S. Rukmini Madegowda vs The State Election Commission & Ors.

Constitution of India – Article 243-ZA(1), 324(1) – Held: The language and tenor of Article 243-ZA(1) is in pari materia with Article 324(1) – Interpretation of Article 324(1) to confer wide powers on the Election Commission to issue directions in respect of elections to Parliament and State legislatures would apply to Article 243ZA(1) which has to be construed to confer powers on the State Election Commission to issue directions related to superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral roles or for conduct of elections to municipalities – State Election Commission has the same powers u/Article 243-K and 243-ZA(1) as the Election Commission has u/Article 324(1).

Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 – Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 – Representation of People Act, 1951 – Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 – Held: A hypertechnical view of the omission to incorporate any specific provision in the KMC Election Rules, similar to the 1961 Rules, expressly requiring disclosure of assets, to condone dishonesty and corrupt practice would be against the spirit of the Constitution and public interest.

Precedent – Held: A judgment is a precedent for the issue of law raised and decided – Judgment has to be construed in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which it has been rendered.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The election of the Appellant is governed by the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, and the Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 framed thereunder. A false declaration with regard to the assets of a candidate, his/her spouse or dependents, constitutes corrupt practice irrespective of the impact of such a false declaration on the election of the candidate. It may be presumed that a false declaration impacts the election. [Para 16, 38][10-E-F; 17-A-B]

1.2 A judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised and decided. The judgment has to be construed in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which the judgment has been rendered. Words, phrases and sentences in a judgment, cannot be read out of context. Nor is a judgment to be read and interpreted in the manner of a statute. It is only the law as interpreted by Court in an earlier judgment, which constitutes a binding precedent, and not everything that the Judges say. [Para 41][18-B-D]

State of M. P. v. Centre for Environment Protection Research & Development (2020) 9 SCC 781 : 2020

(8) JT 353 – distinguished.

1.3 Under Section 39 of the KMC Act, corrupt practices include undue influence. The definition of undue influence in Clause 2 of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act 1951, (“the 1951 RP Act”) has been incorporated in Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. Under Section 27 of the KMC Act corrupt practices defined in Section 39(2) which includes “undue influence’ entails disqualification from being a Councillor, for six years. [Para 45, 47][22-D-E; 23-D]

1.4 Corrupt Practices have been defined in Section 39(2) of the KMC Act to include ‘undue influence’ as defined in Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act came up for interpretation by this Court in Lok Prahari, where this Court held that the non-disclosure would amount to ‘undue influence’ as defined under the Representation of People Act. The definition of ‘undue influence’ as used in Section 123(2) of 1951 RP Act is also adopted by Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. Therefore, the non- disclosure of assets in the municipal elections would also amount to ‘undue influence’ and consequently to ‘corrupt practice’. As argued, the notifications dated 14th July 2003 and 19th June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission, have never been questioned by the Appellant. Rather, the Petitioner accepted the notifications as binding on her, and accordingly filed an affidavit. The Appellant is, therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the notifications or the power of the State Election Commission to issue the same. That nondisclosure of assets would amount to ‘corrupt practices’, entailing disqualification, is evident from Sections 35 and 39(ii) of the KMC Act, read with Section 123(2) of the Representation of People Act 1951, as interpreted by this Court in Lok Prahari. It is not in dispute that the Appellant had suppressed information with regard to the assets of her husband. Section 35(1)(b) of the KMC Act provides that if the Court is of the opinion that a party has committed a ‘corrupt practice’, that would result in the election being declared void. Section 35 of the KMC Act enumerates the grounds on which Courts could declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. Section 35(1)(b) mentions corrupt practice by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person, either with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent, as one of the grounds for declaring the election to be void. Section 39 of the KMC Act enumerates the acts/practices, which are to be deemed to be corrupt practices. Corrupt practices include ‘undue influence’. This is specified in Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. The definition of undue influence in Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act has expressly been incorporated in the definition of undue influence in Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. Further, having regard to the tenor of Section 39(3) of the KMC Act, any false statement relating to a candidate would be corrupt practice. At the cost of repetition, it is emphasized that KMC Act incorporates the definition of undue influence in Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. The judgments of this Court interpreting ‘undue influence’ in Section 123(2) of the 1951, RP Act, would squarely apply to the interpretation of undue influence under Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. Section 123(2) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 had been interpreted by this Court in Lok Prahari where this Court held that non-disclosure would amount to ‘undue influence’ as defined in the Representation of People Act, 1951. The non-disclosure of assets would therefore, also amount to ‘undue influence’ and consequently to ‘corrupt practices’ under the KMC Act. Mr. Patil argued that the Notifications dated 14th July 2003 and in particular 19th June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission made it mandatory for the candidates to file affidavits, disclosing the assets of their spouses. [Paras 55-62][24-H; 25-A-B, C, F-H; 26-A-G] Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2018) 4 SCC 699 : [2018]

2 SCR 892 – relied on.

1.5 The question of whether the Election Commission had power to issue directions to the candidates to file affidavits disclosing the assets of their spouses, in the absence of any specific provision under the KMC Act or the Rules framed thereunder is no longer res integra. The question is squarely covered by the law laid down by this Court in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and Ors., where this Court had directed the Election Commission to secure to voters, inter alia, information pertaining to assets not only of the candidates but also of their spouse and dependents. The Election Commission has to act within the four corners of law made by the Parliament and/or the concerned State legislature, as the case may be. The notification dated 14th July 2003 was issued pursuant to the judgment of this Court in Association for Democratic Reforms, where this Court held that “the Constitution has made comprehensive provision under Article 324 to take care of surprise situations and it operates in areas left unoccupied by legislation.” The interpretation given by this Court of Article 324 of the Constitution of India is binding on all courts. [Paras 6365][26-G-H; 27-A-C]

Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) 5 SCC 294 : [2002] 3 SCR 696 – relied on.

1.6 The language and tenor of Article 243-ZA(1) is in pari materia with Article 324(1) of the Constitution. The language and tenor of Section 243-ZA(1) is identical to that of Article 324(1). This Court has interpreted Article 324(1) to confer wide powers on the Election Commission relating to superintendence, direction and control of preparation of electoral roles and/or the conduct of elections to Parliament and to the legislature of every State provided, of course, that the directions are not contrary to law. The interpretation of Article 324(1) to confer wide powers on the Election Commission to issue directions in respect of elections to Parliament and State legislatures would apply to Article 243-ZA(1). Article 243-ZA(1) has to be construed to confer powers on the State Election Commission to issue directions related to superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral roles or for conduct of elections to municipalities. The Election Commission has wide powers under Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India to issue directions necessary for conducting free and fair elections, subject to the contours of law. The power of the Election Commission includes the power to issue directions where the law is silent. The State Election Commission has the same powers under Article 243-K and 243-ZA(1) as the Election Commission of India has under Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India. In Association for Democratic Reforms and in Lok Prahari, this Court held that for effective exercise of his fundamental right under Article 19(1)((a), the voter is entitled to have all relevant information about candidates at an election which would include criminal antecedents, if any, of the candidate, his/her assets and liabilities, educational qualifications, etc. It may be true that amendment of the 1951 RP Act is within the exclusive domain of the Union Parliament as observed in Lok Prahari and amendment of the KMC Act is exclusively within the domain of the Karnataka State Legislature. However, in light of the law declared by this Court in Association for Democratic Reforms, there is no legal or normative impediment for the State Election Commission to issue directions requiring disclosure of assets of the candidate, his/her spouse and dependent associates by way of affidavit. In issuing the notification dated 14th July 2003, the Election Commission has not encroached into the legislative domain of the Karnataka State Legislature. The direction, as contained in the notification dated 14th July 2003 had been accepted by the Appellant. Having affirmed a false affidavit, it does not lie in the mouth of the Appellant to contend that her election should not be set aside on the ground of corrupt practice under Section 35(1) of the KMC Act. [Paras 66-70][27-C-D, G-H; 28-A-G]

1.7 The Election Commission has issued the notification dated 14th July 2003 within the contours of law. Purity of election at all levels, be it election to the Union Parliament or a State Legislature or a Municipal Corporation or a Panchayat is a matter of national importance in which a uniform policy is desirable in the interest of all the States. A hypertechnical view of the omission to incorporate any specific provision in the KMC Election Rules, similar to the 1961 Rules, expressly requiring disclosure of assets, to condone dishonesty and corrupt practice would be against the spirit of the Constitution and public interest. There are no grounds to interfere with or set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, affirming the judgment and order of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mysuru, allowing Election Petition and setting aside the election of the Appellant. [Paras 72, 74 and 75][29-C, F-G; 30-A-B]

Shrikant v. Vasantrao and Others (2006) 2 SCC 682 : [2006] 1 SCR 496; Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (1982) 1 SCC 691 : [1982] 3 SCR 318 – distinguished.

Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar & Ors. (2015) 3 SCC

467 : [2015] 4 SCR 987; State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta (2017) 2 SCC 538 : [2016] 9 SCR 985; State of West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1963 – relied on.

Srikant v. Vasant Rao and Others; Shailesh Manubhai Parmar v. Election Commission of India (2018) 9 SCC

100 : [2018] 10 SCR 76; Tolaram Relumal and Another v. State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 158; Bipinchandra Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat (2003) 4 SCC 642: [2003] 3 SCR 533 – referred to.