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R/CR.A/2014/2012
(GJHC240442912012)
JUDGMENT DATED: 03/11/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2014 of 2012
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE S.V. PINTO
Sd/-
========================================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
No
√
========================================================
STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
ABHESINH RANJITSINH VAGHELA & ORS.
========================================================
Appearance:
MS CM SHAH, APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR RUDRANSH NAYAK, ADVOCATE for MR ANKIT Y BACHANI(5424) for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
NOTICE SERVED for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 4
========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE S.V. PINTO
Date : 03/11/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
1.
This appeal has been filed by the appellant – State
under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) against the judgment and
the order dated 20.09.2012 in Special (Atrocity) Case No.10 of
2011 passed by the learned Special Judge and 3 rd Additional
Sessions, District Banaskantha at Palanpur (hereinafter referred
to as ‘the learned Trial Court’), whereby, the learned Trial Court
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has acquitted the respondents – accused from the offences
punishable under Sections 332, 504, 506(2), 186 and 114 of the
Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’) and
under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred
to as ‘the Atrocity Act’). The respondents are hereinafter referred
to as ‘the accused’ as they stood in the rank and file in the
original case, for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity.
2.
The relevant facts leading to filing of the present
appeal are as under:
2.1.
The complainant, Bhimjibhai Martabhai Ninama, was
serving as the Principal of Godhani Primary School for the
preceding six years. On 16.09.2010, at approximately 2:00 p.m.,
while the complainant was making arrangements for the
children to sit for their midday meal, the accused No. 1 who was
the Manager of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme, questioned him as to
why he was not allowing the children to sit for lunch. The
complainant replied that the children who wished to have their
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lunch could sit and partake of the meal. Upon hearing this, the
said Manager got enraged and started abusing the complainant.
He also made derogatory remarks by referring to the
complainant as belonging to the Adivasi/Bhil caste and
questioned whether he was competent to mark the attendance of
the children. The complainant replied that the attendance of the
children who sat for lunch would be marked accordingly.
Thereafter, accused No. 1 went to his house, brought a bottle of
medicine and threatened the complainant by stating that he
would consume the said medicine and that the complainant
could thereafter take care of his children. At that time, accused
Nos. 2 and 3, who were the wife and sister-in-law of accused No.
1, respectively, also came to the school. They questioned the
complainant as to why the accused no.1 should consume the
medicine and stated that the complainant himself should
consume it. They also attempted to assault the complainant. At
that
juncture,
the
other
teachers,
namely,
Rameshbhai
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Chaganbhai Kharadi, Maheshbhai Indubhai Suthar, Dineshbhai
Maganbhai Prajapati, Sonalba, Himmatsinh Vaghela, and other
persons intervened and rescued the complainant from further
assault. Thereafter, the accused persons issued threats to the
complainant and left the place. Subsequently, the complainant,
along with Dalpatdan Kakkaldanji Gadhvi of Paniyari village,
went to Danta Police Station and lodged a complaint in respect of
the aforesaid incident. On the basis of the said complaint, an
offence punishable under Sections 332, 504, 506(2), 186 and 114
of the IPC and Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocity Act was registered
at Danta Police Station vide II-C.R. No. 3088 of 2010.
2.2.
After registration of the FIR, the investigation was
carried out by the concerned Investigating Officer and after
having sufficient material against the accused, the chargesheet
came to be filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Danta, which registered as Criminal Case No.1995 of
2010. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of
Sessions therefore, after completion of process under Section
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209 of the Cr.P.C., the case was committed to the Sessions Court
and the same was registered as Special (Atrocity) Case No.10 of
2011.
2.3.
The accused was duly served with the summons and
the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court and it was
verified whether the copies of all the police papers were
provided to the accused as per the provisions of Section 207 of
the Code and a charge was framed by the learned Trial Court at
Exh.7 and the statements of the accused were recorded at Exhs.
8 to 10 respectively, wherein, the accused denied all the contents
of the charge and the entire evidence of the prosecution was
taken on record. The prosecution has examined 6 witnesses and
has produced 7 documentary evidences in support of the case.
2.4.
After the closing pursis was submitted by the learned
APP at Exh.26, the further statement of the accused under
Section 313 of the Code was recorded. After hearing the
arguments of the learned APP and learned advocate for the
accused and after perusing the documents on record, the
learned Trial Court, by the impugned judgment and order,
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acquitted the accused accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 332, 504, 506(2), 186 and 114 of the IPC and
under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocity Act.
3.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the
appellant – State has filed the present appeal mainly stating that
the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial
Court is contrary to law, evidence on record and principles of
justice. The learned Trial Court has not considered the direct or
indirect evidence produced in this case connecting the accused
with the crime and has also not appreciated the oral as well as
documentary evidence on record and has straightway arrived at
the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case
beyond reasonable doubts. That the reasons given by the
learned Trial Court appreciating the evidence and while
acquitting the accused, are not proper and are perverse and bad
in law, and hence, the impugned judgment and order deserves
to be quashed and set aside.
4.
Heard learned APP Ms.C.M.Shah for the appellant –
State and learned advocate Mr. Rudransh N. Nayak appearing for
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learned advocate Mr.Ankit Y. Bachani for the respondent Nos.1
to 3 – original accused. Though served, the respondent no.4 –
original complainant has not appeared either in person or
through an advocate. Perused the impugned judgment and
order of acquittal and have re-appreciated the entire evidence of
the prosecution on record of the case.
5.
Learned APP Ms.C.M.Shah for the appellant – State
has taken this Court through the entire evidence produced by
the prosecution and has vehemently argued that the learned
Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence properly and the
prosecution has produced cogent evidence to prove the case
and has successfully proved the case against the accused but the
learned Trial Court has not considered the same and has
acquitted the accused. The judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the learned Judge is contrary to law, evidence on
record and principles of justice. The judgment and order of
acquittal passed by learned Judge is based on inferences, not
warranted by facts of the case and also on presumption, not
permitted by law. Learned APP has urged this Court to quash
and set aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal and
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to find the accused guilty for the said offence. Learned APP has
urged this Court to allow the present appeal and impose
maximum sentence on the accused.
6.
Learned advocate Mr. Rudhansh N. Nayak appearing
for learned advocate Mr.Ankit Bachani for the respondent Nos. 1
to 3 – original accused Nos. 1 to 3 has submitted that the learned
Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence in true perspective
and has not committed any error in acquitting the accused.
Therefore, no interference of this Court is required in the impugned judgement and the order of acquittal passed by the
learned Trial Court and has urged this Court to reject the appeal.
7.
At the outset, before discussing the facts of the
present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the
observations of the Apex Court with regard to the powers of the
Appellate Court while dealing with acquittal appeal in the case
of Surendra Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Uttarakhand, in Para
No. 11:
“11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and
others v. State of Karnataka6, a Bench of this Court to which
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one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to
consider the legal position with regard to the scope of
interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed
thus:
“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid
down by this Court governing the scope of interference
by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for
challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the
trial court.
39.
This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh
Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC
(Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the
field after considering various earlier judgments and
held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)
29.
After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court
culled out the following general principles regarding
the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an
appeal against an order of acquittal in the following
words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] ,
SCC p. 432, para 42)
42.
From the above decisions, in our considered view, the
following general principles regarding powers of the
appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an
order of acquittal emerge:
(1)
An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2)
The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of
such power and an appellate court on the
evidence before it may reach its own conclusion,
both on questions of fact and of law.
(3)
Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient
grounds”,
“very
strong
circumstances”,
“distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.
Such phraseologies are more in the nature of
“flourishes of language” to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to
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review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4)
An appellate court, however, must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to him
under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court.
(5)
If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
court should not disturb the finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial court.”
40.
Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D.
Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023)
3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles
governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section
378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8)
“8. … XXX XXX XXX
8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the
presumption of innocence;
8.2.
The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against
acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and
documentary evidence;
8.3.
The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required
to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is
a possible view which could have been taken on the
basis of the evidence on record;
8.4.
If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground
that another view was also possible; and
8.5.
The appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
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conclusion was possible.”
41.
Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an appellate court for reversing the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in
favour of the accused has to be exercised within the
four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to
consider material evidence on record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the
view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible
from the evidence available on record.”
8.
It is a settled principle of law that in an appeal
against acquittal, the Appellate Court is circumscribed by
limitation that no interference has to be made in the order of
acquittal unless after appreciation of the evidence produced
before the learned Trial Court, it appears that there are some
manifest illegality or perversity which could not have been
possibly arrived at by the Court. It is also a settled principle that
there is no embargo on the Appellate Court to review the
evidence but, generally the order of acquittal shall not be
interfered with as the presumption of innocence of the accused
is further strengthened by the order of acquittal. The golden
thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in
criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence
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adduced in the case of the prosecution i.e. (i) guilt of the
accused and (ii) his innocence, the view, which is in favour of the
accused, should be adopted, and if the trial Court has taken the
view in favour of the accused, the Appellate Court should not
disturb the findings of the acquittal. The Appellate Court can
interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal only when
there are compelling and substantial reasons and the order is
clearly unreasonable and where the Appellate Court comes to
conclusion that based on the evidence, the conviction is a must.
9.
In light of the above, the evidence produced by the
prosecution on record is appreciated and PW-1, Bhimjibhai
Martabhai, examined at Exh.14, is the complainant. The witness
has narrated the facts and circumstances of the incident as
stated by him in his complaint, which has been produced on
record at Exh.15. The complainant has fully supported the
prosecution case and has also produced his caste certificate at
Exh.16.
During
his
cross-examination
by
the
learned
advocate for the accused, the witness stated that the work
relating to the Mid-Day Meal Scheme was entrusted to one
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teacher, namely, Vishnudan Barot, whose duty was to supervise
whether the children were sitting and having their meals. He
further stated that there were six rooms in the school and one
separate room was being used for storing the ingredients
required for preparing the midday meal, and the cooking
activities were also carried out in the said room. Accused No. 1
was the Manager of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme and was in
charge of the said room. He was also responsible for maintaining
the accounts of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme and supervising the
children. The witness further admitted that, as per the rules, only
one teacher was permitted to have a meal under the scheme. He
also stated that his wife was serving as a primary teacher at
Navavas village Primary School and that his children sometimes
availed themselves of the midday meal at Godhani School.
However, he denied the suggestion that he had demanded that
accused No. 1 prepare a separate meal for him. The witness
further admitted that there was a police outpost at Navavas and
that he had initially gone to Navavas and thereafter proceeded to
Danta Police Station for lodging the complaint.
9.1.
PW-2, Sonalba Himmatsinh, examined at Exh.17, is
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projected by the prosecution as an eyewitness to the incident.
The witness stated that, on the day of the incident, a quarrel had
taken place between accused No. 1 and the complainant. At that
time, she was standing in the lobby at some distance from them.
As there was considerable commotion, she could not hear the
conversation that had taken place between the complainant and
accused No. 1. She further stated that, at the relevant time, she
had been serving in the school for only about one and a half
months and, therefore, she could not say who had gathered at the
spot during the incident. However, she identified accused No. 1
before the Court. The witness further stated that she
subsequently came to know that the wife and sister-in-law of
accused No. 1 had also come to the school, though she could not
identify them. She had also subsequently learnt that the quarrel
between the complainant and accused No. 1 had taken place in
connection with the distribution of pens to the children and the
functioning of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme. She further came to
know that accused No. 1 had stated that he would consume some
medicine. The witness admitted that the complainant belonged
to the Adivasi community; however, she expressed her
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ignorance as to whether accused No. 1 had made any remarks
concerning the caste of the complainant.
During
her
cross-examination
by
the
learned
advocate for the accused, she stated that the complainant and
one Rameshbhai Kharadi used to commute from Navavas
together, though she could not say whether they travelled on the
same motorcycle.
9.2.
PW-3, Rameshbhai Chaganbhai Kharadi, examined at
Exh.18, is also projected by the prosecution as an eyewitness to
the incident. The witness stated that the incident had occurred
on 16.09.2010 at approximately 2:00 p.m. At the relevant time, he
was present in his classroom. As Vishnubhai was on leave, the
Principal was making arrangements for the children to sit for
their midday meal. At that time, accused No. 1 arrived with some
pens and distributed them among the children who were sitting
for lunch. The complainant told accused No. 1 that, instead of
distributing pens, he should ensure that proper meals were
prepared so that more children would come forward to avail
themselves of the midday meal. Upon hearing this, accused No. 1
became angry and started abusing the Principal. The witness
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further stated that he could not hear the exact words uttered by
accused No. 1. Thereafter, the accused No.1 went to his house,
from where he returned with a bottle of medicine. The witness
stated that accused No. 1 was threatening to consume the
medicine and was telling the complainant to take care of his wife
and children thereafter. The witness snatched the bottle of
medicine from accused No. 1, and the bottle fell down.
Thereafter, accused No. 2 rushed towards the complainant and
questioned him as to why her husband should consume the
medicine, stating that the complainant himself should consume
it. At that time, there was a table in the lobby, around which the
complainant started running round the table, while accused No.
2 also took the bottle of medicine and chased him. The witness
further stated that the complainant took out his mobile phone
from his pocket and started communicating with the police
station. The witness also deposed that, during the incident,
accused No. 1 had made derogatory remarks against the
complainant by referring to him as belonging to a lower caste
and an Adivasi.
During
his
cross-examination
by
the
learned
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advocate for the accused, the witness stated that, at the time of
the incident, he was present in Room No. 1. The children had
already sat down for their meals, and two women were serving
food to them. Approximately 50 children were sitting for lunch.
He further stated that the Mid-Day Meal Scheme was meant
exclusively for the children and that only one teacher was
permitted to have a meal under the scheme for the purpose of
verifying the quality of the food. He also stated that Vishnubhai
was regularly supervising and checking the food supplied
under the scheme. The witness further stated that the
complainant used to commute with him from Navavas village to
Godhani. However, at the time of the incident, he was inside the
classroom and subsequently came to know that a quarrel had
taken place between the complainant and accused No. 1. He also
admitted that he knew Dalpat Gadhvi, a resident of village
Paniyari, who used to visit the complainant, and that he had good
relations with the complainant.
9.3.
PW-4, Dineshbhai Maganbhai Prajapati, examined at
Exh.19, is also projected by the prosecution as an eyewitness to
the incident. The witness stated that the incident had occurred
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on 16.09.2010 between 1:50 p.m. and 2:30 p.m., during the
recess period. At the relevant time, he was sitting in the lobby as
it was recess time. The Principal was making arrangements for
the children to sit for their midday meal, as the concerned
teacher was on leave. At that time, one child was distributing
pens. The witness noticed that the accused and the complainant
were engaged in a conversation and were speaking loudly. On
hearing the commotion, he went towards them. The complainant
told the accused that, instead of enticing the children by
distributing pens, he should ensure that proper food was
prepared so that the children would voluntarily come forward
and sit for their meals. The witness further stated that he
separated them, whereupon accused No. 1 suddenly went to his
house and returned with a bottle of medicine, accompanied by
his wife. Accused No. 1 told the complainant that he would
consume the medicine and that the complainant could thereafter
take care of his wife and children. Accused No. 1 was also
abusing
the
Principal.
Thereafter,
Rameshbhai
Kharadi
intervened and separated them. Subsequently, accused No. 2
took the bottle of medicine in her hands, stated that she would
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consume the medicine and rushed towards the complainant. At
that time, the complainant and accused No. 2 started running
around a table. The complainant attempted to contact the police
station over the telephone and the accused no.1 calmed down.
Subsequently, the school activities resumed, and the Principal
left for his meeting.
During
his
cross-examination
by
the
learned
advocate for the accused, the witness stated that several persons
from the village had also gathered at the school at the time of the
incident. He further stated that Alkhiben and Galkhiben were
serving food to the children who were sitting in the lobby in two
rows facing each other. At that time, all the teachers were
present in Room No. 1, situated opposite the place where the
children were seated for their meals and near the place where
the food was being cooked. He further admitted that the children
of the complainant regularly availed themselves of the Mid-Day
Meal Scheme and that, at the time of the incident, the children
had already finished their meals.
9.4.
PW-5, Dalpatdan Kakkaldan Gadhvi, examined at
Exh.20, is the person who accompanied the complainant to the
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police station for lodging the complaint. The witness stated that,
at the relevant time, he was pursuing his LL.B. studies and was
acquainted with the complainant. He further stated that, on the
day of the incident, he had gone to Satlasana Hospital and his
mobile phone was on vibration mode. Upon checking his phone,
he noticed eleven missed calls from the complainant. He,
therefore, called the complainant, who was crying at that time.
During the conversation, the complainant informed him that he
had a verbal altercation with accused No. 1 and that accused
Nos. 1 and 2 had brought a bottle of medicine and threatened to
consume it, whereupon the staff members intervened and
separated them. The witness further stated that the complainant
informed him that the accused persons had threatened him.
Thereafter, he travelled from Satlasana to the school, where the
complainant expressed his intention to lodge a police complaint.
The witness accompanied the complainant to the Navavas
Outpost Police Station, but as the outpost was closed, they
proceeded to the Danta Police Station, where the complainant
lodged the complaint. The witness further stated that the
complainant had informed him that the accused persons had
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used expressions such as "Adivasi Bhil" and had made casterelated derogatory remarks against him.
During
his
cross-examination
by
the
learned
advocate for the accused, the witness admitted that he had good
relations with the complainant and that they used to visit each
other's houses.
9.5.
PW-6, Ravjibhai Fulabhai, examined at Exh.21, was
serving as the Police Station Officer at Danta Police Station on
16.09.2010. The witness stated that, on the said date, he had
registered the complaint lodged by the complainant.
9.6.
PW-7, Rohitkumar Dhuljibhai Baranda, examined at
Exh.24, is the Investigating Officer. The witness has narrated the
procedure undertaken by him during the course of the
investigation. During his cross-examination by the learned
advocate for the accused, the witness specifically admitted that
he had not seized any bottle of medicine from the accused
during the course of the investigation.
10.
Upon reappreciation of the entire evidence available
on record, it appears that the prosecution has not been able to
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establish the charges against the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that there is no cogent
and reliable evidence on record to establish that the
complainant was a public servant within the meaning of law. The
prosecution has also failed to establish the essential ingredients
of the offence punishable under Section 332 of the Indian Penal
Code. There is no satisfactory evidence to demonstrate that the
complainant was voluntarily caused hurt by the accused persons
with the intention of preventing or deterring him from
discharging his duty as a public servant or on account of
anything done by him in the lawful discharge of such duty.
Consequently, the necessary ingredients of the said offence
remain unestablished.
11.
So far as the involvement of accused Nos. 2 and 3 is
concerned, the prosecution has failed to establish their specific
and individual roles in the alleged incident. The evidence on
record does not satisfactorily establish the manner in which
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accused Nos. 2 and 3 allegedly assaulted or attempted to assault
the complainant. Mere allegations of their presence at the place
of incident, without reliable evidence establishing their
participation in the commission of the alleged offences, would
not be sufficient to record a finding of guilt.
12.
Moreover, upon careful scrutiny of the depositions of
the complainant and the other prosecution witnesses, it appears
that there are material improvements and exaggerations in their
versions. Though PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 have been projected by
the prosecution as eyewitnesses, their evidence does not inspire
the requisite confidence to establish the prosecution case in its
entirety. Their depositions, particularly the admissions elicited
during cross-examination, indicate that they were either present
in the classroom or at a distance from the place where the
alleged conversation had taken place and that they had not
heard the actual conversation between the complainant and
accused No. 1. PW-2 has categorically admitted that, owing to the
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distance and the commotion, she could not hear what transpired
between them. Similarly, the evidence of the other witnesses,
when considered in the light of their cross-examination, does not
provide a consistent and reliable account of the alleged casterelated utterances or the precise circumstances in which the
incident occurred. Thus, notwithstanding their description as
eyewitnesses, their evidence does not satisfactorily corroborate
the material allegations made by the complainant.
13.
Another significant circumstance which creates
doubt regarding the prosecution version is the failure of the
Investigating Officer to seize the alleged bottle of medicine.
According to the prosecution, accused No. 1 had gone to his
house, brought a bottle of medicine and threatened to consume
it, and accused No. 2 had subsequently taken the said bottle in
her hands. However, the Investigating Officer, PW-7, has
categorically admitted that no such bottle was seized during
investigation. Similarly, no pen allegedly distributed by accused
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No. 1 to the children was seized. There is also no independent
material on record to establish whether accused No. 1 had, in
fact, gone to his house and returned with a bottle of medicine, as
alleged. These omissions assume significance when considered
alongside the material inconsistencies and improvements in the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses. It is also relevant to note
that PW-5, who accompanied the complainant to the police
station, is admittedly on good terms with the complainant and
used to visit his house. His evidence regarding the incident is
based upon what was subsequently narrated to him by the
complainant and, therefore, does not constitute independent
corroboration of the actual occurrence. The evidence of PW-6,
being the Police Station Officer who registered the complaint, is
formal in nature and does not independently establish the
allegations levelled against the accused.
14.
The prosecution was required to establish its case
through cogent, consistent and reliable evidence. However, the
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cumulative effect of the material omissions, improvements, lack
of independent corroboration and failure to establish the
specific overt acts attributed to the accused persons creates a
reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution version. It is a
settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion,
however strong, cannot take the place of proof and that the
accused are entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt
arising from the evidence on record.
15.
In the case of Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of
Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 17 SCC 615, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has in Para-17 emphasized the necessity of
specifying the actual utterances attributed to the accused for
determining whether the ingredients of the offence under the
Atrocity Act are attracted and the same is reproduced as under:
“17
That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had
hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a
view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not
advance the case of the complainant any further to
bring it within the ambit of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST
Act. We have noted from the first FIR as well as the
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charge-sheet that the same makes no reference to the
utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal
altercation or to the caste to which the complainant
belonged, except for the allegation/observation that
caste-related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent
seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for
humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence
under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course,
such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim
because of he being a member of a particular
Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot
(bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any
place within public view, this would obviously
constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user
of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be
directed generally to a person, who happens to be a
Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be
sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(x) unless such words
are laced with casteist remarks.”
16.
Similarly, in the case of Gorige Pentaiah v. State of
Andhra Pradesh reported in (2008) 12 SCC 531, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that the basic ingredients of the
offence under Section 3(1)(x) must be established and that a
general allegation of caste-based insult, without the necessary
particulars, would not be sufficient. The observations in Para 9
are reproduced as under.
“9
In the instant case, the allegation of respondent No.3 in
the entire complaint is that on 27.5.2004, the appellant
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abused them with the name of their caste. According to
the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the
complainant ought to have alleged that the accusedappellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No. 3) was
intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused
with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In
the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the
accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally
insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate
respondent No. 3 in a place within public view. When
the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the
complaint, then permitting such a complaint to
continue and to compel the appellant to face the
rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally
unjustified leading to abuse of process of law.”
17.
In the present case, though the complainant has
alleged that accused No. 1 referred to him as belonging to the
Adivasi/Bhil community and made derogatory remarks, the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses does not consistently
establish the precise words allegedly uttered by accused No. 1.
PW-2 Sonal Himmatsinh has categorically stated that she was
standing at a distance and could not hear the conversation
between the complainant and accused No. 1. PW-3 Rameshbhai
Kharadi has also admitted that he could not hear the exact words
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uttered by accused No. 1. The other witnesses have also not
furnished a consistent account of the specific caste-related
expressions allegedly used by the accused. Thus, the material
particulars regarding the actual utterances, the context in which
they were made and the intention to humiliate the complainant
on account of his caste have not been satisfactorily established.
18.
In view of the aforesaid discussion and the principles
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decisions,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has
failed to establish the essential ingredients of the offences
alleged against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
evidence does not satisfactorily establish the specific casterelated utterances attributed to accused No. 1, the requisite
intention to humiliate the complainant on account of his caste or
the specific overt acts attributed to accused Nos. 2 and 3. The
failure to investigate the circumstances surrounding the alleged
medicine bottle, the absence of seizure of the material articles,
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the improvements in the testimony of the complainant and the
other witnesses, and the absence of reliable independent
corroboration,
when
considered
cumulatively,
create
a
reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case.
19.
The learned Trial Court has considered these
material aspects of the evidence and has rightly extended the
benefit of doubt to the accused. The findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court are neither perverse nor contrary to the
evidence on record. It is well settled that, in an appeal against
acquittal, where the view adopted by the learned Trial Court is a
reasonable and possible view on the basis of the evidence
available on record, the appellate Court would not be justified in
interfering merely because another view may also be possible.
In the present case, the appreciation of evidence by the learned
Trial Court is found to be proper and legally sustainable.
Consequently, no interference is warranted with the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal, and the same deserves to be
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confirmed
and
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resultantly, the
present
applicant
stands
dismissed.
20.
The impugned judgment and the order dated
20.09.2012 in Special (Atrocity) Case No.10 of 2011 passed by
the learned Special Judge and 3rd Additional Sessions, District
Banaskantha at Palanpur is hereby confirmed.
21.
Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings
be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.
Sd/-
(S. V. PINTO,J)
F.S.KAZI
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