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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRL. A NO.23 OF 2022
Shri Babul Chandra Bhowmik,
Son of Late Lalit Chandra Bhowmik,
Aged about 68 years, resident of North Julaibari,
P.O.- Julaibari, P.S.- Baikhora, District-South Tripura.
……… Appellant(s)
Vs.
1. Shri Mihir Kanti Baidya,
Son of Late Manmohan Baidya,
Resident of Village- ONGC Colony(On the southern side of
Satsang Bihar, Badarghat), P.O.- ONGC, P.S. A.D. Nagar, SubDivision- Agartala, District- West Tripura.
2. The State of Tripura.
……..Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s)
:
Mr. S. Lodh, Advocate.
Ms. A. Saha, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
: Ms R. Guha, Advocate.
Mr. S. Ghosh, Addl. P.P.
Ms. S. Debnath, Advocate.
Date of hearing
: 14.09.2023
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
: 19.09.2023.
Whether fit for reporting : YES.
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
This present appeal has been filed under Section
378(4) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the impugned
Judgment dated 19.09.2022, passed by the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Belonia, South Tripura in N.I. 15 of 2019,
whereby the learned Judicial Magistrate acquitted respondent No.1
for committing an offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
2.
The brief fact of this case is that based on a complaint
filed by the complainant-appellant alleging that he is the owner of
a brick kiln and also executes construction works under the Public
Works Department of State of Tripura and the accused is also a
fellow brick kiln owner having two brick manufacturing units one at
Jirania and another at Sekerkote under West Tripura District. In
the 1st week of April, 2019 the accused person at the time of
sending off his migrant labourers, which were brought from outside
of the State of Tripura, approached the complainant to give him a
personal loan.
Accordingly, the complainant gave the accused-
respondent No.1 Rs. 40,00,000/- from his bank account lying with
the State Bank of India, Sabroom Branch. It is also contended that
at the time of taking that loan from the complainant, the accused
gave assurance to him that he would repay the same within a
short period. Thereafter to discharge liability, the accused person
issued
two
cheques
bearing
No.
105946
dated
20.05.2019
amounting to Rs. 20,00,000/- and another Cheque No. 105947
dated 22.05.2019 amounting to Rs. 20,00,000/-drawn on
State
Bank of India, ONGC Colony Branch, Agartala, West Tripura. On
18.07.2019 the complainant deposited the said cheques to his
bank account in the State Bank of India, Sabroom Branch, South
Tripura. Thereafter on 29.07.2019 Manager of the State Bank of
India, Sarboom Branch, South Tripura returned the said cheques
with remarks, "Fund Insufficient".
A legal demand notice dated
12.08.2019, was sent to the accused requesting the accused
person to make payment within the stipulated period from the date
of receipt of said notice, but in spite of having the notice duly
served upon the accused on 13.08.2019, the accused did not take
any step to liquidate his liabilities by making the payments to the
complainant towards the amount covered under the said cheques.
3.
Accordingly, the appellant filed a complaint before the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Belonia and after
taking cognizance, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate transferred
the complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class
Belonia, South Tripura, for disposal.
4.
The learned Court below issued a summon upon
respondent No.1 and in response to the summon, he appeared
before the learned Court below. On 21.08.2021, respondent No.1
was examined under Section 251 of Cr.P.C., to which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed for trial. To prove the case, on behalf of the
complainant side, one witness, i.e., the complainant himself was
examined as P.W.-1 and proved 7(seven) documents. On the other
hand, on behalf of respondent No.1, he himself appeared before
the witness box as D.W.-1 and did not produce any document.
After hearing the parties, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Belonia, South Tripura vide impugned Judgment and Order dated
19.09.2020, acquitted respondent No.1.
5.
Being aggrieved by the impugned Judgment dated
19,09.2022, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class,
Belonia , South Tripura in N.I. No.15 of 2019, the appellant
preferred this instant appeal praying to set aside the impugned
order.
6.
Heard Mr. S. Lodh, learned counsel assisted by Ms. A.
Saha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. R.
Guha, learned counsel appearing for private respondent No.1, and
Mr. S. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P. appearing for State-respondent.
7.
Earlier this Court upon the request of the learned
counsels appearing for both sides has taken steps for settling this
matter out of Court. Despite the best efforts of the counsels, they
represented that the matter could not be settled outside the Court
and prayed to proceed with the matter on merits.
8.
Mr.
Lodh,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
complainant-appellant submits that the learned Court below failed
to appreciate the evidence on record and passed the impugned
Judgment. The Court below ought to have convicted respondent
No.1 as the prosecution has proved the charge against respondent
No.1 herein. At the time of cross-examination, respondent No.1
failed to rebut the presumption of Section 139 of N.I. Act, thus the
findings of the learned Court below with regard to legally
enforceable debt is erroneous. The learned Court below committed
an error in holding that the appellant did not produce any
document, whereby, it is established that he made a payment of
Rs.40,00,000/- to respondent No.1 The learned Court below at the
time of evaluating the evidence on record, did not take into
consideration
the
examination-in-chief
submitted
by
the
respondent No.1, whereby, he admitted that he issued 2(two)
cheques, amounting to Rs.20,00,000/- each, and he also admitted
that he purchased bricks on credit from the appellant. It is
submitted that when the accused has admitted to taking of loan
and issuance of cheques, the learned Court below ought to have
taken presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act and hold that the
accused person has issued the cheques against the legally
enforceable debts. The learned Court below failed to appreciate the
aforesaid legal position. The learned Court below failed to
appreciate that respondent No.1 at no point in time denied his
signature
on
the
Cheque
and
hence
there
is
a
statutory
presumption of the existence of legally enforceable debts, hence,
the findings of the learned Court below are liable to be interfered
with.
In addition to support his argument on proving that
transaction is not required in complaint under Section 138 of N.I.
Act , learned counsel appearing for the appellant referred to para11 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court Judgment reported in 2021 SCC
Online SC 1191 titled as K.S. Ranganatha Vs. Vittal Shetty
which is reproduced here-in-under:“11. The position of law as noted above makes it crystal
clear that when a cheque is drawn out and is relied upon by the drawee, it
will raise a presumption that it is drawn towards a consideration which is a
legally recoverable amount; such presumption of course, is rebuttable by
proving to the contrary. The onus is on the accused to raise a probable
defence and the standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is on
preponderance of probabilities.”
Stating thus, he prayed to allow this appeal.
9.
On the other hand, Ms. R. Guha, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.1 submits that legally enforceable
debt
is
not
proved.
Though
in
the
cross-examination,
the
complainant-appellant said that he paid Rs.26,00,000/- in total to
respondent No.1 through four cheques, and with interest, those
amounts
increased
to
Rs.40,53,66/-,
but
the
appellant-
complainant has not submitted any documents which show that he
made any payment to respondent No.1 from his SBI Account,
Sabroom Branch. There is no clarity on how the money for given,
why it was given, and for which purpose it was given. The story of
the complainant that on good faith he has given the said amount
of money to respondent No.1 is not believable at all.
To support his argument on the point of legally
enforceable debt to be proved, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.1 pressed into service paras-9-11 and paras-13
to 32 of the Hon’ble Apex Court Judgment reported in (2019) 5
SCC 418 titled as Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa which is
reproduced herein:“9. We having noticed the facts of the case and the
evidence on the record, we need to note the legal principles regarding
nature of presumptions to be drawn under Section 139 of the Act and the
manner in which it can be rebutted by an accused. We need to look into
the relevant judgments of this Court, where these aspects have been
considered and elaborated.
10. Chapter XIII of the Act, 1881 contains a heading “Special
Rules of Evidence”. Section 118 provides for presumptions as to negotiable
instruments. Section 118 is as follows:“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. —Until the contrary is
proved, the following presumptions shall be made:—
(a) of consideration —that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn
for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been
accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed,
negotiated or transferred for consideration;
(b) as to date —that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was
made or drawn on such date;
11. Next provision, which needs to be noticed is Section 139,
which provides for presumption in favour of holder. Section 139 lays
down:“139. Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the
nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of
any debt or other liability.”
13.. This Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing
Company Vs. Amin Chand Pyarelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35 had occasion to
consider Section 118(a) of the Act. This Court held that once execution of
the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section
118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a
presumption is rebuttable and defendant can prove the non-existence of a
consideration by raising a probable defence. In paragraph No.12 following
has been laid down:“12. Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the
position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory
note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it
is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The
defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a
probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial
onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable
or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who
will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove
would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable
instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of
the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the
preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon
which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely
upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well.
In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by
showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would
invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under
Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant
to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the
existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and
even if led, is to be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the
consideration apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something
which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the benefit of
shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff. To disprove the presumption,
the defendant has to bring on record such facts and circumstances upon
consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration
did not exist or its non- existence was so probable that a prudent man
would, under the circumstances of the case, shall act upon the plea that it
did not exist……”
14.
Justice S.B. Sinha in M.S. Narayana Menon Alias Mani Vs. State of
Kerala and Another, (2006) 6 SCC 39 had considered Sections
118(a), 138 and 139 of the Act, 1881. It was held that presumptions both
under Sections 118(a) and 139 are rebuttable in nature. Explaining the
expressions “may presume” and “shall presume” referring to an earlier
judgment, following was held in paragraph No.28:“28. What would be the effect of the expressions “may presume”, „shall
presume” and “conclusive proof” has been considered by this Court
in Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC 1, in the following
terms: (SCC pp. 30-31, para 52)
“52….“It is true that the legislature used two different phraseologies „shall
be presumed‟ and „may be presumed‟ in Section 42 of the Punjab Land
Revenue Act and furthermore although provided for the mode and manner
of rebuttal of such presumption as regards the right to mines and minerals
said to be vested in the Government vis-à-vis the absence thereof in
relation to the lands presumed to be retained by the landowners but the
same would not mean that the words „shall presume‟ would be conclusive.
The meaning of the expressions „may presume‟ and „shall presume‟ have
been explained in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872, from a perusal
whereof it would be evident that whenever it is directed that the court shall
presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless disproved. In
terms of the said provision, thus, the expression „shall presume‟ cannot be
held to be synonymous with „conclusive proof‟.”
15. It was noted that the expression “shall presume” cannot be held to be
synonymous with conclusive proof. Referring to definition of words
“proved” and “disproved” under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, following
was laid down in paragraph No.30:
“30. Applying the said definitions of “proved” or “disproved” to the
principle behind Section 118(a) of the Act, the court shall presume a
negotiable instrument to be for consideration unless and until after
considering the matter before it, it either believes that the consideration
does not exist or considers the non-existence of the consideration so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the
particular case, to act upon the supposition that the consideration does not
exist. For rebutting such presumption, what is needed is to raise a probable
defence. Even for the said purpose, the evidence adduced on behalf of the
complainant could be relied upon.”
16. This Court held that what is needed is to raise a probable defence, for
which it is not necessary for the accused to disprove the existence of
consideration by way of direct evidence and even the evidence adduced on
behalf of the complainant can be relied upon. Dealing with standard of
proof, following was observed in paragraph No.32:“32. The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities.
Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the
materials on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which
he relies.”
17. In Krishna Janardhan Bhat Vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54,
this Court held that an accused for discharging the burden of proof placed
upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his
burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. Following
was laid down in Paragraph No.32:“32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under
a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the
basis of the materials already brought on record. An accused has a
constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of an
accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different.”
18. This Court again reiterated that whereas prosecution must prove the
guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so
as to prove a defence on the part of an accused is “preponderance of
probabilities”. In paragraph No.34, following was laid down:“34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused
beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a
defence on the part of an accused is “preponderance of probabilities”.
Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from
the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the
circumstances upon which he relies.”
19. In Kumar Exports Vs. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513, this Court
again examined as to when complainant discharges the burden to prove
that instrument was executed and when the burden shall be shifted. In
paragraph Nos. 18 to 20, following has been laid down:“18. Applying the definition of the word “proved” in Section 3 of the
Evidence Act to the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, it
becomes evident that in a trial under Section 138 of the Act a presumption
will have to be made that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn
for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability
once the execution of negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted.
As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the
instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules of
presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the
burden on the accused. The presumptions will live, exist and survive and
shall end only when the contrary is proved by the accused, that is, the
cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or
liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima
facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists.
19. The use of the phrase “until the contrary is proved” in Section 118 of
the Act and use of the words “unless the contrary is proved” in Section
139 of the Act read with definitions of “may presume” and “shall presume”
as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that
presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When
a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies
the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when
that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show
that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is
over.
20. ……………………The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the
note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no
debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist
in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of
consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of
negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time,
it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence
of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something
which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of
proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the
accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon
consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration
and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a
prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea
that they did not exist……………”
20.
A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rangappa Vs. Sri
Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 had occasion to elaborately consider provisions
of Sections 138 and 139. In the above case, trial court had acquitted the
accused in a case relating to dishonour of cheque under Section 138. The
High Court had reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting the
accused. In the above case, the accused had admitted signatures on the
cheque. This Court held that where the fact of signature on the cheque is
acknowledged, a presumption has to be raised that the cheque pertained to
a legally enforceable debt or liability, however, this presumption is of a
rebuttal nature and the onus is then on the accused to raise a probable
defence. In Paragraph No.13, following has been laid down:“13. The High Court in its order noted that in the course of the trial
proceedings, the accused had admitted that the signature on the impugned
cheque (No. 0886322 dated 8-22001) was indeed his own. Once this fact has been acknowledged, Section
139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque pertained to a
legally enforceable debt or liability. This presumption is of a rebuttal nature
and the onus is then on the accused to raise a probable defence. With
regard to the present facts, the High Court found that the defence raised
by the accused was not probable.”
21.
After referring to various other judgments of this Court,
this Court in that case held that the presumption mandated by Section
139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability, which, of course, is in the nature of a rebuttable
presumption. In paragraph No.26, following was laid down:“26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the
respondent claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the
Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan
Bhat, (2008) 4 SCC 54 may not be correct. However, this does not in any
way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was
based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the
citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it
is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no
doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.”
22.
Elaborating further, this Court held that Section 139 of the
Act is an example of a reverse onus and the test of proportionality should
guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses on the
defendant-accused and the defendant- accused cannot be expected to
discharge an unduly high standard of proof. In paragraph Nos. 27 and 28,
following was laid down:“27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has
been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the
credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies
a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue
delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the
offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a
regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of
a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse
onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge
an unduly high standard of proof.
28. In
the absence of
compelling
justifications, reverse
onus
clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive
burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused
has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for
doing so is that of “preponderance of probabilities”. Therefore, if the
accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials
submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is
conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce
evidence of his/her own.”
23. We may now notice judgment relied by the learned counsel for the
complainant, i.e., judgment of this Court in Kishan Rao Vs. Shankargouda,.
This Court in the above case has examined Section 139 of the Act. In the
above case, the only defence which was taken by the accused was that
cheque was stolen by the appellant. The said defence was rejected by the
trial court. In paragraph Nos. 21 to 23, following was laid down:“21. In the present case, the trial court as well as the appellate court
having found that cheque contained the signatures of the accused and it
was given to the appellant to present in the Bank, the presumption
under Section 139 was rightly raised which was not rebutted by the
accused. The accused had not led any evidence to rebutthe aforesaid
presumption. The accused even did not come in the witness box to support
his case. In the reply to the notice which was given by the appellant, the
accused took the defence that the cheque was stolen by the appellant. The
said defence was rejected by the trial court after considering the evidence
on record with regard to which no contrary view has also been expressed
by the High Court.
22. Another judgment which needs to be looked into is Rangappa v. Sri
Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441. A three-Judge Bench of this Court had occasion
to examine the presumption under Section 139 of the 1881 Act. This Court
in the aforesaid case has held that in the event the accused is able to raise
a probable defence which creates doubt with regard to the existence of a
debt or liability, the presumption may fail. Following was laid down in paras
26 and 27:
“26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent
claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does
indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To
that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat, may
not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the
correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific
facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course
in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to
raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an
initial presumption which favours the complainant.
27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has
been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the
credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies
a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue
delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the
offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a
regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of
a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse
onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge
an unduly high standard of proof.”
23. No evidence was led by the accused. The defence taken in the reply to
the notice that cheque was stolen having been rejected by the two courts
below, we do not see any basis for the High Court coming to the conclusion
that the accused has been successful in creating doubt in the mind of the
Court with regard to the existence of the debt or liability. How the
presumption under Section 139 can be rebutted on the evidence of PW 1,
himself has not been explained by the High Court.
24. The above case was a case where this Court did not find the defence
raised by the accused probable. The only defence raised was that cheque
was stolen having been rejected by the trial court and no contrary opinion
having been expressed by the High Court, this Court reversed the
judgment of the High Court restoring the conviction. The respondent
cannot take any benefit of the said judgment, which was on its own facts.
25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in above cases
on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated
by this Court in following manner:25.1.
Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of
the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of
any debt or other liability.
25.2.
The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable
presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence.
The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of
preponderance of probabilities.
25.3.
To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely
on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted
by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of
preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials
brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances
upon which they rely.
25.4.
That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the
witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary
burden and not a persuasive burden.
25.5.
the
witness
It is not necessary for the accused to
box to support his defence.
come
in
26. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in facts of the present
case, it is clear that signature on cheque having been admitted, a
presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that cheque was issued in
discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to
whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. In crossexamination of the PW1, when the specific question was put that cheque
was issued in relation to loan of Rs.25,000/- taken by the accused, the
PW1 said that he does not remember. PW1 in his evidence admitted that
he retired in 1997 on which date he received monetary benefit of Rs. 8
lakhs, which was encashed by the complainant. It was also brought in the
evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale
agreement for which he paid anamount of Rs.4,50,000/- to Balana Gouda
towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs.4,50,000/- being admitted in
the year 2010 and further payment of loan of Rs.50,000/- with regard to
which complaint No.119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, copy of
which complaint was also filed as Ex.D2, there was burden on the
complainant to prove his financial capacity. In the year 2010-2011, as per
own case of the complainant, he made payment of Rs.18 lakhs. During his
cross-examination, when financial capacity to pay Rs.6 lakhs to the
accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the
complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf
of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his
financial capacity and other facts.
27. There was another evidence on the record, i.e., copy of plaint in O.S.
No. 148 of 2011 filed by the complainant for recovery of loan of Rs. 7 lakhs
given to one Balana Gouda in December, 2009. Thus, there was evidence
on record to indicate that in December, 2009, he gave Rs.7 lakhs in sale
agreement, in 2010, he made payment of Rs.4,50,000/- towards sale
consideration and further he gave a loan of Rs.50,000/- for which
complaint was filed in 2012 and further loan of Rs.6 lakhs in November,
2011. Thus, during the period from 2009 to November, 2011, amount of
Rs.18 lakhs was given by the complainant to different persons including the
accused, which put a heavy burden to prove the financial capacity when it
was questioned on behalf of the accused, the accused being a retired
employee of State Transport Corporation, who retired in 1997 and total
retirement benefits, which were encashed were Rs.8 lakhs only. The High
Court observed that though the complainant is retired employee, the
accused did not even suggest that pension is the only means for survival of
the complainant. Following observations were made in Paragraph 16 of the
judgment of the High Court:“17.
Though the complainant is retired employee, the accused
did not even suggest that pension is the only means for survival of the
complainant. Under these circumstances, the Trial Court‟s finding that the
complainant failed to discharge his initial burden of proof of lending
capacity is perverse.”
28. There is one more aspect of the matter which also needs to be noticed.
In the complaint filed by the complainant as well as in examination-in-chief
the complainant has not mentioned as to on which date, the loan of Rs.6
lakhs was given to the accused. It was during cross-examination, he gave
the date as November, 2011. Under Section 118(b), a presumption shall be
made as to date that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn on
such date. Admittedly, the cheque is dated 27.02.2012, there is not even a
suggestion by the complainant that a post dated cheque was given to him
in November, 2011 bearing dated 27.02.2012. Giving of a cheque on
27.02.2012, which was deposited on 01.03.2012 is not compatible with the
case of the complainant when we read the complaint submitted by the
complainant especially Para 1 of the complaint, which is extracted as
below:“1. The accused is a very good friend of the complainant. The
accused requested the Complainant a hand loan to meet out urgent and
family necessary a sum of Rs.6,00,000/-(Rupees Six Lakh) and on account
of long standing friendship and knowing the difficulties, which is being
faced by the accused the complainant agreed to lend hand loan to meet
out the financial difficulties of the accused and accordingly the Complainant
lend hand loan Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakh) dated 27.02.2012 in
favour of the Complainant stating that on its presentation it will be
honored. But to the surprise of the Complainant on presentation of the
same for collection through his Bank the Cheque was returned by the Bank
with an endorsement “Funds Insufficient” on 01-03- 2012.”
29.
Thus, there is a contradiction in what was initially stated
by the complainant in the complaint and in his examination-in-chief
regarding date on which loan was given on one side and what was said in
cross-examination in other side, which has not been satisfactorily
explained. The High Court was unduly influenced by the fact that the
accused did not reply the notice denying the execution of cheque or legal
liability. Even before the trial court, appellant- accused has not denied his
signature on the cheque.
30.
We are of the view that when evidence was led before the
Court to indicate that apart from loan of Rs.6 lakhs given to the accused,
within 02 years, amount of Rs.18 lakhs have been given out by
thecomplainant and his financial capacity being questioned, it was
incumbent on the complainant to have explained his financial capacity.
Court cannot insist on a person to lead negative evidence. The observation
of the High Court that trial court‟s finding that the complainant failed to
prove his financial capacity of lending money is perverse cannot be
supported. We fail to see that how the trial court‟s findings can be termed
as perverse by the High Court when it was based on consideration of the
evidence, which was led on behalf of the defence.
31.
This Court had occasion to consider the expression
“perverse” in Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao and others Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh through Secretary, (2009) 10 SCC 636, this Court held that
although High Court can reappraise the evidence and conclusions drawn by
the trial court but judgment of acquittal can be interfered with only
judgment is against the weight of evidence. In Paragraph No.14 following
has been held:“14. We have considered the arguments advanced and heard the
matter at great length. It is true, as contended by Mr Rao, that
interference in an appeal against an acquittal recorded by the trial court
should be rare and in exceptional circumstances. It is, however, well
settled by now that it is open to the High Court to reappraise the evidence
and conclusions drawn by the trial court but only in a case when the
judgment of the trial court is stated to be perverse. The word “perverse” in
terms as understood in law has been defined to mean “against the weight
of evidence”. We have to see accordingly as to whether the judgment of
the trial court which has been found perverse by the High Court was in fact
so.”
32.
High Court without discarding the evidence, which was led
by defence could not have held that finding of trial court regarding financial
capacity of the complainant is perverse. We are, thus, satisfied that
accused has raised a probable defence and the findings of the trial court
that complainant failed to prove his financial capacity are based on
evidence led by the defence. The observations of the High Court that
findings of the trial court are perverse are unsustainable. We, thus, are of
the view that judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.
Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 in
support of his argument also referred to Paras-22 to 28 of the
Hon’ble Apex Court Judgment reported in (2013) 3 SCC 86 titled
as Vijay vs. Laxman and anr., which is reproduced here-inunder:“22. The decision in M.S. Narayana Menon (supra) was
relied upon in K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan where this Court reiterated
the legal position as under:
“13.
The Act raises two presumptions; firstly, in regard to the
passing of consideration as contained in Section 118 (a) therein and,
secondly, a presumption that the holder of cheque receiving the same of
the nature referred to in Section 139 discharged in whole or in part any
debt or other liability. Presumptions both under Sections 118 (a) and 139
are rebuttable in nature.
14.
It is furthermore not in doubt or dispute that whereas the
standard of proof so far as the prosecution is concerned is proof of guilt
beyond all reasonable doubt; the one on the accused is only mere
preponderance of probability.”
23.
. To the same effect is the decision of this Court
in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) 4 SCC 54 where
this Court observed:
“32… Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that of the
prosecution a criminal case is different.
34.
Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an
accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove
a defence on the part of an accused is preponderance of probabilities.
45… Statute mandates raising of presumption but it stops at that. It does
not say how presumption drawn should be held to have rebutted. Other
important principles of legal jurisprudence, namely presumption of
innocence as human rights and the doctrine of reverse burden introduced
by Section139 should be delicately balanced.”
24.
Presumptions under Sections 118(a) and Section 139 were held
to be rebuttable on a preponderance of probabilities in Bharat Barrel &
Drum Manufacturing Company v. Amin Chand Pyarelal also where the
Court observed:
“11…‟32… Though the evidential burden is initially placed on the defendant
by virtue of S.118 it can be rebutted by the defendant by showing a
preponderance of probabilities that such consideration as stated in the
pronote, or in the suit notice or in the plaint does not exist and once the
presumption is so rebutted, the said presumption 'disappears'. For the
purpose of rebutting the initial evidential burden, the defendant can rely on
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence or on presumptions of law or
fact. Once such convincing rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by
the Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the
preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the
plaintiff who has also the legal burden.”
25.
In Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee (2001) 6 SCC
16 this Court compared evidentiary presumptions in favour of the
prosecution with the presumption of innocence in the following terms:
“22… Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the
presumption of innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that
the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged
with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces
evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the
presumed fact.
23.
In other words, provided the facts required to form the
basis of a presumption of law exists, no discretion is left with the Court but
to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person
against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the
contrary. …”
26.
Decisions in Mahtab Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh 670, Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu and Vishnu Dutt
Sharma v. Daya Sapra , take the same line of reasoning.
27.
Coming then to the present case, the absence of any
details of the date on which the loan was advanced as also the absence of
any documentary or other evidence to show that any such loan transaction
had indeed taken place between the parties is a significant circumstance.
So also the fact that the cheque was presented on the day following the
altercation between the parties is a circumstance that cannot be brushed
away. The version of the respondent that the cheque was not returned to
him and the complainant presented the same to wreak vengeance against
him is a circumstance that cannot be easily rejected. Super added to all
this is the testimony of DW1, Jeevan Guru according to whom the accounts
were settled between the father of the complainant and the accused in his
presence and upon settlement the accused had demanded return of this
cheque given in lieu of the advance. It was further stated by the witness
that the complainant‟s father had avoided to return the cheque and
promised to do so on some other day. There is no reason much less a
cogent one suggested to us for rejecting the deposition of this witness who
has testified that after the incident of altercation between the two parties
the accused has been supplying milk to the witness as he is also in the
same business. Non- examination of the father of the complainant who was
said to be present outside the Court hall on the date the complainant‟s
statement was recorded also assumes importance. It gives rise to an
inference that the non- examination was a deliberate attempt of the
prosecution to keep him away from the court for otherwise he would have
to accept that the accused was actually supplying milk to him and that the
accused was given the price of the milk in advance as per the trade
practice in acknowledgement and by way of security for which amount the
accused had issued a cheque in question.
28.
In the totality of the above circumstances, the High Court
was perfectly justified in its conclusion that the prosecution had failed to
make out a case against the accused and in acquitting him of the charges.
With these observations in elucidation of the conclusion drawn by my
worthy colleague, I agree that the appeal fails and be dismissed.
Stating
thus,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
respondent No.1 prayed to dismiss this appeal.
10.
Heard both sides and perused the evidence on record.
11.
It
is
evident
from
the
record
that
both
the
complainant-appellant and respondent No.1 know each other and
the series of business transactions as evident in the record cannot
be denied. The issuing of cheques and the cheque amount are not
denied by the Court below.
12.
It is seen from the record that in reply to the demand
notice of the appellant dated 12th August 2019, respondent No.1
has
given
a
reply
dated
30.08.2019.
After
a
categorical
examination of the said reply to the demand notice of the
appellant-complainant, it is apparent that respondent No.1 i.e., the
accused-person herein in the said reply notice has not denied with
regard to business relation transactions with the appellantcomplainant and he has also not denied issuing of the cheques.
13.
As per the evidence of the accused person, he has not
denied the transactions, his issuing of cheques, and his signatures.
So, in view of the same, this Court draws an inference that there
was a business relation between the complainant and the accused
person, and the cheques were paid to the accused person.
Accordingly, reasonable presumption has to be made under
Section 139 of N.I. Act. The amount of cheques which are issued
are legally enforceable debt and thus the amounts are payable by
the accused person to the complainant herein.
14.
Since in the reply of the accused-respondent dated
30.08.2019 to the demand notice of the appellant-complainant
dated 12.08.2019, he has not denied about the transactions,
issuing of cheques, and putting his signature, accordingly, the
liability is confirmed. So because, there are transactions, issuing of
cheques, and putting signatures, it amounts to legally enforceable
debt and the same is recoverable. Hence this Court has no
hesitation to draw a conclusion that, there is a legally enforceable
debt and the cheque amount is to be paid. Further, the Judgments
as cited by learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 are not
relevant to the facts of this case.
15.
In view of the above discussion, this complaint filed
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 stands
allowed and accordingly, the present criminal appeal is allowed and
closed with the following directions:a.
The appellant-complainant is entitled to recovery of
the cheque amount and the accused respondent No.1 herein
is liable to pay the said cheque amount. Accordingly, it is
directed that the accused-respondent No.1 shall pay the
amount of Rs.20,00,000/-(Rupees twenty lakh) each in
2(two)cheques totaling Rs.40,00,000/- to
the appellant-
complainant herein.
B.
The cheque amounts as mentioned here-in-above
shall be paid by accused-respondent No.1 to the appellantcomplainant within a period of 2(two) months from the date
of this Judgment and Order. In the event if the cheque
amounts are not paid within 2(two) months from the date of
Judgment and Order, the accused-respondent No.1 herein
shall undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of 1(one)
year.
16.
As a sequel, stay if any stands vacated. Pending
application(s), if any also stands closed.
JUDGE
suhanjit
RAJKUMAR
SUHANJIT
SINGHA
RAJKUMAR SUHANJIT
SINGHA
Date: 2023.09.20
17:36:41 +05'30'
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