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2026:BHC-AUG:54045
-1Cri.WP-1385-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1385 OF 2026
Shaikh Shahrukh @ Kabutar Shaikh Azgar,
Age : 29 Years, Occ. Labour,
R/o Khudbenagar Chaurasta,
Mahebubiya Colony, Nanded
VERSUS
The State of Maharashtra,
Through Police Station Officer,
Bhagya Nagar Police Station,
Nanded, Tq. & Dist. Nanded
… PETITIONER
(Orig. Accused No.4)
… RESPONDENT
…..
Mr. S. S. Gangakhedkar, Advocate for the Petitioner.
Mrs. Ashlesha S. Deshmukh, APP for Respondent – State.
…..
CORAM : HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 28th OCTOBER, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 03rd NOVEMBER, 2026.
JUDGMENT :
1.
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent
of the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, the petition is
heard finally.
2.
The petitioner, who is accused No.4 in Crime No. 172 of
2026 registered with Bhagyanagar Police Station, Nanded,
challenges the order dated 3rd July, 2026 extending the period for
completion of investigation and filing of the charge-sheet by sixty
-2Cri.WP-1385-2026
days and the order dated 27 th July, 2026 rejecting his application
for default bail. He seeks release under Section 187(3) of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 read with Section
21(2)(b) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act,
1999. Both the validity of the extension and the consequential
refusal of bail are thus before this Court.
3.
The brief facts is that the crime was registered on the
report of Anita Gajanan Chavan following the death of her son,
Prafull alias Arjitsingh, in an assault during the early hours of 4 th
April, 2026. The prosecution alleges that the deceased and his
companions were returning after watching a film when Saisingh
alias Sailala and members of his gang, including the petitioner,
assaulted them with swords and knives near E-Square on Canal
Road, Nanded, on account of previous enmity. Prafull sustained
fatal injuries and his companions were also assaulted. Offences
under Sections 103(1), 109, 118(1), 115(2), 189(2), 191(2),
191(3) and 190 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the
Arms
Act
were
registered.
According
to
the
prosecution,
investigation disclosed an organised crime syndicate. Sections 3(1)
(i), 3(2) and 3(4) of the MCOC Act were consequently invoked
after prior approval, which the impugned extension order records
as having been granted on 28th May, 2026.
-3Cri.WP-1385-2026
4.
The petitioner was arrested on 21st April, 2026. The
Investigating Officer submitted a request for extension, followed by
the Special Public Prosecutor's separate report dated 29 th June,
2026 seeking ninety additional days. The Special Judge granted
sixty days by the order dated 3rd July, 2026. Claiming that his
ninety-day period had expired on 20th July, 2026 without a valid
extension applicable to him, the petitioner applied for default bail
on 24th July, 2026 and expressed his readiness to furnish bail.
That application was rejected on 27th July, 2026. The State's
affidavit records that the charge-sheet was subsequently filed on
27th August, 2026. There is no dispute that it had not been filed
when default bail was sought.
5.
Learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that the
extension request concerned the two other accused who were
arrested on 5th April, 2026 and whose statutory period was
approaching completion. The petitioner's period was to expire later
and the application was premature against him. Merely including
his name in a list, according to counsel, did not amount to seeking
extension of his detention. He submits that the prosecutor
reproduced the police records without independently explaining
the progress of investigation and the necessity of detaining the
-4Cri.WP-1385-2026
petitioner further. Awaiting forensic reports, telephone records,
sanction and arrest of another accused could not justify prolonged
detention when a charge-sheet could be filed and further
investigation continued. The petitioner's remand to judicial
custody is also relied upon to question the continued necessity of
detention.
6.
Learned Advocate further submits that the petitioner
was not afforded an effective opportunity to oppose the extension
through his advocate. His initial refusal to receive the papers in
prison was accompanied by a request to consult his advocate.
Counsel points to the investigating officer's records of copies being
supplied to advocates and the Special Judge's finding that the
petitioner himself acknowledged receipt and submits that these
observations are contrary to each other and hence cannot be relied
upon. He submits that acknowledgment of papers does not
establish effective hearing. He also challenges the subsequent
reasoning that the extension expressly and impliedly covered all
accused, relying upon the case of Nayantara Gupta v. State of
Maharashtra, 2020 DGLS (Bom.) 1671 and the requirement that
extension affecting personal liberty must be judicially granted
after compliance with the prescribed safeguards.
-5Cri.WP-1385-2026
7.
Learned Advocate for the petitioner relies upon Saquib
Abdul Hamid Nachan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 SC (Supp)
40, also reported in (2019) 16 SCC 707; Nayantara Gupta v. State
of Maharashtra, 2020 DGLS (Bom.) 1671; Shaikh Moin Shaikh
Mehmood v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 968; S.
Kasi v. State through the Inspector of Police , (2021) 12 SCC 1;
Mohsin Nasir Sheikh and others v. State of Maharashtra , Criminal
Appeal No. 23 of 2025, decided on 25th August, 2025; Jigar alias
Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC
484; and Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand ,
2026 INSC 456. These decisions are relied upon to emphasize that
extension is subject to strict statutory conditions, that the
prosecutor must apply his mind independently, and that the right
to default bail cannot be defeated by an invalid extension.
8.
Learned APP submits that the application and the
prosecutor's report concerned the common investigation against
all accused. The petitioner's name, arrest and investigation
concerning him were disclosed. The reference to the earlier arrests
explained the urgency and did not restrict the relief sought. Notice
was issued to all twelve accused. After their initial refusal in
prison, they were produced on 1 st July, 2026 and supplied the
papers. The application was heard on 2nd July, 2026 and decided
-6Cri.WP-1385-2026
on 3rd July, 2026 after hearing the prosecution and the advocates
who appeared during the hearing . Learned APP submits that the
absence of the petitioner's advocate cannot defeat an otherwise
valid extension, and that his application for default bail was filed
while the extended period was subsisting. She thus prays for
dismissing the Petition.
9.
The objection concerning the availability of an appeal
under Section 12 of the MCOC Act does not require rejection of the
petition. In Abdul Rehman Abdul Latif Shaikh @ Sonu v. State of
Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal Nos. 509 and 518 of 2021, decided
on 11th April, 2022, the Division Bench permitted the connected
extension and bail prayers in one proceeding and directed
conversion of the surviving appeal into a criminal application for
bail. In Shehzada Khan v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal
Application (APL) No. 894 of 2022, order dated 15 th September,
2022, this Court expressly entertained a challenge to extension
with a consequential prayer for default bail. The present combined
challenge is accordingly examined on merits.
10.
Before proceeding to hear the merits and argument of
both the side, it is necessary to consider the relevant provision of
MCOCA which deals with the powers to extend the period of filing
-7Cri.WP-1385-2026
charge-sheet. Under the proviso to Section 21(2)(b), the ninetyday period may be extended up to one hundred and eighty days on
the
Public
Prosecutor's
report
indicating
the
progress
of
investigation and specific reasons for detention beyond ninety
days. Invocation of the MCOC Act does not automatically confer the
longer period. In State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundlik
Gadling, (2019) 5 SCC 178, the Supreme Court explained the
prosecutor's duty of independent scrutiny, while emphasising that
the substance of the report, rather than its description or form
alone, must be examined.
11.
In Saquib Abdul Hamid Nachan (supra), the Supreme
Court examined the grounds advanced for extension under the
MCOC Act and restored the Special Judge's refusal of extension
upon finding that those grounds did not justify it. The decision
establishes that the prosecutor's request remains subject to judicial
scrutiny. The subsequent filing of charge-sheet and commencement
of trial did not render the earlier claim for statutory bail
irrelevant. It does not, however, hold that every common extension
request is impermissible or that different arrest dates necessarily
require separate applications.
12.
Learned Advocate's submission that the extension
-8Cri.WP-1385-2026
necessarily excluded the petitioner cannot be accepted. The
application at paper-book pages 34 onwards identifies him as
accused No.4 and records the dates of arrest of the accused
separately. It also refers to investigation concerning him, including
the alleged recovery of a sword. The prosecutor's report at pages
51 to 55-A names him among the accused and describes
investigation undertaken after invocation of the Act. The prayer
seeks time to complete investigation and file the charge-sheet in
the crime. The notice at page 106 expressly concerns all twelve
accused. Read together, these documents disclose a common
request for extending the period of filing charge-sheet which
included the petitioner .
13.
The reference in paragraph 24 of the police application
to the two accused arrested on 5th April, 2026 explained why
extension was then being sought. It did not confine the application
to them. In Sandesh @ Papya Ananta Phadke v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 DGLS (Bom.) 3440 : 2023:BHC-AS:25247, this
Court recognised a common extension where the application and
investigation concerned all the accused notwithstanding their
different arrest dates. The statute does not require the prosecutor
to await the final few days of each accused's period before seeking
extension. Nevertheless, a common request must satisfy the
-9Cri.WP-1385-2026
statutory requirements in relation to those whom it covers; it is not
an automatic enlargement of custody against everyone named in
an FIR.
14.
The submission that the prosecutor acted merely as a
forwarding agency also cannot be accepted on the contents of the
report. His separate report identifies seizures, witness statements,
investigation of the alleged syndicate, the alleged supplier of
weapons who remained absconding, examination of telephone
records and the source of the firearm. These were matters
concerning the alleged common criminal activity, rather than a
request founded only on the seriousness of the accusation. Pending
forensic reports or sanction would not, standing alone, invariably
justify extension. Equally, the possibility of further investigation
after a charge-sheet does not abolish the statutory power to extend
time on sufficient grounds. Remand to judicial custody does not
amount to a concession that investigation is complete or that every
ground for continued detention has ceased. The report relates the
work already undertaken to the further investigation into the
alleged common criminal activity. Read with the material already
collected, these were relevant reasons for seeking continued
detention during that investigation. The Special Judge identified
those matters in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the extension order and
-10Cri.WP-1385-2026
granted sixty days against the request for ninety days. The order
thus records scrutiny of the request and a limited extension,
rather than an automatic grant merely because the MCOC Act had
been invoked.
15.
The decisions in Shaikh Moin Shaikh Mehmood and
Mohsin Nasir Sheikh (supra), reinforce the requirement of a
genuine prosecutor's report showing independent consideration,
progress of investigation and specific reasons for further detention.
In Shaikh Moin, a police application presented through the
prosecutor was found not to satisfy that requirement. In Mohsin
Nasir Sheikh, the Court found repeated grounds, replication of the
police applications and failure to demonstrate the necessary
progress and justification for continued detention. These decisions
require examination of the contents of the report, rather than
acceptance of its title or signature as sufficient compliance. The
report here has therefore been examined on its own contents. The
report cannot be rejected merely because some of the investigative
facts necessarily also appear in the investigating officer's
application. Its substance, the progress described and its
assessment of the remaining work disclose the requisite scrutiny.
The factual deficiencies identified in those decisions are not
established here. Compliance with the safeguard governing the
-11Cri.WP-1385-2026
opportunity to oppose extension must nevertheless be considered
separately.
16.
The submission concerning an implied extension also
does not assist the petitioner. The order dated 3 July 2026
expressly grants sixty days. In Nayantara Gupta (supra),
concerned an application which had not been adjudicated on merits
and an attempt to infer extension from the Supreme Court's
pandemic limitation orders. Here, the scope of an express order
has to be understood from the common request it decided. The
expression 'expressly and impliedly' used in the subsequent
rejection order is unnecessary; the original documents themselves
establish that the petitioner was included. The remaining question
is whether the petitioner was afforded the opportunity recognised
by law in the extension proceedings.
17.
In S. Kasi (supra), the Supreme Court held that its
general orders extending limitation during the pandemic did not
extend the period for filing a charge-sheet under Section 167(2) of
the Code. The protection of personal liberty could not be suspended
through that construction of the limitation orders. That principle
supports the requirement of a legally valid extension, but does not
remove the express statutory power under Section 21(2)(b) of the
-12Cri.WP-1385-2026
MCOC Act. The present case concerns the validity of an order made
under that power, not an extension claimed automatically under
the pandemic orders.
18.
In Jigar alias Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of
Gujarat, (supra), the Supreme Court explained the requirement of
producing the accused physically or virtually and informing him
that extension is under consideration, so that he may raise the
objections available to him. A written notice in a particular form is
not indispensable. The purpose of production and intimation is to
secure a real opportunity in proceedings which affect continued
detention; the requirement is not an empty formality. In Md. Ariz
Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand (supra), the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that safeguard and the obligation of the
Court to examine and record justifiable reasons for extension.
19.
These principles must be applied to the actual course of
the present proceedings. The Special Court did not dispose of the
extension request on its presentation or without taking steps to
bring it to the accused. The notice dated 30 th June, 2026, at paperbook page 106, directed service upon all twelve accused and their
production before the Court on 1st July, 2026 for the extension
proceedings. Paragraph 9 of the order dated 27th July, 2026
-13Cri.WP-1385-2026
specifically records that all accused were produced on 1 st July, that
the petitioner received the application and that he acknowledged
it. The State's affidavit also records his production and service.
Thus, the petitioner's production was directly referable to the
pending extension request. It was not a case in which an extension
was obtained without bringing him before the Court or informing
him of the proceeding.
20.
Learned Advocate submits that the investigating
officer's reference to copies being given to advocates contradicts
the Special Judge's finding of acknowledgment by the petitioner.
We do not find such a necessary contradiction. Supply of copies to
advocates does not exclude supply to the accused as well. The
judicial record positively states that the petitioner received and
acknowledged the application. His initial refusal in prison,
accompanied by a desire to consult his advocate, does not displace
the subsequent production and acceptance. The argument that no
notice of the request was received by the petitioner is therefore
contrary to the recorded course of the proceedings.
21.
After production and service on 1st July, the application
was kept for hearing on 2nd July and was decided on 3rd July. The
petitioner was therefore made aware of the request while it
-14Cri.WP-1385-2026
remained pending, and time intervened before its disposal. The
Special Judge records that the petitioner's advocate remained
absent at the hearing, while the prosecution and advocates for
other accused were heard. The opportunity afforded to the
petitioner cannot be treated as non-existent merely because his
advocate did not appear to advance his objections. Nor does the
record disclose that an objection tendered on his behalf was
refused consideration or that a request by him for reasonable
assistance was rejected.
22.
Paragraph 16 of the State's affidavit, which refers to the
accused remaining absent on 2nd July, has also been considered.
That statement cannot be read apart from paragraphs 10 and 11,
which expressly record their production on 1st July for the pending
application and its adjournment for hearing to the next day, or
from the Special courts records of the petitioner's acknowledgment
and his advocate's subsequent absence. I do not make a finding, by
inference from the attendance of other advocates, that the
petitioner was necessarily produced again on 2nd July. Equally, the
expression in the affidavit does not erase the production and
opportunity which had already taken place in the very extension
proceedings. The question is whether the extension was obtained
behind his back without the prescribed opportunity, not whether
-15Cri.WP-1385-2026
every recital concerning attendance is expressed identically in the
police reply and the subsequent order. On the record as a whole,
the contention that the petitioner was excluded from the extension
proceedings or denied an opportunity to oppose the request is not
established.
23.
In reaching that conclusion, this court have considered
Qamar Ghani Usmani v. State of Gujarat , (2023) 18 SCC 155.
Which explains the object of notice and/or presence as securing the
accused's knowledge that extension is sought and granted. The
refusal of default bail in that case rested on its particular
circumstances, including the unchallenged extensions and the
accused's presence at the second extension. I do not treat the
present challenge as barred by acquiescence, since the petitioner
has challenged the extension itself. The relevance of the decision
here is that the actual notice, participation and opportunity in the
extension proceedings must be examined, rather than a conclusion
drawn from an isolated circumstance. Here the petitioner was
produced and supplied the pending request before extension was
granted. His advocate's non-appearance on the adjourned date does
not establish denial by the Court of the opportunity which had been
afforded.
-16Cri.WP-1385-2026
The Division Bench in Md. Mehrajuddin s/o Abdul Hai
24.
Ansari
v.
State
of
Maharashtra,
MANU/MH/3727/2023
:
2023:BHC-AUG:20166-DB, considered Qamar Ghani Usmani and
rejected the challenge concerning non-production where notice and
an opportunity to oppose the extension had been afforded. In that
case the advocates had in fact opposed the application and there
were also unchallenged extension orders. Those facts are not
identical to the present case. Nevertheless, the decision illustrates
the need to examine the proceedings as a whole. The conclusion by
this court here rests upon the petitioner's actual production in
relation to this request, his acknowledgment, the adjournment
before disposal, and the Special Judge's finding that his advocate
remained absent, rather than upon any proposition that the
accused has no right to oppose extension.
25.
In the case of Jigar and Md. Ariz Hasnain (supra) do
not permit the Court to dispense with the safeguard, and this court
have not done so. The factual distinction is that the present
petitioner was brought before the Court in the pending extension
proceedings, informed of the request and supplied the application
before adjudication. The Special Judge also examined the
prosecutor's report and stated the investigation undertaken and
the further work which justified a limited extension. The extension
-17Cri.WP-1385-2026
was thus neither an undisclosed order made without involving the
petitioner in the proceedings nor an order supported only by the
assertion that investigation remained pending. For the same
reason, in case of Sagar Shrawan Bhosale v. The State of
Maharashtra, in Criminal Appeal No.560 of 2026 (Aurangabad
Bench), in which this Court found non-compliance with notice,
production and independent scrutiny, is distinguishable on the
facts. The mandatory requirements recognised in that judgment
are accepted; their breach is not established by the present record.
26.
The Special Judge's subsequent reference to the
extension covering all accused 'expressly and impliedly' is not the
foundation on which the original extension is sustained. The
common application, the prosecutor's report, the notice and the
operative order themselves show its scope. Similarly, the petition
is not dismissed merely because the petitioner first sought default
bail before challenging the extension in this Court. Both orders
have been examined on their merits. The extension was sought and
granted before the petitioner's ordinary ninety-day period expired,
covered his case, was supported by the prosecutor's assessment
and the Special Judge's reasons, and followed the opportunity
described above. No ground is made out to set it aside.
-18Cri.WP-1385-2026
27.
When the petitioner applied for default bail on 24 th July,
2026, the period for investigation and filing the charge-sheet had
already been extended by sixty days under the order dated 3 rd
July, 2026. His application was not founded upon expiry of those
sixty days, but upon the contention that the extension was invalid
or did not apply to him. Those contentions have not been accepted.
Consequently, an enforceable right to default bail had not accrued
on the ground advanced. The subsequent filing of the charge-sheet
is not relied upon to extinguish an earlier accrued right or to
render this petition infructuous. The refusal of default bail is
sustained because the extension was operative and valid when that
relief was sought. Nothing stated in this judgment decides an
application for regular bail or expresses an opinion on the truth of
the allegations and the evidentiary value of the material collected.
ORDER
(a)
The Criminal Writ Petition is dismissed.
(b)
The challenge to the orders dated 3rd July, 2026 and
27th July, 2026 is rejected.
(c)
Rule is discharged.
-19Cri.WP-1385-2026
(d)
The petitioner is at liberty to seek regular bail, if so
advised, and any such application shall be decided
independently, in accordance with law and on its own
merits, uninfluenced by observations in this judgment
concerning the validity of the extension and the claim
for default bail.
(HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR)
JUDGE
Tandale
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