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Civil · Reportable judgment

Santhosh Maize & Industries Limited vs The State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date
4 July 2023
Case No.
Civil Appeal No. 5731 of 2009
Result
Dismissed
Bench
S. Ravindra Bhat, Dipankar Datta
Citation
[2023] 10 S.C.R. 101 : 2023 INSC 590
Supreme Court Reports [2023] 10 S.C.R. 101 : 2023 INSC 590
Headnote

Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 – TNGST (Amendment) Act, 1993 (Act No. 24 of 1993) – TNGST (Second Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act No.37 of 1996) – Taxation Entry No.61 – TNGST (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No.32 of 1994) – Exemption Entry No.8 – The appellant dealt in maize starch – The State through an Exemption Notification exempted the products of millets including maize from the tax – State Legislature imposed tax on ‘sago and starch of any kind’ (Taxation Entry No.61) – Same caused concerns among maize starch dealers – High Court concluded that maize starch will not be entitled to the benefit of exemption and upheld the validity of the circular which classified maize starch under Entry No.61 subject to 4% tax – Held: Maize is entitled to exemption in terms of Exemption Entry No.8 – Maize starch being a product of maize derived through mechanical process, it cannot be read as “like maize”, the “like” having been excluded by Act No. 32 of 1994 – Maize starch being a kind of starch, it is covered by Taxation Entry No. 61 as introduced by Act No.37 of 1996 which is to the effect “… starch of any kind” – Looking at the specific (Taxation Entry No.61) in contradistinction with the general (Exemption Entry No.8), there can be no manner of doubt that maize starch would be covered by the taxation entry and not by the exemption entry. Interpretation of Statutes – Law is well settled that if in any statutory rule or statutory notification two expressions are used one in general words and the other in special terms - under the rules of interpretation, it has to be understood that the special terms were not meant to be included in the general expression; alternatively, it can be said that where a statute contains both a general provision as well as a specific provision, the latter must prevail.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. When Act No.32 of 1994 amended Schedule III of the Act, Exemption Entry No.8 did not include the word ‘like’ which was hitherto there in the Exemption Notification [No. 88 of 1970 dated 14th March, 1970]. According to English grammar, the word “like” can be used as a verb, as a noun as well as a preposition depending upon its setting. It had been used in the Exemption Notification as a ‘noun”. Once it becomes clear from Exemption Entry No.8, as introduced by Act No.32 of 1994, that

Read the full headnote (7 more paragraphs)

(i) it does not include the noun “like” as the first word within brackets and (ii) that maize is only included along with rice, flour, etc. (and not maize starch), it is only those items within the brackets which, for the purposes of exemption, qualify as products of millets. It is, therefore, those products of millets specifically indicated, which are entitled to exemption under Section 8 of the Act read with Schedule III as per Exemption Entry No.8. [Para 17][113-F-H; 114-A]

2. Can maize starch be considered a millet product, as in Exemption Entry No.8, for the present purpose? This Court does not think so. Maize is the raw product, whereas maize starch is a processed product. While we are bound to hold that maize is entitled to exemption in terms of Exemption Entry No.8 as it stood prior to the relevant assessment year, maize starch being a product of maize derived through mechanical process, it cannot be read as “like maize”, the “like” having been excluded by Act No. 32 of 1994. Maize starch being a kind of starch, it is covered by Taxation Entry No. 61 as introduced by Act No.37 of 1996 which is to the effect “… starch of any kind”. The dictionary meaning of the word “any” is “one or same or all”. In Black’s Law Dictionary, it is explained that the word ‘any’ has diverse meaning and may be employed to indicate ‘all’ or ‘every’ as well as ‘same’ or ‘one’ and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and subject matter of the statute. Had the legislature intended to exclude any starch, including maize starch, a specific provision excluding it would have been made. [Para 18][114-B-D]

3. Trite to say, the Legislature may not have intended two entries for the self- same commodity, one under the exempted category and the other under the taxable entry. Therefore, maize starch has to be either covered by Taxation Entry No.61 or Exemption Entry No.8. Taxation Entry No.61 provides a more specific description and maize starch undoubtedly being a ‘kind of starch’ would, therefore, be comprehended in it. This is more so because what is covered by Exemption Entry No.8 is maize, which is a product of millet. The position would have been otherwise if Exemption Entry No.8 or any other entry in Schedule III carried the description of product of maize instead of ‘product of millet’. [Para 23][115-B-D]

State of Tamil Nadu vs. Lakshmi Starch (1990) SCC OnLine Mad 777; State of Tamil Nadu vs. TVL. Indras Agencies (P) Ltd. T.C.(R) 902/1999 – held inapplicable. Reliance Trading Company, Kerala vs. State of Kerala (2011) 15 SCC 762; Associated Cement Company Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs (2001) 4 SCC 593 : [2001]

1 SCR 608; Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131; B. Shankara Rao Badami vs. the State of Mysore (1969) 1 SCC 1 : [1969]

3 SCR 1; M/s. Associated Indem Mechanical (P) Limited vs. West Bengal Small Industries Development

Corporation (2007) 3 SCC 607 : [2007] 1 SCR 174 – referred to.

As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.

Full Judgment Text

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DIPANKAR DATTA, J. THE CHALLENGE The present appeals before us, by special leave, have been carried by the appellant from orders passed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court (“High Court”, hereafter). While the judgment and order dated 8th September, 2008 dismissing the writ petition1 instituted by the appellant is challenged in C.A. No. 5731 of 2009, the order dated 10 th February, 2009 dismissing a review application2 seeking a review of the aforesaid judgment and order is under challenge in C.A. No. 5732 of 2009. RELEVANT FACTS 2. The r
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