Jammu & Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972 – s.2(4), 2(6), 2(7) and 50 – Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Rules, 1973 – r. 5 – Jammu & Kashmir Agrarian Reforms (Suspension of Operations Act), 1975 – Jammu & Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976 – Registration Act, 1977 – s.17 – Jammu & Kashmir Transfer of Property Act – s.138 – Suit for declaration and possession – The Suit was filed for declaration and possession by the respondent-plaintiff who was the adopted son of one ‘SS’ (who was the owner of property is in dispute) – Respondent claimed that he received gifts of land in his favour from SS – He supported his claim by producing a compromise deed dated 18.12.1975 in between himself and one ‘AJK’(tenant) on which there was a thumb impression of SS endorsing the instrument – Deputy commissioner (DC) passed an order recording the compromise on 24.12.1975 – The appellant contended that they are in possession of the land – The District judge passed decree in favour of plaintiff-respondent, the finding was primarily based on compromise deed – The first appeal by the appellants herein was dismissed – The LPA preferred by the appellants was dismissed – Appellants approached the Supreme Court and contended that the compromise does not confer any title on the respondent and that such an instrument requires compulsory registration as per s.17 of 1977 Act and further, that in terms of Section 3 of the Suspension Act, 1975, the operation of the concerned provisions and all proceedings thereunder 1972 Act remained in suspension until 30.3.1976 and therefore 18.12.1975 compromise and the DC’s order dated 24.12.1975 for correction of revenue records based on the compromise are non-est – Held: With his endorsement on the compromise, SS intended to give the right of personal cultivation but the same does not in any manner suggest that SS had intended to confer title on the respondent – The compromise cannot be treated as a family arrangement – Furthermore, the compromise and the DC’s consequent Order, was passed in a revenue proceeding thus the compromise did not fall under the exception category under Section 17(2)(vi) of – Thus, compromise in order to have legal effect needed registration under the Registration Act, 1977 – The DC lacked inherent jurisdiction to either entertain the appeal or endorse the compromise during the suspended phase – Any order or decree so passed through such unlawful exercise of power, will be a legal nullity – Decree in favour of respondent (plaintiff) set aside.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. A. Whether the compromise dated 18.12.1975 confers title?
In order to adjudicate the above issue, this Court needs to look at the compromise in its intent and functioning. The compromise between the Plaintiff and tenant was recorded in a proceeding for correction of revenue records under the 1972 Act and the Rules. There, the Plaintiff was admitted to be the owner and in possession of land which he personally cultivated. SS with his thumb impression endorsed the compromise deed. On this the defendants have contended that the said statement has to be read in the context in which it was made and how the parties to the transaction understood the same. The plaintiff says that his adoptive father SS intended to confer title on the Plaintiff and SS would not have looked into the definition of “owner” under the 1972 Act, before making the endorsement on the compromise. On this, it cannot be ignored that the parties effectuated the transaction in a proceeding under the 1972 Act. Thus, the compromise exists within the four corners of the 1972 Act, and must therefore be read by applying the statutory provisions. [Para 18][116-C-E]
2. The purpose of the compromise decree in the correction proceedings under Chapter III of the Rules pertain only to revenue entries, and the possession of land in capacity of a personal cultivator. This could hardly confer any lawful title on the plaintiff over SS’s land. With his endorsement on the compromise, SS perhaps intended to give the right of personal cultivation but the same does not in any manner suggest that SS had intended to confer title on the plaintiff. The land is therefore of the orchard category. In this situation, the land which is the subject matter of the Compromise being an Orchard stood excluded from the definition of land under S. 2(4) of the 1972 Act. As such, the title for such category of land could not vest with the Plaintiff. Thus This Court held that the compromise (18.12.1975) does not convey any lawful title on the Plaintiff. [Paras 19, 20, 21][116-G; 117-B-E]
B. Did the compromise require registration?
3. It is contended by the defendants that the compromise did not comply with Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1977 which mandates compulsory registration, and without a registered document, no title or claim or possession can fructify. The compromise was not amongst family members but between the plaintiff and the tenant (not a family member). The statement of SS “I accept the compromise”, is only with regard to the internal arrangement regarding the tenancy, and this will not make it a family arrangement. Moreover, the plea that compromise is a “Family Arrangement” is raised for the first time before this Court. The Plaintiff significantly had waived his claim to other assets left by SS (on the basis that the Plaintiff is his adopted son), before the High Court. He cannot therefore be permitted to raise such a contention for the first time before this Court. Even otherwise, tenant was not a family member. Thus, he could not have been a party to a so called “family arrangement”. Besides, none of the other family members were parties to the said compromise either. Therefore, the documents in question would require registration and it cannot be treated as a family arrangement. [Paras 22 and 23][117-F-H; 118-A-C]
4. The compromise was required to be registered, under Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1977 and also under Section
138 of the J&K Transfer of Property Act. Without such registration no title can fructify for the plaintiff from the documents in question. Furthermore, the compromise and the DC’s consequent Order, was passed in a revenue proceeding and this was definitely not a part of a Court proceeding. That being the case, the compromise did not fall under the exception category under Section 17(2)(vi) of Registration Act, 1977 (as applicable to then State of J&K). The above makes it abundantly clear that the compromise in order to have legal effect needed registration under the Registration Act, 1977. Since title is claimed, and the plaintiff founded his entire case on the compromise, it would necessarily require registration. Accordingly, question B is answered in affirmative. [Paras 26, 27 and 28][119-F-H; 120-A-C]
5. The DC, lacked inherent jurisdiction to either entertain the appeal or endorse the compromise during the suspended phase. In cases where the authority lacked jurisdiction under a special Act and yet exercises powers, without authority of law, any order or decree so passed through such unlawful exercise of power, will be a legal nullity. The deficiency of jurisdiction of the authority cannot be cured by the consent of the parties. The challenge to such an incompetent order could be set up wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even in execution or in collateral proceedings. Accordingly answering in favour of the defendants, the DC’s order in our opinion can have no legal effect as the same was passed during the operation of Suspension Act, 1975. This Court finds that the compromise being unregistered cannot confer title on the respondent. [Para 30][121-B-D] Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major (1995) 5 SCC 709 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 466; K. Raghunandan & Ors. v. Ali Hussain Sabir & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 102 : [2008]
8 SCR 657; Phool Patti v. Ram Singh (2015) 3 SCC 465; Ajudh Raj v. Moti (1991) 3 SCC 136 : [1991] 2 SCR 690; Mohammad Ansari v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 3 SCC 740 : [2017] 1 SCR 422; Sitabai & Anr. v. Ramachandra AIR 1970 343 : [1970] 2 SCR 1; Om Prakash & Ors. v. R. K. Kalra (1988) 4 SCC 705 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 556; Kale and Others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others (1976) 3 SCC
119 : [1976] 3 SCR 202; Ram Charan Das v. Girija Nandini Devi and Others AIR 1966 SC 323 : [1965]
3 SCR 841; Maturi Pullaiah and Another v. Maturi Narasimham and Others AIR 1966 SC 1836; K. C. Kappor v. Smt. Radhika Devi (Dead) by LRs. and Others (1981) 4 SCC 487 : [1982] 1 SCR 907; Mehaboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail and Others (1995) 3 SCC 693 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 537; Bhagwan Krishan Gupta (D) v. Prabha Gupta and Others (2009) 11 SCC 33 : [2009]
3 SCR 393; Ganeshi (Dead) Through LRs. and Others v. Ashok and Another (2011) 15 SCC 417 : [2011]
4 SCR 215; Ajambi (Dead) by Legal Representative v. Roshanbi and Others (2017) 11 SCC 544; Ripudaman Singh v. Tikka Maheshwar Chand (2021) 7 SCC 446; Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation v. Cork Manufacturing Co. (2007) 8 SCC 120 : [2007] 9 SCR 508 - referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.