The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
23. However, in Order No. 9 dated 11th September, 2025, the learned Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by bypassing the mandatory provisions of the Act in allowing the application under Section 7 filed by defendant no. 2, another tenant, after one such application had (2022) 3 Indian Civil Cases 37 (Cal) already been rejected. The same is tantamount to gross perversity and palpable illegality and is, as such, liable to be set aside.
24. Accordingly, C.O. No. 4196 of 2025 is, thus, allowed. Connected applications, if any, are also, thus, disposed of.
25. Order No. 3 dated 29th April, 2025 passed by the Learned Chief Judge, Presidency Small Causes Court at Calcutta and sequential Order No. 9 dated 11th September, 2025 passed by the Learned 3 rd Judge, Presidency Small Causes Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 60 of 2025 are set aside save and accept the portion of directing serving of notice to the defendant no.2 afresh, so that Defendant No. 2 may also contest the case in accordance with law, if so advised.
Full Judgment Text
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta
C.O. No. 4196 of 2025
Sanjoy Paul
Versus
Ayodhya Prasad and Anr.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Anirban Roy, Adv.
Mr. Debjit Basu, Adv.
For the Opposite Party No. 2
:
Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Manabendra Saha Roy, Adv.
Mr. Sounak Bhattacharya, Adv.
Mr. Milan Kanti Mondal, Adv.
Mr. Anirban Saha Roy, Adv.
Heard on
:
24.08.2026
Judgment on
:
18.09.2026
Uploaded on
:
18.09.2026
Ajay Kumar Gupta, J.:1.
The instant application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
filed by the plaintiff/petitioner, is directed against the Order No. 3
dated 29th April, 2025 passed by the Learned Chief Judge, Presidency
Small Causes Court at Calcutta and the sequential Order No. 9 dated
11th September, 2025 passed by the Learned 3 rd Judge, Presidency
Small Causes Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 60 of 2025.
2.
Ejectment Suit No. 60 of 2025 is at the behest of the petitioner before
the Learned Presidency Small Causes Court, Calcutta, for eviction of
the opposite parties on the grounds of default, unauthorised
construction, change of user and reasonable requirement. Summons
in the suit were duly issued to both defendants through the Court
bailiff and by Speed Post with A/D on 25 th March 2025.
3.
The postal tracking report clearly establishes that service on
defendant no. 1 was effected through his daughter-in-law "Moumita"
on 26th March, 2025 and that the article sent to defendant no. 2 was
delivered to the same person and, thereafter, deliberately returned by
defendant no. 2 with the endorsement "addressee left without
instruction."
4.
By Order No. 3 dated 29th April, 2025, the Learned Chief Judge,
despite rejecting the application under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (in short, ‘the said Act’),
filed by defendant no. 1 as time-barred, erroneously directed the
petitioner to take fresh steps for service upon defendant no. 2,
ignoring the postal records and the presumption of due service in
law. Thereafter, defendant no. 2, though residing in the same
premises, filed fresh applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) on 9 th
June, 2025 beyond the statutory period.
5.
The Learned 3rd Judge, Presidency Small Causes Court, by Order No.
9 dated 11th September, 2025, allowed those applications, relying on
the previous observation that service had not been effected, without
calling for evidence or considering the materials on record. The
petitioner, therefore, seeks supervisory interference under Article 227
of the Constitution of India to set aside the impugned portions of
Order No. 3 (29th April, 2025) and the entire Order No. 9 (11th
September, 2025), and to direct that the defence of the defendants
stands struck out in accordance with law. Hence, this application.
6.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that
the learned Judge acted erroneously and without jurisdiction in
allowing the applications under Section 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act
filed by another tenant (Defendant No.2), although previously similar
applications filed by the Defendant No.1/tenant were rejected on the
ground of filing beyond the statutory period as prescribed, i.e. one
month from the date of service of notice.
7.
It is further submitted that the learned Court failed to appreciate that
once an application under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act filed
by one of the tenants stands rejected on contest in respect of one
joint tenant, the same cause of action cannot be revived by filing
similar applications by another tenant on identical grounds, and
belated applications amount to a gross abuse of process of the Court.
Therefore, the same is liable to be set aside.
8.
It was further submitted that the Trial Court ignored the settled legal
position that service of summons has to be presumed under Order 5
Rule 9 of the CPC when a postal article is returned with postal
endorsement “refused”, “house locked”, “not available in the house”
or “shop closed” or “addressee not in station”.
9.
It was finally submitted that an application filed under Section 151 of
the CPC cannot be invoked to override an express statutory bar. The
exercise of inherent power in contravention of the said Act constitutes
an excess of jurisdiction and, if it occurred, the High Court, in its
supervisory jurisdiction, can interfere with the same by setting it
aside.
10. Learned Counsel has placed reliance upon the following judgments to
bolster his submissions: i. Uma Beriwal and Ors. v. Sree Shree Iswar Annapurna Mata &
Ors.1;
ii. Jayanti Dam and Ors. v. Aurobinda Pyne 2;
iii. Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School v. Ismat
Ahmed and Ors.3;
2026 SCC OnLine Cal 6383;
2013 SCC OnLine Cal 23120;
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1696;
iv. Vishwabandhu v. Sri Krishna and Anr. 4.
11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party no. 2, on
the other hand, submitted that the applications filed by the opposite
party no.2 were allowed correctly, with the application of a judicious
mind. The court itself allowed summons to be served afresh upon the
Opposite Party No.2/defendant no. 2 and, on receipt of such
summons, the Opposite Party no. 2 filed applications within the
stipulated time. The petitioner did not challenge the previous order
dated 29.04.2025 by which the court directed that summons to be
served upon the Opposite Party No. 2; therefore, the impugned orders
are correct and, as such, do not require interference.
12. It was further indicated that the Opposite Party No. 2 has challenged
the relationship with the lawyer and another tenant. Learned counsel
has placed reliance of a judgment passed in the case of M/S Smart
Enterprises vs Shree Ram Trust 5 particularly in paragraph no. 7 to
support his contention as under: “7. Strictly speaking, Section 7(1) of the Act does not conceive of
any application being made thereunder. But a practical difficulty
arises in a deposit being made in Court without anything in
writing. Thus, a practice has developed whereunder an application
is made under Section 7(1) of the Act, even if only to make good the
default or pay the entire amount that is perceived to be due, at
least for the first time. The monthly deposits may be more easily
made if there is a file opened in the department of the relevant
(2021) 19 SCC 549
2017 (4) CHN 139
Court in the name of a particular suit where at least one previous
deposit has been made.”
13. Having heard the learned counsels for the respective parties and
having gone through the records, this Court is of the view that once
the applications under sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act are filed
beyond the stipulated time by one of the tenants and rejected on the
ground of delay, the same cannot be allowed to be subsequently filed
by another tenant bypassing the statutory provision of the said Act.
14. The Defendant No. 1 appeared through learned advocate and had
specifically stated before the learned court that the Defendant No. 2
is the married sister of Defendant No. 1 and resides at a separate
address, and he is not representing Defendant No. 2; as such, the
bailiff report shows that the process was returned unserved as the
defendant is out of station.
15. It is revealed from the record that Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are joint
tenants as per the rent receipt. Now the question that arises before
this court is whether several joint tenants can file separate
applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act, when facts,
tenanted premises and defence are the same and identical and the
previous applications filed under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said
Act were rejected by the trial court.
16. Before deciding this issue, it is apposite to quote the relevant
provision stipulated in the said Act, 1997 for the sake of convenience
and ready reference to decide the issue involved in the present case.
Section 7 of the said Act of 1997 read as follows: “7. When a tenant can get the benefit of protection against
eviction.
(1) (a) On a [suit] [Word substituted for the word 'proceeding' by W.B.
Act 12 of 2006.] being instituted by the landlord for eviction on
any of the grounds referred to in section 6, the tenant shall,
subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of this section, pay to
the landlord or deposit with [the Civil Judge] [Words 'or the Civil
Judge' first inserted by W.B. Act 6 of 2005, then, the words
within third brackets substituted for the words 'the Controller or
the Civil Judge' by W.B. Act 12 of 2006.] all arrears of rent,
calculated at the rate at which it was last paid and upto the end
of the month previous to that in which the payment is made
together with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum.
(b) Such payment or deposit shall be made within one month of the
service of summons on the tenant or, where he appears in the
[suit] [Words substituted for the word 'proceeding' by W.B. Act 12
of 2006.] without the summons being served upon him, within
one month of his appearance.
(c) The tenant shall thereafter continue to pay to the landlord or
deposit with [the Civil Judge] [Words 'or the Civil Judge' first
inserted by W.B. Act 6 of 2005, then, the words within third
brackets substituted for the words 'the Controller or the Civil
Judge' by W.B. Act 12 of 2006.] month by month by the 15th of
each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate.
(2) If in any [suit] [Words substituted for the word 'proceeding' by W.B.
Act 12 of 2006.] referred to in sub-section (1), there is any dispute as
to the amount of the rent payable by the tenant, the tenant shall,
within the time specified in that sub-section, deposit with [the Civil
Judge] [Words 'or the Civil Judge' first inserted by W.B. Act 6 of
2005, then, the words within third brackets substituted for the words
'the Controller or the Civil Judge' by W.B. Act 12 of 2006.] the amount
admitted by him to be due from him together with an application for
determination of the rent payable. No such deposit shall be accepted
unless it is accompanied by an application for determination of the
rent payable. On receipt of the application, [the Civil Judge] [Words
'or the Civil Judge' first inserted by W.B. Act 6 of 2005, then, the
words within third brackets substituted for the words 'the Controller
or the Civil Judge' by W.B. Act 12 of 2006.] shall, having regard to
the rate at which rent was last paid and the period for which default
may have been made by the tenant, make, as soon as possible
within a period not exceeding one year, an order specifying the
amount, if any, due from the tenant and, thereupon, the tenant shall,
within one month of the date of such order, pay to the landlord the
amount so specified in the order:
Provided that having regard to the circumstances of the case, an
extension of time may be granted by [the Civil Judge] [Words 'or the
Civil Judge' first inserted by W.B. Act 6 of 2005, then, the words
within third brackets substituted for the words 'the Controller or the
Civil Judge' by W.B. Act 12 of 2006.] only once and the period of such
extension shall not exceed two months.
(3) If the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in subsection (1) or sub-section (2) within the time specified therein or
within such extended time as may be granted, [the Civil Judge]
[Words substituted for the words 'the Controller' by W.B. Act 6 of
2005.] shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be
struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the [suit] [Words
substituted for the word 'proceeding' by W.B. Act 12 of 2006.].
(4) If the tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2), no order for delivery of possession of the
premises to the landlord on the ground of default in payment of rent
by the tenant, shall be made by [the Civil Judge] [Words substituted
for the words 'the Controller' by W.B. Act 6 of 2005.], but he may
allow such cost as he may deem fit to the landlord:
Provided that the tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this
sub-section if, having obtained such relief once in respect of the
premises, he again makes default in payment of rent for four months
within a period of twelve months or for three successive rental
periods where rent is not payable monthly.”
17. On perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that a tenant can get
benefit of protection against eviction filed on the ground of default in
payment of rent by the tenant. subject to the provisions of this
section, the tenant shall pay to the landlord or deposit with the Civil
Judge, all arrears of rent, calculated at the rate at which it was last
paid and up to the end of the month previous to that in which the
payment is made together with interest with interest @ 10 % per
annum and same shall be deposited within one month of the service
of summons on the tenant or, where he appears in the suit without
the summons being served upon him, within one month of
appearance.
18. The term ‘tenant’ in the section refers to tenant/joint tenant as both
deposit a combined rent for the tenanted premises. Consequently,
once the applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act,
1997 filed by the tenant were rejected, a second or separate
application filed by another tenant cannot be allowed. The Trial Court
committed a gross error in allowing the subsequent applications;
counting the date of receiving summons by defendant no. 2 cannot
and does not arise at all.
19. Once an eviction summons is served on a tenant, the statutory 30day period for depositing arrears of rent along with applicable interest
is mandatory and cannot be extended by invoking Section 5 of the
Limitation Act or inherent powers conferred under Section 151 of the
CPC. The provisions of Sections 7(1) and 7(2) are mandatory and
binding on all the defendants/tenants in an eviction suit.
20. There is a specific bar to entertain several applications filed under
Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act due to the statutory period
stipulated in the said Act by the different tenants; since when the suit
is filed for eviction of the tenant(s), the obligation to deposit arrears
and seek determination of dispute under Section 7 is a unified
defence available to the defendants sued as tenant(s) or legal
heirs/representatives.
Therefore,
the
defence
available
to
the
remaining co-tenants/defendants would equally stand affected, since
the obligation under Section 7 is a unified defence, wherein noncompliance by one cannot be dissociated from the liability of the
others. In that case, an order may be passed for striking out the
defence in view of the non-compliance with the requirement under
Section 7(1) of the Act. The Trial Court already indicated the same,
observing “Therefore, provisions of Section 7(3) of the W.B.P.T Act
shall be operative” in its first order.
21. This Court concurs with the observation of the Learned Court below
while passing Order No. 3 dated 29th April, 2025, whereby, relying on
a decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Arsala
Khan v. Land & Bricks & Entertainment Ltd. 6 it was observed
that Section 7 of the said Act of 1997 does not allow the tenant to
take recourse to the Limitation Act to deposit the arrear rent beyond
the stipulated period.
22. This Court further concurs with the reliance on the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bijay Kumar Singh v. Amit
Kumar Chamariya7 wherein it was held that simultaneous deposit
of admitted rent with an application for determination is a precondition; the Limitation Act cannot aid a belated deposit. Impact:
Provided the direct ratio that the Court re-applied. The decision in the
case of Debasish Paul v. Amal Boral8 further reaffirms Bijay
Kumar (Supra); and clarified that if the WBPT Act prescribes a
shorter limitation, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot enlarge it.
23. However, in Order No. 9 dated 11th September, 2025, the learned
Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by bypassing the mandatory
provisions of the Act in allowing the application under Section 7 filed
by defendant no. 2, another tenant, after one such application had
(2022) 3 Indian Civil Cases 37 (Cal)
(2019) 10 SCC 660
(2024) 2 SCC 169
already been rejected. The same is tantamount to gross perversity
and palpable illegality and is, as such, liable to be set aside.
24. Accordingly, C.O. No. 4196 of 2025 is, thus, allowed. Connected
applications, if any, are also, thus, disposed of.
25. Order No. 3 dated 29th April, 2025 passed by the Learned Chief
Judge, Presidency Small Causes Court at Calcutta and sequential
Order No. 9 dated 11th September, 2025 passed by the Learned 3 rd
Judge, Presidency Small Causes Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit
No. 60 of 2025 are set aside save and accept the portion of directing
serving of notice to the defendant no.2 afresh, so that Defendant No.
2 may also contest the case in accordance with law, if so advised.
26. Let a copy of this Judgment be sent to the Learned Court below for
information.
27. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
28. All parties will act on the server copies of this Judgment duly
downloaded from the official website of this Hon’ble High Court.
29. Urgent photostat certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for, is to
be given as expeditiously to the parties on compliance of all legal and
necessary formalities.
(Ajay Kumar Gupta, J.)
(P.A.)
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