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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Reserved on: 11.08.2026
Pronounced on: 21.08.2026
Uploaded on: 21.08.2026
Whether the operative part or full
Judgment is pronounced: Full
RFA No. 42/2026 (O&M)
Shifali Gupta, Aged 41 years
W/o Sh. Vaibhav Chowdhary,
R/o H. No. 47-C/C, Gandhi
Nagar, Jammu.
…. Petitioner(s)/Appellants
Through:-
Mr. Sunil Sethi, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Ankesh Chandel, Advocate.
V/s
1. Punjab National Bank , Through
its Zonal Manager, Zonal
Officer 1st Floor Plot No. 10,
Administrative Block B, District
Shopping Centre, near Passport
Office, Ranjit Avenue, Amristar
Punjab.
2. Branch
Manager,
Punjab
National Bank, Channi Rama,
NH Bye Pass, Jammu.
Through:-
…..Respondent(s)
Mr. Parveen Kapahi, Advocate.
CORAM:HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M A CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1.
This appeal is directed against order dated 30.06.2026 passed by the
learned Commercial Court, Jammu (for short “trial Court”) whereby
RFA No. 42/2026
the application for grant of interim relief filed by the appellant in suit
titled “Shifali Gupta v. Punjab National Bank &Anr.”
has been
dismissed.
Grounds of Appeal:
2.
The appellant has assailed the order dated 30.06.2026 on the grounds
that the appellant had succeeded in establishing the prima facie case by
placing on record numerous documents in support of her case but the
learned trial Court without returning any cogent findings has dismissed
the application for temporary injunction filed by the appellant. It is
urged that the learned trial Court has fallen into grave error in arriving
at a conclusion that the appellant had sought restructuring of the loan
from the Bank. In fact, restructuring was not sought by the appellant,
nor did RBI circular provide any such condition and no prudent man
availing huge loan facility would agree for restructuring of his/her loan
amount at a higher rate of interest. It is also contended that the learned
trial Court has agreed that the rate charged by the respondent-bank is
exorbitant, but the appellant would not be entitled to the interim
injunction, as she can be compensated for it by way of costs. These
findings returned by learned trial Court are highly erroneous that the
learned trial Court ought to have protected the appellant form the illegal
and arbitrary actions of the respondent-Bank.
Submissions:
3.
Mr. Sunil Sethi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has
submitted that the appellant had never sought restructuring of the loan
RFA No. 42/2026
in the manner, the respondents have restructured the loan, as the
appellant had only agreed for such terms and conditions, pursuant to
which loan was initially granted to the appellant. He has strenuously
argued that the respondent was only entitled to charge interest at the
rate which was initially agreed to by the appellant i.e.at the rate of
9.15% per annum. He has further argued that downgrading of the rating
of the appellant from B1 to B3 is unilateral act of the Bank regarding
which the appellant was never informed and letter dated 10.12.2021
was merely a proposal which was never agreed to by the appellant.
4.
Per contra, Mr. Parveen Kapahi, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-Bank, has submitted that the appellant through the medium
of letter dated 11.08.2021 had approached the respondent-Bank for
restructuring of both the loans for a further period of 10 years and,
accordingly, her request was considered by MCC-CAC in its meeting
held on 10.12.2021 and loans were restructured by extension of tenure
of loan by two years. The sanction dated 10.12.2021 containing the
terms and conditions of the restructuring of loan was duly
acknowledged and accepted by the appellant and in token thereof, she
had signed each page of the sanction restructuring the loan. He has
further argued that in the sanction, it was mentioned that effective rate
would be 11.90 percent. As such, once the appellant has herself agreed
for restructuring of the loan, the appellant now cannot turn around to
say that restructuring of the loan has been done by the respondent-Bank
unilaterally. He has further argued that suit is not maintainable on the
RFA No. 42/2026
ground of being barred by Section 21-A of Banking Regulation Act,
1949 which provides that the transaction between the Banking
company and its debtor shall not be reopened by any Court on the
ground that the rate of interest charged by the Banking company in
respect of such transaction is excessive. He has further argued that prior
to the filing of the suit, the appellant had approached the Punjab and
Haryana High Court through the medium of writ petition which was
subsequently dismissed as withdrawn. Thereafter, the appellant
approached the Banking Ombudsman but again withdrew the petition
and thereafter approached the Consumer Commission and again, the
complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, just to prevent the Bank from
declaring the loan account of the appellant as NPA, as the appellant has
not maintained the financial discipline in discharging her obligation
arising out of restructuring of loan, the present suit has been filed. He
has further argued that the Bank has already declared the loan accounts
of the appellant as NPAs.
5.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on
record.
Facts
6.
The appellant filed the suit for declaring notice dated 12.12.2025 issued
by respondent No. 2 as void and inoperative in the eyes of law; for
declaring the letter dated 10.12.2021 as void ab-initio; for declaring the
action of the respondents in downgrading the appellant’s risk rating
from B1 to B3 and the charging of alleged exorbitant interest on two
RFA No. 42/2026
different loan account numbers as illegal, in-operative, null and void
with consequential relief of mandatory injunction restraining the
respondents from acting upon the unilateral and arbitrary restructuring
of loan communicated vide impugned letter dated 10.12.2021 and for
mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to restore the
original terms of the loan as sanctioned on 12.02.2019 and 27.05.2020
including the B1 risk rating and further relief of mandatory injunction
commanding the respondents to appropriate the excess interest amount
of Rs. 1,82,19,512/- charged upto 31.08.2025 towards the liquidation of
the loan and interest on initial terms & condition and further restraining
the respondent-Bank from adopting any coercive measure or declaring
the two loan accounts of the appellant as NPA.
7.
It was pleaded by the appellant that she, for the purpose of financing
the construction of 7500 MT capacity Godown at Reasi, had obtained
the loan of ₹ 4,16,84,000/- from the respondent-Bank in loan account
No. 338600SA00000022. On 12.02.2019, as per terms of the aforesaid
sanction letter, the appellant was assigned B1 risk rating and the
applicable rate of interest was set at 9.15 percent per annum. Due to
Covid-19 pandemic, the project execution was hampered, which
constrained the appellant to seek an additional loan of ₹ 45.57 lacs,
which was granted to her pursuant to term loan account No.
338600SA00000031. It is stated that due to Covid-19 pandemic, the
Reserve Bank of India issued a beneficial circular titled “Resolution
Framework 2.0 dated 05.05.2021 with an objective to provide relief and
RFA No. 42/2026
alleviate the financial stress of the borrowers. It is contended that the
appellant accordingly submitted a formal request for loan restructuring
to the respondent-Bank through the medium of letter dated 11.08.2021
seeking the benefit of RBI’s circular but the respondent- Bank in a
flagrant disregard for the binding directive of the RBI circular informed
the appellant vide its letter dated 10.12.2021 regarding the unilateral
sanction of restructuring the loans of the appellant. It was contended
that the communication dated 10.12.2021 never had the consent of the
appellant and the risk rating of the appellant was also unilaterally
reduced to B3 account, which seriously prejudiced the appellant as the
Bank started charging interest at the rate of 11.95 percent up to
31.05.2022, 12.35 percent upto 01.06.2022, 12.85 percent upto
31.07.2022, 13.85 percent upto 01.12.2022 and 14.20 percent upto
01.02.2023. Faced with the alleged exorbitant charge of interest, the
appellant vide communication dated 15.05.2023 asked the Bank to
rectify its error but the Bank resorted to coercive measures and
threatened that her accounts would be declared NPAs and under
pressure, the appellant deposited ₹ 64.00 lacs on 24.06.2023. Faced
with this situation, the appellant filed a complaint with the Banking
Ombudsman, Reserve Bank of India on 30.10.2023 which was closed
as not maintainable. Thereafter, the appellant filed a consumer
complaint before the J&K Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission,
Jammu which was subsequently withdrawn with liberty to approach
appropriate forum. It is stated that pursuant to coercive tactics of the
RFA No. 42/2026
respondent-Bank, the appellant under duress deposited further amounts
of ₹ 24,40,000/- and ₹ 2,45,000/- and despite that the Bank continued
to issue overdue notices to the appellant. The appellant also served a
notice upon the respondent-Bank but without any effect and, as such,
the appellant filed the abovementioned suit.
8.
The respondent-Bank filed its response stating therein that the suit is
barred by Section 21-A of Banking Resolution Act, 1949. It was further
stated that the risk rating and the applicable rate of interest were fixed
strictly in accordance with the internal guidelines of the Bank and the
applicable MCLR issued by the RBI and the same were duly
communicated to and accepted by the appellant initially at the time of
sanction and the execution of loan documents on 12.02.2019 and
27.05.2020.Thereafter, pursuant to the appellant’s written request dated
11.08.2021 seeking restructuring of the loan accounts, the Bank
sanctioned the same vide letter dated 10.12.2021. The said letter was
duly executed by both the appellant and the guarantor, thereby
confirming their full knowledge of and consent to the revised terms. It
was further stated that internal risk rating of the borrower was
reassessed on 23.09.2021 as the previous rating was valid only up to
31.08.2021 and the said re-assessment resulted in the revision of the
rating from B1 to B3, based upon the financial parameters of the
borrower and delay in the completion of the project. The said rating and
the applicable rate of interest were clearly mentioned in the sanction
letter dated 10.12.2021 which was duly accepted by the appellant. The
RFA No. 42/2026
Bank denied that the rate of interest levied on the loan accounts of the
appellant was punitive, arbitrary or a result of any alleged illegal
restructuring or risk rating downgrade. Rather, the rate of interest
applicable to the loan accounts was floating in nature and linked with
the Banks applicable MCLR and other regulatory benchmarks,
therefore, was subject to revision from time to time in accordance with
the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India and the internal policies of
the Bank. Any variation in the interest rate occurred automatically in
accordance with the applicable benchmark lending rates and the
banking norms and not due to any arbitrary action on the part of the
Bank. The respondent-Bank admitted the issuance of communications
to the appellant regarding the payment of overdue amounts and the
appellant was requested to regularize the accounts in accordance with
the terms and conditions governing the loan. It was also stated that
through the communications, the appellant was merely informed
regarding the status of loan accounts and requirement to regularize the
overdue amount, failing which, the accounts were liable to be classified
as NPAs. The said communications by no stretch of imagination can be
construed as coercion or abuse of position as alleged by the appellant.
The respondent-Bank also submitted that the deposits made by the
appellant were voluntary towards liquidating the outstanding dues in
the loan accounts and not because of any alleged pressure or coercion
by the Bank. The respondents denied having acted in violation of the
objective of RBI Resolution Framework dated 05.05.2021. Rather, it
RFA No. 42/2026
was submitted that re-structuring of the loan facilities was undertaken
only at the request of the appellant. Precisely, the contention of the
respondent is that the operation of both the loan accounts has been
carried out strictly in accordance with sanction terms, loan agreements
and applicable banking norms and the repayments have been
appropriated in the manner as agreed to by the parties.
Appreciation
9.
Before addressing the rival contentions of the parties, it is pertinent to
observe that the grant or refusal of interim relief by a trial court is a
matter of judicial discretion. Appellate interference with such an
exercise of discretion is warranted only where it is demonstrated that
the discretion was exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or in disregard of
settled principles of law. The mere possibility of a plausible alternative
view does not constitute a valid ground to set aside an interlocutory
order, provided the view taken by the court below is reasonably
sustainable on the basis of record. In “Shruti Manav Sharma v.
Sunaina Singh”, 2026 INSC 843, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
observed as under:
“36. An order on an application for temporary injunction is
a discretionary one, and an appellate court does not
ordinarily substitute its own discretion for that of the court
of first instance, save where the discretion has been
exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or in
ignorance of the settled principles governing the grant or
refusal of such relief. The principle laid down in Wander
Ltd. &Anr. (supra) which has been approved by subsequent
decisions of this Court, has been guiding the appellate courts
in the country for decades while exercising the appellate
jurisdiction considering the correctness of the discretion and
jurisdiction for grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions.
The order of the learned Single Judge, resting as it does on
seven specific findings addressing the nature of the original
RFA No. 42/2026
plaintiff’s interest under the Will, the doubt surrounding its
finality, the plea of undue influence, and the alter-ego character
of the defendant entities, cannot be said to be arbitrary,
capricious or perverse, nor to have been passed in ignorance of
settled principle. It is, on the contrary, an order squarely
anchored in the three conditions that govern the grant of interim
injunction. The Division Bench’s substitution of its own
appreciation of the Will, of the parties’ conduct, and of the
applicability of statutory provisions bearing on the final merits,
for the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge, was
not warranted on the standard it had itself correctly recited, and
constitutes precisely the kind of interference that Wander Ltd.
&Anr. (supra) forbids.”
(emphasis added)
10.
The appellant contends that the Bank unilaterally restructured the loan
accounts in violation of the applicable RBI circular, and that the
appellant never consented to the terms and conditions of restructuring
for either of the two loan accounts mentioned above. However, a
perusal of the record reveals that the Bank initially sanctioned a term
loan of ₹4,16,84,000/- (Loan Account No. 338600SA00000022), and
subsequently granted an additional amount of ₹45,57,000/- (Loan
Account No. 338600SA00000031). Under the initial sanction letter
dated 12.02.2019, the interest rate for the former account was set at
MCLR + 0.60% (i.e., 9.15% per annum as applicable to a B1 risk
rating), subject to annual review linked to credit risk ratings as per
Circular 54 of 2018. Similarly, the loan of ₹45,57,000/- obtained on
27.05.2020 carried an interest rate of 8.65% per annum, subject to
identical terms.
11.
The record further reveals that by way of a communication dated
11.08.2021, the appellant requested the respondent-Bank for a 10-year
extension of the loan tenure. The respondent-Bank considered the
appellant's request; however, in lieu of 10-years extension, the
RFA No. 42/2026
competent authority sanctioned a restructuring of the loans vide
sanction dated 10.12.2021, extending the tenure of both term loans by
two years. The sanction letter setting forth the terms and conditions of
restructuring was duly signed by the appellant, which stipulated an
interest rate of 11.90%, as applicable to a B-3 risk-rated account.
Furthermore, the sanction contained a provision empowering the Bank
to review the re-assessed sanction limit at least semi-annually, with a
complete renewal or re-assessment required on at least an annual basis.
12.
The appellant’s plea that the loan restructuring was unilateral and nonconsensual is manifestly unsubstantiated. The restructuring was
initiated exclusively at the appellant's behest and subsequently
formalized through a sanction letter duly accepted and signed by the
appellant. The appellant cannot now be permitted to approbate and
reprobate by challenging the very restructuring terms to which she
voluntarily assented.
13.
It is a settled principle of law that the grant of an injunction is governed
by the irreducible trinity i.e. the existence of a robust prima facie case,
the balance of convenience lying in favor of the applicant, and the
manifest likelihood of suffering irreparable injury.
14.
Though a prima facie case signifies the presence of substantial
questions to be tried, the record in the instant dispute is bereft of any
material to show that the Bank unilaterally restructured the loan
accounts. The appellant, having acted upon and accepted the benefit of
the restructuring, is precluded by law from approbating and
RFA No. 42/2026
reprobating. In “M/s. New Bihar Biri Leaves Co. and others Vs.
State of Bihar and others”, AIR 1981 SUPREME COURT 679, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:
“50. It is a fundamental principle of general application
that if a person of his own accord, accepts a contract on
certain terms and works out the contract, he cannot be
allowed to adhere to and abide by some of the terms of
the contract which proved advantageous to him and
repudiate the other terms of the same contract which
might be disadvantageous to him. The maxim is qui
approbat non reprobat, (one who approbates cannot
reprobate). This principle, though originally borrowed
from Scots Law, is now firmly embodied in English
Common Law. According to it, a party to an. Instrument
or transaction cannot take advantage of one part of a
document or transaction and reject the rest, That is to say
no party can accept and reject the same instrument or
transaction.”
(emphasis added)
15.
In “R. N. Gosain Vs. Yashpal Dhir”, AIR 1993 SUPREME COURT
352, Hon’ble the Apex Court has observed as under:
“10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and
reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of
election which postulates that no party can accept and
reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say
at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain
some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the
footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is
void for the purpose of securing some other advantage".
According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 16,
"after taking an advantage under an order (for example for
the payment of costs) a party may be precluded from saying
that it is invalid and asking to set it aside".
(emphasis added)
16.
Be that as it may, the gravamen of the suit pertains to the alleged
overcharging of interest by the respondent-Bank. The monetary value
of the alleged injury is thus easily quantifiable. Once harm is
susceptible to full financial indemnification, the threshold requirement
of 'irreparable loss' fails. The appellant’s own prayer of seeking a
RFA No. 42/2026
mandamus to appropriate the excess interest charged prior to
31.08.2021 in accordance with the original sanction letter dated
12.02.2019 demonstrates that any prospective injury is purely
pecuniary in nature and fully rectifiable without injunctive relief. In
“Dalpat Kumar and another Vs. Prahlad Singh and others, AIR
1993 SUPREME COURT 276, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
has held as under:
5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence
aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is "a prima facie
case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The
existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the
enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the
grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be
confused with prima facie title which has to be established,
on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a
substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs
investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that
there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to
grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that
non-interference by the Court would result in
"irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that
there is no other remedy available to the party except one
to grant injunction and he needs protection from the
consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession.
Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there
must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but
means only that the injury must be a material one,
namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by
way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance
of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The
Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should
exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of
substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to
the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with
that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction
is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or
probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers
that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained
in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court
has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or
refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.”
(emphasis added)
RFA No. 42/2026
17.
We have examined the judgment passed by the learned trial court and
we find that the learned trial court has rightly arrived at the conclusion
that the appellant has failed to establish prima facie case for issuance of
injunction. Similarly, the learned Trial Court has rightly concluded that
any loss allegedly suffered by the appellant is capable of monetary
indemnification in the event the appellant ultimately succeeds in the
suit. The discretion exercised by the learned trial Court in refusing the
injunction cannot be said to be perverse, capricious or arbitrary in any
manner.
18.
In view of the above, the present appeal is found to be devoid of any
merit and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
(M A Chowdhary)
Judge
(Rajnesh Oswal)
Judge
JAMMU
21.08.2026
NEHA-1
Whether the order is speaking:
Whether the order is reportable:
Neha Kumari
2026.08.21 13:51
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
RFA No. 42/2026
Yes
Yes
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