimes are
generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house
and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead
evidence. No member of the family, even if he is a witness
of the crime, would come forward to depose against
another family member. The neighbours, whose evidence
may be of some assistance, are generally reluctant to
depose in court as they want to keep aloof and do not
want to antagonise a neighbourhood family. The parents
or other family members of the bride being away from the
scene of commission of crime are not in a position to give
direct evidence which may inculpate the real accused
except regarding the demand of money or dowry and
harassment caused to the bride. But, it does not mean
that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the houses
should go unpunished.
14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house
and in such circumstances where the assailants have all
the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time
and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely
difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish
the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of
circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon
by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal
trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A
judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not
escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of
Public Prosecutions [1944 AC 315] quoted with approval
by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh
[2003 (11) SCC 271]. The law does not enjoin a duty on
the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is
almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely
difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead
such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard
to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is
necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act
which says that when any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact
is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section
throws some light on the content and scope of this
provision and it reads:
„(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway
without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a
ticket is on him.‟
15.Where an offence like murder is committed in
secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the
case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the
nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish
the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in
other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would
be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section
106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding
burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent
explanation as to how the crime was committed. The
inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping
quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise
that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the
prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to
offer any explanation.
Similar view has been expressed in State of Punjab vs. Karnail
Singh [2003 (11) SCC 271], State of Rajasthan vs. Kashi Ram
[2006 (12) SCC 254], Raj Kumar Prasad Tamakar vs. State of
Bihar [2007 (10) SCC 433].
[16]
Reliance has also been placed by counsel of the state-
respondent on another judgment of the apex court in Trimukh Maroti
Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681. The
relevant portion is extracted herein under:
4. Since the present appeal has been filed under Section 2(a) of
the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate
Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 and the High Court has reversed the order
of acquittal and has convicted the appellant under Section 302
IPC, it will be appropriate to briefly consider the evidence on
record. PW1. Dattarao is the father and PW.2 Rukmabai is the
mother of the deceased Revata and they are residents of village
Umatwadi. Both of them have deposed that the marriage of the
deceased with the appellant took place nearly 7 years back in
which they had given Rs.20,000/- in cash besides clothes and
utensils. Whenever deceased came to her parental home, she used
to complain that she was being harassed and ill-treated on account
of demand of money. They have further deposed that last time the
deceased came to their house on the occasion of Panchami festival
when she told them that the appellant wanted to purchase a
tempo and, therefore, her in-laws and also the appellant were
asking her to get Rs.25,000/- from her parents. The deceased also
informed that occasionally she was not provided food and was
beaten on account of non-fulfillment of the demand of Rs.25,000/. They have further deposed that the deceased stayed with them
for about 15 days and thereafter PW.1 Dattarao escorted her to
her matrimonial home and informed her in-laws that he was not in
a position to give Rs.25,000/- and further requested them not to
ill-treat her. A few days before the Diwali festival a person came
from village Kikki and informed that Revata had died on account of
snake bite. Thereafter, PW.1, PW.2 and their sons and two
daughters-in-law went to village Kikki which is about 25 kilometers
from their village Umatwadi. On reaching there they saw that the
body of Revata had been placed in a sitting posture with her back
resting on the wall and a strip of cloth had been tied along her
mouth. PW.1 has further deposed that subsequently he lodged an
FIR on 5.11.1996 at the police station. Though a suggestion was
given to both the witnesses that the marriage of the deceased had
taken place about 10 years back, but both of them specifically
denied and stated that the marriage had taken place 5-6 years
back. PW.1 has further deposed that he removed the cloth which
was tied along the mouth of the deceased and noticed marks of
injury around the neck and cheek and there were no bangles on
her hands. PW.3 Balasaheb, who is cousin of PW.1 and is resident
of village Umatwadi, has deposed that whenever Revata came to
her parental home, she always came to his house as well. She
used to narrate about the ill-treatment meted out to her by the
appellant and her in-laws as they were demanding an amount of
Rs.25,000/- for purchasing a tempo for the appellant. He has
further deposed that in the evening of 4.11.1996 two persons from
village Kikki came to his village and informed PW.1 and others that
Revata had died on account of snake bite. The witness has further
deposed that next day in the morning he went to village Kikki
along with several other persons of his village and saw the body of
the deceased. There were injury marks around the neck, cheek,
hand and other parts of the body. PW.4 Chander is another cousin
of PW.1 and is resident of the same village Umatwadi. His
statement is almost similar to that of PW.3 Balasaheb. PW.5
Girjabai is a resident of village Kikki and her house is very close to
the house of the accused in the same village. She has deposed
that the deceased Revata used to visit her and she had often told
her that on account of non-fulfilment of demand of money by her
parents, she was being ill-treated by her in-laws and husband
(appellant). She has further deposed that she used to console the
deceased and tell her that the ill-treatment being meted out to her
would gradually stop. She has further stated that at about 3-3.15
p.m. on the date of the incident she was informed that Maroti's
daughter- in-law had died due to snake bite. She immediately
rushed to the house of Maroti and saw the body of the deceased.
There were marks of injury on the neck and cheek and there were
no bangles on her hands. This witness is no doubt distantly related
to the deceased as her husband's mother is sister of PW.2 but
nothing material has come out in her cross-examination which
may discredit her testimony regarding the demand of Rs.25,000/by the appellant and his parents and also the ill-treatment being
meted out to the deceased. It was suggested to her in her crossexamination that the deceased was suffering from T.B. and
asthma and also that she used to have occasional chest pain but it
was emphatically denied by her.
5. PW.8 Madhvrao is the real brother of accused Maroti and the
appellant is his nephew. In his examination-in-chief he stated that
he did not know how Revata had died and he had not witnessed
any incident. The witness was declared as hostile and in his crossexamination by State counsel he admitted that the appellant
Trimukh used to ply a tempo. PW.6 Maroti son of Ramrao Telange
and PW.7 Venkat, both residents of village Kikki, have deposed
that while in the custody of the police the appellant said that he
would show the spot where the incident had taken place.
Thereafter he had taken the police party and the witnesses to the
field of his father Maroti and on his pointing out a pair of ladies
chappal, broken pieces of bangles and a sickle lying there were
recovered and the appellant had further said that the ladies
chappal belonged to his wife. The aforesaid articles were taken
into possession by the Police Inspector and a panchnama was
prepared which was signed by them. PW.7 has further deposed
that on the pointing out of the appellant his shoe was recovered
which was taken in possession by the police and panchnama was
drawn on which he has put his signature. PW.9 Digamber who was
a witness of inquest turned hostile, but in his cross-examination he
stated that he went to the house of accused Maroti at about 9.00
a.m. and had seen the body of the deceased with a piece of cloth
tied around her mouth. He further admitted that when the police
was recording the panchnama, he had said that there was no mark
of snake bite on the body of the deceased and that he had put his
signature on the inquest panchnama. PW.11 Vilas and PW.12
Nilawati whose agricultural land is situate near the agricultural
land of Maroti accused turned hostile. PW.13 Digamber son of
Madhavrao who is also a resident of village Kikki, also turned
hostile. However, he admitted that he had heard that Revata had
died due to snake bite and further that a tempo is owned by Maroti
which is plied by the appellant Trimukh.
[17]
This court thinks it apposite to extract here in below the
relevant portion of the disclosure statement which says there was
hot altercation between the appellant and the deceased wife prior
to her death.
“On 09/04/2018 at about 2000 hours I came in my resident from
my shop in a drunken condition. I have completed dinner at about
2100 hr. After dinner I along with my wife and son went to my
room and closed the door. Then my son fall asleep soon after. Me
and my wife took some alcohol drink. After a while at about 2230
hrs a hot altercation started between me and my wife regarding
repairing of ornaments and to purchase a new mobile phone. My
wife didn‟t understand me. During altercation, my wife suddenly
pushed me back. After that moment out of anger I grabbed my
wife‟s neck with both hand, for a while. Firstly she resisted me and
then she became quite and then I released my grasp from her
neck. Then I slept beside her. At that moment I could not
understand that my wife has already died. On that night at 0230
hrs my son started crying and then I called my wife. But, she was
not responding and then I switched on the light and found that she
already expired. Out of fear I then called my family members who
came to my room and after seeing the she is dead informed my inlaws and others.”
[18]
From the deposition of PW10, Dr. Nanigopal Das, a
Medical Officer, it also surfaces that the cause of death could be
asphyxia due to throttling (manual strangulation).
[19]
In view of the above, this court has no hesitation to
hold that the counsel for the respondent has made out his case in
establishing that none but appellant has committed the crime. But a
bare perusal of the records also shows that the appellant had no
intention to cause death to his wife. It is evident that the appellant
did grab his wife’s neck in a fit of anger but not with the intention
to cause her death. The fact that the appellant committed the act of
grabbing
his
wife’s
neck
in
inebriated
condition
cannot
be
neglected. Therefore, we are of the view that present case may be
viewed under Exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC.
Exception 4- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed
without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion
upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken
undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation- It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the
provocation or commits the first assault.
[20]
None but the children of the appellant are the ones who
have been affected a lot by this incident. We, looking at the future
of the children, also cannot shut our eyes towards the fact that who
would be looking after them in the absence of their parents. After
the demise of their mother, it is only the father who can be the best
support for them. It is evident from the records that the appellant
has two minor children (a daughter and a son).
[21]
Having considered the aspect discussed above and also
considering the exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, we are treating
the crime under Section 304 Part-B of the IPC. Therefore, the
judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 08.09.2022
sentencing the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life
may be converted to 5 (five) years of imprisonment only, if not
found guilty in any other case. Accordingly, it is ordered. The period
of detention undergone by the appellant shall be set off as per
procedure.
[22]
Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed in part to the
extent as indicated above.
JUDGE
Dipak
DIPAK
DAS
DIPAK DAS
Date: 2023.09.15
16:14:02 +05'30'
JUDGE
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