Constitution of India: Art. 226 – Writ jurisdiction, scope of – Judicial rewriting, permissibility – Held: Writ court is entrusted by the Constitution of the power of judicial review – In the discharge of its mandate, the court may evaluate the validity of a legislation or rules made under it – However, the court in exercise of judicial review cannot supplant the terms of the provision through judicial interpretation by re-writing statutory language – In the instant case, High Court by interim order modified the operation of Rule 29 of the Copyright Rules by stipulating that the particulars which are to be furnished in the notice may be furnished within a period of fifteen days after the broadcast – According to Rule 29, the broadcasting organisation shall give notice of fifteen days before broadcasting, exception provides that in unforeseen circumstances, notice shall be given twenty four hours after the broadcasting – The interim order converted the second proviso into a “routine procedure” instead of an exception (as the High Court has described its direction) that notice shall be given fifteen days after the broadcast – This exercise by the High Court amounts to re-writing – Such an exercise of judicial redrafting of legislation or delegated legislation cannot be carried out – An exercise of judicial rewriting of a statutory rule by High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Art.226 particularly in interlocutory proceedings is not warranted – Copyright Rules, 2013 – r.29 (4) – Interlocutory order. Judicial review: Scope of – Held: Court in exercise of judicial review cannot supplant the terms of the provision through judicial interpretation by re-writing statutory language – Draftsmanship is a function entrusted to the legislature – Craftsmanship on the judicial side cannot transgress into the legislative domain by re-writing the words of a statute – For then, the judicial craft enters the forbidden domain of a legislative draft.
Interpretation of statutes: It is a settled principle of law that when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, it is not permissible for the court to read words into the statute. Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 It is a settled principle of law that when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, it is not permissible for the court to read words into the statute. The court is entrusted by the Constitution of the power of judicial review. In the discharge of its mandate, the court may evaluate the validity of a legislation or rules made under it. A statute may be invalidated if is ultra vires constitutional guarantees or transgresses the legislative domain entrusted to the enacting legislature. Delegated legislation can, if it results in a constitutional infraction or is contrary to the ambit of the enacting statute be invalidated. However, the court in the exercise of judicial review cannot supplant the terms of the provision through judicial interpretation by re-writing statutory language. Draftsmanship is a function entrusted to the legislature. Craftsmanship on the judicial side cannot transgress into the legislative domain by re-writing the words of a statute. For then, the judicial craft enters the forbidden domain of a legislative draft. That precisely is what the Division Bench of the High Court has done by its interim order. Section 31D(2) speaks of the necessity of giving prior notice, in the manner as may be prescribed, of the intention to broadcast the work stating the duration and the territorial coverage of the broadcast, together with the payment of royalties in the manner and at the rates fixed by the Appellate Board. While the High Court held the broadcasters down to the requirement of prior notice, it modified the operation of Rule 29 by stipulating that the particulars which are to be furnished in the notice may be furnished within a period of fifteen days after the broadcast. The High Court was also of the view that the second proviso may be resorted to as a matter of routine, instead of as an exception and that the ex post facto reporting should be enlarged to a period of fifteen days (instead of a period of twenty four hours). Such an exercise was impermissible since it would substitute a statutory rule made in exercise of the power of delegated legislation with a new regime and provision which the High Court considers more practicable. The interim order of the High Court is set aside. This is, however, subject to the clarification that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival submissions which would fall for determination in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in the pending proceedings. [Paras 20-23][149-G; 150-D-H; 151-D-F]
Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu (2002) 3 SCC 533 - followed.
In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases Under Section 138 of NI Act 1881 Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 2 of 2020, 16 April 2021 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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