Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.A.ABDUL HAKHIM
FRIDAY, THE 11TH DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 21ST CHAITHRA, 1947
RSA NO. 1262 OF 2011
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT&DECREE DATED 13.07.2011 IN AS NO.156 OF 2006
OF
ADDITIONAL
DISTRICT
COURT-II,
MAVELIKKARA
ARISING
OUT
OF
THE
JUDGMENT&DECREE DATED 20.09.2006 IN OS NO.293 OF 2002 OF MUNSIFF COURT,
MAVELIKKARA
APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS 2 AND 3:
RAVI S/O LATE.KUNJUPANIKEN,
KANNIMEL PARAMBIL HOUSE,, ARANOOTTIMANGALAM MURI, VETTIYAR
VILLAGE,, MAVELIKKARA TALUK.
PONNAMMA W/O.RAVI
KANNIMEL PARAMBIL HOUSE,, ARANOOTTIMANGALAM MURI, VETTIYAR
VILLAGE,, MAVELIKKARA TALUK.
BY ADVS.
SRI.M.V.THAMBAN
SRI.B.BIPIN
SRI.R.REJI
SMT.REVATHY P.NAIR
SMT.THARA THAMBAN
RESPONDENTS/APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS:
LEKSHMI (DIED),
D/O.LATE NANGELI, NJARAKKATTU PADEETTATHIL,
ARANOOTTIMANGALAM MURI, VETTIYAR VILLAGE, MAVELIKKARA-691
101.
SURENDRAN,
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
S/O.LATE LEKSHMI, LITTLE HUT, THAZHAKKARA VILLAGE,
AKKANATTIKARA, MURI, KALLUMALA FROM NJARAKKATTU
PADEETTATHIL,, ARANOOTTIMANGALAM MURI, VETTIYAR VILLAGE,,
MAVELIKKARA - 690101.
KOMALAN,
AGED 54 YEARS, S/O.LATE LEKSHMI, NJARAKKATTU PADEETTATHIL,
ARANOOTTIMANGALAM MURI, VETTIYAR VILLAGE,,
MAVELIKKARA - 690101.
SOLOMEN,
AGED 45 YEARS, S/O.LATE LEKSHMI, NJARAKKATTU PADEETTATHIL,
ARANOOTTIMANGALAM MURI,, VETTIYAR VILLAGE,
MAVELIKKARA - 690101.
SOBHA,
AGED 39 YEARS, D/O.LATE LEKSHMI, NJARAKKATTU PADEETTATHIL,
ARANOOTTIMANGALAM MURI,, VETTIYAR VILLAGE,
MAVELIKKARA - 690101.
NJANAMBIKA,
W/O.LATE SUDHAKARAN, NJARAKKATTU PADEETTATHIL,
ARANOOTTIMANGALAM MURI,, VETTIYAR VILLAGE,
MAVELIKKARA - 690101.
SUDHI SUDHAKARAN,
S/O.LATE SUDHAKARAN, NJARAKKATTU PADEETTATHIL,
ARANOOTTIMANGALAM MURI,, VETTIYAR VILLAGE,
MAVELIKKARA - 690101.
SUMITH SUDHAKARAN,
S/O.LATE SUDHAKARAN, NJARAKKATTU PADEETTATHIL,
ARANOOTTIMANGALAM MURI,, VETTIYAR VILLAGE,
MAVELIKKARA - 690101.
BY ADVS.
R2 TO R8 BY ADV. SRI P.MARTIN JOSE
SRI P.PRIJITH
R2 TO R4 BY ADV. SRI SIJU KAMALASANAN
R5 TO R8 BY ADV. SRI. ANEESH JAMES
SMT. DHANYA CHANDRAN, ADVOCATE COMMISSIONER
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 11.04.2025,
THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
JUDGMENT
1.
The appellants are the defendants 2 and 3 in the suit. They are
husband and wife. The 2nd defendant is the nephew of the 1st
defendant. The plaintiff is the wife of the 1st defendant.
2.
Plaintiff filed suit for declaration of easement by prescription
over C schedule pathway and consequential injunction. On
account of the objection of non-joinder of parties, the 3rd
defendant who is the wife of the 2nd defendant was impleaded
in the suit. The 3rd defendant remained exparte.
3.
Plaint A schedule property having an extent of 58.5 cents of land
and the residential building therein belongs to the plaintiff as per
Ext.A1. Plaint B schedule property having an extent of 11.20
Ares of land belongs to the 1st defendant. Plaint B schedule
property is situated on the south-eastern side of plaint A
schedule property. Canal Road is situated on the eastern side
of B schedule property. Plaint C schedule pathway is shown as
having a length of 48 meters and 3 meters width situated on the
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
northern extremity of Plaint B schedule property starting from
the Canal Road on the eastern side and ending at the southeastern side of the plaint A schedule property. The suit was filed
on 10.07.2002. The 1st defendant had executed Ext.B2 Sale
Deed dated 05.07.2002 with respect to plaint B schedule
property in favour of the defendants 2 and 3, and thus, they also
became parties to the suit.
4.
As per the plaint allegations, the residential building in the Plaint
A schedule property is having an age of more than 100 years
facing towards east. The plaintiff and her predecessors have
been using plaint C schedule property for the last more than 50
years for passage including vehicular passage from canal road
to Plaint A schedule property. Plaint C schedule pathway is the
only means of access to plaint A schedule property. The plaintiff
travels through the eastern side of plaint A schedule property
towards south from the house and enters plaint C schedule
pathway for traveling to the eastern public road which was
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
converted into a canal road about 22 years back. On account of
age-related diseases, the plaintiff has been frequently going for
treatment in the car through Plaint C schedule property. The 1st
defendant is also residing in the house in the plaint A schedule
property. He also has been using Plaint C schedule property for
access. Though the plaintiff and the 1st defendant have been
residing in the same house, they have been remaining in bitter
inimical terms. Hence, 1st defendant has been attempting to
obstruct the plaint C schedule pathway. He has been attempting
to create some documents in favour of the defendants 2 and 3
to defeat the rights of the plaintiff.
5.
The 1st defendant filed a Written Statement opposing the suit
prayers, contending, inter alia, that there is no pathway through
plaint B schedule property. Plaint A schedule property is having
access to the PWD road situated on the northern side through
a pathway starting from the northern side of plaint A schedule
property. The plaintiff is not in need of any other pathway. The
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
canal road on the eastern side of plaint B schedule property
came into existence only in the year 1986. Hence the contention
of the plaintiff that the plaintiff has been using the pathway
through the Plaint B schedule property to access the canal road
on the eastern side for the last more than 50 years is incorrect.
Even according to the plaintiff, the canal road came into
existence about 22 years back, and hence, she could not
contend that she has been using pathway through plaint B
schedule property for the last more than 50 years. Since the
plaintiff is the wife of the 1st defendant, the 1st defendant has
permitted the plaintiff to access the Canal Road through the
plaint B schedule property for walking and on the basis of the
said permission, the plaintiff has been walking through plaint B
schedule property for accessing the Canal road on the western
side. It will not create an easement by prescription.
6.
The 2nd defendant also filed a Written Statement opposing the
suit prayers, contending that the 2nd defendant and his wife
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
purchased the plaint schedule property as per Ext.B2 Sale deed
dt. 05.07.2002. The said sale was very well known to the
plaintiff. Before the date of sale, the property was measured and
boundary stone was fixed in the presence of the plaintiff and the
plaintiff has filed the suit impleading the 2nd defendant alone as
a party in the suit apart from the 1st defendant. There was no
pathway in the plaint B schedule property at the time of
purchase by the 2nd defendant. The alleged C schedule is a part
and parcel of Plaint B schedule. If there was a pathway, these
defendants would not have purchased the property. Hence, the
plaintiff has no right to claim the prescriptive right of easement
through the alleged C schedule. There was no canal road till the
year 1985. If the plaintiff had any opportunity to walk through the
plaint B schedule property after the commissioning of eastern
canal it is pursuant to the consent or agreement with the 1st
defendant on the basis of their relationship. On the basis of such
usage, the plaintiff cannot claim the prescriptive right of
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
easement through any portion of Plaint B schedule property. No
vehicle has ever passed through plaint B schedule property.
There is no chance of passing of any vehicle since the canal
portion of the property is lying 2 ft higher than the plaint B
schedule property, and there is a ‘murippu’ situated on the
eastern side of the plaint A schedule property separating A
schedule property from the plaint B schedule property.
7.
Since the 1st defendant died during the pendency of the suit and
no legal heirs were impleaded, the suit was dismissed as abated
against the 1st defendant.
8.
On the side of the plaintiff, son of the plaintiff was examined as
PW1, Brother in law of PW1 was examined as PW2, President
of SNDP Branch was examined as PW3 and Advocate
Commissioner who prepared Exts.C1, C2 and C2(a) was
examined as PW4. The title deed of the plaintiff was marked as
Ext.A1 and Land Tax Receipt was marked as Ext.A2 on the side
of the plaintiffs. On the side of the defendants, the 2nd
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
defendant was examined as DW1, and Exts.B1 to B3 were
marked. Ext.B1 is the copy of the plaint in O.S NO. 242/2006
filed by the plaintiff and her children against the defendants 2
and 3.Ext.B2 is the Sale deed by which the 1st defendant sold
Plaint B schedule property to the defendants 2 and 3. Ext.B3 is
the title deed of the 1st defendant by which he derived the plaint
B schedule property.
9.
The Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff failed
to prove that she had acquired an easement by prescription
over plaint C schedule property.
10. The plaintiff filed an appeal before the First Appellate Court.
During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff died, and hence,
her legal heirs were impleaded as additional appellants 2 to 8.
11. The First Appellate Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the
judgment and decree of the Trial Court and decreeing the suit
declaring that the plaintiff/additional appellants are having right
of easement by prescription over plaint C schedule property for
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
travel and to carry vehicle for the beneficial enjoyment of A
schedule property and passing permanent prohibitory injunction
restraining the defendants 2 and 3 and their men from
obstructing the use of the plaint C schedule way by the plaintiff
for their ingress and egress.
12. This Court admitted the Regular Second Appeal on the following
substantial question of law:
“Whether on the evidence on record, the First Appellate Court was
justified in holding that the plaint c schedule way was in existence and
the appellant has established a right of way by easement or
prescription under S.15 of the Indian Easement Act?”
13. At the time of admission, this Court had ordered the parties to
maintain the status quo. During the pendency of the appeal, the
appellants filed I.A No.996/2012 to restrain the respondents
from trespassing into the plaint B and C schedule till the disposal
of the appeal on the ground that there is no such way as
mentioned in the plaint C schedule available at the spot at
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
present. In view of the said contention, this Court appointed an
Advocate Commissioner to inspect and report regarding the
plaint schedule properties. The Advocate Commissioner has
filed a Report dt. 09.04.2012, and the same is available in the
files. Thereafter, this Court passed order dt. 11.04.2012
directing the respondents not to do any act affecting the present
lie, condition, and position of the plaint C schedule property as
reported by the Advocate Commissioner in her Report dt.
09.04.2012 and they are further directed not to enter into the
rest of Plaint B schedule property or to do any act therein.
14. I heard the learned Counsel for the appellant Sri. R.Reji, and
the learned Senior Counsel for respondents Sri.S Sreekumar
instructed by Adv. Sri. P Martin Jose.
15. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the Trial
Court, as well as the First Appellate Court, illegally found
easement by prescription over the plaint C schedule property.
The Advocate Commissioner did not identify Plaint C schedule
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
pathway in his report. Though the plaintiff specifically contended
that the plaint C schedule pathway is the only means of access
to plaint A schedule property, it has come out in evidence that
there is a pathway starting from the north side of plaint A
schedule property towards the PWD road situated on the
northern side, which will reveal the falsity of the contention of
the plaintiff. At any rate, the plaintiff might have used plaint B
schedule property as a means of easy access by walking to the
canal road on the eastern side of B schedule property as per
the permission given by the 1st defendant on account of their
relationship. Such permissive use could not be turned as
easement by prescription. The learned counsel for the appellant
cited the decision of this court in Cherootty Balan v.
Velayudhan Nair [1998 (1) KLJ 479] to substantiate the point
that when the right of way is by way of permission, the same
could not ripen into an easement by prescription. At any rate,
the plaintiff is having only right of way by walking through the
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
plaint B schedule property. The learned counsel for the
appellants cited the decision of this Court in Badariya
Madrassa Committee and another v. Antony Robert
Breganza [2006(2) KLT 636] to substantiate the point that
when the use of way is only for walking, the plaintiff cannot claim
easement for taking vehicular traffic. She cannot claim any
vehicular passage through plaint B schedule property. The
plaintiff herself admits that the canal road on the eastern side
came into existence only about 22 years back, and at the same
time, she claims that she has been using the plaint C schedule
property for the last more than 50 years for vehicular passage.
It reveals the falsity of the claim. As a matter of fact, the canal
road came into existence after 1986, and the suit was filed in
the year 2002 and hence, the plaintiff will not get the statutory
period of 20 years to claim an easement right by prescription.
The Advocate Commissioner has specifically reported that the
way towards the northern side from the plaint A schedule
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
property is aged more than 50 years, whereas the age of the
beaten track through the middle of the plaint C schedule is only
around 10 years. At any rate, the First Appellate Court acted
illegally in granting easement by prescription over plaint C
schedule pathway, including vehicular passage, holding that the
width of the pathway is 3 meters, whereas the Advocate
Commissioner has reported in his report that the width of the
beaten track is only 30 cms. At any rate, only a width of 2 feet is
sufficient for a pathway which can be used for walking. The Trial
Court has specifically found that PW2 and PW3 are interested
witnesses, and their interests could not be relied on. The plaintiff
did not mount to the box to give evidence. The son of the
plaintiff, who was examined as PW 2, could not give an answer
to the material questions, pleading ignorance of the same. The
counsel further contended that the plaintiffs filed an Ext.B1 suit
claiming that the plaintiffs are the owners of plaint B schedule
property against defendants 2 and 3 and others. In such case,
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
the plaintiff does not admit the defendants 2 and 3 as the owners
of plaint B schedule property. It is settled that only if the plaintiff
admits the defendant as the owner of the land, easement by
prescription can be claimed against the defendants. The
learned counsel for the appellants concluded his arguments by
praying to allow the appeal answering the substantial question
of law formulated in the appeal in favour of the appellant.
16. On
the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents contended that the specific case of the defendants
was that plaint C schedule property does not exist. The Trial
Court, as well as the First Appellate Court, specifically found the
existence of a plaint C schedule pathway. The Trial Court nonsuited the plaintiff on the sole reason that the plaintiff could not
prove easement for the statutory period to claim an easement
by prescription relying on the age of Plaint C schedule pathway
reported by the Advocate Commissioner as 10 years. The
Advocate commissioner will not be able to assess the age of a
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
pathway on inspection. It is in evidence that the plaintiff and the
1st defendant, though wife and husband, were at loggerheads.
The 1st defendant wanted to see that the right of easement
through the plaint C schedule pathway of the plaintiff is defeated
and hence executed Ext.B2 sale deed in favour of the
defendants 2 and 3 who are his nephew and wife. It is in
evidence that the pathway started from the northern side of
plaint A schedule is not wide enough to take four-wheeler
vehicles through it. It is a settled law that the availability of an
alternative pathway is not a reason for denial of easement by
prescription if the essentials are pleaded and proved by the
plaintiff. The learned Senior Counsel cited the decision of this
court in Mercy v. Agnes Maria. E.J [2023 KHC 828] to
substantiate the said proposition of law. The house situated in
plaint A schedule property is facing towards east. Hence, it is
quite natural that the pathway for access would go towards the
eastern side. The Learned Senior Counsel concluded the
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
arguments by praying to dismiss the appeal, answering the
substantial question of law in favour of the respondents.
17. I have considered the rival contentions.
18. The original ownership of the plaint A schedule property by the
plaintiff and the plaint B schedule property by the 1st defendant
is admitted by the parties. The suit was filed on 10.07.2002. The
plaint B schedule property was sold by the 1st defendant to the
2nd and 3rd defendants by Ext.B2 immediately before the
institution of the suit on 05.07.2002. Hence, as on the date of
the suit, defendants 2 and 3 are the owners of the plaint B
schedule property. The plaintiffs filed Ext.B1 suit only on
06.07.2006 to declare that Ext.B2 document is a sham
document and that they are the title holders of the plaint B
schedule property as legal heirs of the 1st defendant after his
death on 10.05.2006. The plaint B schedule property belonged
to the 2nd and 3rd defendants as per Ext.B1 document so long
as the said document is not set aside or declared void by a
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
competent court. Since the plaintiffs are not the owners of the
Plaint B schedule property, they can maintain the suit for
easement by prescription. Merely because they have filed an
Ext.B1 suit challenging the Ext.B2 document after the death of
the 1st defendant, it could not be said that the present suit is not
maintainable.
19. The first question to be considered is the existence of Plaint C
schedule pathway. Plaint C schedule pathway is shown as
having 3 Meters width and 48 Meters length. The existence of
the pedestrian pathway as on the date of the suit is more or less
admitted by the defendants. Their contention is that it is used as
a means of easy access on the basis of consent on account of
the relationship of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. The
appellants have expressed no objection in providing the said
pedestrian pathway on the northern extremity of the plaint B
schedule property. But such concession could not be taken as
a proof of existence of the pathway having a width of 3 Meters
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
for the statutory period of 20 years immediately preceding the
suit. Hence the plaintiffs have to prove the existence of the plaint
C schedule pathway having a width of 3 Meters first.
20. Let us examine whether the plaintiffs have succeeded in proving
the existence of the plaint C schedule pathway having a width
of 3 Meters.
21. There are two Commission Reports available in the suit. Ext.C1
is the Commission Report dated 26.07.2002 prepared on the
basis of the inspection on 10.07.2002, the date on which the suit
was filed. Ext.C1 would show that there is a beaten track on the
front side of the house situated in A schedule property towards
southern side joining with Plaint C schedule way.
Plaint C
schedule way goes towards east and ends at canal road. The
length and width of Plaint C schedule way is reported as 47
Meters and 30 cms respectively. It is true that the Advocate
Commissioner has reported tyre marks on both sides of the said
30 cms. Even then, the Advocate Commissioner did not report
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
that the way is having a width to take vehicles. In sum and
substance, Ext.C1 would reveal that the width of the way found
by the Advocate Commissioner is only 30 cm. As rightly pointed
out by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, an
Advocate Commissioner could not assess the age of the
pathway, and hence, the report of the Advocate Commissioner
that the age of the pathway is only ten years could not be relied
on. Ext.C2 Commission was taken at the instance of the
defendants to prove that the plaint A schedule property is having
a way towards the northern side. Ext.C2 Commission Report is
dated 09.04.2003 and prepared on the basis of the inspection
on 17.03.2003. It reveals that there is a pathway towards the
northern side from the north-eastern corner of the plaint
schedule property. As per Ext.C2 Commission Report four
wheeler vehicles could be taken through the said way in the first
60 Meters towards south from the northern Panchayat road and
only three wheeler vehicles could be taken through the further
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
33 Meters upto the plaint A schedule property. Ext.C2(a) Plan
would also reveal that the plaint A schedule property is having
access towards northern side. It is in evidence that the house in
Plaint A schedule property is situated on the northern side of
Plaint A schedule property. It is in evidence that the house is
facing towards east. The way towards the northern side starts
from the north-eastern side, and the plaint C schedule starts
from the south-eastern side. Hence, merely because of the fact
that the house is facing towards the eastern side, it could not be
said that the plaint C schedule pathway is the pathway to the
plaint A schedule property. Considering the fact that the house
is situated on the northern side of Plaint A schedule property,
the access towards the northern side is the probable access. It
is true that the existence of an alternative pathway is not a
ground to deny easement by prescription. But as rightly pointed
out by the learned counsel for the appellants, the suppression
of the northern way will reveal the falsity of the claim of the
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
plaintiffs. Hence, the existence of a vehicular passage through
plaint C schedule property is not proved by the Commission
Reports available in the suit.
22. The plaintiffs examined PWs 1 to 4 to prove the plaint claim.
Instead of the plaintiff, the son of the plaintiff was examined as
PW2. PW2 deposed that the plaint C schedule pathway is the
only pathway available to plaint A schedule property. When it is
in evidence that the plaint A schedule property is having a
pathway towards northern side, it is clear that PW2 is not telling
truth before the court. PW2 was examined as a person who
knows the parties to the suit. He did not disclose the fact that he
is the brother-in-law of PW1 in his proof affidavit. He filed a proof
affidavit stating that the plaint C schedule is the only way
available for the plaint A schedule property. His evidence could
not be relied on as he is also not telling the truth and he is an
interested witness. PW4 is the President of the SNDP branch.
Even though in cross examination he initially stated that there is
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
no way towards northern side from Plaint A schedule, later he
admitted that there is a way towards northern side since 21
years and he could not state for sure whether the plaintiff and
her family members have used the said way. The evidence of
PW4 also does not inspire confidence. The evidence of PW4
Advocate Commissioner would show that there is a beaten track
having a width of 30 cms through the middle of plaint C
schedule. PW1 admitted that he had seen a way towards the
northern side during the inspection for preparing Ext.C1, and the
plaintiffs did not want to inspect the said way. PW4 has
specifically stated that the way which she saw in the plaint B
schedule is having a width of 30 cms and length of 47 Meters.
So, the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 is not helpful to the plaintiffs to
prove a vehicular passage through Plaint B schedule property.
23. The plaintiff might have taken the car through plaint C schedule
pathway for some period when she was taken for treatments.
When the canal road is situated on the eastern side of plaint B
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
schedule property and B schedule property has been remaining
open, the usage of vehicles through plaint C schedule pathway
is quite normal. But the plaintiff cannot claim right to take vehicle
through plaint C schedule pathway as of right in the absence of
any proof to show that the plaintiff has been taking vehicle
through plaint C schedule pathway for the statutory period of 20
years. The way towards northern side from plaint A schedule
property admits only three wheeler vehicle passage. The
evidence would indicate that the plaintiffs and the family
members started walking through plaint B schedule property as
an easy access after the formation of the canal road. Now the
attempt of the plaintiff is to obtain a vehicular passage through
the plaint B schedule property.
24. The specific finding of the First Appellate Court is that once the
use is established over a particular area, a reasonable space
claimed as 3 Meters width required for the said use as deposed
by PWs 1 to 3 can be fixed as the width of the plaint C schedule
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
though the same is not specifically demarcated in the
Commission Report. Such finding is plainly illegal and
unsustainable. First of all, the width of the way could not be fixed
relying on the interested testimonies of PWs 1 to 3. The
Advocate Commissioner has not identified a 3 Meters width
pathway through plaint B schedule property. There is no
evidence to prove the vehicular passage through the plaint
schedule property for the statutory period of 20 years.
25. The First Appellate Court failed to understand the distinction
between the pedestrian passage and vehicular passage. In
Badariya Madrassa Committee (supra) this Court held that
when the use of way is only for walking the plaintiff cannot claim
easement for taking vehicular traffic. When the evidence before
the court is only for pedestrian passage the First Appellate Court
should not have granted the relief of vehicular passage. Hence,
I am of the view that the judgment and decree passed by the
First Appellate Court is liable to be modified. From the pleadings
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
and evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff and the family members
have been using the northern extremity of plaint B schedule
property for walking. Even though the Advocate Commissioner
has reported only 30 cms as the width of beaten track, I am of
the view that 30 cms is not enough for pedestrian passage,
when both sides are enclosed. A minimum width of three feet is
reasonably required for a pedestrian passage. The description
of plaint C schedule pathway is not in accordance with the said
three feet width pathway and the same is not identified by the
Advocate Commissioner. Even then, in order to have a quietus
to the litigation, I hold that plaintiffs are entitled to get a
declaration of easement by prescription over a pathway having
three feet width on the northern extremity of plaint B schedule
property, i.e; on the immediate southern side of the northern
boundary of plaint B schedule property. There will not be any
difficulty to identify such a pathway through plaint B schedule
property even without any schedule.
RSA No.1262/2011
2025:KER:31413
26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I answer the substantial
question of law in the negative and in favour of the appellant.
27. The Regular Second Appeal is allowed in part, modifying the
judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court by
declaring that the additional plaintiffs are having right of
easement by prescription over a pathway lying east-west having
three feet width on the immediate southern side of the northern
boundary of plaint B schedule property starting from eastern
canal road and ending at the south eastern side of the Plaint A
schedule property and further passing a permanent prohibitory
injunction restraining the defendants 2 and 3 from obstructing
the use of such three feet width pathway by the additional
plaintiffs for their ingress and egress to Plaint A Schedule
property.
Sd/M.A.ABDUL HAKHIM
JUDGE
jma/shg
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review