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R/CR.A/2055/2012
(GJHC240443222012)
JUDGMENT DATED: 04/11/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2055 of 2012
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE S.V. PINTO: Sd/==========================================================
Approved for Reporting
No
==========================================================
STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
PRAVINBHAI BADABHAI MANAT
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR. KRUTIK PARIKH, APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR P P MAJMUDAR(5284) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE S.V. PINTO
Date : 04/11/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
1.
The appeal is filed by the appellant State under
Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against
the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Sabarkantha Camp at Modasa
(hereinafter referred to as “the learned Trial Court”) in
Sessions Case No. 75/2011 on 10.07.2012, whereby, the
learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondent for the
offence punishable under Sections 306 and 498(A) of Indian
Penal Code, 1860.
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1.1
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The respondent is hereinafter referred to as “the
accused” as he stood in the original case for the sake of
convenience, clarity and brevity.
2.
The brief facts that emerge from the record of the case
are as under:
2.1
The accused was married to Arunaben, the sister of
the complainant, Bachubhai Lalubhai Bhagora. It is the
case of the prosecution that the accused used to subject
Arunaben to mental and physical harassment and did not
give her money to run the household. Fed up with the
harassment, she committed suicide by hanging at about
18:00 hours on 18.05.2011. The complainant lodged a
complaint at Isari Police Station, which was registered for
the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 306 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 at I – C.R. No. 5/2011.
2.2
The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of
the
connected
witnesses
and
seized
the
necessary
documents and after completion of investigation, a chargesheet came to be filed before the Court of the Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Meghraj and as the said offences
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against the accused were exclusively triable by the Court of
Sessions, the case was committed to the Sessions Court,
Banaskantha as per the provisions of Section 209 of Code of
Criminal Procedure and the case was registered as Sessions
Case No. 75/2011.
2.3
The accused was duly served with the summons and
the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court and it
was verified whether the copies of all the police papers were
provided to the accused as per the provisions of Section 207
of the Code. A charge at Exh. 3 was framed against the
accused and the statement of the accused was recorded at
Exh. 4, wherein, the accused denied the contents of the
charge and the entire evidence of the prosecution was taken
on record.
2.4
The prosecution examined 9 witnesses and produced
12 documentary evidences on record in support of their
case and after the learned Additional Public Prosecutor filed
the closing pursis, the further statement of the accused
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
was recorded. After the arguments of the learned Additional
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Public Prosecutor and the learned advocate for the accused
were heard, the learned Trial Court by the impugned
judgement and order was pleased to acquit the accused
from the charges levelled against him.
3.
Being
aggrieved
and
dissatisfied
with
the
said
judgment and order of acquittal, the appellant - State has
filed the present appeal mainly stating that the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial
Court is contrary to law and evidence on record and the
learned Trial Court has not appreciated the fact that all the
witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and
during the cross-examination, nothing adverse has been
elicited in favor of the respondent. The case has been proved
beyond
reasonable
doubt
and
the
prosecution
has
successfully established the case against the respondent
and the judgment and order of acquittal is unwarranted,
illegal, and without any basis in the eyes of the law and the
reasons
stated
while
acquitting
the
respondent
are
improper, perverse and bad in law. Hence the impugned
judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court
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deserves to be quashed and set aside.
4.
Heard learned APP Mr. Krutik Parikh for the appellant
State and learned advocate Ms. Hastee Doshi for learned
advocate Mr. P.P. Majmudar for the respondent. Perused the
impugned judgement and order of acquittal and have
reappreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on
record of the case.
5.
Learned APP Mr. Krutik Parikh has taken this Court
through the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of
the case and submitted that the complainant has fully
supported the facts of his complaint. The impugned
judgement and order is perverse and learned APP has urged
this Court to quash and set aside the same and find the
respondent guilty for the offences.
6.
Learned advocate Ms. Hastee Doshi
for learned
advocate Mr. P.P. Majmudar for the respondent submitted
that the impugned judgment of acquittal is legal, just and
proper and suffers from no perversity. Learned advocate
submits that to attract Section 498A IPC, the prosecution
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must prove continuous and systematic harassment, but the
allegations in the FIR were sudden, were made after delay
with material omissions and improvements, rested only on
interested witnesses, and were not corroborated by any
independent neighbour. Learned advocate further submits
that for an offence under Section 306 read with Section 107
IPC, active mens rea in the form of instigation, conspiracy
or intentional aid must be proved and that the prosecution
failed to prove any proximate act of the accused which left
the deceased with no option but to end her life. Learned
advocate further submits that the deceased had delivered a
child only six days before the incident and was reportedly
not eating properly, which, according to him, suggests that
the incident was an uninstigated tragic suicide. Learned
advocate further submits that the accused enjoys a double
presumption of innocence, strengthened by the acquittal,
and that the Trial Court’s well-reasoned judgment, based
on a careful appreciation of the omissions in the witnesses’
testimony
and
the
non-examination
of
independent
witnesses, should not be interfered with merely because a
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second view is possible and has therefore prayed that the
appeal be dismissed.
7.
At the outset, before discussing the facts of the
present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the
observations of the Apex Court regarding the scope of
interference in acquittal appeals in the case of Mohan alias
Srinivas alias Seens Alias Tailor Vs. State of Karnataka
reported in (2022) 12 SCC 619, wherein, the Apex Court in
para 23 has observed as under:
23.This court, time and again has laid down the law on the scope of
inquiry by an Appellate court while dealing with an appeal against
acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. We do not wish to multiply the
aforesaid principle except placing reliance on a recent decision of this
court in Anwar Ali and Anr. v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, (2020) 10
SCC 166:
14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to
be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20
of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: (Babu case
[Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri)
1179])
“20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to
be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring
or excluding relevant material or by taking into
consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding
may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight
of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic
as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.(Vide Rajinder
Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. H.B. Gandhi, Excise &
Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath &
Sons, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, Gaya Din v.
Hanuman Prasad, Aruvelu and Gamini Bala Koteswara
Rao v. State of A.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of
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A.P.,”
It is further observed, after following the decision of this
Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. Of Police, that if a decision is
arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable
evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order
would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which
is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions
would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be
interfered with.
14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh, this Court
again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC
and the interference by the High Court [State of Karnataka v.
Vijay Mohan Singh in an appeal against acquittal. This Court
considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952
onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under:
“31. An identical question came to be considered before this
Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v.
State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228: 1978 SCC (Cri) 108]. In
the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the
order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on
reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However,
the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not
consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while
acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High
Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under:
‘10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the
order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to
reappreciate the entire evidence independently and
come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court
would give due importance to the opinion of the
Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper
appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be
applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge
has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very
material and clinching aspect in the peculiar
circumstances of the case.’
31.1. In Sambasivan [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998)
5 SCC 412: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320], the High Court reversed
the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and
held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire
evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record
its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the
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trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or
the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable.
Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the
accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned
trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal
passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered
from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the
order of conviction passed by the High Court. While
confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court,
this Court observed in para 8 as under:
‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to
ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the
aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court
has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by
this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State
of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972] viz.
first recording its conclusion on the question whether the
approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence
was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it
were wholly untenable, which alone will justify
interference in an order of acquittal though the High
Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly
meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will
this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the
judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in
such a case, the approach of the court which is
considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate
court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed
by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the
approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence
was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are
demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment
of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so
to hold that the trial court judgment warranted
interference. In such a case, there is obviously no
reason why the appellate court's judgment should be
disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to
the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does
not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that
the interference by the appellate court in the order of
acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the
judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of
the two reasonable views, the one in support of the
acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above
discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of
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the trial court in this case.’
31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan [K. Ramakrishnan
Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC
(Cri) 410] , after observing that though there is some
substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted
to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an
order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of
conviction passed by the High Court after having found that
the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of
acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the
learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was
unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the
Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the
relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the
High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the
evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court
scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that
reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the
testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This
Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence
made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and
therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an
order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
31.3. In Atley [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807: 1955
Cri LJ 1653], in para 5, this Court observed and held as
under:
‘5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one
of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside
on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the
prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the
judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our
opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate
court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the
conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal
was perverse it could not set aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to
the High Court on an appeal against an order of
acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its
own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the wellestablished rule that the presumption of innocence of
the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the
judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which
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had the advantage of observing the demeanour of
witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its
presence.
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as
wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal
against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal
against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that
the presumption of innocence with which the accused
person starts in the trial court continues even up to the
appellate stage and that the appellate court should
attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which
recorded the order of acquittal.
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping
those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary
conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been
vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at
the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh
v. State, 1951 SCC 1207: AIR 1952 SC 52]; Wilayat
Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P.,
1951 SCC 898: AIR 1953 SC 122]) In our opinion, there
is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the
appellant that the High Court was not justified in
reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own
conclusions.’
31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy [K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P.,
(1979) 1 SCC 355: 1979 SCC (Cri) 305], this Court has
observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset
with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for
slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is
but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to
interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of
justice be brought to ridicule.”
8.
The law with regard to acquittal appeals is well
crystallized and in acquittal appeals, there is presumption
of innocence in favour of the accused and it has finally
culminated when a case ends in an acquittal. The learned
Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and when the
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learned Trial Court has come to a conclusion that the
prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable
doubts, the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused gets strengthened. There is no inhibition to re
appreciate the evidence by the Appellate Court but if after
re appreciation, the view taken by the learned Trial Court
was a possible view, there is no reason for the Appellate
Court to interfere in the same.
9.
As the appeal pertains to a case under Section 306 of
the IPC,
it
would
be
appropriate
to reproduce
the
observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M.
Mohan
Vs.
State
represented
by
the
Deputy
Superintendent of Police reported in (2011) 3 SCC 626 in
paras 36 to 45:
36. We would like to deal with the concept of 'abetment'. Section
306 of the Code deals with 'abetment of suicide' which reads as
under:
“306. Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide,
whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.”
37. The word 'suicide' in itself is nowhere defined in the Indian
Penal Code, however, its meaning and import is well known and
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requires no explanation. `Sui' means `self' and `cide' means
`killing', thus implying an act of self-killing. In short a person
committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the
means employed by him in achieving his object of killing
himself.
38. In our country, while suicide itself is not an offence
considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach of
law, attempt to suicide is an offence under section 309 of I.P.C.
39. `Abetment of a thing' has been defined under section 107 of
the Code. We deem it appropriate to reproduce section 107,
which reads as under:
"107. Abetment of a thing - A person abets the doing of a
thing, who First - Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly - Engages with one or more other person or
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if
an act or illegal omission takes places in pursuance of
that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing;
or
Thirdly - Intentionally aides, by any act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with
section 107 reads as under:
"Explanation 2 - Whoever, either prior to or at the time
of the commission of an act, does anything in order to
facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby
facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the
doing of that act."
40. Learned counsel also placed reliance on yet another judgment
of this court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9
SCC 618, in which a three-Judge Bench of this court had an
occasion to deal with the case of a similar nature. In a dispute
between the husband and wife, the appellant husband uttered
"you are free to do whatever you wish and go wherever you like".
Thereafter, the wife of the appellant Ramesh Kumar committed
suicide.
41. This Court in paragraph 20 has examined different shades of
the meaning of "instigation'. Para 20 reads as under:
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"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or
encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of
instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must
be used to that effect. or what constitutes instigation must
necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the
consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the
consequence must be capable of being spelt out. the present
one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or
omission or by a continued course of conduct created such
circumstances that the deceased was left with no other
option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation
may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or
emotion without intending the consequences to actually
follow cannot be said to be instigation."
In the said case this court came to the conclusion that there is no
evidence and material available on record wherefrom an
inference of the accused-appellant having abetted commission of
suicide by Seema (appellant's wife therein) may necessarily be
drawn.
42. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal & Another (1994) 1
SCC 73, this Court has cautioned that the Court should be
extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of
each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of
finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact
induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to
the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to
ordinary petulance, discord and difference in domestic life, quite
common to the society, to which the victim belonged and such
petulance, discord and difference were not expected to induce a
similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit
suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for
basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence
of suicide should be found guilty.
43. This court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi) 2009 (16) SCC 605, had an occasion to deal with this
aspect of abetment. The court dealt with the dictionary meaning
of the word "instigation" and "goading". The court opined that
there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing
of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is
different from the others. Each person has his own idea of selfesteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down
any straight-jacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case
has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and
circumstances.
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44. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or
intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a
positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in
committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.
45. The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by this court are clear that in order to convict a person
under section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit
the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led
the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act
must have been intended to push the deceased into such a
position that he/she committed suicide.
46. In V.P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Limited and Others
(2010) 10 SCC 361, this court has held that when prima facie no
case is made out against the accused, then the High Court ought
to have exercised the jurisdiction under section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
and quashed the complaint.
47. In a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Madan
Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (2010 ) 8 SCC 628, this
Court quashed the conviction under Section 306 IPC on the
ground that the allegations were irrelevant and baseless and
observed that the High Court was in error in not quashing the
proceedings.
10. In light of the above settled principle of law, the
evidence of the prosecution is dissected and PW1 –
Bachubhai Lalubhai Bhagora examined at Exh. 13 is the
brother of the deceased and the complainant. He has
deposed that his sister was married to the accused about
six years prior to the incident. About four months before
the incident, she came to his house and, crying before his
mother, stated that the accused was assaulting her
physically. Her cheeks were swollen and red, and she
stayed at his house for four days. About 25 days later, she
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again came and informed them that the accused was not
giving her money to run the house. At about 06:00 p.m. on
18.05.2011, the accused telephoned his brother Naveen
and informed him that the deceased had consumed some
medicine. Thereafter, the accused telephoned his cousin
Arvindbhai and informed him that the deceased had
committed suicide by hanging. On the following day, they
went to the house of the accused, where they saw the dead
body of the deceased lying on the floor, with marks of
injuries on the chest and back. The deceased had delivered
a child about seven days prior to the incident. He gave a
Janvajog to the police, which is produced at Exh. 14. In his
cross-examination, PW1 stated that he and the deceased
had the same father but different mothers, and that
Naveenbhai is her real brother. On the day before the
incident, their mother had gone to the house of the
deceased, and he does not know when she returned, as he
lives separately from her. He has a jeep and his brothers
also have vehicles. He saw the marks of injuries on the
body on the following day, but did not mention them in the
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Janvajog. Although his brothers and uncle were also
present at the Police Station, none of them informed the
police that the accused used to quarrel with and assault
the deceased. He also did not inform the police that the
deceased often came to his house and narrated the illtreatment. He was not present at the cremation, as he had
returned home.
10.1 PW2 – Kantibhai Lalubhai Bhagora examined at Exh.
15 is a brother of the deceased. He has deposed that the
deceased had three children, that the accused kept her well
after the marriage, and that quarrels thereafter arose over
work. The deceased often came to their house, but they
used to send her back. On the day of the incident, they
were first informed that she had consumed some medicine
and later that she had committed suicide by hanging. They
went to her house on the following day and saw her body
lying on the floor with injuries. In his cross-examination,
PW2 admitted that he did not inform the police about the
injuries on the body in his statement. They were informed
of the incident at about 06:00 p.m. and all gathered
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together, but did not go to the house of the accused, which
is about 10 kilometres away, although vehicles were
available. When they went there, villagers were already
present.
10.2 PW3 – Valiben Lalubhai Bhagora examined at Exh. 16
is the mother of the deceased. She has deposed that her
daughter never told her the reason for the harassment, and
that her daughter had given birth to a daughter about six
days prior to the incident. She had gone to meet her
daughter two days before the incident and returned. This
witness did not support the case of the prosecution and
was declared hostile. In her cross-examination by the
learned APP, she stated that she saw the dead body of her
daughter lying on the floor, but returned after seeing it and
did not see anything else. In her cross-examination by the
learned advocate for the accused, she stated that she did
not give any statement to the police and that her brotherin-law had given the statement on her behalf. On the day of
the incident, the accused had come to their house to deliver
the invitation for his sister’s marriage.
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10.3 PW4 – Navinbhai Lalubhai Bhagora examined at Exh.
17 is the brother of the deceased. He has deposed that on
18.05.2011 the accused telephoned him and informed him
that the deceased had consumed some medicine. A further
call was made to Arvindbhai, who was informed that she
had committed suicide by hanging. They all gathered, but
as it was night, they went to the house of the accused on
the following day and saw the dead body lying on the floor.
In his cross-examination, PW4 admitted that the deceased
had given birth to a daughter about six days prior to the
incident, and that two days before the incident he had been
telephoned and asked to send his mother. The complainant,
Bachubhai, owns a jeep which he rents out, and the father
and other family members also have vehicles. He did not
inform the police that the accused did not give money to his
sister to run the house.
10.4 PW5 – Dr. Vinodbhai Manglabhai Menat examined at
Exh. 20 was the Medical Officer on duty at the Primary
Health Centre, Kasana, on 20.05.2011. He conducted the
postmortem on the body of the deceased Arunaben along
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with Dr. Tanvir G. Sheth and produced the postmortem
note at Exh. 21. As per column no. 17, the following
injuries were found:
1.
Small superficial laceration near the right nipple,
lateral side.
2.
Small superficial laceration on the mid-chest,
upper side.
3.
Scratch mark on the lower back.
4.
Ligature mark on the right side, 4 cm below the
ear, oblique and incomplete; ligature mark on the
left side, 6 cm below the ear, complete and
straight; ligature mark on the front, below the
chin and above the hyoid, 0.5 cm deep, with a
knot on the right side, and dislocation of the
cervical spine.
In the opinion of the doctors, the cause of death was
asphyxia due to hanging. The witness produced the cause
of death certificate at Exh. 22.
9.5 PW6 – Arvindbhai Hirabhai Bhagora examined at Exh.
23 is the cousin of the deceased. He has deposed that the
accused used to consume liquor, demand money from the
deceased, and beat her if she did not give it. The deceased
often came to his house. About 15 days prior to the
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incident, she came to his house and stated that the
accused had demanded money from her to consume liquor
and, as she did not give it, had assaulted her. Thereafter,
his mother, father and Kantibhai took her back to the
matrimonial home. After they were informed that the
deceased had committed suicide, they went to her house on
the following day. He did not see the dead body. They went
to the Police Station, where the police completed the
necessary procedure. In his cross-examination, PW6 stated
that on the day before the incident, the mother of the
deceased had gone to the house of the deceased and the
accused had come to deliver the invitation card for his
sister’s marriage. They were informed of the incident at
about 04:30 p.m., but made no effort to go to the house of
the deceased that day,
although it is about seven
kilometres away and could be reached within half an hour
by vehicle.
10.6 PW7 – Hirabhai Velabhai Bhagora examined at Exh.
24 is the uncle of the deceased. He has deposed that the
deceased was married to the accused about seven years
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prior to the incident and that the accused used to harass
her. After being informed of the incident, they went to the
house of the deceased on the following day. He did not go to
the Police Station. Nothing material in support of the case
of the prosecution has emerged in his cross-examination..
10.7 PW8 – Yogeshbhai Rajnikant Kharadi examined at
Exh. 25 is the panch witness to the inquest panchnama,
which is produced at Exh. 26.
10.8 PW9 – Dilisinh Kalusinh Rathod examined at Exh. 27
is the Investigating Officer. He has deposed that Accidental
Death No. 1 of 2011 was registered and inquired into, that
the complaint was thereafter lodged, and that he conducted
the investigation. In his cross-examination, he admitted
that he was present at the hospital while the postmortem
was being conducted, and that the family members were
also present, but they did not state anything about any
mental or physical harassment meted out to the deceased
by the accused. It has also come on record that the
deceased had come to her parental home five days before
giving birth to the child.
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11. On a careful appreciation of the entire evidence of the
prosecution, it emerges that the incident occurred on
18.05.2011, the Janvajog was given on 19.05.2011, and the
complaint was lodged on 20.05.2011. Accidental Death No.
1 of 2011 was registered and inquired into, but the
statements of the complainant and the witnesses recorded
in that inquiry have not been produced on record. No
explanation has been offered for the delay in lodging the
complaint. Although the witnesses have made various
allegations, none of them is supported by any independent
evidence. Some witnesses have stated that the accused
used to consume liquor and did not give the deceased
money to run the house. However, there is no evidence that
the accused was present at the time of the incident, or that
he did any act amounting to instigation, abetment or
goading of the deceased to commit suicide. It has further
come on record that at about 04:30 p.m. on 18.05.2011,
the complainant and the other brothers of the deceased
were informed that she had committed suicide. Though
they had vehicles and the house of the deceased was only
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about 7 to 10 kilometres away, which could be reached
within half an hour, they made no effort to go there that
day. They went only on the following day. The complainant
gave the Janvajog on 19.05.2011 at Isari Police Station, but
made no allegation therein of ill-treatment or of mental or
physical harassment by the accused. The complaint was
lodged only on 20.05.2011. The learned Trial Court
appreciated the entire evidence and rightly acquitted the
accused, as the prosecution failed to prove the charges
against him beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment and
order of acquittal therefore deserves to be confirmed.
12. In view of the settled position of law in the decisions of
Mohan alias Srinivas (supra) and M.Mohan (supra), the
learned Trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in
proper perspective and there does not appear to be any
infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order
of acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the
evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that
the
learned
Trial
Court
was
completely
justified
in
acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against them.
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The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are
absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has
been committed by the learned Trial Court and this Court is
in
complete
agreement
with
the
findings,
ultimate
conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by
the learned Trial Court. This Court finds no reason to
interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the
present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same
is dismissed.
13. The impugned judgement and order of acquittal
passed
by
the
learned
Additional
Sessions
Judge,
Sabarkantha Camp at Modasa in Sessions Case No.
75/2011 on 10.07.2012, is hereby confirmed.
14. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings
be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.
Sd/-
(S. V. PINTO,J)
VASIM S. SAIYED
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