Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay
WPA 30535 of 2017
Ramesh Chandra Gaur
Vs.
Union of India & Ors.
For the Petitioner
: Mr. Surajit Samanta
: Ms. Sohini Samanta
: Ms. Anindita Roy,
: Mr. Biswajit Samanta
For the respondents
: Mr. Siddhartha Lahiri
Judgment on
: 16.06.2026
Uploaded on
: 16.06.2026
Rai Chattopadhyay, J. :1.
The petitioner is an erstwhile DIT (IRTA No. 18429671) of
M&C Ftr. attached with SHQ, Kolkata, BSF. In the instant
writ petition, the petitioner has challenged an order of the
Special Secretary (IS) of Ministry of Home Affairs (Police-II
Division) of Government of India dated November 13, 2017.
2.
The petitioner was tried by the General Security Force Court
(in short “GSFC”) for committing five offences under Section
40 and 46 of the BSF Act, 1968. The GSFC after appraisal of
evidence on record, found him “not guilty” of I and II charges
and “guilty” of III, IV and V charges and sentenced him to be
“dismissed from service” on July 08, 2016. The findings and
sentence of the GSFC were confirmed by the DG, BSF on
November 09, 2016.
3.
In a writ petition earlier filed by the present petitioner
challenging the punishment awarded by GSFC and praying
for reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits,
the Court directed the respondent as above to consider
petitioner‟s prayer upon granting him opportunity of hearing,
assisted by an advocate. Such hearing was allowed and the
resultant order is that, impugned in the writ petition, that is,
dated November 13, 2017.
4.
Before going into the decision of the authority in the said
impugned order as well as the reasons therefor, it is necessary
to discuss in a nutshell the factual background of the case
which is as follows.
5.
The petitioner was issued a charge sheet dated March 01,
2016 and on March 03, 2016 it was directed that the
petitioner was to be tried by General Security Force Court.
The charges against the writ petitioner inter alia were as
follows: First Charge
BSF Act, 1968
Sec 46
Committing a civil offence, that is to say,
criminal misconduct by abusing his
position as a public servant, obtained for
himself pecuniary advantage, an offence
specified in Sect 13(1)(d) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988, punishable under
Section 13(2) of the said Act.
Second Charge
BSF Act, 1968
Sec 46
Committing a civil offence, that is to say,
criminal misconduct by abusing his
position as a public servant, obtained for
himself pecuniary advantage, an offence
specified in Sect 13(1)(d) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988, punishable under
Section 13(2) of the said Act.
Third Charge
BSF Act, 1968
Sec 40
An act prejudicial to good order and
discipline of the force
Fourth Charge
BSF Act, 1968
Sec 40
An act prejudicial to good order and
discipline of the force
Fifth Charge
BSF Act, 1968
Sec 40
An act prejudicial to good order and
discipline of the force
6.
The respondent authority has alleged that during September
to November, 2013, while discharging duties of Deputy
Inspector General, SHQ, BSF, Krishnanagar the petitioner
obtained Rs. 80 thousand in two installments that is, Rs. 50
thousand from Madhu Ghosh and Rs. 30 thousand from H.C.
Sk. Jamaluddin of 12th Battalion BSF, as pecuniary
advantage in lieu of eight cattles which were handed over to
Madhu Ghosh out of 25 cattles seized on September 30, 2013.
It has further been alleged that, during November, 2013, in
the same capacity, the petitioner received Rs. 50 thousand
through Head Constable Sk. Jamaluddin of 12th Battalion
BSF as pecuniary advantage in lieu of releasing 10 cattles
along with two Bolero pick up vehicles which were seized on
November 13, 2013 led by the said Sk. Jamaluddin.
7.
The other allegations against the writ petitioner was that, on
September 30, 2013, in the same capacity, the petitioner had
unauthorizedly directed ASI (GD) Ved Prakash of SHQ BSF,
Krishnanagar the party COMDR, to hand over eight cattles to
Madhu Ghosh out of 25 cattles seized on September 30, 2013;
also that, during July to September, 2013, the petitioner in
the same capacity made deal without authority with Habil
Shaikh for paying Rs. 2 thousand per vehicle per month for
plying of total 10 vehicles in border area for transportation of
cattles meant to be smuggled to Bangladesh and received Rs.
20 thousand for the same purpose as the first installments.
Lastly, it has been alleged and charged against the writ
petitioner that, during May, 2013 to November, 2013, the
petitioner retained Head Constable Sk. Jamaluddin of 12th
Battalion BSF at SHQ BSF, Krishnanagar, without any
authority or authorization, till November 15, 2013 despite the
12th Battalion BSF moved alone from South Bengal frontier to
Kashmir frontier in the month of June, 2013.
8.
From March 18, 2016 to July 08, 2016 trial was held against
the petitioner before the GSFC on the charges framed vide the
charge sheet dated March 01, 2016. The objections raised by
the petitioner before the GSFC regarding its jurisdiction as
well as non-maintainability of the charges framed against him
stood rejected by the said Court. The GSFC after completion
of the proceeding, recorded its finding that the petitioner was
“not guilty” on the first two charges under Section 46 of the
BSF Act, 1968 and that the petitioner was “guilty” on the rest
three general offences/charges under Section 40 of the said
Act. Hence, a sentence of dismissal from service was issued
against the writ petitioner on July 08, 2016.
9.
The petitioner is aggrieved that, a copy of the GSFC
proceeding/trial has never been provided to him though the
trial was completed. Therefore, the petitioner has stated that
there has been gross violation of Rule 129 of the BSF Rules,
1969 due to such inaction by the respondent authority. Rule
129 of the BSF Rules, 1969 speaks about „Right of person
tried to copies of proceedings‟, that every person tried by a
Security Force Court should be entitled to obtain on demand
a copy thereof, including the proceedings upon revision if any
time after confirmation of the finding and sentence. Therefore,
the petitioner filed a pre-confirmation petition dated July 14,
2016 with request for a copy of the GSFC proceedings.
However, allegedly without responding to his requests and by
rejecting the pre-confirmation petition filed by the present
petitioner the Director General of BSF confirmed the findings
and sentence of the GSFC vide order dated November 09,
2016, though allegedly without assigning any reason therefor.
Hence, it has been alleged that the order of the Director
General, BSF of confirmation of the finding and sentence of
the GSFC is an unreasoned and arbitrary one. The petitioner
was served with the copy of the proceeding and order on
November 25, 2016. The order of dismissal of service of the
writ petitioner was promulgated on the same date that is,
November 25, 2016 resulting into striking of name of the
petitioner from the role of BSF.
10.
In the impugned order, the respondent authority has
attributed the reasons for upholding the findings and
sentence of GSFC in the manner as quoted below: “SHQ BSF Kolkata has written that charges in the charge sheet were
prepared in accordance with the provisions of BSF Rules 53 & 54.
Moreover, the petitioner has not specified as to how the charge sheet
do not confirm to Rules 53 and 54 of BSF Rules and how it was in
violation of service jurisprudence. Further, in this case before trial of
petitioner by GSFC, SCOI and 02 addl SCsOI were conducted. On the
basis of evidence recorded in the SCsOI, disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against the petitioner by preparing preliminary charges.
After hearing of charges against him under BSF Rule 45 B, ROE was
ordered to be prepared. After recording of ROE, on the basis of
evidence available in the said ROE proceedings, the charge sheet was
prepared against the petitioner. Furthermore, the copies of said
SCsOI and ROE proceedings were provided to petitioner on his
request for preparation of his defence and none of the documents
relevant to the disciplinary proceedings has been denied to him.
Hence, the contentions raised by the petitioner above are false,
baseless and misconceived.
The perusal of GSFC trial proceedings reveals that the objections
about jurisdiction of the GSFC (Exhibit-‘L’) and to the charges (Exhibit‘N’) were raised by the petitioner during GSFC trial. The Court gave
opportunity
to
persecution
and
defence
to
make
submission/arguments and thereafter, it considered the same in the
light of legal provisions and rejected being devoid of merit. The Court
announced its decision in the open Court in the presence of petitioner
and prosecution and vivid record of same was made on pages 05 to
08 of trial proceedings. Thus, the contentions raised by the petitioner
are baseless and without any substance.
SHQ BSF Kolkata has written that the petitioner has not specified as
to how the findings of GSFC suffer from malice in law and fact as
alleged by him. The particulars of each charge are different, hence it
is wrong to state that mere acquittal of one charge will result in
automatic acquittal of other charges as contended by the petitioner.
Further, the GSFC has recorded brief reasons for its findings on each
charge wherein evidence of relevant witnesses have been duly
discussed. Besides that, in his summing up, the law officer has
discussed the whole evidence recorded during the GSFC trial. Hence,
the contentions raised by the petitioner are baseless and without any
substance.
The perusal of GSFC trial proceedings reveals that before deciding the
quantum of punishment, the Court has taken on record the previous
convictions, character and rewards etc. of petitioner (Exhibit – 'ZZZ')
through a witness. The offences u/s 40 of which he is convicted carry
punishment up to seven year's imprisonment. However, keeping in
view the past record of petitioner, facts and circumstances of case
and nature of offences, the Court has taken a lenient view and
awarded punishment of dismissal from service only which is lesser
than the maximum punishment awardable for the said offences. The
punishment awarded to the petitioner is legal and very much
commensurate with the gravity of the offences committed by him.”
11.
The respondent, in the impugned order has further held that
records have revealed about the petitioner having been
granted ample opportunity to defend himself during the
course of trial. Considering all as extracted above, the
respondent in the said impugned order has turned down the
petitioner‟s request for revival of the dismissal order.
12.
Mr. Surajit Samanta, learned counsel has represented the
writ petitioner. He has argued on various points. It is stated
that the trial conducted by the GSFC was a sham and premeditated exercise. He submits that, on due perusal of the
mode and manner of the proceeding before the GSFC and
awarding sentence of dismissal after alleged finding of guilt of
the petitioner having been recorded by that Court, the
allegation of the petitioner as above would be duly
substantiated. He submits that the petitioner has all along
been deprived of natural justice as respondent has violated
the principles of natural justice by not affording fair and
transparent opportunity to the petitioner to defend his cause
upon receipt of copy of the proceeding duly. He says that,
discharging the petitioner for the first two charges as above
and holding him guilty for the rest of the charges is a farce, in
so far as the rest of the charges would only be dependent on
the result of the enquiry in the first two charges. He submits
that the charges No. III, IV and V are general in nature
whereas the specific charges against the writ petitioner could
not have been proved in the trial.
13.
Mr. Samanta has further submitted that the proceeding itself
is mala fide, malicious and unsustainable in so far as
evidently the evidence on record not accepted for the first two
charges of specific offence under Section 46 of the BSF Act are
seen to have been accepted for holding the petitioner as guilty
on the next three general offences/charges under Section 40
of the said Act. According to the petitioner, his guilt having
been proved only for the charges general in nature the
punishment granted against him is disproportionately
rigorous. Mr. Samanta has submitted that the doctrine of
disproportionality as part of the concept of judicial review is to
ensure that even an aspect which is otherwise within the
exclusive province of the GSFC, if the decision of the same
even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of all logic then
the sentence would not be immune from correction. It is the
specific allegation of the petitioner that he has been denied
justice at all stages; the pre-trial stage, trial stage as well as
pre-confirmation stage. Allegedly also, neither reply of the
petitioner to the charge sheet nor his plea in the preconfirmation petition has been considered by the respondent
authority in its proper perspective. Therefore, considering the
entire service record and achievements therein of the writ
petitioner and the misconduct for which petitioner‟s guilt is
said to have been proved in trial, the punishment or dismissal
from service tantamount to a severe disproportionate
disposition by the respondent authority. Mr. Samanta,
learned advocate for the petitioner has relied on the following
judgments: i.
Ranjit Thakur versus Union of India and Others
reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611
Judicial review primarily examines the legality and
fairness of the decision-making process rather than
the decision itself. Although the determination of
punishment falls within the discretion of a courtmartial, the sentence must be proportionate to the
offence and the offender and must not be vindictive or
excessively harsh. A punishment that is so
disproportionate as to shock the conscience may
indicate bias and warrant judicial intervention. Under
the doctrine of proportionality, courts may review and
correct sentences that are irrational, perverse, or
constitute an outrageous defiance of logic.
ii.
State of M.P. and Others versus Hazarilal reported
in (2008) 3 SCC 273
The doctrine of proportionality has evolved as a more
refined standard of judicial review, replacing the
traditional Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness.
It requires that administrative and disciplinary
decisions maintain a reasonable balance between the
misconduct and the punishment imposed. Authorities
exercising statutory discretionary powers must
consider all relevant facts, circumstances, and
mitigating factors before determining a penalty.
iii.
The Managing Director, State Bank of Hydrabad
and Another versus P. Kata Rao reported in (2008)
15 SCC 657
The scope of judicial review over findings of fact
recorded in departmental enquiries is limited, and
superior courts generally refrain from re-appreciating
evidence. Courts also ordinarily do not interfere with
the quantum of punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority unless it is arbitrary or
disproportionate. An acquittal in a criminal case does
not automatically bar the initiation or continuation of
departmental proceedings against the employee.
iv.
Union of India versus B.N. Jha reported in (2003) 4
SCC 531
The disciplinary authority is legally required to
independently assess the materials on record before
deciding whether disciplinary action should be
initiated. Such a decision must be based on the
authority‟s own application of mind and discretion. A
higher authority with no statutory role in the
disciplinary process cannot direct or influence this
decision.
v.
Roop Singh Negi versus Punjab National Bank and
Others reported in 2009 (2) SCC 570
Since orders of the disciplinary and appellate
authorities entail serious civil consequences, they
must be supported by clear and reasoned findings.
The guilt of the delinquent employee must be
established through evidence placed on record and not
on mere suspicion or conjecture. Although the strict
provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable to
departmental
proceedings,
conclusions
must
nevertheless be based on legally admissible and
reliable material. Compliance with the principles of
natural justice remains mandatory to ensure fairness
and validity of the decision-making process.
14.
Apart from the above, the following two Delhi High court
decisions have also been relied on by Mr. Samanta, namely,
i.
G. M. Gouzaming Kuki @ G.M. Kuki versus UOI and
Others reported in (2015) SCC OnLine Del 13950
The doctrine of proportionality is an important ground
of judicial review used to assess the legality and
fairness of administrative or executive actions. It
requires that the punishment imposed bears a
reasonable relationship to the gravity of the
misconduct proved. Courts may intervene where the
penalty is excessive, disproportionate, or grossly
disproportionate to the offence committed.
ii.
Amar Singh Bhati versus Union of India (UOI) and
Others reported in 2002 SCC OnLine Del 1139
The findings and sentence of the GSFC, as well as
their confirmation by the competent authorities, were
vitiated by the absence of recorded reasons and were
based solely on an alleged extra-judicial confession.
Recording reasons is an essential requirement of
quasi-judicial decision-making, as it promotes
transparency, fairness, and accountability while
minimizing arbitrariness. This obligation applies to
administrative authorities exercising quasi-judicial
powers. Although reasons need not be as detailed as a
judicial judgment, they must adequately disclose the
basis of the decision.
15.
The respondent authority is represented by Mr. Siddhartha
Lahiri, learned advocate. The respondent has contended that
in accordance with the provisions of the statute and due to
proof of guilt of the offence of the petitioner in a duly
constituted proceeding before the GSFC, the respondent
authority is empowered pursuant to the provisions of the
statute itself to impose a sentence of dismissal of service of
the petitioner. It is also submitted that so far as the
proceeding conducted before the GSFC is concerned, the same
has been done in due compliance with the provisions and
formalities provided in the law. Also that the petitioner has
been provided with the copy of the proceeding order and
sentence, hence, according to the respondent, petitioner‟s
grievance as to non-receipt of any copy of the proceeding is
only baseless.
16.
It is further submitted that on proof of a misconduct/offence
under Section 40 of the BSF Act since the statute is said to
have empowered the respondent authority to grant any
punishment including a sentence for dismissal of service, the
respondent challenges the petitioner‟s argument of
disporportionality of the sentence, for the said reason. It is
stated that, it is only in terms of the statute and
commensurate to the offence/misconduct proved against the
petitioner in a duly constituted GSFC, the punishment of
dismissal has been granted against him. It has been
submitted that power of judicial review is meant to ensure
that the individual receives fair treatment and not to
adjudicate or ensure that the conclusion which the authority
has reached to, is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court.
That the Force Court is empowered and competent as the sole
judge of facts. The Appellate Authority has coextensive power
to re-appreciate the evidence or nature of punishment.
According to the respondent, both have discharged their
respective statutory duties directly in terms of law and there
can be found no impropriety in the same. In such an event,
the order and sentence of the GSFC which has been affirmed
subsequently by the Director General of BSF for dismissal of
service of the present petitioner needs no interference by this
Court. In this regard, Mr. Samanta has relied on the judgemtn
of the Surpeme Court in Union of India and Others versus
Subrata Nath reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1617.
17.
Similarly, another case of Supreme Court has been referred to
by Mr. Lahiri in Union of India versus P. Gunasekaran
reported in 2015 2 SCC 610. The Supreme Court has
observed that, High Court may not act an Appellate Authority
in a disciplinary proceeding; that there is no scope for
recognition of evidence or interference with the conclusion in
enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance
with law. That, in judicial review in a disciplinary proceeding,
the Constitutional Court may only enquire about the
competency of the authority holding the enquiry or the
procedure adopted by the same if was in accordance with law
and principles of natural justice were not violated by the
authority. Fairness, non-arbitrariness, reasonableness of the
proceeding are tests before the Court for sustaining the final
decision of a disciplinary authority.
18.
To the allegation of the petitioner that order of his dismissal
as well as confirmation of the same by the Director General of
BSF has been a non-speaking and unreasoned one, therefore,
arbitrary in nature is replied by the respondent with aid of
another Supreme Court verdict in Union of India and
Another Vs. Dinesh Kumar, (2010) 3 SCC 161. In the said
judgment, the Court was deciding the appeals on the question
whether the Summary Security Force Court (SSFC) is required
to give reasons in support of its verdict and whether the
Appellate Authority under Section 117(2) is required to give
reasons while considering the correctness, legality or propriety
of the order passed. The Court has relied on a Constitution
Bench decision in S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India,
(1990) 4 SCC 594 that the reasons would not be required to
be given by the SSFC under Rule 149 or by the Appellate
Authority under Section 117(2) of the Act.
19.
In S.N. Mukherjee (Supra) at Paragraph 44, the Court has
recorded while considering provisions of the Army Act and
Rules that “at the stage of recording of findings and
sentence, the Court Martial is not required to record its
reasons”. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court has
further held that: “Except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with
expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for
its decision.”
The Court was of the view that such reasons, if recorded, would enable
the higher courts like the Supreme Court and the High Courts to
effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. It also expressed
(at SCC p. 612, para 35) that the requirement of recording reasons would
necessarily
“(i) guarantee consideration by the authority;
(ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and
(iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision-making”.
This Court also further held that the reasons need not be as elaborate,
as in the decision of a court of law and that the extent and nature of the
reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances.”
20.
Lastly, Mr. Lahiri, learned advocate has relied on a Delhi High
Court judgment R.K. Sharma versus Union of India and
Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Del 9727 which takes
into its realm the well-defined proposition of law that the Writ
Court may not act as Appeal Court particularly in case of an
impugned order passed by a fact finding authority.
21.
At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind the settled
principles governing judicial review of proceedings conducted
under the Border Security Force Act, 1968. A Security Force
Court constituted under the Act is a specialised statutory
adjudicatory forum entrusted with the maintenance of
discipline within a uniformed force, charged with safeguarding
the security of the nation. The Constitutional power of judicial
review exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution over
findings and sentence recorded by a GSFC is therefore not
appellate in nature. The doctrine of institutional competence
recognises that questions relating to discipline, operational
integrity and standards of conduct within the Armed and
Paramilitary Forces fall primarily within the domain of the
competent statutory authorities constituted under the
relevant enactment. The doctrine of limited judicial review in
matters arising from Court Martial and Security Force Court
proceedings stands consistently recognised by judicial
precedents. The Writ Court does not sit in appeal over the
findings recorded by the Force Court. It neither reassesses nor
re-appreciates evidence for arriving at an independent
conclusion on facts. Interference is warranted only where
there is demonstrable lack of jurisdiction, violation of
mandatory statutory provisions, breach of principles of
natural justice, patent perversity, manifest arbitrariness, mala
fides or an error apparent on the face of the record. Unless
such exceptional circumstances are established, findings
recorded by the competent fact-finding authority are entitled
to judicial deference.
22.
The primary fact-finding authority in this case is the GSFC
and its finding is the genesis of dispute. The question is if the
said primary fact-finding authority has adopted due
procedure under the law in an unbiased and transperent
manner or not. The GSFC, after recording evidence,
considering the defence of the petitioner and evaluating the
entire materials placed before it, returned findings of “not
guilty” in respect of Charge Nos. I and II and findings of
“guilty” in respect of Charge Nos. III, IV and V. Such findings
are findings of fact rendered by the authority statutorily
empowered to appreciate oral and documentary evidence. This
Court cannot substitute its own opinion merely because
another view may also be possible on the evidence available.
23.
The petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any
jurisdictional error in the constitution of the GSFC or in the
conduct of the trial. The records disclose that prior to
commencement of the trial, Staff Court of Inquiry and
additional Staff Court of Inquiry proceedings were conducted.
Thereafter, hearing of charge under Rule 45B of the Border
Security Force Rules, 1969 was undertaken and Record of
Evidence was prepared. The charge-sheet was thereafter
framed on the basis of materials emerging from such
proceedings. The impugned order further records that copies
of the relevant proceeding were made available to the
petitioner for preparation of his defence. Objections relating to
jurisdiction and maintainability of the charges were
specifically raised before the GSFC, considered and rejected
by a reasoned determination during the course of trial itself.
This Court does not find any violation of the statutory
framework contained in the Border Security Force Act, 1968
and the Border Security Force Rules, 1969.
24.
The petitioner has sought to contend that the proceedings
stood vitiated on account of alleged violation of Rule 129 of
the Border Security Force Rules, 1969. Such contention also
does not merit acceptance. Rule 129 confers a right upon a
person tried by a Security Force Court to obtain copies of the
proceedings after confirmation of the findings and sentence.
Even assuming that there was some delay in supply of the
proceedings, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any
prejudice caused thereby. The doctrine of prejudice is now
firmly embedded in administrative and disciplinary
jurisprudence. Every procedural irregularity does not ipso
facto vitiate the proceedings unless failure of justice is shown
to have resulted therefrom. In the present case, no material
prejudice affecting the defence of the petitioner has been
established.
25.
The petitioner has further argued that once Charge Nos. I and
II under Section 46 of the Act failed, the remaining charges
under Section 40 of the Act necessarily had to fail. This
submission proceeds on an erroneous understanding of the
nature of the charges framed against the petitioner. The
doctrine of severability of charges clearly applies in the facts
of the case. A plain reading of the charge-sheet reveals that
Charge Nos. III, IV and V were independent charges alleging
acts prejudicial to good order and discipline under Section 40
of the Border Security Force Act, 1968. The ingredients
required to establish offences under Section 40 are distinct
from those necessary to prove offences under Section 46 read
with the Prevention of Corruption Act. Failure to establish the
specific ingredients constituting criminal misconduct under
Section 46 does not automatically result in failure of charges
relating to conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.
Each charge has to be assessed on its own evidence and
according to its own statutory ingredients. The GSFC appears
to have adopted precisely such an approach only. The fact
that the Court acquitted the petitioner of Charge Nos. I and II
itself demonstrates independent application of mind to the
evidence. Had the proceeding been predetermined or
mechanical, as alleged by the petitioner, there would have
been no occasion for recording acquittal on two charges while
simultaneously convicting him on the remaining three. The
acquittal on some charges and conviction on others is in fact
indicative of careful appreciation of evidence charge-wise and
not of arbitrariness.
26.
The petitioner has further contended that evidence not
accepted for proving the charges under Section 46 of the said
Act was relied upon for sustaining the charges under Section
40 thereunder. The submission is misconceived. The same
factual matrix may legitimately give rise to different legal
consequences depending upon the ingredients of the offences
alleged. Failure to prove criminal misconduct involving
pecuniary advantage beyond the level required for the offence
under Section 46 of the BSF Act, does not preclude the Force
Court from considering whether the underlying conduct
nevertheless constituted behaviour prejudicial to good order
and discipline under Section 40 of the said Act. Such an
exercise is legally permissible and cannot be termed
contradictory. The Court further finds that the impugned
order contains cogent reasons for rejecting the petitioner‟s
contentions. The authority has specifically recorded that the
GSFC had discussed the evidence relevant to each charge and
that the Law Officer had summarised the entire evidence
during the course of trial. The authority further recorded that
the petitioner had not demonstrated how the findings suffered
from any legal infirmity. This Court finds no arbitrariness in
such reasoning.
27.
The contention regarding absence of reasons in the findings
and confirmation proceedings is equally untenable.
Proceedings before Security Force Courts stand on a distinct
statutory footing. The law laid down by the Constitution
Bench in S.N. Mukherjee (supra) and subsequently reiterated
in Dinesh Kumar (supra) recognises that recording of
elaborate reasons at every stage of Security Force Court
proceeding is not a statutory requirement where such
requirement stands excluded expressly or by necessary
implication. In any event, the impugned order presently under
challenge furnishes adequate reasons while dealing with the
petitioner's objections. Therefore, the ratio of Amar Singh
Bhati (supra) relied upon by the petitioner is distinguishable
on facts and affords no assistance to him. Equally
inapplicable are the decisions relied upon by the petitioner in
Roop Singh Negi (supra), B.N. Jha (supra) and other service
jurisprudence cases. Those decisions arose in materially
different
factual
and
statutory
settings
concerning
departmental proceedings in civil services. The present case
concerns adjudication by a GSFC constituted under a special
enactment governing a disciplined force. The procedural
architecture, statutory objectives and judicial standards
applicable to Security Force Court proceedings are
fundamentally different. Consequently, the said authorities do
not advance the petitioner‟s case.
28.
So far as the doctrine of proportionality is concerned, there
can be no quarrel with the proposition that in exceptional
cases the Constitutional Court may interfere where the
punishment imposed is outrageously disproportionate or
shocks the conscience of the Court. However, the doctrine is
not an invitation for substitution of judicial opinion in place of
the s assessment of the Force trial court. The proportionality
test in matters concerning members of disciplined forces must
necessarily be applied bearing in mind the heightened
standards of integrity, discipline and accountability expected
from such personnel. Section 40 of the Border Security Force
Act itself prescribes serious consequences for acts prejudicial
to good order and discipline. The findings recorded against the
petitioner concern misuse of official position, unauthorised
conduct in relation to seized cattle and retention of personnel
without authority. Such acts strike at the discipline and
integrity of the Force. Once the misconduct stood established
before the competent statutory forum, the disciplinary
authority was entitled to consider the impact of such conduct
on institutional discipline. Still, the authority in exercise of its
discretion did not grant the highest punishment as
enumerated in section 40 of the Act but resorted to the
hierarchical lesser punishment as categorized in section 48 of
the statute. Therefore, it is not an exceptional case of that
nature where a writ court can interfere due to the punishment
being wholly outside the statutory framework or gross
procedural illegality, mala fide or arbitrariness, or that the
punishment being so outrageously disproportionate that it
shocks the conscience of the Court, all these being the criteria
for interference by this Court in an order and sentence of
GSFC.
29.
The impugned order specifically records that before awarding
sentence, the GSFC considered the previous convictions,
character, rewards and service particulars of the petitioner. It
further records that the offences under Section 40 of the Act
carried punishment extending up to imprisonment and that
after considering the entire circumstances, the Court awarded
dismissal from service. Thus, the relevant factors were taken
into account while determining punishment. The decisionmaking process therefore stands protected by the doctrine of
informed discretion. This Court is unable to hold that
dismissal from service, in the facts of the present case, is so
outrageously disproportionate as to shock the conscience of
the Court. The doctrine of proportionality does not permit
interference merely because a lesser punishment could also
have been imposed. Judicial review is concerned with the
legality of the decision-making process and not with
substitution of the Court‟s subjective view regarding the
appropriate penalty. The punishment awarded cannot be
characterised as irrational, perverse or manifestly excessive.
30.
The judgments in Ranjit Thakur (supra), Hazarilal (supra)
and G.M. Gouzaming Kuki (supra) relied upon by the
petitioner are distinguishable. The principles relating to
proportionality laid down therein are unexceptionable.
However, those authorities do not lay down that every
dismissal from service in a disciplinary proceeding is liable to
be interfered with. Interference is warranted only where the
punishment is shockingly disproportionate. Such exceptional
circumstances are absent in the present case. On the
contrary, the principles laid down in Subrata Nath (supra),
P. Gunasekaran (supra) and R.K. Sharma (supra) reinforce
the limited nature of judicial review in disciplinary and
Security Force Court matters. The Court is concerned only
with examining the legality, fairness and procedural regularity
of the process and not with re-appreciation of evidence or
reassessment of punishment.
31.
Having examined the records and the impugned order in the
light of the aforesaid doctrinal principles, this Court finds no
procedural irregularity, no breach of natural justice, no
jurisdictional defect, no patent illegality, no mala fides and no
manifest arbitrariness warranting interference under Article
226 of the Constitution. The findings recorded by the GSFC
are findings of fact rendered by the competent authority upon
appreciation of evidence. Reappraisal thereof is impermissible
within the scope of judicial review. For all the aforesaid
reasons, this Court finds that the respondent authority was
justified in affirming the findings and sentence recorded by
the GSFC. The challenge by the petitioner consequently fails.
The impugned order dated November 13, 2017 does not suffer
from any infirmity requiring interference by this Court.
32.
For all the reasons as discussed above, the present writ
petition being WPA No. 30535 of 2017 is dismissed.
Application/s if any, stand/s disposed of.
33.
Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite
formalities.
(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review