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In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
FMAT 449 of 2024
with
CAN 1 of 2025
Sabbir Alam
Vs.
Ababs and Ors.
For the appellant
:
Mr. Partha Pratim Roy,
Mr. Sayantan Hazra, Advs.
For the respondent no.1 to 5 :
Md. Nauroz Rahber,
Mr. Mohammad Jawwad,
Ms. Shahin Parveen, Advs.
Heard on
:
07.04.2026
Judgment on
:
07.04.2026
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1.
In view of the questions involved in the appeal being brief, we admit
the appeal take it up for hearing along with the application by
dispensing
with
technical
formalities,
to
save
the
parties
unnecessary wastage of resources due to pendency of litigation
before this Court.
2.
The instant appeal has been preferred against an order whereby the
application filed by the defendants/respondent nos. 1 to 5 under
Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure was allowed,
thereby vacating the ad interim order of injunction initially granted
in favour of the plaintiff/appellant on March 20, 2024, primarily on
the ground of suppression of material facts.
3.
By the selfsame order, the learned Trial Judge also disposed of the
main temporary injunction application, filed under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 of the Code, as well.
4.
Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the learned Trial
Judge erroneously proceeded on the premise that material facts were
suppressed at the time of obtaining the initial ex parte ad interim
injunction order. By placing reliance on paragraph nos. 11, 15 and
16 of the plaint, it is argued that the plaintiff categorically disclosed
the recording of the names of some of the defendants in the Records
of Rights but disputed their title and the basis of inclusion of their
names in the Records of Rights. Even in the prayer portion of the
plaint, the title of some of those defendants has been disputed.
However, for abundant caution, subject to adjudication in the suit,
their names were included in the array of parties in the partition
suit. That apart, learned counsel relies on the recording in Order no.
1 dated March 20, 2024 to the effect that the plaintiff filed copies of
the plaint, power as well as “xerox copies” of documents as per
firisty, which indicates, according to the appellant, that none of the
documents relied on in the plaint were suppressed, including the
relevant extracts of the Records of Rights.
5.
Learned counsel appearing for the contesting defendants/respondent
nos. 1 to 5 points out that the plaintiff virtually admitted the case
run by the contesting respondents in their application under Order
XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code by making several applications after
passing of the impugned order. For example, an application has been
made for impleading certain other persons whose names are also
recorded in the Records of Rights, who were not originally impleaded
in the suit. Moreover, an application has been filed by learned
counsel for the plaintiff appearing in the Trial Court to the effect that
he had filed the plaint as per instruction of his client and was not
responsible
for
the
statements
made
therein.
Moreover,
an
application has also been filed seeking rectification of a deed number
erroneously mentioned in the plaint.
6.
That apart, it is argued that there are several parties on whom title
devolved in respect of the subject plots who were neither impleaded
in the suit nor were even mentioned in the plaint or temporary
injunction application, thereby leading to the conclusion of the
learned Trial Judge that there was suppression of material facts.
7.
Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, we find that the
primary ground on which Order XXXIX Rule 4 was invoked was
suppression of material facts, since the initial order was passed at
the ad-interim stage ex parte, in the absence of the defendants.
8.
Entering into the merits of the alleged suppression, we find that the
learned Trial Judge observed that the deed of 1959 and other
documents were not placed before the Court, neither were those
served on the “defendant first party”, who could have perused the
same during submissions.
9.
The learned Trial Judge further held that the RS Records were filed
later by the plaintiff and by the plaintiff’s own document, his
contentions of paragraph 11 of the injunction application is
contradicted, which tantamounts to approbating and reprobating in
the same breath.
10.
The learned Trial Judge further observed that the averments and
contentions of the injunction application which state that defendant
first party and defendant second party had no right, title and interest
were intentionally thought out, typed and produced in court, serving
copy on the other side, in spite of having the documents as per
firisty dated March 20, 2024 which was not submitted to court. It
was held to tantamount to filing of a false affidavit.
11.
However, we find from the impugned order itself that the learned
Trial Judge simultaneously observed that from the plaintiff’s own
document it is revealed that Munseuddin’s share, as stated to be 16
annas, by which he transferred his total share, is required to be
proved by “trial and evidence” in court. Since, in the opinion of the
Trial Judge himself, the matter requires to be proved by trial and
evidence, it cannot be a ground for vacating an interim order under
Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code. To come to a finding that there was
suppression of material facts, if detailed appreciation of evidence and
further materials is necessary, the same transgresses into the
domain of adjudication of the suit or at least the temporary
injunction application itself on merits upon taking on record the
versions of both parties. However, a qualitative finding on merits as
to the importance/relevance of the material alleged to be suppressed
cannot be arrived at at the stage of deciding an application under
Order XXXIX Rule 4 in the event detailed evidence is required to be
appreciated for coming to such finding.
12.
The suppression of material facts and/or misleading statements
contemplated in Order XXXIX Rule 4 has to be palpable and ex facie.
13.
We find from the averments made in paragraph no. 11 of the plaint
as well as the injunction application that the right, title, interest and
possession of the defendant first and second parties have been
categorically disputed. However, in paragraph no. 15 of the plaint
and the injunction application, it is clearly disclosed as to whose
names are recorded in the Records of Rights but it has been pleaded
that most illegally, without any authenticity, the RS Record was
changed and one Asiran was shown as the owner of 50% of the suit
land and that the inclusion was made after the field survey and the
said endorsement of the name of Asiran was written in red colour. It
was also pleaded that such scanned copy of RS ROR does not show
any date or case number or even any initial or signature of the
Revenue Officer who corrected the endorsement; therefore there is a
serious doubt about the authenticity of inclusion of the name of said
Asiran.
14.
In paragraph no. 16, presuming the devolution of title in respect of
the suit land on the basis of the Records of Rights, a genealogical
table has also been given, simultaneously disputing the title of some
of the defendants.
15.
Consistency is maintained with such stand in the body of the plaint
and the injunction application in the reliefs sought in the suit, in
particular prayer (g) thereof, where a declaration has been sought to
the effect that the defendant first and second parties derive no title
or any right to possess the suit plot and the RS and LR ROR are
erroneous, wrong and not binding upon the plaintiff and such
recording does not extinguish the title of the plaintiff over the suit
land.
16.
In conjunction with such averments, in Order No. 1 dated March
20, 2024, the learned Trial Judge categorically recorded that the
plaintiff filed copies not only of the plaint and the power but also
“xerox copies” of the documents as per firisty.
17.
Hence, as per the recording in the said order, in the view of the
learned Trial Judge as well, photocopies of the documents referred to
and relied on in the plaint and the injunction application were filed
at the time of filing of the plaint itself and were before the trial court
at the juncture when the ex parte ad-interim injunction was granted.
18.
Learned counsel for the contesting respondents relies on paragraph
11 of the Order XXXIX Rule 4 application in particular by pointing
out that the names of some parties disclosed therein were also
depicted in the Records of Rights but they were not impleaded as
parties. Such stand is sought to be bolstered by arguing that the
plaintiff subsequently filed applications for impleadment of such
parties,
thereby
corroborating
the
case
of
the
contesting
respondents.
19.
However, on a perusal of the said application, a copy which was
handed over to court momentarily for the purpose of perusal, it
transpires that the plinth of the said application is that since the
defendants have mentioned the names of certain additional parties,
they are being impleaded for abundant caution.
20.
Insofar as the application for correction of a deed number is
concerned, the date of the deed was correctly mentioned in the plaint
and the injunction application but only the number thereof was
erroneously stated. Thus, we do not find any suppression of material
fact worth vacating an order, coming within the purview of Order
XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
21.
The application by learned counsel for the plaintiff in the trial court
to the effect that he acted on instruction of his client does not take
away anything from, or deny, the averments made in the plaint and
the injunction application. Such application was obviously made
under threat of being hauled up for making false affidavit in court,
which was insinuated in the impugned order itself.
22.
However, we insert a caveat here to the extent that all the issues
raised by the contesting defendants/respondents will be open to be
taken by them and the other defendants at the time of final hearing
of the temporary injunction application.
23.
The respective scopes of Order XXXIX Rule 4 with regard to an ex
parte ad-interim injunction and a final adjudication of a temporary
injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 are
different. The former is restricted to the parameters laid down in
Order XXXIX Rule 4 whereas all questions are open to be canvassed
by the parties at the final hearing of the temporary injunction
application, since the pleadings and documents of both parties are
before the Court at that juncture.
24.
On the anvil of the yardsticks of Order XXXIX Rule 4 in respect of
an ex parte ad-interim injunction, however, we do not find such tests
to be satisfied in the present case, sufficient to vacate the initial ex
parte ad-interim order granted in favour of the plaintiff/appellant.
25.
Another aspect of the matter cannot be overlooked. The learned
Trial Judge, even prior to filing of the written objection by the
contesting
defendants,
disposed
of
the
temporary
injunction
application itself by the impugned order without giving both parties
opportunity to address the same on merits, consequentially upon
allowing the application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code.
Such approach is completely erroneous and contrary to law, since
the adjudication of an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4
pertains only to the ex parte ad interim order granted initially and
not to the final adjudication of the injunction application, which is to
be heard and decided independently upon hearing both parties and
giving opportunity to them to bring their pleadings and materials on
record.
26.
Thus, the impugned order is bad on such count as well.
27.
Accordingly, FMAT 449 of 2024 is allowed on contest, thereby
setting aside the impugned order bearing Order no. 5 dated May 15,
2024 and re-imposing the ad-interim order of injunction granted on
March 20, 2024 by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Islampur, District – Uttar Dinajpur in Partition Suit no. 134 of 2024
till disposal of the temporary injunction application by the trial
court.
28.
The contesting respondents shall file their written objection to the
temporary injunction application in the Trial Court if not already
filed.
On
the
prayer
of
learned
counsel
for
the
contesting
respondents, the time for filing such written objection is granted for
a period of six weeks from date.
29.
It is expected that the learned Trial Judge shall dispose of the
temporary injunction application as expeditiously thereafter as the
business of the said Court permits.
30.
We reiterate that this Court has not entered into the merits of the
temporary injunction application and it will be open to the learned
Trial Judge to decide the same independently and in accordance
with
law,
without
being
influenced
in
any
manner
by
the
observations made above.
31.
CAN 1 of 2025 is consequentially disposed of as well.
32.
There will be no order as to costs.
33.
Urgent certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to
the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
AD -15
Ct No.16
07.04.2026
(SSS)
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