The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
14. This application, therefore, is being disposed off with the direction to the Registry of this Court to take necessary steps in this regard and do the needful forthwith. If a proper application u/s 389(2) of Cr.P.C. is moved by the accused-applicant the same shall be accepted by the Registry and shall be dealt with accordingly." Referring the same Learned Counsel for the petitionerconvicts submitted that although they approached to the High Court for filing application under Section 389(2) of Cr.P.C. but that was not considered and as such they were compelled to file this revision petition and prayed before this Court to pass an appropriate order. On the other hand, Learned P.P. strongly objected the submission since the order challenged was an interlocutory order. According to him in view of Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. there is no scope to entertain the application filed by the petitioners. In support of his contention he referred one order of the Madras High Court in Udaiyar @ Sattaiudaiyar and Ors. vs. State represented by Sub Inspector of Police dated 07.03.2018 wherein in para No.2 Hon’ble Madras High Court observed as under: “2. In the considered opinion of this Court, an order of dismissal of application for suspension of sentence and bail is not a final order and is only an interlocutory order and, therefore, the revision is maintainable in view of the bar under Section 39…
Full Judgment Text
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The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl.Rev.P. No.25 of 2026
1.Sabujer Rahaman @ Sabuj (45),
Son of Ajiulla Chowdhury,
Resident of Khilpara, Amtali,
P.S. R.K. Pur, District: Gomati Tripura
2.Ali Ahamed (42),
Son of Ojir Ali,
Resident of Tarapukur, Ward No.1,
P.S. Sonamura, District: Sepahijala Tripura
-----Accused Petitioners
-VsThe State of Tripura,
represented by the Principal Secretary
to the Government of Tripura,
having his office at New Secretariat Complex,
Gorkhabasti, P.O. Kunjaban, P.S. New Capital Complex,
Sub-Division: Sadar, District: West Tripura, PIN:799 010
---Respondent
For Petitioner(s)
For Respondent(s)
:
:
Mr. Debajit Biswas, Adv.
Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
06/05/2026
Learned Counsel Mr. D. Biswas is present for the petitioner
accused convicts and Learned P.P. Mr. R. Datta is present for the
State.
Heard both the sides.
This is regarding maintainability of the petition filed by the
petitioner challenging the order dated 30.01.2026 passed by
Learned Sessions Judge, Sonamura, Sepahijala Tripura in Crl.
Misc. No.07 of 2025 arising out of Crl. Appeal No.09 of 2025. The
petition was filed under Section 397 Cr.P.C. read with Section 401
of the Cr.P.C. corresponding to Section 438 read with Section 442
of BNSS, 2023.
At the time of hearing Learned Counsel appearing for the
petitioners drawn the attention of the Court that the petitioneraccused persons were convicted by a judgment dated 04.08.2025
passed
by
Learned
CJM,
Sepahijala
District,
Sonamura
in
connection with PRC(WP) 94 of 2024. By the said judgment
Learned Trial Court found the appellants to be guilty and passed
the following orders:
Accordingly considering the nature of the offences and the
premeditated manner in which the offences were committed,
the convicts Ali ahammed and Sabujer Rahaman are hereby
is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment (RI) for a term
of 7(seven) years and to pay fine of Rs.50,000/- (fifty
thousand) each i.d. to suffer simple imprisonment (SI) of six
months for commission of offence under Sections 457 of
I.P.C. and the convicts Ali Ahammed and Sabujer Rahaman
are further sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment (RI)
for a term of seven years and to pay fine of Rs.50,000/(fifty thousand) each i.e. to suffer simple imprisonment (SI)
of six months for commission of offence under Section 382 of
I.P.C. and it was further ordered that both the sentences
shall run concurrently.
Challenging that order the present petitioners convicts
preferred an appeal to the Court of Learned Sessions Judge,
Sepahijala District, Sonamura and also filed an application for
suspension of the sentence passed by Learned CJM dated
04.08.2025 till disposal of the appeal under Section 389 of Cr.P.C.
According to Learned Counsel for the petitioners by order dated
30.01.2026
Learned
Sessions
Judge,
Sepahijala
District,
Sonamura has rejected their application and challenging that
order they have filed this revision petition.
In support of his contention, Learned Counsel for the
petitioners relied upon one judgment of the Andhrapradesh High
Court
in
Boya
Nallabothula
Manohar
vs.
State
of
Andhrapradesh reported in 2024 SCC OnLine AP 618,
wherein
in
para
No.10
Hon’ble
Andhrapradesh
High
Court
observed as under:
“10. Section 389(1) of the Code lays down the power of an Appellate
Court to deal with a petition seeking suspension of execution of
sentence and release of a person in confinement, pending disposal of
the appeal. Coming to Section 389(2) of the Code, this provision is
vivid as to the authority of the High Court to exercise the very same
power of the Appellate Court as envisaged under Section 389(1) of
the Code, when the appeal is pending before a Court Subordinate to
the High Court. In the case on hand, the appeal preferred by the
Accused is pending before the Appellate Court, which is a District
Court, which is a Court that is subordinate to the High Court. In that
view, this Court also has jurisdiction to entertain the present petition
filed under Section 389(2) of the Code, as clear from the very wording
of the provision.”
He also relied upon another order of the High Court of
Allahabad in B.K. Tiwari vs. State of U.P. and Another
reported in (2016) 6 A11LJ 657 wherein in para Nos.9, 10, 12,
13 and 14 the High Court of Allahabad observed as under:
“9. It may be relevant to extract the relevant
provisions in this regard, which read as under:
389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal;
release of appellant on bail.
(1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the
Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by
it in writing, order that the execution of the
sentence or order appealed against be suspended
and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be
released on bail, or on his own bond.
[Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before
releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted
person who is convicted of an offence punishable
with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment
for a term of not less than ten years, shall give
opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing
cause in writing against such release:
Provided further that in cases where a convicted
person is released on bail it shall be open to the
Public Prosecutor to file an application for the
cancellation of the bail.]
(2) The power conferred by this section on an
Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High
Court in the case of an appeal by a convicted person
to a Court subordinate thereto.
(3)………………….
(4)…………………..
10. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions would
be sufficient to indicate that the power with regard
to granting or rejecting the bail exercisable by the
lower appellate court can very well be exercised by
the High Court also, by virtue of sub-section (2) of
Section 389 of Cr.P.C. If an appeal by a convicted
person is filed in a court subordinate to High Court
then the powers which the subordinate court of
appeal would exercise are concurrent with the
powers of the High Court in this regard by virtue of
389(2) of Cr.P.C. In fact just as has been provided
by Section 439 of Cr.P.C. that a High court or a court
of Session both may direct the release of an under
trial accused on bail, similarly in case of an appeal
filed by a convicted accused also the power of the
subordinate appellate court with regard to bail can
also be exercised by the High Court to whom the
lower appellate court is subordinate to. There does
not appear to be any ambiguity with regard to the
aforesaid provisions.
12. So far as the refusal of Registry to accept the
application moved on behalf of the convicted
accused u/s 389(2) of Cr.P.C. is concerned, the
same cannot be vindicated on the ground of any
pragmatic difficulties which the Registry might be
facing in this regard. If appropriate categories have
not been carved out in this regard as yet, the
Registry can always do so now. If appropriate
systems are to be generated or improvised upon in
this regard the same must also be done by the
Registry. If there is a statutory remedy provided
under law, it is the right of a person to invoke and
seek the same. This Court does not feel persuaded
to invoke or exercise its inherent jurisdiction for the
purposes of granting the normal statutory reliefs
which have been provided under law. The statutory
schemes of law and the statutory remedies cannot
and should not be bypassed in ordinary course. The
inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. is little
known to be used for the purposes of releasing an
accused on bail. There are sufficient statutory
provisions provided for this purpose in the Code of
Criminal Procedure and they must be adhered to. In
this regard the alleged inconvenience which the
Registry might confront in generating the requisite
systems or in doing the needful in this regard
cannot constitute a good ground for this Court to
exercise its inherent jurisdiction.
13. It is almost ironical and not little embarrassing
to see that an accused in custody has been shuttling
from pillar to post, from one court to another in the
quest of justice for no fault which may be attributed
to him. The period of incarceration is being
perpetuated not because the Court has not found it
fit to release him on bail but because the existing
technical systems generated in the computers could
not prove equal to the requirement of the situation.
The registry must rise to the occasion and address
the problem in right earnest. This Court can illafford to impart this impression to anyone, be he
the victim or the accused, that the door's of justice
were not kept ajar for him.
14. This application, therefore, is being disposed off
with the direction to the Registry of this Court to
take necessary steps in this regard and do the
needful forthwith. If a proper application u/s 389(2)
of Cr.P.C. is moved by the accused-applicant the
same shall be accepted by the Registry and shall be
dealt with accordingly."
Referring the same Learned Counsel for the petitionerconvicts submitted that although they approached to the High
Court for filing application under Section 389(2) of Cr.P.C. but that
was not considered and as such they were compelled to file this
revision petition and prayed before this Court to pass an
appropriate order.
On the other hand, Learned P.P. strongly objected the
submission since the order challenged was an interlocutory order.
According to him in view of Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. there is no
scope to entertain the application filed by the petitioners. In
support of his contention he referred one order of the Madras High
Court
in
Udaiyar
@
Sattaiudaiyar
and
Ors.
vs.
State
represented by Sub Inspector of Police dated 07.03.2018
wherein in para No.2 Hon’ble Madras High Court observed as
under:
“2. In the considered opinion of this Court, an order of dismissal of
application for suspension of sentence and bail is not a final order and
is only an interlocutory order and, therefore, the revision is
maintainable in view of the bar under Section 397(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. It is open to the petitioners to work out their
remedy in the manner known to law.”
Further reference was made in another judgment of Madras
High Court in Bapuji Murugesam vs. Mythili Rajagopalan
reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 3258 in para No.17 the High
Court of Madras observed as under:
“17. Thus, in this context, it is pertinent to state that by the judgment
of Kerala High Court in Samuel George, Maliyekkal Bunglow's case
(cited supra), it has been held that such powers are in the
interlocutory in nature and Revision is not maintainable. Even in a
case as instance case where the direction of deposit is made coupling
it as a condition for grant of suspension of sentence, this Court had
already held in Udaiyar @ Sattaiudaiyar and Anr. Vs. State
[Crl.R.C.(MD).No.126 of 2018] (stated supra) that the order for grant
of suspension of sentence or bail are all interlocutory orders and are
not revisable under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Therefore, viewing from any angle, I hold that the Revision against
the present order is not maintainable.”
Referring the same Learned P.P. submitted that this present
petition is liable to be dismissed.
I have heard both the sides and also perused the citations
referred by the parties. It appears to me that since the appeal is
pending before the Court of Learned Sessions Judge, Sepajijala
District, Sonamura so at this stage against the rejection order of
suspension of sentence passed under Section 389 of Cr.P.C. by
the said Court, the only remedy lies with the petitioner convict
persons is to approach the High Court invoking the jurisdiction
under Article 389(2) of Cr.P.C. which provides as under:
“(2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may
be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by a
convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto.”
Thus, after hearing both the sides this Court is of the
considered view that the present petition under Section 397 is not
maintainable
and
accordingly
the
same
stands
dismissed.
However, liberty is given to the petitioner convicts to file
appropriate application to the Registry of the High Court under
Section 389(2) of Cr.P.C. and in that case the Registry of the High
Court may accept the same and register the case accordingly for
hearing and disposal.
With this observation, this Criminal Revision Petition stands
disposed of.
Send down the records to the Learned Trial Court along with
a copy of this order.
AMRITA DEB
Moumita
Date: 2026.05.07 10:13:44 +05'30'
JUDGE
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