Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
FRIDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF JULY 2024 / 4TH SRAVANA, 1946
WA NO.967 OF 2024
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2023 IN WP(C) NO.27360 OF 2023 OF
HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT:
SECRETARY-REGISTRAR, SURESH KUMAR.K,TECHNOPARK
AGED 50 YEARS
S/O.SRI.KUTTAN NAIR, SREEVALLABHAM, OORUTTAMBALAM,
MALAYINKEEZHU, MARANALLOR,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695507
BY ADVS.
K.V.RASHMI
ANIL THOMAS(T)
RESPONDENTS:
THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY
VIKAS BHAVAN.P.O, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
KERELA, PIN - 695033
STATE OF KERALA, REP. BY ITS SECRETARY.
LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695005
SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, ELECTRONIC AND IT DEPARTMENT
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695005
JITHU SUKUMARAN NAIR
TC 98/105, SUBWAY RESTURANT, TECHNOPARK,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695581
BY ADV.SUMAN CHAKRAVARTHY, SC
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 26.07.2024,
THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WA NO.967/2024
JUDGMENT
Syam Kumar V.M., J.
This Writ Appeal is filed from the judgment dated
30.11.2023 in W.P.(C) No.27360 of 2023 of the learned Single
Judge. Appellant and the respondents were the petitioner and
the respondents respectively in the said W.P.(C).
Facts in brief :
2.
Appellant is the Secretary- Registrar of a Society
which has been registered under the Travancore Cochin
Literary Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act,
1955 and is fully owned by the Government of Kerala. The
objective of the said Society, (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Technopark’)
is
to
foster
the
development
of
IT/ITES
investment in Kerala and to create infrastructure for Companies
in the said field. The Government of Kerala had allocated land
and infrastructure for the Technopark and has by invoking the
provisions of the Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development
Act, 1992 notified certain areas within the Technopark as an
‘industrial area’.
A Single Window Clearance Board has also
been constituted for Technopark as envisaged under the Kerala
Industrial Single Window Clearance Board and Industrial
WA NO.967/2024
Township Area Development Act, 1999. It is contended by the
appellant that by virtue of the notification issued declaring
Technopark as an “industrial area”, no prior licence, permission
need be obtained from the local Government institution, viz.,
the 1st respondent Municipal Corporation, before effecting
constructions etc. within the Technopark ‘industrial area’. The
grievance of the appellant is that notwithstanding the above, the
1st respondent Municipal Corporation had been levying tax from
the areas notified as ‘industrial area’ situated within the
Technopark. Appellant contends that the 1st respondent has no
authority or jurisdiction to do so. The appellant had hence filed
W.P.(C)No.33694 of 2022 before this Court challenging the levy
of property tax on the buildings owned by the appellant. An
interim stay (Ext.P4) had been granted by this Court in the said
W.P.(C). While so, the appellant had issued to the 4th respondent
a licence/NOC to conduct from within the Technopark a
hotel/restaurant (under the trade name 'Subway') and the 4th
respondent had been running the said establishment on the
strength of such licence. However, when the 4th respondent
approached the 1st respondent Municipal Corporation to renew
the trade licence mandated under the Kerala Municipality
Act,1994 it was declined by the 1 st respondent on the premise
that the 4th respondent had along with the application produced
WA NO.967/2024
only an NOC issued by the appellant instead of the property tax
receipt evidencing payment of property tax to the 1st respondent
with respect to the relevant building. The 1st respondent thus
informed the 4th respondent that since the property tax due to
the 1st respondent with respect to the building from which the
4th respondent operates has not been remitted and the tax
receipt not produced, the application for trade licence cannot be
considered. The 1st respondent thereafter issued Ext.P7 notice to
the 4th respondent informing that the application for trade
licence has been rejected for the selfsame reason. The 4 th
respondent was vide Ext.P7 also informed that conducting the
establishment without a trade licence is illegal as per the
relevant provisions of the Municipality Act and hence the 4th
respondent has to immediately stop the functioning of the
establishment from the relevant premises within Technopark.
Appellant contends that Ext.P7 notice issued by the 1 st
respondent to the 4th respondent is illegal, arbitrary and
unsustainable and that the 1st respondent ought to have
renewed the trade licence of the 4 th respondent accepting the
NOC issued by the appellant in lieu of the property tax
receipt. Appellant filed the W.P.(C) thus challenging Ext.P7
notice, seeking to quash the same and also praying for issuance
of a writ of mandamus directing the 1st respondent Municipal
WA NO.967/2024
Corporation to issue trade licence to the 4 th respondent without
insisting on the payment of property tax or production of
property tax receipt.
Judgment in the WP (C):
3.
The learned Single Judge dismissed the W.P.(C)
holding that the 4th respondent is an independent entity and
therefore, the writ petition filed by the appellant impugning
Ext.P7 decision of the 1st respondent Municipal corporation is
not maintainable. The said judgment of the learned Single Judge
is challenged in this Writ Appeal.
4.
Heard Smt.Rashmi.K.V., learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant. Sri.Suman Chakravarthy, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 3 and the
learned Government Pleader appearing for the 2nd respondent
were also heard.
Contentions of the appellant:
5.
It was contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the learned Single Judge erred in concluding that
the appellant does not have locus standi to prefer the Writ
Petition. According to her, the person really aggrieved by Ext.P7
notice is the appellant in so far as the 4th respondent had been
permitted to occupy the premises by the appellant and thus the
appellant becomes answerable to the facilities allotted to the 4th
WA NO.967/2024
respondent within its premises. The learned counsel further
contends that the 1st respondent has no right, power or
authority to issue Ext.P7 notice to the 4th respondent since with
the constitution of the Board under the 1992 Act, the 1st
respondent has no power whatsoever to insist on property tax or
exercise any jurisdiction over the premises which has been
declared as an ‘industrial area’. Basing on Exts.P1, P2 and P3
notifications and on P8 judgment of this Court in W.P.(C) No.
3603 of 2016, the learned counsel contends that since the Board
has already been constituted for issuance of licences, the 1st
respondent has no authority to issue Ext.P7. The learned
counsel also contends that the appellant Technopark had issued
NOC to the 4th respondent since it is convinced that the 4th
respondent has been conducting business following all legal
mandates and without violating any rules.
Hence the 1st
respondent ought not to have rejected the application for
renewal preferred by the 4th respondent on the premise that
property tax is outstanding from the appellant and must have
issued the trade licence accepting the NOC issued by the
appellant. The learned counsel also relies on Ext.P4 interim stay
order in W.P.(C) No.33694 of 2022 filed by the appellant. In the
said W.P.(C), the authority of the 1st respondent to levy property
tax upon the buildings situated within the industrial area
WA NO.967/2024
designated with the Technopark has been challenged. In view of
the interim stay granted therein, the 1st respondent ought not
have insisted on the production of property tax receipt,
contends the learned counsel for the appellant.
Contentions of the respondents:
6.
Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st
and 3rd respondents submitted that mere constitution of a Board
under the 1992 Act does not take away the powers of the 1 st
respondent Municipal Corporation to levy property tax or to
take steps towards collection of the said tax from defaulters.
The authority of the 1st respondent to insist on trade licences on
commercial/trade establishments operating from within its
jurisdiction is also not taken away merely because an industrial
area has been declared under the relevant statute. The learned
counsel further contends that the W.P.(C) was rightly dismissed
in limine by the learned Single Judge in so far as Ext.P7 notice,
which was sought to be quashed, had been issued to the 4th
respondent and not to the appellant. If at all there could be any
person aggrieved by Ext.P7 and wished to challenge the same,
that could only be the 4th respondent. Since the 4th respondent
has not chosen to prefer a W.P.(C) or to challenge Ext.P7, the
learned counsel submits that there was a total lack of locus
standi in the appellant to prefer the same and hence according
WA NO.967/2024
to him, the W.P.(C) was validly dismissed at the threshold by the
learned Single Judge.
Discussion and findings:
7. The learned Single Judge had dismissed the W.P.(C)
holding that
grievance, if any, regarding Ext.P7 would subsist
only in the 4th respondent and not in the appellant. The
appellant contends that since the consequence of Ext.P7 is to
lead to the closure of the establishment run by the 4th
respondent from the premises licensed to it by the appellant,
Ext.P7 has an
effect of detrimentally impacting the appellant
also. To the said extent appellant claims to possess locus standi
to prefer the W.P.(C) challenging Ext.P7. It thus becomes
necessary to examine whether the appellant possess the locus
standi to seek a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P7 invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
On locus standi :
8.
The easiest of the definitions of locus standi is the
one given in the Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition). It reads
as follows:
"A right of appearance in a court of justice,
or before a legislative body, on a given
question".
WA NO.967/2024
9.
The concept of locus standi has had a checkered
history in Indian constitutional jurisprudence. It has never been
captive and has evolved along with the development of
constitutional law. In the context of invoking constitutionally
guaranteed rights, locus standi has been explained as the
foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction vested in the High
Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. (State of Orissa
v. Madan Gopal Rungta ([1952] S C.R. 28); Charanjit Lal
Chowdhury v. Union of India and others [(1950) S.C.R.
869]; Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal
and
others
(AIR
SC
1044);
Gadde
Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and
others (AIR 1966 SC 828)
10.
Some exceptions to the principles governing locus
standi were carved out later so as to accommodate public
interest litigations concerning enforcement of fundamental
rights. The objective of such relaxation was to ensure that legal
wrong wherever done or legal right wherever violated, must not
go unaddressed for lack of amenities or due to any other
disability to approach the court. [Hussainara Khatoon and
others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81];
Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1983 SC 378);
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and others [(1978) 4
WA NO.967/2024
SCC 494]; Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichan and
others [(1980) 4 SCC 162]; M.C. Mehta (II) v. Union of India
and others (AIR 1988 SC 1115), PT. Parmanand Katara v.
Union of India and others (AIR 1989 SC 2039); S. P. Gupta
v. Union of India and another (AIR 1982 SC 149)]. That the
relaxation of locus standi needs to be approached with due care
and caution as to prevent its misuse is also a trite proposition in
this
respect
(Dattaraj
Nathuji
Thaware
v.
State
of
Maharashtra and others (AIR 2005 SC 540) and Common
Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and others
(2008 SCC OnLine SC 664).
In Vinoy Kumar v. State of UP and others [(2001) 4 SCC
734], it was held by the Supreme Court that ;
“Generally speaking, a person shall have no
locus standi to file a writ petition if he is not
personally affected by the impugned order
or his fundamental rights have neither been
directly or substantially invaded nor is there
any imminent danger of such rights being
invaded or his acquired interests have been
violated ignoring the applicable rules. The
relief under Article 226 of the constitution is
based on the existence of a right in favour of
the person invoking the jurisdiction. The
exception to the general rule is only in cases
where the writ applied for is a writ of
habeas- corpus or quo warranto or filed in
public interest.”
In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra
and others [(2013) 4 SCC 465 ], the Supreme Court held as
follows:
WA NO.967/2024
“Thus, from the above it is evident that
under ordinary circumstances, a third
person, having no concern with the case at
hand, cannot claim to have any locus standi
to
raise
any
grievance
whatsoever.
However, in exceptional circumstances as
referred to above, if the actual persons
aggrieved, because of ignorance, illiteracy,
inarticulation or poverty, are unable to
approach the court, and a person, who has
no personal agenda, or object, in relation to
which, he can grind his own axe,
approaches the court, then the court may
examine the issue and in exceptional
circumstances, even if his bona fides are
doubted, but the issue raised by him, in the
opinion of the court, requires consideration,
the court may proceed suo moto, in such
respect.”
Writ of certiorari and locus standi :
11.
Insistence on locus standi in writs seeking issuance
of certiorari has been held to be on a higher footing when
compared to writs seeking habeas corpus or quo warranto
wherein a rather relaxed regime of locus standi has been
permitted. In order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari
jurisdiction, it was held by the Supreme Court that the
petitioner should be an "aggrieved person", and in a case of
defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner shall be entitled to a writ
of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not fulfill that
character and is a "stranger" the court will, in its discretion,
deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in exceptional
circumstances [Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar,
Haji Bashir Ahmed and others[ (1976) 1 SCC 671)].
WA NO.967/2024
12. The cardinal principles of law governing exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari
were laid down by the Supreme Court in Central Council for
Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & anr. v.
Bikartan Das
and others (2023 SCC OnLine SC 996), which reads as
follows :
“The first cardinal principle of law that
governs the exercise of extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, more particularly when it
comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari, is
that in granting such a writ, the High Court
does not exercise the powers of Appellate
Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the
evidence upon which the determination of
the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It
demolishes the order which it considers to be
without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous
but does not substitute its own views for
those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of
certiorari can be issued if an error of law is
apparent on the face of the record. A writ of
certiorari, being a high prerogative writ,
should not be issued on mere asking.”
13.
It is in the backdrop of the above set precedents that
the question whether the appellant has the right to file the W.P.
(C) out of which the present appeal has arisen is to be
answered. It is trite that generally, only a person whose rights
are alleged to have been threatened or transgressed can
approach this Court invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The discretionary nature
WA NO.967/2024
of
the
jurisdiction
exercised
under
Article
of
the
Constitution and that it has to be exercised only in extraordinary
circumstances
in matters pertaining to proceedings and
adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial
matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature
has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal
has been highlighted in M/s.South Indian Bank Ltd. and
others v. Naveen Mathew Philip and another [(2023) SCC
OnLine SC 435]. The rigidness and strict insistence on locus
standi could thus be justifiably relaxed depending on facts and
circumstances peculiar to the case by a cautious exercise of
discretion vested in this court.
Stay Order in W.P.(C) No.33694 of 2022:
14.
As regards the contention of the learned counsel for
the appellant based on Exts.P1 to P3, that an NOC from the
appellant would suffice for the issuance or renewal of the trade
licence and that the 1st respondent cannot insist on the
production of property tax receipts with respect to the building
wherein the trade licence is sought to be issued, the said
contention is not sustainable since the said question already
stands answered against the appellant vide judgment dated
30.11.2023 in W.P.(C) No.33694 of 2022 and the challenge
against the said judgment by the appellant was negatived by
WA NO.967/2024
this Court in W.A.No.757 of 2024. The further contention that
Ext.P7 notice is unsustainable in the light of the interim order
issued by this Court in W.P.(C) No.33694 of 2022, also has to
fail for the same reason.
Conclusion:
15.
Ext.P7 has been issued to the 4th respondent by the
1st respondent in response to an application preferred by the
former seeking renewal/ issuance of trade licence. Grievance, if
any, with respect to Ext. P7 thus lies only in the 4 th respondent.
Even assuming that the appellant has some interests in the 4 th
respondent continuing to run the establishment in its building
based on the licence issued, that does not by itself shift the legal
right to challenge Ext.P7 issued to the 4 th respondent exclusively
on to the appellant. It is settled law that except in the case of
writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto, writ remedy is not
meant to be generally invoked by a proxy as is, in fact, done by
the appellant in the present case. No compelling circumstance
has been pointed out to justify the appellant stepping into the
shoe of the 4th respondent to prefer the W.P.(C) challenging
Ext.P7 issued to the 4th respondent. Hence the finding of the
learned Single Judge that the 4th respondent is an independent
entity and the W.P.(C) filed by the appellant impugning Ext.P7
decision of the 1st respondent is not maintainable, is valid,
WA NO.967/2024
subsisting and does not call for any interference.
For the reason stated above, the appeal fails and it is
dismissed. No costs.
Sd/DR. A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
JUDGE
Sd/SYAM KUMAR V.M.
JUDGE
csl
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review