Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:HHC:41037
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 649 of 2025
Reserved on: 15.9.2026
Date of Decision: 24.9.2026.
Sanjay Dhiman
...Petitioner
Versus
Super Treads & anr.
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
Yes.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Mohn Singh, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1
:
Mr. Bhairav Gupta, Advocate.
For Respondent No.2-State
:
Mr.
Jitender
Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision petition is directed against the
judgment dated 08.07.2025 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge (CBI Court), Shimla (learned Appellate Court),
vide which the judgment of conviction dated 31.08.2024 and
order of sentence dated 03.09.2024 passed by the learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 4, Shimla, H.P. (learned
Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:41037
to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial
Court for convenience).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (in short ‘NI Act’). It was asserted that the
accused owed ₹1,26,600/- for retreading and purchase of new
tyres for his vehicle. The accused issued a cheque of
₹1,26,600/-, drawn on UCO Bank, Branch Chakkar, Shimla, in
favour of the complainant. The complainant presented the
cheque before his bank, and it was dishonoured with the
endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The complainant issued a
legal notice on 24.06.2014 asking the accused to pay the amount
within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The notice was
delivered to the accused, but the accused failed to pay the money
despite the service of the notice. Hence, the complaint was filed
before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI
Act.
3.
2026:HHC:41037
The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
The complainant examined Sanjay Sood (CW-1),
Arpit Verma (CW-2), and Sandeep Sharma (CW-3) to prove his
complaint.
5.
The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that the
complainant is engaged in the business of retreading and sale of
new tyres under the name of Super Treads at Taradevi, Shimla
and Darlaghat. He claimed that he had purchased the tyres for
₹22,000/-, out of which he had paid ₹8,000/-. He had issued a
blank cheque which was misused by the complainant. He was
liable to pay ₹14,000/-, and a false complaint was made against
him. He examined himself as (DW-1) to prove his defence.
6.
The learned Trial Court held that the accused had not
disputed the issuance of the cheque and his signatures on it.
Therefore, a presumption arose that the cheque was issued for
2026:HHC:41037
consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The plea taken by
the accused that he had to pay ₹14,000/- and that he had issued
a blank cheque was not probable. The amount was definite, and
there was no justification for issuing a blank cheque. The
accused had failed to produce any evidence to prove that he had
repaid the amount to the complainant, and his evidence was not
sufficient to discharge the burden. The cheque was dishonoured
with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’, and the notice was
duly served upon the accused. The accused had failed to pay the
money despite the service of the notice. Hence, the learned Trial
Court convicted the accused for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced him to
undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of
₹1,75,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo
further simple imprisonment for two months.
7.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was
decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (CBI Court),
Shimla (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court
concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court
that the issuance of the cheque and signatures of the accused on
2026:HHC:41037
the cheque were not disputed. Therefore, a presumption arose
that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the
debt/liability. The plea taken by the accused that he had
purchased the tyres for ₹22,000/- and handed over a blank
cheque was not believable. The accused had failed to prove the
payment of money to the complainant. The cheque was
dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The
notice was also presumed to be served upon the accused. The
learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, which
did not require any interference. Hence, the appeal was
dismissed.
8.
Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in
appreciating the evidence on record. The complainant has not
placed any bills of the sale/retreading. The plea taken by the
accused that he had issued a blank signed cheque, which was
misused by the complainant, was highly probable. Therefore, it
was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the
judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set
aside.
9.
2026:HHC:41037
I have heard Mr Mohan Singh, learned counsel for
the petitioner/accused, Mr Bhairav Gupta, learned counsel for
respondent No. 1/complainant, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned
Additional Advocate General, for the respondent No. 2/State.
10.
Mr
Mohan
Singh,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below
erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The
cheque was issued in the name of Super Treads, Taradevi. There
was no evidence that Sanjay Sood is the proprietor of Super
Treads. The learned Courts below relied upon the presumption
to hold that the notice was served upon the accused; however, a
presumption can be applied after 30 days of the issuance of the
notice. The complaint was filed within the 15 days available to
the accused to repay the money, and it was premature.
Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and
the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be
set aside. He relied upon O.C. Doegar Vs. Ganesh Dutt Sharma
2025:HHC:43992-DB, in support of his submissions.
11.
Mr
Bhairav
Gupta,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent/complainant, submitted that the accused had
2026:HHC:41037
admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that
Sanjay Sood is the owner of Super Treads, and the plea taken by
the accused before this Court is not sustainable. The accused had
never claimed before the learned Trial Court or the learned
Appellate Court that the complaint was premature. This plea was
not even taken in the memorandum of revision petition and
cannot be taken for the first time at the time of arguments.
Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.
12.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the dispute is
between private parties, and the State has no submissions to
make in the present case.
13.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
14.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a
revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only
determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings,
sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed:
“7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours
2026:HHC:41037
and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts
and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality
or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal
court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder:
“438. Calling for records to exercise powers of
revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or
his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself
or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety
of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed,
and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such
inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record,
direct that the execution of any sentence or order be
suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that
he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending
the examination of the record.
Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to
the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection
and of section 439.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section
(1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been
made by any person either to the High Court or to the
Sessions Judge, no further application by the same
person shall be entertained by the other of them.”
Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
should be exercised within the four corners of this section
whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However,
while exercising power under this section, the Court does
2026:HHC:41037
not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and
should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the
case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and
order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain
from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts
should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this
case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record.
7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan
Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri)
2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent
one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the
present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court
gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits
of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the wellreasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and
appellate courts.
7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order
dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went
into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents
and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court,
the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the
case, something which is generally impermissible unless
a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the
record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
2026:HHC:41037
Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while
considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the
High Court, this Court has laid down the following:
“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court
can call for and examine the record of any proceedings
for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is
one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the
said revisional power cannot be equated with the
power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even
as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily,
therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High
Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already
been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the
Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is
brought to the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of
justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the
High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no
hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the
conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the
oral evidence. …”
7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction
have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court
wherein time and again it has been observed that the
High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower
court unless:
i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse,
grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or
wholly unreliable or untenable in law.
ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order
after considering immaterial or irrelevant material
or no material at all.
2026:HHC:41037
iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant
material or the judicial discretion has been
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025
INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the
High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the
impugned order, observed as under:
“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This
Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional
Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on
record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales &
Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH,
(2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of
law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if
a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction,
in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in
the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High
Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to
upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and
the Sessions Court.”
7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High
Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record
so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional
jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the
judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the
present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in
exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground
has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to
2026:HHC:41037
enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting
aside the conviction.
15.
The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
16.
The ingredients of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were explained in
Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 as under:
5.3. At this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight the key
ingredients as highlighted by this Court in the case of
Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities
Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745: 2000 SCC (Cri) 546: (2000) 100
COMP CAS 755.
“10. On a reading of the provisions of Section 138 of
the NI Act, it is clear that the ingredients which are to
be satisfied for making out a case under the provision
are:
(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an
account maintained by him in a bank for
payment of a certain amount of money to
another person out of that account for the
discharge of any debt or other liability;
(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date on
which it is drawn or within the period of its
validity, whichever is earlier;
(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid,
either because the amount of money standing to
the credit of the account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from that account by an
agreement made with the bank;
2026:HHC:41037
(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque makes a demand for the payment of the
said amount of money by giving a notice in
writing to the drawer of the cheque, within 15
days of the receipt of information by him from
the bank regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid;
(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make
payment of the said amount of money to the
payee or the holder in due course of the cheque
within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.
11. If the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied,
then the person who has drawn the cheque shall be
deemed to have committed an offence. In the
explanation to the section, clarification is made that
the phrase “debt or other liability” means a legally
enforceable debt or other liability.
5.4. The ingredients of the offence under Section 138 are
as follows:
i. The drawing of a cheque by a person on an account
maintained by him with the banker for the payment
of any amount of money to another from that
account.
ii. The cheque being drawn for the discharge in whole
or in part of any debt or other liability.
iii. Presentation of the cheque to the bank within the
period of six months or within the period of its
validity.
iv. The return of the cheque by the drawee bank as
unpaid either because the amount of money
standing to the credit of that account is insufficient
to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from that account.
v. A notice by the payee or the holder in due course
making a demand for the payment of the amount to
the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the
2026:HHC:41037
receipt of information from the bank in regard to
the return of the cheque.
vi. Failure of the drawer of the cheque to make
payment of the amount of money to the payee or
the holder in due course within fifteen days of the
receipt of the notice.
vii. Filing of the complaint within a month from the
date of expiry of the grace period of fifteen days
before a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial
Magistrate not below first class.
17.
The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
18.
The accused admitted in his statement recorded
under Section 313 of the CrPC that he had issued a blank cheque.
He admitted in his cross-examination that the cheque (Ext.CW1/A) bears his signatures. He admitted that he had issued the
cheque towards the payment of the tyres of the bus. He
volunteered to say that he had purchased the tyres worth
₹22,000/- and had handed over a blank signed cheque. Thus, it
is apparent that the accused has not disputed the issuance of the
cheque and his signatures on it.
19.
It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148 that where the
accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily
signed and handed over by him to the complainant, it is
2026:HHC:41037
sufficient to trigger the presumption contained under Section
118(a) and 139 of the NI Act. It was observed: 36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding
that presumption takes effect even in a situation where
the accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was
voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the
complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309:
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40]]. Therefore, mere admission of the
drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of
the entire contents of the cheque, is now sufficient to
trigger the presumption.
37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to
prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by
the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device
under Section 139 of the Act helps shift the burden on the
accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to
transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving
that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the
discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is
discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to
be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to
do anything further.
20.
It was laid down in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, that where the execution of the cheque
is proved or admitted, the presumption would be attracted. It
was observed:
“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED,
PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI
ACT ARISE
2026:HHC:41037
15. In the present case, the cheque in question has
admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused.
This Court is of the view that once the execution of the
cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of
the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for
consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of
the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said
cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or
liability arise against the accused. It is pertinent to
mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge
Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde,
(2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge
Bench in Rangappa(supra).
16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this
presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques
as a mode of payment in commercial transactions.
17. Needless to mention that the presumption
contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is
rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that the
cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is
on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].
21.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kuntegowda(supra) that the cheque carries a presumption that it
was issued in discharge of the liability for consideration, and the
burden is upon the accused to rebut this presumption. It was
observed:
5.7.A conjoint and harmonious reading of the aforesaid
provisions clearly indicates towards the statutory
presumption that every negotiable instrument was made
or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for
discharge of debt or liability once the execution of the
negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As
2026:HHC:41037
soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove
that the instrument was executed by the drawer, the rules
of presumption under Sections118and139of theNI Acthelp
him and shift the burden of rebutting the said
presumptions upon the said drawer. Since these
presumptions are rebuttable, the accused has the burden
of disproving the same by leading evidence, either direct
or indirect, to the effect that there did not exist any
consideration or debt or that the non-existence of the
said debt or consideration is so probable that a prudent
man ought to suppose that no consideration or debt
existed. However, a bare denial of the passing of any
consideration or existence of any debt does not support
the defence of the accused and, therefore, to disprove the
presumptions, something which is probable has to be
brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted
back to the complainant. The accused has to bring on
record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration
of which the court may either believe that the
consideration and the debt did not exist or their nonexistence was so probable that a prudent man would,
under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea
that it did not exist.
22.
Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held
that a presumption would be attracted in the present case that
the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the
debt/liability, and the burden would shift upon the accused to
rebut the presumption.
23.
The accused claimed that he had purchased two tyres
from the complainant. Each tyre was worth ₹11,000/-, and he
was to pay ₹22,000/- to the complainant. He paid ₹8,000/- in
2026:HHC:41037
cash to the complainant in 2013 and issued a blank cheque
regarding the payment of the rest of the amount. He admitted in
his cross-examination that one tyre of the bus is worth
₹14,000–15,000/-. He volunteered to say that the cost of each
tyre was ₹8,000/-. The statement of the accused makes his
version doubtful. The cost of two tyres would have been
₹16,000/- at the rate of ₹8,000/- per tyre or ₹ 22,000/- at the
rate of ₹ 11,000/- per tyre. Thus, the balance amount would be
₹8,000/- or ₹ 14,000/- after deducting ₹8,000/- paid by the
accused in cash. Thus, the accused had no justification for
issuing a blank cheque.
24.
The accused admitted in his cross-examination that
the complainant used to maintain an account of the amount due
to him in his copy. The complainant also admitted in his crossexamination that he had maintained an account of the
transaction with the accused; however, he had not produced any
record of the transaction on record. He volunteered to say that
he could have produced it if asked. It was submitted that the
absence of evidence regarding the amount due to the accused
would make the complainant’s case highly suspect. This
submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
2026:HHC:41037
Supreme Court in Uttam Ram v. Devinder Singh Hudan, (2019) 10
SCC 287: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1361, that a presumption under
Section 139 of the NI Act would obviate the requirement to prove
the existence of consideration. It was observed:
“20. The trial court and the High Court proceeded as if the
appellant was to prove a debt before the civil court,
wherein the plaintiff is required to prove his claim on the
basis of evidence to be laid in support of his claim for the
recovery of the amount due, and the dishonour of a
cheque carries a statutory presumption of consideration.
The holder of the cheque in due course is required to
prove that the cheque was issued by the accused and that
when the same was presented, it was not honoured. Since
there is a statutory presumption of consideration, the
burden is on the accused to rebut the presumption that
the cheque was issued not for any debt or other liability.”
25.
This position was reiterated in Ashok Singh v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 706, wherein it was observed:
“22. The High Court, while allowing the criminal
revision, has primarily proceeded on the presumption
that it was obligatory on the part of the complainant to
establish his case on the basis of evidence by giving the
details of the bank account as well as the date and time of
the withdrawal of the said amount which was given to the
accused and also the date and time of the payment made
to the accused, including the date and time of receiving of
the cheque, which has not been done in the present case.
Pausing here, such presumption on the complainant, by
the High Court, appears to be erroneous. The onus is not
on the complainant at the threshold to prove his
capacity/financial wherewithal to make the payment in
discharge of which the cheque is alleged to have been
2026:HHC:41037
issued in his favour. Only if an objection is raised that the
complainant was not in a financial position to pay the
amount so claimed by him to have been given as a loan to
the accused, only then would the complainant have to
bring before the Court cogent material to indicate that he
had the financial capacity and had actually advanced the
amount in question by way of a loan. In the case at hand,
the appellant had categorically stated in his deposition
and reiterated in the cross-examination that he had
withdrawn the amount from the bank in Faizabad (Typed
Copy of his deposition in the paperbook wrongly
mentions this as ‘Firozabad’). The Court ought not to
have summarily rejected such a stand, more so when
respondent no. 2 did not make any serious attempt to
dispel/negate such a stand/statement of the appellant.
Thus, on the one hand, the statement made before the
Court, both in examination-in-chief and crossexamination, by the appellant with regard to withdrawing
the money from the bank for giving it to the accused has
been disbelieved, whereas the argument on behalf of the
accused that he had not received any payment of any loan
amount has been accepted. In our decision in S. S.
Production v. Tr. Pavithran Prasanth, 2024 INSC 1059, we
opined:
‘8. From the order impugned, it is clear that though the
contention of the petitioners was that the said amounts
were given for producing a film and were not by way of
return of any loan taken, which may have been a probable
defence for the petitioners in the case, but rightly, the High
Court has taken the view that evidence had to be adduced
on this point, which has not been done by the petitioners.
Pausing here, the Court would only comment that the
reasoning of the High Court, as well as the First Appellate
Court and Trial Court, on this issue is sound. Just by taking
a counter-stand to raise a probable defence would not
shift the onus on the complainant in such a case, for the
plea of defence has to be buttressed by evidence, either
oral or documentary, which in the present case has not
2026:HHC:41037
been done. Moreover, even if it is presumed that the
complainant had not proved the source of the money
given to the petitioners by way of loan by producing
statement of accounts and/or Income Tax Returns, the
same ipso facto would not negate such claim for the
reason that the cheques having been issued and signed by
the petitioners have not been denied, and no evidence has
been led to show that the respondent lacked capacity to
provide the amount(s) in question. In this regard, we may
make profitable reference to the decision in Tedhi Singh v.
Narayan Dass Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735:
‘10. The trial court and the first appellate court have
noted that in the case under Section 138 of the NI Act,
the complainant need not show in the first instance
that he had the capacity. The proceedings under
Section 138 of the NI Act are not a civil suit. At the time
when the complainant gives his evidence, unless a
case is set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice
sent, that the complainant did not have the
wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the complainant
to initially lead evidence to show that he had the
financial capacity. To that extent, the courts, in our
view, were right in holding on those lines. However,
the accused has the right to demonstrate that the
complainant in a particular case did not have the
capacity and therefore, the case of the accused is
acceptable, which he can do by producing
independent materials, namely, by examining his
witnesses and producing documents. It is also open to
him to establish the very same aspect by pointing to
the materials produced by the complainant himself.
He can further, more importantly, further achieve this
result through the cross-examination of the witnesses
of the complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of
the courts to consider carefully and appreciate the
totality of the evidence and then come to a conclusion
whether, in the given case, the accused has shown that
the case of the complainant is in peril for the reason
that
the
accused
2026:HHC:41037
has
established
a
probable
(underlining
original; emphasis supplied by us in bold).
defence.’(emphasis
26.
supplied)’
in
A similar view was taken in Sanjay Sanjabij Tari v.
Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was
observed:
“21. This Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that
some District Courts and some High Courts are not giving
effect to the presumptions incorporated in Sections 118
and 139 of the NI Act and are treating the proceedings
under the NI Act as another civil recovery proceeding and
are directing the complainant to prove the antecedent
debt or liability. This Court is of the view that such an
approach is not only prolonging the trial but is also
contrary to the mandate of Parliament, namely, that the
drawer and the bank must honour the cheque; otherwise,
trust in cheques would be irreparably damaged.”
27.
Therefore, the complainant’s version cannot be
doubted merely because no record of the transaction was
produced before the Court.
28.
It was submitted that the cheque was issued in the
name of Super Treads, Taradevi, and there is no evidence to
connect Sanjay Sood to Super Treads, Taradevi; hence, the
complaint is not maintainable. This submission will not help the
accused. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the complainant is engaged in the
business of retreading and sale of new tyres under the name and
2026:HHC:41037
style of Super Treads at Taradevi. He stated in his crossexamination that he used to purchase the tyres from Super
Treads, Taradevi, Shimla, and that Sanjay Sood is the owner of
Super Treads, Taradevi. Therefore, the accused never disputed
that the complainant is the owner of Super Treads, Taradevi,
and the submission that Sanjay Sood is not connected to Super
Treads cannot be accepted.
29.
The accused claimed that he had only purchased two
tyres and had returned ₹8,000/- to the complainant; however,
he did not produce any receipt of the payment of the amount,
and the plea taken by the accused is not acceptable.
30.
There is no other evidence to show that the cheque
was not issued for consideration; hence, the learned Courts
below had rightly held that the accused had failed to rebut the
presumption attached to the cheque.
31.
Complainant stated that the cheque was dishonoured
with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. Arpit Verma (CW-2)
stated that, as per the record brought by him, the cheque
(Ext.CW-1/A)
was
dishonoured
with
an
endorsement
‘insufficient funds’. He has produced the account statement
2026:HHC:41037
(Ext.CW-2/A). He was not cross-examined at all, which means
that his testimony was not disputed by the accused. Therefore, it
was duly proved on record that the cheque was dishonoured for
insufficient funds.
32.
The complainant stated that he had issued a notice
(Ext.CW-1/D) to the accused asking him to pay the money. He
has produced on record the acknowledgement (Ext.CW-1/F),
which bears the signatures of the accused. Therefore, the notice
was duly served upon the accused, and the submission that the
service has to be presumed after 30 days of the issuance of the
notice cannot be accepted. The presumption applies when the
notice is not served. In the present case, the acknowledgement
shows that the notice was duly served upon the accused, and
there can be no question of any presumption. Hence, the
judgment in O.C. Doegar (supra) does not apply to the present
case.
33.
The accused has not claimed that he had paid the
money to the complainant after the receipt of the notice. Hence,
the learned Trial Court had rightly held that it was duly proved
on record that the accused had issued a cheque to the
2026:HHC:41037
complainant to discharge the existing liability, which cheque
was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’, and
the accused had failed to repay the money despite the receipt of
a valid notice of demand. Hence, he was rightly convicted by the
learned Trial Court.
34.
The learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to
undergo simple imprisonment for three months and pay a fine
of ₹1,75,000/-. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri)
40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138, that the penal
provision of Section 138 is deterrent in nature. It was observed at
page 203:
“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable
instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and
promote the use of negotiable instruments, including
cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended
to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable
instruments such as cheques without serious intention to
honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”
35.
Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the
punishment, the sentence of three months cannot be said to be
excessive.
36.
2026:HHC:41037
The cheque was issued for ₹1,26,600/-. The learned
Trial Court imposed a fine of ₹1,75,000/- and ordered that the
amount of the fine be paid to the complainant as compensation,
which means that ₹48,400/- was paid as compensation to the
complainant. The cheque was issued on 17.06.2014. The sentence
was awarded on 03.09.2024 after the lapse of ten years. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P.
Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2
SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75, that the Courts should
uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with
simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at
page 291: 19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf
of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled
principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not
only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The
provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal
liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil
liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also
well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach
towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist
special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy
fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple
interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260,
para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]”
37.
The complainant lost interest that he would have
earned by investing the amount. He had to engage a counsel to
2026:HHC:41037
prosecute the complaint. He was entitled to be compensated for
the loss suffered by him. Considering these factors, the
compensation of ₹48,400/- cannot be said to be excessive.
38.
Thus, the sentence imposed by the learned Trial
Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, was adequate
and did not require any interference from this Court.
39.
No other point was urged.
40.
In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it
is dismissed. All the pending applications, if any, also stand
disposed of.
41.
A copy of the judgment, along with records of the
learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.
24th September, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review