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2026:BHC-AUG:54529
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 15047 OF 2026
Sau. Sangita Ashok Patil
Age. Major, Occ. Agriculture/Household,
R/o. Nilanga, Tq. Nilanga, Dist. Latur.
...Petitioner
Versus
1.
Returning Officer and Residential
Deputy Collector, The Latur District
Central C-operative Bank, Latur.
2.
Arvind Dilip Patil
Age. 50 years, Occ. Agri.,
R/o. Nilanga, Tq. Nilanga, Dist. Latur.
3.
Omprakash Laxman Biradar,
Age. Major, Occ. Agri.,
R/o. Mirgaon Phale Post. Kasar Balkunda,
Tq. Nilanga, Dist. Latur.
4.
The Latur District Central C-operative Bank, Latur,
Through Managing Director.
...Respondents
…
Advocate for Petitioner : Mr. N.B. Khandare (Senior Counsel) i/b. Mr.
D.J. Chaudhary
Advocate for Respondent No. 1 : Mr. V.H. Dighe
Advocate for Respondent No. 2 : Mr. V.D. Sapkal (Senior Counsel) i/b.
Mr. A.D. Ostwal
Advocate for Respondent No. 4 : Mr. S.V. Advant
…
CORAM : MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J.
RESERVED ON
: 30TH OCTOBER, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 04TH NOVEMBER, 2026
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JUDGMENT :
1.
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by
the consent of the parties.
2.
By way of this Writ Petition, challenge is raised to the order
passed by Respondent no. 1 – Returning Officer and Residential Deputy
Collector, for the elections of the Latur District Central Co-operative
Bank (for short ‘the LDCC Bank’), dated 19.10.2026, rejecting the
objection raised by the Petitioner to the nomination of Respondent no. 2
– Arvind Dilip Patil.
3.
Heard the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Khandare for the
Petitioner, learned Advocate Mr. Dighe, for Respondent no. 1, learned
Senior Counsel Mr. Sapkal for Respondent no. 2 and learned Advocate
Mr. Advant for Respondent no. 4.
4.
Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Khandare, for the Petitioner
submitted that, the Petitioner is contesting the elections of Board of
Directors of the LDCC Bank. The Petitioner has raised objection to the
nomination of Respondent no. 2, before Respondent no. 1 on the ground
that he is not holding the requisite qualification for being elected as a
Director of LDCC Bank. Therefore, acceptance of his nomination is bad
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in law and unsustainable. He has raised the following grounds are raised :
i.
The Society namely Nilanga Multipurpose Service Co-
operative Society (for short ‘the NMSCS’) to whom Respondent
no. 2 is representing in the election is a defaulter of the LDCC
Bank.
ii.
The NMSCS has taken loan of Rs. 1,75,98,400/- from the
LDCC Bank for the year 2025-2026 out of which the Bank is in
arrears of Rs. 67,15,198/- for which the notice is also issued to the
Society on 02.07.2026, calling upon to pay the arrears. The arrears
were due and payable on 30.06.2026. Since the bank is in arrears,
Respondent no. 2 has created a farce of resignation from the post
of the Director in collusion with the Society for the purpose of
participating in the bank elections. Even though Respondent no. 2
has resigned from the post of Director of the said Society vide
resignation letter dated 02.12.2026, which forms part of the
documents in the audit report and though the Resignation has yet
to come into effect from 02.12.2026, the nomination of
Respondent no. 2 has been accepted on the ground that he is a
member and not a Director in view of the resignation given by
him.
iii.
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As per the LDCC Bank Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1 read with
Part 5 – Membership therein particularly clause 15.A.3.5
specifically provides that if a person is a defaulter of any Society,
he/she is ineligible to contest the elections for the post of the
Director. As per this provision, the defaulter Society falls within
the definition of a legal person. Hence, both the Society and the
representative of the Society are included in this provision, thus
Respondent no. 2 is not eligible to contest the elections for the post
of Director of the bank.
vi.
The account of the Society is not regular. Therefore,
the Society has committed a default. Hence, Respondent no. 2 is
not eligible to contest the elections of LDCC Bank by virtue of
Bye-law no. 35.1.B.3.
v.
It is submitted that in response to the objections raised
by the Petitioner, Respondent no. 2 has submitted reply wherein
Respondent no. 2 has denied the objections raised by the Petitioner.
Even though the allegations were denied, the Returning Officer
was bound to independently examine the nomination and consider
the objections and evaluate the supporting documents in
accordance with the Act, election’s Rules and applicable Bye-laws.
vi.
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He submits that Respondent no. 1 has totally failed to apply
his mind to the ground, wherein the Petitioner has relied on Byelaw no. 35.1.2.A.1 read with Bye-law no. 5(15). This Bye-law
makes it necessary that the Society who proposes to file
nomination for the post of Director should be eligible as per Byelaw no. 5(15). According to this Bye-law such Society should be a
member and the representative of such Society should also be a
member of that Society.
vii.
Referring to Bye-law no. 5(15), he submits that Bye-law no.
15.A.3.5 governs eligibility pf the voter of the Bank, Primary
Agricultural Credit Society Multipurpose Executive Services Cooperative Society, and Grain Society. The aforementioned Bye-law
provides for the conditions of eligibility and one such condition is
that the affiliated Society of the bank should not be a defaulter of
Bank as well as any other Co-operative Society.
5.
According to him, in the present case, the NMSCS, is
undoubtedly a defaulter of the loan availed by them from the bank for
which a notice has been issued for making payment of the unpaid
installments. Such notice has been issued on 02.07.2026, calling upon the
Society to make payment of arrear of dues of the loan amount, failing
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which, the Society will be declared as a defaulter and coercive steps will
have to be taken against the Society as provided under Section 101 and
Section 98 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act (for short ‘the
MCS, Act’). He submits that in view of the notice dated 02.07.2026, it is
evident that the Society is a defaulter of the bank / Respondent no. 4. He
submits that even though this ground has been raised by the Petitioner but
Respondent no. 1 while passing the order has not even considered the
grounds raised by the Petitioner by answering the issue.
6.
He submits that since Society itself is a defaulter, it would
be disqualified to participate in the elections of Respondent no. 4 / Bank
in the light of Section 73(CA)(1)(f)(ii) and (iv). He submits that
particularly clause (iv) is the provision which was invoked by the
Petitioner seeking disqualification of Respondent no. 2. In case of
District Central Co-operative Bank or the State Co-operative Bank, a
member, if he has incurred any disqualification under this Act or the
Rules made thereunder which includes Bye-laws of a Society, the
member is disqualified from contesting the elections. In the present case,
on account of the Bye-law no. 35 (i) read with 5 (15). It is evident that
Respondent no. 2 as a representative of a defaulter Society cannot be
allowed to fill in nomination form for the post of Director of Respondent
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no. 4 / Bank. In support of his submissions that the Bye-laws are also
equally binding to decide the eligibility for nomination of the elections to
Respondent no. 4 / Bank. The Petitioner has relied on the following
decisions of this Court, more particularly, on the observations made in the
following judgment in case of Sambha Versus The State of
Maharashtra and Others, in Writ Petition no. 5177, 5178 and 5180 of
1995, reported in 1996 (2) Bom CR 700, wherein this Court has taken a
view that even the Bye-laws have a binding force. He has also relied on
the decision in Writ Petition nos. 14991, 14993 and 14998 of 2021, in
case of Kishor Gangadhar Patil Versus The State of Maharashtra
and Others, with connected Writ Petitions, reported in 2022(3) ALL
MR 106, in which a similar view has been taken by this Court.
7.
In support of his submission that the Bye-laws have a
binding force, if it is approved by the statute, he would rely on decision
of this Court in Writ Petition no. 2652/2003 in Shivshankar Dudh
Vyavsayek Va Utpadak Sanstha Maryadit and Others Versus State of
Maharashtra and Others, 2004 (1) Mh.L.J. 779. He has relied on few
other judgments where a similar view has been taken by this Court. He,
therefore, submitted that considering the binding force of the Bye-laws
even in the present case, the Returning Officer should have taken into
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consideration the applicable Bye-laws in the instant case which is held to
be one of the grounds for disqualification under Section 73(CA)(1)(f)(ii).
8.
He further submitted that although defence is taken by
Respondent no. 2 that the State Government has issued a government
resolution staying the recovery from the persons affected by the drought.
Pursuant to the government resolution issued on 10.10.2025, granting
stay to the loans that are sanctioned for agricultural allied activities for a
period of one year, no such instructions have been issued by the
government to the bank. Therefore, according to him, the Society
continues to be a defaulter and even assuming that any directions are
issued granting stay to the loans disbursed to the agricultural related
business, it does not clear all the dues of the Society or any of the
individuals, only the recovery of the amount is defered. Hence, the
Society continues to be a defaulter.
9.
Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sapkal, for
Respondent no. 2 submitted that eligibility for the elections of the District
Central Co-operative Bank or the State Co-operative Bank is governed by
Section 73(CA)(1)(f) and the sub-clause (i) to (v) provided under the
MCS, Act. According to him, Section 73(CA)(1)(f)(ii) would be the
relevant provision that would govern the Society. Mr. Sapkal, submits
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that disqualification for being a member of a committee is provided
under Section 73(CA)(1), since the present case is related to District
Central Co-operative Bank, the disqualification in relation to bank is
provided under sub-clause (f)(ii) which provides that in case a person
who is a defaulter of Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society
i.e. a person in his personal capacity is a defaulter of Primary Agricultural
Credit Co-operative Society becomes a defaulter and thus, ineligible.
Similarly, even if an officer bearer of a defaulting Primary Agricultural
Credit Co-operative Society, such Society becomes ineligible for being
nominated, elected, opted, etc., of a committee.
10.
In the present case, Respondent no. 2 is undoubtedly not a
defaulter of the Society. Similarly, he is also not a office bearer of a
defaulting Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society, which can
be supported from the documents placed by the Petitioner on record,
which contains the audit report of the Society, wherein a resolution has
been passed accepting the resignation of Respondent no. 2 in its meeting
dated 12.12.2025. In resolution no. 2 of the Society, the resignation
tendered by Respondent no. 2 dated 02.12.2025, has been accepted. Thus,
he is no more a Director of the Society to whom he is representing. He
continues being a member of that Society. Hence, Respondent no. 2 does
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not incur disqualification as provided under Section 73(CA)(1)(f)(ii).
11.
According to him, except the conditions mentioned for the
aforementioned provisions no other disqualification can be alleged to
incur by Respondent no. 2. In response to the submissions of the
Petitioner that Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1 disqualifies Respondent no. 2 from
contesting the elections of the bank. He submits that the Society is
undoubtedly member of Respondent no. 4 / Bank and Respondent no. 2 is
the member of the Society. Therefore, there is no disqualification on
account of Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1. With reference to Bye-law no. 5(15)
referred by the Petitioner to invoke disqualification of Respondent no. 2,
he would submit that Bye-law no. 15.A.3.5 governs the eligibility of a
valid voter. So far as the inclusion of Respondent no. 2 in the voters’ list
is concerned, the same is not objected by the Petitioner, in fact in the
objection itself it is clearly stated by the Petitioner that according to
Section 27(3) of the MCS, Act, Respondent no. 2 is eligible only as a
voter to represent the Society and he is not eligible to file nomination for
the post of Director of the Bank, in view of the disqualification incurred
by him under Section 73(CA)(f)(ii) and (iii). Hence, according to him,
Bye-law no. 5 (15) does not relate to eligibility for nomination to the
committee of the bank. The only disqualification for nomination to the
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Committee is provided under Section 73(CA)(f) of the MCS, Act.
12.
Learned Advocate Mr. Advant for Respondent no. 4 / Bank,
supports the Petitioner and submits that Respondent no. 2 is the Director
of the NMSCS who has availed the financial assistance from Respondent
no. 4 / Bank and has defaulted in repayment thereof, for which, the
demand notice dated 02.07.2026, is already issued to the Society, to pay
arrears of 67,15,198/- that was the amount due as on 30.06.2026. He
submits that a harmonious reading of Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1 and
35.1.B.3 of Respondent no. 4/ Bank, obligates a person who is a member
of Society or a borrowing Society, who commits default in repayment of
subsisting liability towards Respondent no. 4 would not be eligible to
contest the election of the bank. He further submits that in view of Byelaw no. 35.1.B.3, it is necessary that the bank account of the member
Society should be regular and in operation. However, in the instant case,
the account of NMSCS is in default. Therefore, Respondent no. 2 is not
eligible to contest the election of Respondent no. 4 / Bank.
13.
He would submit that the Bye-laws of Respondent no. 4 /
Bank operates within the statutory framework, to regulate Society
specific aspects of governance, including qualifications, representation,
rights and duties of members, and norms in relation to participation in the
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affairs of Respondent no. 4 / Bank. It is, therefore, submitted that the Act
of 1960, expressly provides that elections of the management shall be
conducted not only in accordance with the Act and Rules, but also in
accordance with the Bye-laws. He submits that right to vote is not a
fundamental right but a statutory right with reasonable restrictions
governing eligibility.
14.
Learned Advocate Mr. Dighe, for Respondent no. 1, submits
that the order passed by Respondent no. 1 is in consonance with the
powers conferred on Respondent no. 1. The powers of Respondent no. 1
are governed by Rule 25 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Society
(Election to Committee) Rules, 2014 (for short ‘the Election Rules of
2014). Respondent no. 1 has rightly held that the grounds of
disqualification invoked are not applicable to the facts of the present
case. So far as the resignation is concerned, according to him, the
document placed on record discloses that Respondent no. 2 has already
given his resignation on 02.12.2025. Thus, he does not incur
disqualification on account of being Director / member of managing
committee of the Society. Hence, he does not incur disqualification under
Section 73(CA) of the MCS, Act. He submits that even otherwise the
election programme has already commenced and it is at the stage of
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withdrawal of nominations which is permitted from 21.10.2026 to
04.11.2026, this being an intermediate stage of elections, any interference
by the Court is not warranted. If at all the Petitioner has any greivance, he
has a remedy of filing election dispute after the elections are conducted.
15.
I have heard the respective Advocates for the parties and
perused the documents on record with their assistance.
16.
The Petitioner has raised various grounds in the Writ
Petition as recorded in submission of learned Advocate for the Petitioner.
However, during the course of arguments, the learned Senior Advocate
Mr. Khandare, submitted that since some of the grounds raised by him,
would amount to disputed question of fact. He would not insist on those
grounds, but the grounds about the applicability of the Bye-laws of the
Society, which make Respondent no. 2 ineligible would still survive.
Consequently, the challenge in the Writ Petition is now the limited only
to the extent of applicability of the Bye-laws, to the facts of the present
case. Bye-laws of the LDCC Bank are placed on record. Bye-law no. 9 is
regarding membership of the bank. Bye-law no. 15.A.3 governs the
eligibility for being a valid voter of the bank, under clause no. 5 of Byelaw no. 15.A.3, it is provided that the affiliated member of Co-operative
Society, should not be in arrears of the bank or any other Society. This
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clause has been relied upon by the Petitioner for seeking disqualification
of Respondent no. 2.
17.
According to the Petitioner, since the Society to whom
Respondent no. 2 represents is in arrears of the loan, it is not eligible as a
valid voter. So far as this contention is concerned, the Petitioner in his
written objection raised before Respondent no. 1, has already conceded to
the position that though Respondent no. 2 is eligible as a voter under
Section 27(3) of the MCS, Act, he is not be eligible to contest the
elections as a member of the managing committee, in view of the
disqualification incurred by him under Section 73(CA)(1)(f)(ii) and (iii)
of the MCS Act and Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1 and 35.1.B.3 of the bank. On
perusal of Section 73(CA)(1)(f) it provides for disqualification of
Committee and its members. In relation to District Central Co-operative
Bank, disqualification is provided under clause (f). The relevant
provision is reproduced here under which reads thus :
“(f)
in the case of District Central Co-operative Bank or of
the State Co-operative Bank, a member, if he,(i)
is a person who represents a society other than a primary
agricultural credit co-operative society on the board of a District
Central Co-operative Bank or the State Co-operative Bank, if the
society to whom he represents has committed a default towards
the payments of such Bank for a period exceeding ninety days;
(ii)
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is a person who is a defaulter of a primary agricultural
credit co-operative society or is an office bearer of a defaulting
primary agricultural co-operative credit society;
(iii)
is a person who represents a society whose Managing
Committee is superseded.”
18.
The Petitioner has relied upon (ii) and (iii) of Clause (f).
Sub-clause (ii) provides that the person who is a defaulter of a Primary
Agricultural
Credit
Co-operative
Society
is
disqualified.
Since
Respondent no. 2 is not a defaulter of the Society, the first part of the
aforementioned clause will not be attracted. So far as the second part is
concerned, it disqualifies the office bearer of defaulting office Society.
Although it was claimed that the Petitioner is one of the Director of the
Society, on perusal of the documents on record which forms part of the
audit report, prima facie, do not support the case of the Petitioner. Since
Respondent no. 2 appears to have tendered his resignation on 02.12.2025,
which was accepted by way of a resolution of the Society on 12.12.2025.
Even otherwise, the Petitioner has already given up the challenge to the
validity of the resignation given by Respondent no. 2. Therefore, the
grounds mentioned in item no. 2 of the clause (f) will not be applicable in
the instant case, although it is claimed in the objections raised before
Respondent no. 1 that in case of Respondent no. 2, sub-clause (iii) will be
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a ground for disqualification of Respondent no. 2. Upon reading of the
same, even that ground is not attracted since the managing committee of
the Society is not superseded.
19.
Now turning to the only ground which is insisted by the
Petitioner is the disqualification provided under Section 73 (CA)(1)(f)
(iv). It is provides that, any disqualification incurred by a member under
this Act or Rules or Bye-laws of the Society would be a ground for
disqualification of a member. This is the only ground on which the
challenge to the nomination of Respondent no. 2 has now been insisted
upon by the Petitioner. According to Bye-law no. 35.1.2.A.1, the member
Society who proposes to contest the elections to the managing
committee, should be a member of Society of the bank as provided under
Bye-law no. 5(15) and its representative should be a member of that
Society. In the instant case, Respondent no. 2 is undoubtedly a member
of the Society, to whom, he represents and the Society is a member of
Respondent no. 4 / Bank. Thus, both the conditions as stated in Bye-law
no. 35.1.2.A.1 stand fulfilled.
20.
Similarly, the other ground raised by the Petitioner relying
on Bye-law no. 35.1.B.3 is that, the Society, who a nominates
representative, the account of such Society should be regular. In case the
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account of the affiliated member Society remains non-operative for one
year prior to the elections, such Society would be disqualified from
contesting the elections. On perusal of the account statement of the
NMSCS annexed to the reply affidavit filed by Respondent no. 4, it
appears that there are transaction in the account. Though arrears of
Rs.62,59,283/- are shown, it is bereft of details about the period for
which the loan was sanctioned, and when the account has gone in default.
Even otherwise to prove the default of the Society would require
evidence, interpretation of the MCS, Act, the Rules of 2014 and the
applicable Bye-laws of the Society. It is not within the powers of
Respondent no. 1 to decide the disqualification of Respondent no. 2 with
the available record and by interpreting the Bye-laws without leading any
evidence in support thereof, more particularly, in absence of the Society
who is not been made a party to the Writ Petition, who is the affected
party, since its right of representation in the election of the bank are under
challenge. Any order passed in the Writ Petition would be causing
prejudice to the Society who would be deprived of its right to contest the
elections of Respondent no. 4 / Bank. Thus, on that ground also the
challenge raised in the present Writ Petition cannot be sustained.
21.
In order to disqualify Respondent no. 2, based on the Bye-
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law nos. 35.1.2.A.1 and 35.B.1.3 would require evidence, since various
disputed questions have been raised by the Petitioner. On one hand the
Petitioner is claiming that the Society who is not before this Court is in
default of the payment of arrears of loan, on the other hand it is submitted
by Respondent no. 2 that the State Government has issued government
resolution on 10.10.2025, granting benefits to the affected persons who
incurred heavy loss due to the rains in the year 2025. The government
resolution has granted stay for a period of one year to the recovery of
loans that have been disbursed for agriculture related operations for a
period of one year. Thus, the effect of this government resolution was in
operation till 10.10.2026. The Nilanga Tahsil of the Latur District is
covered under the annexure of the government resolution. A circular is
also is issued by the Co-operation Marketing and Textile Department,
granting similar stay to the recovery of loan disbursed for the agricultural
operations due to the excess rains. The questions; whether the account of
the Society is in default? whether it is regular or inoperative ? The effect
of the stay granted to the recovery of loan and its consequences on the
recovery of the loan granted by the bank to the Society, are all the
questions that can be decided only by leading appropriate evidence,
which cannot be decided in the present Writ Petition, that too in absence
of the Society, who is the affected party.
22.
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Considering the stage of the elections, I do not find that,
case for patent illegality warranting any interference of the Court at this
stage is made out by the Petitioner. In a similar challenge raised before
the Kolhapur Bench of this Court in Writ Petition no. 5261/2026 in case
of Vikramsinha Balasaheb Sawant and Another Versus State of
Maharashtra, Thr. Dept. of Co-operation and Others, decided
13.10.2026, this Court relying upon the qualification prescribed under the
Bye-laws had taken a view that the Returning Officer should have been
alert about the violation of the said Bye-laws and has caused interference
in the election process, by setting aside the order passed by the Returning
Officer and declared the Respondent therein ineligible to participate in
the election process. Upon raising challenge to the aforesaid order before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) no. 37235/2026, it is held that the
High court has overstepped its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India by Returning a categorical finding with respect to
the eligibility of Appellant to contest election. The said issue appears to
be a contestable matter, which requires some evidence as well as an
adequate opportunity of being heard to both the sides. Consequently, the
Appeal was allowed and the judgment and order of this Court is set aside
and the Appellant is permitted to contest the election.
23.
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In my view, the law with regard to the interference in the
elections for cancellation of nomination, that has been already accepted is
no more res integra. This Court as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court has
taken a consistent view that against the rejection of nomination, there is a
remedy provided under Section 152-A of the MCS, Act, since it takes
away right of an individual to contest elections. Thus, to test the veracity
of decision of rejection, the same is made amenable to the writ
jurisdiction in limited circumstances. So far as challenge to the
nominations, that are accepted, no such remedy is provided under the
MCS, Act itself. This absence of any remedy against the acceptance of
the nomination, appears to be intentionally not provided by the
legislature, so as to minimize the interference in the elections process.
The legislature while providing a remedy against rejection of nomination
has intentionally refrained from providing any remedy against the
acceptance of nomination paper since all the grounds are permissible to
be raised in the election petition filed after entire process is over. The
observations made by this Court relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case of Shrikant Bhimraoji Gawande Versus The
District Co-operative Election Officer and Divisional Joint Registrar
Co-operative Society, Amravati and Others, in Writ Petition no.
3493/2026, decided on 17.09.2021, are reproduced herein under which
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reads thus :
“18. The contention of Shri Samarth, learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner regarding absence of any
remedy under section 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, against the impugned
action, has to be viewed in light of the position that
with an intention to minimize, interference in the
election process the Legislature while providing a
remedy against the rejection of a nomination paper,
has intentionally refrained, from providing any remedy,
against the acceptance of nomination paper, as that is
a ground, permissible to be raised in the election
petition filed after the entire process is over, which is
also a reason why the acceptance of nomination ought
not to be interfered with.
19. In fact, the hands-off policy, in regard to
interference by the Courts in elections, has been once
again reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of
Goa Vs. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh and another, 2021 SCC
Online SC 211 , and though the decision was rendered
in the backdrop of Article 243 ZG(b) of the
Constitution, the principle, thereof, would also be
applicable to elections being conducted under the
other Statutes also, more so in view of what has been
said in Kisan Shankar Kathore (supra) that at times it
may not be possible for the Returning Officer, to decide
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upon the objections raised, considering the limited
summary nature of the enquiry to be conducted by him,
in the limited time frame, while deciding the question
of validity of the nomination.”
24.
Thus, at this stage, considering the ground raised by the
Petitioner, which is not capable of being decided with the limited
jurisdiction conferred
on the Returning Officer, I do not find any
infirmity in the order passed by Respondent no. 1.
25.
To cause interference in the election programme which is at
the stage of withdrawal of nomination, the Petitioner has to demonstrate
that the order passed by the Returning Officer is patently illegal and
arbitrary on the face of record. In the instant case, the order passed by
Respondent no. 1 is well within the powers conferred on him and it is not
within his powers to interpret the provisions of Act, 1960, its Bye-laws of
2014 and the Bye-laws of the Society and its interplay. Thus, I do not
find any case for interference is made out by the Petitioner. Consequently
the challenge fails and Writ Petition is dismissed.
26.
However, it is made clear that all the observations made by
this Court while deciding the present Writ Petition are the prima facie
and does not preclude the petitioner from raising an election dispute, if he
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so desires and if such election dispute is raised, the same may be decided
by the appropriate Court without being influenced by any of the
observations made by this Court in the present Writ Petition.
27.
Rule is discharged.
( MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J. )
SPC
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