Shah Newaz Khan & Ors. vs State of Nagaland & Ors.

Interpretation of Statutes – An interpretation of the law that seeks to address the mischief, that is consistent with the Constitution and promotes constitutional objectives and that which responds to the needs of the nation must be adopted.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. Section 24 of the CPC is a general power of ‘transfer and withdrawal’ capable of being invoked by the High Courts at any stage either suo motu without notice or on the application of any of the parties after notice, whereas section 25 confers exclusive power on the Supreme Court, on the application of either of the parties and after notice, to transfer suits, etc. from the Courts stated therein. While section 24 is part of the general law, section 25 is the special law. Law is well-settled, and referring to the decision in Amarendra Pratap Singh vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati, that a general law cannot defeat the provisions of a special law to the extent to which they are in conflict; else, an effort has to be made at reconciling the two provisions by homogenous reading. What, therefore, needs to be seen and appreciated is whether there is any conflict or inconsistency between the general law (section 24) and the special law (section 25) for the former to yield to the latter, and ascertain whether the High Court still has the jurisdiction under the general law to order an inter-State transfer notwithstanding the special law vesting the Supreme Court with such power of transfer. There has to be an inconsistency between the two so as to apply the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant. The jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court pursuant to the amendment of section 25 of the CPC in 1976 though special, invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 24 may not come in conflict and defeat section 25, if jurisdiction is still found available to be exercised in a given case under the former without doing violence to the latter. [Para 37][1006-H; 1007-A, D-G]

2. A High Court ~ howsoever big or small, old or new ~ is as much a Constitutional Court as this Court is and enjoys wide ranging powers vested in it by law. No doubt, the power under section 25 is a special power, but the common High Courts of the country ought not to read section 24 of the CPC in a manner as if the power of the Supreme Court under section 25 to order an inter-State transfer is available to be exclusively exercised by it in all cases of inter-State transfer, thereby denuding the common High Courts of the country of their jurisdiction by mere reference to involvement of an inter-State transfer and without anything more being looked at. [Para 42][1009-G-H; 1010-A-B]

3. In opinion of this Court, an approach to construe section

25 of the CPC has to be fair, pragmatic, reasonable and realistic. Any construction of section 25 which would impede “access to justice”, considered to be a Fundamental Right, has to be eschewed. A narrow interpretation of section 25 imposing a bar for entertainment of an application under section 24 for transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding by a common High Court like the Gauhati High Court inter-se the four States in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction could place a heavy burden and might pose an insurmountable obstacle for litigants of the farflung areas of the North-East, if they were made to approach this Court for such transfer on the specious ground that the Civil Court to which the same is proposed to be transferred is in a State other than the State in which the suit has been instituted. An interpretation of the law that seeks to address the mischief, that is consistent with the Constitution and promotes constitutional objectives and that which responds to the needs of the nation must be adopted. If “access to justice” has to be real, it becomes the moral responsibility of the Supreme Court, the supreme guardians/protectors of the rights of people guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws, not to construe the substantive part in section 25 of the Code in a pedantic manner to bring about a situation that would thwart the initiative of making “access to justice” real. [Para 46][1012-C-F]

4. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the issue is answered by concluding that:

(i) a true and proper interpretation of section 25 of the CPC lead to the conclusion that the same applies to inter-State transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding where both States have a High Court in terms of Article 214 of the Constitution and not to a transfer where both States have a common High Court under Article 231 thereof; and

(ii) the power under section 24 of the CPC can be exercised by the High Court even for inter-State transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding, if it is the common High Court for two or more States under Article 231 of the Constitution and both the Civil Courts (transferor and transferee) are subordinate to it. [Para 48][1013-A-D]

Durgesh Sharma vs. Jayshree (2008) 9 SCC 648 : [2008] 13 SCR 1056- distinguished.

D. Saibaba v Bar Council of India & Anr. (2003) 6 SCC 186 : [2003] 3 SCR 1209; Amarendra Pratap

Singh vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati (2004) 10 SCC 65 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 42 – referred to.

Pomi Sengupta vs. Biswajit Sengupta (2015) 6 GLR 396; Megha Jain vs. Kartik Jain (2019) 6 GLR 379; Chalasani Deepthi vs. Chalasani Krishna Chaitanya 2015 SCC OnLine Hyd 978; Irene Blanch Khera vs. Glenn John Vijay 2018 (6) Mh. L.J. 199 – referred to. 12th Edition of ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ at page 131 (Para 6 (e))