Service Law: Judicial service – Allegation against appellant judicial officer that while posted as ADJ, she had decided the land acquisition reference illegally and against all judicial norms and propriety awarding to the claimants the amount of compensation at an unduly high rate which led to inference that she was actuated by extraneous considerations and thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion of duty and committed misconduct under U.P. Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956 – Enquiry Committee held that the charges were proved for, the errors were apparent in both cases which were such shocking blunders that they could not be attributed to mere misjudgment and consequently were proved to be deliberate – Accordingly, order of dismissal from service passed – Appellant unsuccessfully challenged the order of dismissal before High Court – On appeal, held: It is the decision making process of delinquent officer and not the end result of the judicial process which could be subjected to disciplinary action – It is a matter of record that at the time when the High Court was seized of this matter, writ petitions against both of the appellant’s land acquisition judgments were dismissed by its coordinate benches – High Court nevertheless, rightly observed that dismissal of writ petitions against the appellant’s orders did not serve as vindication or confirmation of her orders – Indeed, as correctly noted by the High Court, the scope of judicial review under Art.226 is limited – The standards to be met prior to interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction are very high, and there needs to be gross substantive injustice through the conclusion, glaring irregularities in procedure or the need to resolve important questions of law for a writ court to overturn the Reference Court’s order – Hence, dismissal of writ petition merely signifies the failure to demonstrate any of these high standards, in a particular case, and not the endorsement of the orders passed by a subordinate authority – However, the facts of the instant case are distinct – This Court, in fact, entered into the merits of one of the allegedly erroneous orders – Not only was the judgment affirmed, but rather the compensation was further enhanced – It, therefore, can no longer be stated that the appellant’s order was wrong in conclusion – This fact is significant as it establishes that the increase in compensation by the appellant was not abhorrent – There is no explicit mention of any extraneous consideration being actually received or of unbecoming conduct on the part of the appellant – Instead, the very basis of the finding of ‘misbehaviour’ is the end result itself, which as per the High Court was so shocking that it gave rise to a natural suspicion as to the integrity and honesty of the appellant – Although this might be right in a vacuum, however, given how the end result itself has been untouched by superior courts and instead in one of the two cases, the compensation only increased, no such inference can be made – Thus, case against the appellant not made out – Order of dismissal set aside – Constitution of India – Art.226 – Judicial service.
Judicial Officers: Judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity – Also mere suspicion cannot constitute ‘misconduct’ – Any ‘probability’ of misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary material, even though the standard of proof would obviously not be at par with that in a criminal trial.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. It is a principle since the nineteenth century that judges cannot be held responsible for the end result or the effect of their decisions. This is necessary to both uphold the rule of law, and insulate judicial reasoning from extraneous factors. It is courts, which uphold the law and ensure its enforcement. They instil trust of the constitutional order in people, and ensure the majesty of law and adherence to its principles. Courts hence prevent people from resorting to their animalistic instincts, and instead provide them with a gentler and more-civilised alternative of resolving disputes. In getting people to obey their dicta, Courts do not make use of guns or other (dis)incentives, but instead rely on the strength of their reasoning and a certain trust and respect in the minds of the general populace. Hence, it is necessary that any corruption or deviation from judicial propriety by the guardians of law themselves, be dealt with sternly and swiftly. [Paras 18, 19] [897-B-E]
2. The judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity. Also mere suspicion cannot constitute ‘misconduct’. Any ‘probability’ of misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary material, even though the standard of proof would obviously not be at par with that in a criminal trial. While applying these yardsticks, the High Court is expected to consider the existence of differing standards and approaches amongst different judges. [Paras 20, 21] [897F; 899-G-H; 900-A]
Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 144 – referred to.
3. It is a matter of record that at the time when the High Court was seized of this matter, writ petitions against both of the appellant’s land acquisition judgments had been dismissed by its coordinate benches. The High Court nevertheless, rightly observed that dismissal of writ petitions against the appellant’s orders did not serve as vindication or confirmation of her orders. Indeed, as correctly noted by the High Court, the scope of judicial review under Article 226 is limited. The standards to be met prior to interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction are very high, and there needs to be gross substantive injustice through the conclusion, glaring irregularities in procedure or the need to resolve important questions of law for a writ court to overturn the Reference Court’s order. Hence, dismissal of writ petition merely signifies the failure to demonstrate any of these high standards, in a particular case, and not the endorsement of the orders passed by a subordinate authority. However, the facts of the present case are distinct. This Court, in fact, entered into the merits of one of the allegedly erroneous orders. Not only was the judgment affirmed, but rather the compensation was further enhanced. It hence can no longer be stated that the appellant’s order was wrong in conclusion. This fact is significant as it establishes that the increase in compensation by the appellant was not abhorrent. Had the charge been specific that the decision-making process was effectuated by extraneous considerations, then the correctness of the appellant’s conclusions probably would not have mattered as much. However, a perusal of the charges would make it evident that the exclusive cause of enquiry, inference of dishonesty as well as imposition of penalty was only on the basis of the conclusion of enhancement of compensation. Given how the challenge to one of those two orders had been turned down at the High Court stage, and the order was both affirmed and furthered in principle by this Court, the very foundation of the charges no longer survives. [Paras 24-26] [900-E-H; 901-A-C]
4. There is no fault in the proposition that the end result of adjudication does not matter, and only whether the delinquent officer had taken illegal gratification (monetary or otherwise) or had been swayed by extraneous considerations while conducting the process is of relevance. There is no explicit mention of any extraneous consideration being actually received or of unbecoming conduct on the part of the appellant. Instead, the very basis of the finding of ‘misbehaviour’ is the end result itself, which as per the High Court was so shocking that it gave rise to a natural suspicion as to the integrity and honesty of the appellant. Although this might be right in a vacuum, however, given how the end result itself has been untouched by superior courts and instead in one of the two cases, the compensation only increased, no such inference can be made. Thus, the entire case against the appellant collapses like a house of cards. The order of dismissal is set aside. [Paras 27-29] [901-D-F-H; 902A-B] Lile Singh v. State Land Acquisition Reference No. 193 of 2006 delivered on 10.02.2003 ; Umesh Chandra v. State Land Acquisition Reference No. 91 of 2001 delivered on 07.11.2003 ; PC Joshi v. State of UP (2001) 6 SCC 491 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 369 ; Union of India v. J Ahmed AIR 1979 SC 1022 : [1979] 3 SCR 504 ; Agra Development Authority v. State of UP 2004 All LJ 1853 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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