Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
Reserved On
: 03/09/2026
Pronounced On : 22/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 314 of 2012
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CLARIFICATION) NO. 1 of 2022
In R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 314 of 2012
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR MODIFICATION OF ORDER) NO.
3 of 2023
In R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 314 of 2012
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
=============================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
√
No
=============================================
SHARADBHAI PREMAJI RAMI
Versus
ABHISHEK SON OF SUBHASHBHAI PREMJI BHATI & ORS.
=============================================
Appearance:
MR ANSHIN DESAI, SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MR DIPUM S
RAMI(6015) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR JINESH H KAPADIA(5601) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR MEHUL S SHAH, SENIOR ADVOCATE & MR UNMESH SHUKLA,
SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MR D K TRIVEDI(5283) for Opponent(s) No. 1
MR RASHESH SANJANWALA, SENIOR COUNSEL WITH MR PRERAK P
OZA(8279) for the Opponent(s) No. 2.1,2.2,2.3
MR DEVARSHI C SHAH(5545) for the Opponent(s) No. 3
=============================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
CAV JUDGMENT
1.
The present revision application is filed under Section
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred
to as “CPC”), challenging the order dated 12/12/2012 passed
by the 7th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural),
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
Mirzapur, in Regular Civil Suit No.215 of 2012, whereby the
Trial Court has rejected the impugned application filed below
Exhibit 13 by the petitioner herein under Order VII Rule 11 of
the CPC.
1.1
The petitioner herein is the original defendant No.1,
whereas respondent No.1 is the original plaintiff, respondent
Nos.2 and 3 are the original defendants Nos.2 and 3.
Respondents Nos.4 to 12 are newly added parties in the
revision application who appear to be subsequent purchasers
of the suit properties (hereinafter referred to as “the
subsequent purchasers”).
1.2
For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred
to as per their original positions in the suit.
SHORT FACTS OF THE CASE :
2.
The Regular Civil Suit No.215 of 2012 was instituted by
the minor Abhishek through his mother and natural guardian
seeking a declaration that the consent decree dated 25/09/1996
passed in Regular Civil Suit No.505 of 1996 whereby the suit
properties partitioned as per consent terms is void and be set
aside, as it is against the interest of the plaintiff. Consequently,
it also prayed that all transactions whatsoever like sale, gift,
lease and/or alienation of property in whatever manner
executed by the defendants be quashed and set aside. The
plaintiff also sought for the partition of the assets and to
bifurcate the share of the plaintiff by metes and bounds.
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
2.1
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
Defendants Nos.1 and 2 happen to be uncles of the
plaintiff, whereas defendant No.3 happens to be the plaintiff’s
father. No other family members joined in the suit. Since,
there is a stay of suit proceeding granted by this Court, the
subsequent
purchasers
who
bought
some
of
the
suit
properties and plaintiff’s given his nod to such transactions,
they are allowed to be joined in this revision.
2.2
The plaintiff was born on 03/04/1995 and has averred in
the plaint that as per Hindu Law, by birth, the plaintiff has a
right in the family properties, which are inherited by the
defendants
from
their father, who happens
to be his
grandfather. According to the plaintiff, a consent decree
passed on 25/09/1996 by the trial Court in Regular Civil Suit
No.505 of 1996 wherein defendants were parties to the suit
with his grandmother, entered into a compromise and
accordingly distributed the ancestral properties, which caused
serious prejudice to the interest of the plaintiff. Since the
interest of the plaintiff was not protected by entering into the
compromise between the defendants upon which the aforesaid
consent decree was passed, he, being a minor, through his
natural guardian – mother, filed the suit.
2.3
It appears from the documents annexed the plaint that
the registered partition executed between one Fuliba, wife of
Lumbaji Kaniram (great-grandmother of the plaintiff) and
Premaji Lumbaji (grandfather of the plaintiff) in relation to
joint
family
property
of
plaintiff’s
great-grandfather.
Thereafter, one another registered partition deed was also
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
executed between the grandfather, grandmother, father and
uncle of the plaintiff on 26/03/1979 in relation to the suit
properties. At that point of time, the parties to that partition
deed had agreed to divide the suit properties which was joint
family properties. Thereafter, once again an oral partition
took place between the defendants on 01/10/1990 which was
also reduced into writing in the form of a family settlement
agreement on 05/07/1993. Thus, before the birth of the
plaintiff, the suit properties were already partitioned between
the defendants and thereafter, they no longer remained HUF
properties.
2.4
It seems that one Regular Civil Suit No.505 of 1996
came to be filed by defendant No.2 along with his mother, i.e.,
the grandmother of the plaintiff, namely, Jamnaben, against
defendant No.1, defendant No.3 and one Amrutlal Premajibhai
Rami. The aforesaid suit was filed seeking a declaration and
injunction that the suit properties were not partitioned and
it’s a joint family property wherein the plaintiffs of that suit
had a right, title and interest. It appears that there was a
compromise in the form of a family settlement agreement
entered into between the parties and upon such settlement
filed in the aforesaid suit, a consent decree dated 25/09/1996
came to be passed by the Court. It may be mentioned that the
plaintiff was already born when the consent decree was
passed. After about 16 years of passing of the aforesaid
consent decree, the suit in question came to be filed by the
plaintiff challenging the consent decree and seeking partition
of the suit property by metes and bounds.
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
2.5
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
Upon entering an appearance, defendant No.1 filed an
impugned application below Exhibit 13 under Order VII Rule
11 of the CPC on 20/06/2012, contending inter alia that as per
Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC, no suit can be filed to
challenge the consent decree. It was also contended that since
there was a partition of the suit properties way back in 1979,
i.e., prior to the birth of the plaintiff, the suit properties no
longer
remained
as
HUF
properties
and
ignoring
the
provisions of law, the suit is filed at the behest of original
defendant No.3. The plaintiff appears to have filed his reply
objecting to the impugned application.
2.6
After hearing the parties, the Trial Court vide its
impugned order held that whether a consent decree can be
challenged by way of a suit is a matter of evidence, inasmuch
as which partition was legal can only be ascertained by
permitting the parties to lead evidence. According to the Trial
Court, the issues raised by the defendant No.1 in the
impugned application are triable issues and they cannot be
decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. Hence,
the Trial Court has rejected the impugned application.
3.
Heard Mr.Anshin Desai, learned Senior Counsel assisted
by Mr. Jinesh H. Kapadia and Mr. Dipum S. Rami, learned
advocates for the petitioner, Mr. Mehul Shah, learned Senior
Counsel and Mr. Unmesh Shukla, learned Senior Counsels
assisted by Mr.D.K.Trivedi, learned advocate for respondent
No.1,
Mr.Rashesh
assisted
by
Sanjanwala,
Mr.Prerak
P.
learned
Oza,
Senior
learned
Counsel
advocate
for
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
respondent Nos.2.1 to 2.3 and Ms.Trusha Patel, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.Tattvam Patel,
learned
advocate for the newly added respondents, at length.
SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONER/DEFENDANT NO.1:
4.
Mr.Anshin Desai, learned Senior Advocate assisted by
Mr.Jinesh Kapadia, learned advocate for the petitioner, would
submit that the Trial Court has committed a jurisdictional
error by rejecting the impugned application filed under Order
VII Rule 11 of the CPC by observing that the issues raised by
defendant No.1 are triable issues and the parties are required
to lead evidence to prove such issues. It is submitted that as
per the settled position of law, no suit can be filed to
challenge the consent decree.
4.1
It is submitted that there is an express bar under Order
XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC to file a suit to set aside the consent
decree. It is further submitted that when there is an express
bar under the law, the suit challenging the consent decree
requires to be rejected at the threshold. It is also submitted
that according to the plaintiff, the decree sought to be
challenged is a consent decree and in the absence of any such
dispute, the Trial Court could not have rejected the impugned
application.
4.2
Mr. Desai, learned Senior Counsel, would further submit
that as per the plain reading of the plaint, there is no right to
sue available to the plaintiff to ask for partition of the suit
properties. It is submitted that as per the plaint, the
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
defendants have inherited the suit property from their father
(grandfather of the plaintiff); in such circumstances, the suit
property inherited by the defendants from their father became
the self-acquired properties of the defendants. It is further
submitted that as per settled law, the grandson has no right to
claim any share in the property of his grandfather died
intestate when his father is alive.
4.3
Mr.Desai, learned Senior Counsel, would further submit
that the Trial Court has completely lost sight of Sections 6 and
8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, while adjudicating the
impugned
application,
which
ultimately
resulted
in
a
miscarriage of justice. It is submitted that there is no
foundational fact pleaded by the plaintiff as to how the suit
properties can be said to be ancestral properties once they
were already partitioned in the year 1979, i.e., before his
birth; in the absence of such material particulars in the
pleadings of the plaintiff, as they are necessary as per Order
VI Rule 4 of the CPC, the plaint ought to have been rejected
by the Trial Court.
4.4
Mr.Desai, learned Senior Counsel, would further submit
that the filing of the suit by the son of defendant No.3 is
nothing but an abuse of the process of law, inasmuch as
defendant No.3 was a party to the aforesaid consent decree as
well as the registered partition deed executed in the year
1979. It is also submitted that the certified copy of the
compromise purshis and the order passed thereon by the Trial
Court on 25/09/1996 in the Regular Civil Suit No.505 of 1996,
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
produced by the plaintiff, appears to have been obtained by
his father-defendant No.3. This shows that the defendant No.3
with the help of his minor son, instituted the suit.
4.5
To buttress his arguments, Mr.Desai, learned Senior
Counsel, has relied upon the following authorities:
(i)
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and
others vs. Chander Sen and others – (1986) 3
SCC 567.
(ii)
Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh and others – (2016) 4
SCC 68.
(iii) Judgment dated 16/06/2025 rendered by
Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
Nachiketa Kantibhai Patel and others vs.
Kantibhai Ishwarbhai Patel and others, being
Second Appeal No.42 of 2025.
(iv) Order dated 18/01/2016 passed by High Court
of Delhi in the case of Surender Kumar vs.
Dhani Ram, being C.S.(O.S.) No.1737 of 2012.
(v)
Order dated 20.08.2026 passed by High Court
of Rajasthan in the case of Devaram S/o.
Khetaram vs. Khetaram S/o. Chutararam and
others, being S.B. Civil First Appeal No.221 of
2026.
(vi) Order dated 12/02/2021 passed by High Court
of Delhi in the case of Master Ansh Kapoor vs.
K.B.Kapur, being C.S.(O.S.) No.3438 of 2014.
(vii) Remisetty Venkatanna and another vs. Nasyam
Jamal Saheb and others – (2023) SCC Online SC
521.
(viii) R. Rajanna vs. S.R.Venkataswamy and others –
(2014) 15 SCC 471.
(ix) Triloki Nath Singh vs. Anirudh Singh (D.) Thr.
Lrs. & Ors. - (2020) 6 SCC 629.
(x)
M/s.Surya Developers and Promoters vs. N.
Sailesh Prasad and others – (2022) 5 SCC 736.
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
(xi)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) & Ors. Vs.
Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.
- 2020 (1) GLR 586.
(xii) C.S.Ramaswamy vs. V.K.Senthil and others –
AIR 2022 SC 4724.
(xiii) Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanjibhai Bhanusali
– (2020) 7 SCC 366.
(xiv) Canara Bank vs. P. Selathal and others – (2020)
13 SCC 143.
4.6
By making the above submissions, Mr.Desai, learned
Senior Counsel, would request this Court to allow the present
revision application.
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NOS. 2.1 TO 2.3 :
5.
Mr.Sanjanwala, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by
Mr.Oza, learned advocate for respondent Nos.2.1 to 2.3
(original
defendant
Nos.2.1
to
2.3),
has
adopted
the
arguments canvassed by Mr.Desai, learned Senior Counsel as
they are supporting respondents.
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NOS. 4 TO 12 :
6.
Likewise, Ms.Trusha Patel, learned Senior Counsel with
Mr.Tattvam
Patel,
learned
advocate
appearing
for
the
respective respondents, has also adopted the arguments of
Mr.Desai, learned Senior Counsel, as they are also supporting
respondents.
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.1-ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF :
7.
Per contra, Mr.Mehul S. Shah, learned Senior Counsel
and Mr.Unmesh Shukla, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
Mr.D.K.Trivedi, learned advocate for respondent No.1 original
plaintiff,
have
opposed
the
present
revision
application, contending inter alia that considering the issues
raised by the defendant No.1 in the impugned application,
such issues cannot be gone into at the stage of Order VII Rule
11 of the CPC.
7.1
Mr. Shah, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the
Trial Court has not committed any manifest error and/or any
jurisdictional error while adjudicating the application which
was filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. It is submitted
that the suit at the instance of minor Abhishek, who happens
to be the son of defendant No.3 and nephew of defendants
Nos.1 and 2, is maintainable in law.
7.2
It is submitted that the bar against the filing of a suit to
set aside the consent decree as per Order XXIII Rule 3A of the
CPC would not apply to a third party, who is not a party to the
consent decree. It is a settled position of law that in a consent
decree in which any right of a third party has been
jeopardized, that party has a right to challenge the consent
decree by way of a suit and such suit is not hit by Order XXIII
Rule 3A of the CPC.
7.3
Mr.Shah, learned Senior Counsel, would emphasize that
as per the Full Bench decision of this Court in Sakina
Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) & Ors. (supra), which was
confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein it was held that
the bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC is not
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
applicable to a third party, whereby he can maintain the suit.
He would also submit that subsequent to the decision of the
Full Bench, the Hon'ble Apex Court in its decision in the case
of Chitralekha Builders and another vs. GIC Employees
Sonal Vihar Co-operative Housing Society Limited and
another - (2022) 19 SCC 252, also reiterated this position
of law.
7.4
Mr.Shah, learned Senior Counsel, would further submit
that as per the meaning reading of the plaint and the
documents submitted along with it, would show that the suit
properties are ancestral – joint family properties and as per
Hindu Law, the plaintiff, being the grandson of Premaji
Lumbaji, by birth having interest in it. It is submitted that
plaintiff’s grandfather received the suit property from his
father (plaintiff’s great-grandfather), the plaintiff has a direct
interest in the suit properties which could not have been
partitioned by way of a consent decree without joining the
plaintiff. It is further submitted that as per the settled position
of law, even if there was a partition effected between the
family members of an HUF which consisted of a minor, if it is
proved to be unjust and unfair and is detrimental to the
interest of the minor, in such circumstances such partition
can certainly be reopened irrespective of the length of time
when the partition took place. In support of his submission,
Mr.Shah, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the
decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ratnam
Chettiar and others vs. S.M.Kuppuswami Chettiar and
others - (1976) 1 SCC 214.
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
7.5
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
Mr.Shah, learned Senior Counsel, would also submit that
as per the settled position of law, once the plaint discloses a
cause of action, it is a question of fact which has to be
gathered on the basis of averments made in the plaint in its
entirety and such averments ought to be considered correct,
then impugned application was correctly rejected by the trial
Court. It is further submitted that so long as the plaint
discloses cause of action which requires determination by the
Court after trial, the Court cannot reject the plaint merely on
the premise that at the end of the trial the plaintiff may not
succeed in the suit. To emphasize his submission, Mr.Shah,
learned Senior Counsel, has placed reliance upon the decision
of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mayar (H.K.) Ltd.
And others vs. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V.Fortune
Express and others - (2006) 3 SCC 100.
7.6
Mr. Shah, learned Senior Counsel, would finally submit
that in totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, not
only does the plaint disclose a cause of action, but the
documents which are placed on record along with the plaint
clearly show that the suit properties are ancestral properties
and as per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, by
birth, the plaintiff, being a grandson of Premaji Lumbaji, who
inherited the suit property from his predecessor, is entitled to
have a share in the suit property and therefore, the plaintiff,
being a male member of the HUF, is entitled to have his share
and seek partition of the suit property. It is submitted that
there are disputed questions of fact and law involved in the
matter and considering all such aspects, the Trial Court has
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
correctly rejected the impugned application.
7.7
Making the above submissions, learned Senior Counsels
appearing for the plaintiff, would request this Court to dismiss
this revision application.
8.
No other or further submissions have been advanced by
the learned advocates for the respective parties.
ANALYSIS & REASONS:
9.
The facts which are enumerated at the outset are not in
dispute. The plaintiff happens to be the son of original
defendant No.3 and nephew of defendants Nos.1 and 2. As per
the plaint, the family properties - suit properties are ancestral
immovable properties inherited by the defendants from
plaintiff’s grandfather, i.e., Premaji Lumbaji. Premji Lumbaji,
plaintiff’s grandfather died in the year 1981 and prior thereto,
there was a registered partition deed executed by him with
his legal heirs, i.e., the defendants as well as his wife
(grandmother of the plaintiff) in relation to the suit properties.
Nonetheless, the Regular Civil Suit No.505 of 1996 came to be
filed by the original defendant No.2 with the grandmother of
the plaintiff against the rest of the defendants and one uncle
of the plaintiff, namely Amrutlal Premaji Rami, seeking a
declaration and injunction qua the suit properties.
9.1
There was a compromise entered into between the
parties which was accepted by the Trial Court, whereby the
consent decree dated 25/09/1996 came to be passed. There
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
appears to be a family settlement/partition agreement in the
presence of arbitrator between the parties to that suit, which
was referred to in the compromise purshis submitted before
the Court and upon which the aforesaid consent decree came
to be passed.
It is not in dispute that when the consent
decree was passed, the plaintiff was already born on
03/04/1995 and he was not joined in that suit. After about 16
years from the passing of the aforesaid consent decree, the
plaintiff, who happens to be the minor son of defendant No.3,
through his mother instituted Civil Suit No.215 of 2012 in
question wherein he sought the following reliefs:
“(A) To declare consent Decree dated 25/9/1996
passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 505 of 1996 on the
basis of partition of properties as per consent terms,
as void and be set aside being against interest of
plaintiff and further be pleased to quash and set aside
all consequential transaction whatsoever like Sale, of
Gift, Lease and/or alienation of properties in whatever
manner.
(B) Cost of this suit be granted.
(C) The Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass appropriate
order for just and proper partition of the assets and
bifurcate share of the plaintiff by meant and bound.”
9.2
Thus, by way of the suit in question, the plaintiff sought
to challenge the consent decree dated 25/09/1996 passed by
the Civil Court in Regular Civil Suit No.505 of 1996 and also
sought partition of the suit properties by metes and bounds.
9.3
Defendant No.1 filed the impugned application under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC which came to be rejected by
the Trial Court vide its impugned order dated 12/12/2012
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
mainly on the ground that the issues raised by defendant No.1
in the impugned application require evidence and since there
are triable issues involved, the plaint cannot be rejected.
10.
Having heard the learned Senior Counsels for the
respective parties and from a perusal of the record and the
impugned order, prima facie, the plaint is questioned by the
defendants broadly on the following two issues:
(i)
The prayer made in para - 13 (A) in the plaint is barred
by Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC, as a suit challenging
a consent decree is not maintainable; and
(ii) No right to sue accrued in favour of the plaintiff to seek
partition of the suit properties, as they no longer
remained HUF property once there was partitioned of
the properties in the year 1979 and from the reading of
the plaint, the plaintiff has not specifically pleaded a
case as to how the suit properties are ancestral – joint
family properties.
11.
Since these two essential issues have raised by the
defendants in the impugned application, this Court deems it
appropriate to examine the same in light of the settled
principles of law, as follows.
12.
So far first issue is concerned, there is an express bar
under the law as regards filing a suit to challenge the consent
decree. Such bar is as per Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC,
which reads thus:
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
"3A. Bar to suit.—No suit shall lie to set aside a decree
on the ground that the compromise on which the decree
is passed was not lawful."
12.1 A plain reading of the aforesaid provision of the CPC
clearly suggests that no suit is maintainable which questions
the consent decree. It is evident from its bare reading that it
would apply to any suit which questions the consent decree. It
is nowhere stated in Rule 3A that a suit is barred challenging
the consent decree at the instance of parties to the consent
decree, otherwise not. Prima facie, the aforesaid provision of
law would preclude any party, including a third party who was
not a party to the consent decree, to maintain the suit. The
aforesaid provision is party agnostic. This would not mean
that such an affected third party cannot challenge the consent
decree, but the modes and recourse are provided under the
CPC itself to that third party who can challenge the consent
decree. Such modes are already mentioned by the Full Bench
of this Court in the case of Sakina Sultanali Sunesara
(Momin) (supra), wherein it was held thus:
“40. The upshot of the above may be summed up as
under:*** *** ***
(vii) If the aggrieved party was not the party to the
suit, the remedy available to him to challenge the
decree passed by the Court on the basis of
compromise between the parties to the suit (consent
decree), would be to file an appeal under Section
96(1) of CPC, with the leave of the appellate Court, or
to file a review application before the Court, which
passed the decree, as may be permissible under
Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC. …”
(emphasis supplied)
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
12.2 Yet, Mr.Shah, learned Senior Counsel, during the course
of his arguments, would draw my attention of para-30 of the
very Full Bench decision wherein it was observed thus:
“30. Still there could be one more situation, where the
third party who was not the party to suit or the party
to the compromise but had an interest in the subject
matter of the compromise, is aggrieved by the decree
passed by the Court under Order XXIII, Rule 3 on the
basis of the compromise arrived at between the
parties to the suit. So what remedy would be available
to him ? It cannot be gainsaid that the decree based
on the compromise between the parties under Order
XXIII, Rule 3, if remains unchallenged would be a
"consent decree" binding to the parties to suit.
However, when the person aggrieved is third party
who was neither a party to the suit nor a party to the
compromise on the basis of which the decree was
passed by the Court in the suit, would not be bound
by such decree. Such a decree could not be said to be
a "consent decree" qua such third party, and
therefore, neither the bar contained in Section 96(3)
nor the bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII would be
application to him. Such an aggrieved party, with the
leave of the Court can always file an appeal under
Section 96(1) against the decree passed by the Court
on the basis of the compromise, and can contest the
decree on the ground that the compromise should, or
should not have been recorded by the Court in view of
Rule 1A(2) of Order XLIII of CPC. When the third party
is vitally and adversely affected by the decree passed
by the Court under Order XXIII, Rule 3 on the basis of
the compromise arrived at between the parties to the
suit on the subject matter or otherwise of the suit, he
can certainly, with the leave of the appellate Court,
prefer an appeal and can contest such a decree
passed under Order XXIII, Rule 3. One of the grounds
to contest the decree could be that such a
compromise should or should not have been recorded
by the Court.”
(emphasis supplied)
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
12.3
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
It is true that in the aforesaid para, the Full Bench in
Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) (supra), has observed
that the third party is not bound by such decree and such a
decree could not be said to be a consent decree qua such
third party and therefore neither the bar contained in Section
96(3) nor the bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII would be
applicable to him. But at the same time, while referring the
recourse available to such third party, was also very much
observed in the said para-30 itself, and finally summarized in
para 40 (vii), referred to hereinabove. Had it been the case
that a suit is maintainable at the instance of a third party to
challenge the consent decree, the Full Bench would have
certainly observed in this regard.
13.
Nonetheless, the decision of a Division Bench and/or a
Full Bench of this Court is binding to me and no contrary view
can be taken by this Court unless the Hon’ble Apex Court held
otherwise. Since it has been observed in Sakina Sultanali
Sunesara (Momin) (supra) that a consent decree is not
binding to the third party and the bar of Rule 3A of Order
XXIII would not be applicable to the third party, the question
would arise as to whether such a third party can maintain the
suit challenging the consent decree.
13.1 Mr.Desai, learned Senior Counsel, during the course of
his submissions, has placed strong reliance upon the decision
of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Triloki Nath Singh
(supra), which in my view, sufficiently clarified the issue and
provides a direct answer to the submissions advanced by
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
Mr.Shah, learned Senior Counsel. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
Triloki Nath Singh (supra) in terms held that the consent
decree cannot be challenged by a stranger to the proceedings
by way of a separate suit. The pertinent observations of the
Hon'ble Apex Court made in this regard read as follows:
“1. The question arises in the appeal for our
consideration is as to whether the decree passed on a
compromise can be challenged by the stranger to the
proceedings in a separate suit.
*** *** ***
18. Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of
all adjudicating forums. Thus, creation of further
litigation should never be the basis of a compromise
between the parties. Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC put a
specific bar that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree
on the ground that the compromise on which the
decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order
23 Rule 3 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and
permit parties to amicably come to a settlement
which is lawful, is in writing and a voluntary act on the
part of the parties. The Court can be instrumental in
having an agreed compromise effected and finality
attached to the same. The Court should never be
party to imposition of a compromise upon an unwilling
party, still open to be questioned on an application
under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC before
the Court.
*** *** ***
20. Thus, after the amendment which has been
introduced, neither any appeal against the order
recording the compromise nor remedy by way of filing
a suit is available in cases covered by Rule 3A of
Order 23 CPC. As such, a right has been given under
Rule 1A(2) of Order 43 to a party, who denies the
compromise and invites order of the Court in that
regard in terms of proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC
while preferring an appeal against the decree. Section
96(3) CPC shall not be a bar to such an appeal,
because it is applicable where the factum of
compromise or agreement is not in dispute.
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
*** *** ***
23. In other words, the appellant can only claim
through his predecessor Sampatiya, to the extent of
rights and remedies available to Sampatiya in
reference to the compromise decree. Merely because
the appellant was not party to the compromise decree
in the facts of the present case, will be of no avail to
the appellant, much less give him a cause of action to
question the validity of the compromise decree
passed by the High Court by way of a substantive suit
before the civil Court to declare it as fraudulent, illegal
and not binding on him. Assuming, he could agitate
about the validity of the compromise entered into by
the parties to the partition suit, it is only the High
Court, who had accepted the compromise and passed
decree on that basis, could examine the same and no
other Court under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC. It
must, therefore, follow that the suit instituted before
the civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable
in view of specific bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC
as held in the impugned judgment.“
(emphasis supplied)
14.
As far as the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Chitralekha Builders and another (supra) is
concerned, the issue before the Hon'ble Apex Court was not
as similar as in the present case. In the case of Chitralekha
Builders and another (supra), the challenge was to the
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dismissing
the appeal of the appellants who challenged the consent
decree. The High Court appears to have noticed that the
consent decree is not binding on the appellants who were not
a party to the consent terms and the compromise decree
cannot be set aside at the instance of the appellants who
sought restoration of the suit. Since one of the appellants
(appellant No.2) had already filed the suit, seeking various
reliefs including the relief to set aside the consent decree, it
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
has been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the legal
effect of such consent decree is open to be examined in the
substantive suit filed by the appellant on its own merits in
accordance with law, thereby it had not disturbed the
judgment of the High Court.
14.1 Thus, in Chitralekha Builders and another (supra), it
was not an issue before the Hon'ble Court as to whether a
substantive
suit
filed
by
a
non-party
(stranger)
to
a
compromise decree challenging the compromise decree was
maintainable or not.
15.
There is no cavil that the compromise decree to which
the plaintiff was not a party, would not bind him in any
manner. At the same time, the issue needs to be examined by
the Court as to whether a non-party to the consent decree can
challenge such decree by way of a separate suit. According to
me, at best the non-party to a consent decree can always seek
a declaration by way of a substantive suit, that such consent
decree is not binding to him, as there is no such bar under
Rule 3A of Order XXIII of CPC.
16.
Apart from the aforesaid decisions, even in following
decisions as well, the Hon'ble Apex Court has again clarified
such position of law.
16.1 In the case of Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi and
another
vs.
Gurusiddappa
Tirakappa
Malagi
(Dead
through Lrs) - 2025 SCC OnLine SC 835, in a similar set of
facts, it has been held that the compromise decree cannot be
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
challenged by way of a suit. The facts of that case also
suggest that the plaintiff who challenged the compromise
decree by way of a suit was not a party to the suit wherein the
compromise decree was passed. The relevant facts and
observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
supra read thus:
“2. The present appeal arises out of pure civil
proceedings initiated at the hands of the present
appellants in the year 2003. The appellants filed a suit
for declaring a compromise decree entered into
between the respondents (defendants) as null and
void, and not binding on the appellants. Additionally,
the appellants also sought partition of a certain share
in the ancestral property, which was in the possession
of the defendants. The trial court dismissed the suit of
the appellants vide order dated 02.03.2007.
Thereafter, the appellants filed the first appeal before
the High Court, which has also been dismissed by the
impugned order dated 23.09.2022.
3. Since the present matter concerns various suits, we
would like to state the facts of the matter in short and
the same are as follows:
*** *** ***
(d) From here, the main dispute arises. In 2003, the
appellants filed the present suit (No.1/2003) seeking a
declaration that the compromise decree dated
18.01.2000 is null and void as, according to the
appellants, the 7 acres of land was their father’s
property and not the ancestral property. Thus, the
appellants’ claim that they are entitled to half of the 7
acres of land (hereinafter referred to as ‘suit
property’). This is the suit with which we are dealing
in the present appeal. This suit of the appellants was
dismissed by the Trial Court, and then the first appeal
filed by the appellants has also been dismissed by the
High Court vide the impugned order dated
23.09.2022. Now, appellants are before us.
*** *** ***
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
11. Also, a compromise decree cannot be challenged
by filing a fresh suit as there is a bar on filing a fresh
suit challenging the consent decree on the ground of
the legality of the compromise under Order 23 Rule
3A of CPC, which reads as follows:
“3-A. Bar to suit.— No suit shall lie to set aside a
decree on the ground that the compromise on
which the decree is based was not lawful.”
12. The only remedy against a compromise decree is
to file a recall application. This Court in Pushpa Devi
Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566
summed up the position of law as follows:
“17. The position that emerges from the amended
provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent
decree having regard to the specific bar contained
in Section 96(3) CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of
the court recording the compromise (or refusing to
record a compromise) in view of the deletion of
clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting
aside a compromise decree on the ground that the
compromise was not lawful in view of the bar
contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and
is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the
court which passed the consent decree, by an order
on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order
23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party
to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree,
is to approach the court which recorded the
compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and
establish that there was no compromise. In that
event, the court which recorded the compromise
will itself consider and decide the question as to
whether there was a valid compromise or not. This
is so because a consent decree is nothing but
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
contract between parties superimposed with the
seal of approval of the court. The validity of a
consent decree depends wholly on the validity of
the agreement or compromise on which it is
made…”
(Emphasis Provided)
Thus, even if we accept the contention of the
appellants that their father was coerced by his
brothers and father (appellants’ grandfather) to
enter into a compromise, which led to the passing
of the consent decree, a fresh suit is still not a valid
remedy. In that situation, the appellants’ father
should have filed a recall application before the
Court that had passed the decree. The appellants’
father has never done so! Moreover, he had
admitted the consent decree and never questioned
its validity.”
(emphasis supplied)
16.2
In the case of Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors.
v. Srimanth Chhatrapati Udyan Raje Pratasinh Maharaj
Bhonsle and another - 2024 15 SCC 675, in paragraph
No.39, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under :
"39. Admittedly the plaintiff is a stranger to the suits
which ended in compromise. Therefore, in view of the
direct bar under Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC, he cannot
seek a declaration "that the compromise decrees
passed in Special Civil Suits Nos. 152 of 1951 and
1622 of 1988 and Civil Appeal No. 787 of 2001, Pune
are void ab initio, null and void and the same are
liable to be set aside". The law on this point is also
already settled by this Court in Triloki Nath Singh v.
Anirudh Singh. The bar under Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC is
applicable to third parties as well and the only remedy
available to them would be to approach the same
court. In the present case, such an exercise is also not
possible in view of the bar of limitation. Hence, we
find the suit to be unsustainable."
(Emphasis supplied)
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
17.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
According to me, in view of the above referred decisions
of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Triloki Nath Singh
(supra), Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi (supra), and Shri
Mukund Bhavan Trust (supra), it is by now well settled
that a person who is a stranger to the consent decree cannot
maintain a separate suit challenging such decree. When there
is an express bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII of the CPC to
maintain a suit to set aside the consent decree, the plaint in
question challenging the consent decree dated 25/09/1996 is
required to be rejected being barred by law, i.e., Order XXIII
Rule 3A of CPC.
18.
So far as the second issue is concerned, it was a case of
the plaintiff that, being a grandson of Premaji Rami, he has a
birth right in the family properties inherited by the defendants
from his grandfather, i.e., Premaji Rami. It is so stated in the
plaint that the plaintiff’s grandfather died on 21/05/1981 and
the defendants, being his sons, inherited his properties. At
none of the places in the plaint, the plaintiff averred that the
suit properties are coparcenary properties. Even after a
meaningful reading of the entire plaint, what is deduced is
that the suit properties were owned by the grandfather of the
plaintiff and upon his death on 21/05/1981, such properties
were inherited by his sons including plaintiff’s father, i.e., the
defendants. If such would be the pleading of the plaint, the
plaintiff cannot claim any right by birth in the property of his
grandfather who died after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
(herein after referred as “the Act, 1956”) came into force.
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
19.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
This issue is no longer remain res integra, having been
decided
by
the
Hon'ble
Apex
Court
in
the
case
of
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur (supra), followed in
Yudhishter vs. Ashok Kumar - 1987 (1) SCC 204 and so
on. This issue and position of law has been discussed in detail
by this Court in the case of Nachiketa Kantibhai (supra)
wherein it has been categorically held that after the year
1956, upon inheritance, the property in the hands of a son
retains the nature and character of individual property and
not as an ancestral property of the grandson in the hands of
the son. Therefore, there is no acquisition of right by birth in
the properties which were not coparcenary properties. This is
in view of Section 8 of the 1956 Act, where interest now
devolves by succession and not survivorship. Ultimately, this
Court held thus:
“32. However, this connotation "ancestral property" is
often misunderstood in the post 1956 era. Of course,
according to the pre-codified Mitakshara law, son
would inhere a right in the property by birth (due to
creation of coparcenary). However, after 1956, merely
because a property is ancestral, would give birth to no
right title or interest of any person in the said
property. That is to say, merely because a property is
ancestral, the son, grandson or great grandson (or
daughters, respectively) would acquire no right over
the same.
33. Only if a property (naturally, being ancestral) has
the character of a coparcenary property, is such right
created by operation of law. That right as created
before 1956, is also preserved by way of Section 6
and continues as such post enactment of the HSA
1956.
*** *** ***
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
47. Therefore, a conjoint reading of the provisions of
law along with the judgments laid down by the
Hon'ble Court would show without a shred of doubt
that before commencement of the 1956 Act if a
property had been impressed with the character of a
coparcenary property it remained the same and it
would devolve as per Section 6 of the Act. However, if
the property was not a coparcenary property before
commencement of the 1956 Act and succession
opened after 1956 Act of a self-acquired property, it
would be transferred only as an individual property
and no coparcenary would be created thereafter of
such property.”
(emphasis supplied)
20.
So far as the case at hand is concerned, upon a bare
reading of the plaint, it is very much clear that the plaintiff is
asserting his right to the properties of his grandfather which
were inherited by the defendants including his father upon
the death of the grandfather on 21/05/1981 and in such a
factual scenario, the properties which were inherited by his
father, defendant No.3, along with his brothers, defendant
Nos.1 and 2, became their self-acquired properties. In such
circumstances,
the
family
arrangement
and/or
consent
partition deed executed between the defendants and their
mother, which appears to have been recorded in Regular Civil
Suit No. 505 of 1996 and culminated into a consent decree,
the plaintiff cannot have a right to claim anything in the said
properties which, according to the plaintiff, were inherited by
the defendants from their father who happens to be the
grandfather of the plaintiff.
21.
Thus, when the plaintiff has no right to claim any share
in such properties inherited by the defendants including his
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
father from their father (plaintiff’s grandfather), no right to
sue accrued in favour of the plaintiff to claim any relief for
partition of such suit properties. Consequently, the plaint does
not disclose any cause of action, inasmuch as no suit can be
maintained by the plaintiff to claim relief as prayed in para
13(C), meaning thereby that the plaintiff cannot seek partition
of the suit properties.
22.
Since Mr. Shah, learned Senior Counsel, has during the
course
of
his
submissions
emphasized
the
documents
submitted along with plaint and contended that the suit
properties are joint family-HUF properties, this Court, having
scrupulously gone through the plaint, finds that there is an
absence of specific pleading that suit properties are joint
family properties, in such factual scenario, any number of
documents produced by the plaintiff with plaint would not
help him from rejection of the plaint. It is a settled position of
law that foundational facts must be stated in the plaint to
maintain the claim. No evidence can be led in the absence of
pleadings. It is also a settled position of law that a party
cannot lead evidence contrary to pleadings and in the absence
of pleadings, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot
be considered. Therefore, in the absence of specific pleadings
of the plaintiff that the suit properties are coparcenary
properties or Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) properties, the
plaintiff cannot place reliance upon the registered partition
deed dated 26/03/1979 and other family arrangement deeds
submitted with the plaint.
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
22.1 Even though, the plaintiff has placed reliance upon the
registered partition deed dated 26/03/1979, family settlement
dated 05/07/1993 as well as the mutual family partition deed
forming part of the consent pursis dated 25/09/1996 to
maintain his claim that he is entitled to have a share in the
suit properties which are the subject matter of that suit and
accordingly sought partition, but as observed above, in the
absence of any material particulars to show how such
properties
can
be
considered
as
HUF
or
coparcenary
properties, this Court cannot assume that such properties are
HUF or coparcenary properties.
23.
At this stage, it would be apposite to observe that as per
settled law, there cannot be any presumption that a property
belongs to an HUF or coparceners without there being any
material pleading. In the absence of any material particulars
and foundational facts stated by the plaintiff in the plaint in
regard to how the suit properties can be considered as
coparcenary or HUF, as the case may be, a mere submission
in this regard would not save the plaint which lacks material
pleadings.
23.1
At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to
relevant paragraphs of the judgment in the case of Nachiketa
(supra) wherein such an aspect has been lucidly considered,
which read thus :
“15. It is well settled that section 8 of the Act provides
for the general rules of succession for a Hindu male
who has died intestate. Whereas, section 6 of the said
Act is an exception to the same in case of a
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
coparcenary property. Therefore, unless and until
there is a clear pleading, proof and consequential
finding of fact that the property in question is a
coparcenary property, the question of application of
Section 6 does not arise. In such an event, the general
clause, i.e., Section 8 of the Act will come into play
and govern the succession.
*** *** ***
57. Therefore, it is clear that unless and until there is
a nucleus which has been used for purchase of the
property, every property cannot be termed to be a
property of the HUF merely because the same exists.
Therefore, in absence of such presumption, it is
necessary that exact pleadings with material
particulars must be averred in the Plaint (or
respective pleading) for a property to be construed as
a joint family or ancestral property.
58. This can be examined from one more angle. Order
VI Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (“CPC”)
provides that all material particulars are required to
be given in a Plaint. In fact, Courts have also held that
averment of the nature of property cannot be averred
as a mere mantra.
59. In Surendra Kumar v. Dhani Ram, (2016) 227 DLT
217, the Delhi High Court has held as follows:
“I would like to further note that it is not enough
to aver a mantra, so to say, in the plaint simply
that a joint Hindu family or HUF exists. Detailed
facts as required by Order 6 Rule 4, CPC as to
when and how the HUF properties have become
HUF properties must be clearly and categorically
averred. Such averments have to be made by
factual references qua each property claimed to
be an HUF property as to how the same is an HUF
property, and, in law generally bringing in any
and every property as HUF property is incorrect
as there is known tendency of litigants to include
unnecessarily many properties as HUF properties,
and which is done for less than honest motives.
Whereas prior to passing of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 there was a presumption as to the
existence of an HUF and its properties, but after
passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
view of the ratios of the judgments of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Chander Sen
(supra) and Yudhister (supra), there is no such
presumption that inheritance of ancestral
property creates an HUF, and therefore, in such a
post 1956 scenario a mere ipse dixit statement in
the plaint that an HUF and its properties exist is
not a sufficient compliance of the legal
requirement of creation or existence of HUF
properties inasmuch as it is necessary for
existence of an HUF and its properties that it
must be specifically, stated that as to whether
the HUF came into existence before 1956 or after
1956 and if so how and in what manner giving all
requisite factual details. It is only in such
circumstances
where
specific
facts
are
mentioned to clearly plead a cause of action of
existence of an HUF and its properties, can a suit
then be filed and maintained by a person
claiming to be a coparcener for partition of the
HUF properties.”
60. This principle is all the more important to be
followed in view of the fact that post 1956, in absence
of an existing coparcenary or property thereof,
succession will be governed by Section 8 of the Act.
Therefore, a party is obligated to give detailed
material particulars and averments regarding the
nature, existence, manner and mode of inheritance,
etc. In absence of these material pleadings and
particulars, there cannot be a presumption in vacuum.
In the present case, assuming there is an averment
that the property belonged to joint family, the same
cannot be made in abstract and bereft of material
particulars. Therefore, the statement cannot be a
mere ipse dixit.”
(Emphasis supplied)
24.
Once, it is clear from a reading of the plaint that the
plaintiff failed to plead that the suit properties are HUF or
coparcenary properties, it is a fallacy on the part of the
plaintiff to claim any share in the suit properties which,
otherwise according to the plaintiff, were inherited by the
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
defendants including his father from their father (plaintiff’s
grandfather). According to my considered view, as per the
settled position of law discussed supra, the plaint does not
disclose any cause of action inasmuch as no right to sue
accrued in favour of the plaintiff to claim any partition of the
suit properties. If such would be the position, the Trial Court
has committed a jurisdictional error in rejecting the impugned
application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. In that
view of the matter, the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Ratnam Chettiar and others (supra), upon which reliance
was placed by Mr.Shah, learned Senior Counsel, would not
come to the rescue of the plaintiff to save the plaint.
25.
Apart from above, it is an undisputed fact that the
plaintiff was born on 03/04/1995, much after the death of the
grandfather, i.e., on 21/05/1981 and prior thereto, there was a
registered
partition
deed
executed
by
the
plaintiff’s
grandfather with the defendants and his wife on 26/03/1979,
whereby the HUF properties of the family were divided
between the grandfather and defendants. Thereafter, once
again an oral partition appears to have taken place between
the defendants on 01/10/1990 which was also reduced into
writing in the form of a family settlement agreement on
05/07/1993. Thus, before the birth of the plaintiff, the suit
properties were already partitioned between the defendants
and thereafter, they no longer remained HUF properties.
25.1
It would be apt to refer to the recent past decision of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Angadi Chandranna
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
Vs. Shankar and Others - 2025 SCC OnLine SC 877,
wherein observed thus:
“17. It cannot be disputed that the properties divided
among Defendant No. 1 and his brothers through
partition deed dated 09.05.1986, are joint family
properties. However, as per Hindu law, after
partition, each party gets a separate and
distinct share and this share becomes their
self-acquired property and they have absolute
rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or
bequeath it as they wish. Accordingly, the
properties
bequeathed
through
partition,
become the self-acquired properties of the
respective sharers.”
(Emphasis supplied)
25.2
It may be true that despite such partition, the
grandmother and the original defendant No.2 filed Regular
Civil Suit No.505 of 1996 wherein the aforesaid consent
decree was passed upon the strength of the consent pursis
filed, as there was a mutual partition deed executed by the
parties to that suit. Once the defendant No.3 (plaintiff’s
father) received any joint family properties by virtue of
aforesaid partition which took place prior to the birth of the
plaintiff, such properties in hands of the defendant No.3
became his self-acquired properties and he was free to enter
into any compromise with his brothers/mother.
26.
Thus, after having examined the second issue from all
angles, I am of the considered view that neither plaintiff can
claim partition of the suit properties nor does the plaint
disclose a cause of action.
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
CONCLUSION:
27.
In view of the foregoing observations, discussions and
reasons, the following are the conclusions.
27.1 No third party to the consent decree can challenge such
a decree by way of a separate suit, as it is barred by Order
XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC. The remedy available to the
aggrieved third party to the consent decree is to approach the
very Court which passed the consent decree or he can file an
appeal u/s 96(1) of the CPC by way of leave to appeal to the
higher Court [See : Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) &
Ors. (supra), Para 40(vii)].
27.2
Even though the plaintiff was not a party to the consent
decree dated 25/09/1996 passed by the Civil Court concerned
in Regular Civil Suit No.505 of 1996, in view of the settled
position of law, he cannot challenge the consent decree by
way of a suit, as it is barred by law.
27.3
Since the plaint lacks foundational facts and material
particulars regarding nature of the suit properties, the Court
cannot presume these properties are coparcenary or HUF
properties, as the case may be. Rather, as per plaint, the suit
properties inherited by the defendants from their father who
happens to be plaintiff’s grandfather, i.e., Premaji Rami, who
died on 21/05/1981, then as per Section 8 of the Act, 1956,
the defendants have inherited such properties as their selfacquired, wherein the plaintiff being grandson has no right,
title and interest, especially when plaintiff’s father, i.e.,
defendant No.3 is alive.
C/CRA/314/2012(GJHC240387552012)
27.4
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 22/09/2026
In view of above, the plaintiff has no right to sue the
defendants and sought for the partition of the suit properties.
As such, the plaint does not disclose any cause of action; suit
is barred by law. In such case, the plaint needs to be rejected.
28.
In view of the foregoing conclusions, the impugned order
dated 12/12/2012 passed by the 7th Additional Senior Civil
Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, below Exhibit 13 in
Regular Civil Suit No.215 of 2012, is quashed and set aside.
Accordingly, the impugned application filed under Order VII
Rule 11 of the CPC by defendant No.1 below Exhibit 13 in the
aforesaid Regular Civil Suit is hereby allowed. Consequently,
the plaint in question is hereby rejected.
29.
Thus, the present Civil Revision Application is allowed.
Consequently, the connected Civil Applications are disposed
of. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs.
(MAULIK J. SHELAT, J)
GAURAV J THAKER
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review