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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl.Petn.No.53 of 2021
Ramendra Kishore Bhattacharjee, son of Late Santi Gopal
Bhattacharjee Resident of Badharghat, Sreepalli, P.S.-Amtali DistrictWest Tripura
..............Petitioner(s)
Versus
Smt. Madhurima Bhattacharjee wife of Ramendra Kishore
Bhattacharjee C/O Sri Tapan Bhattacharjee of Ramnagar Road No.4
P.S: West Agartala District: West Tripura.
...........Respondent(s)
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR.JSUTICE S.G.CHATTOPADHYAY
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. S.Kar Bhowmik, Sr. Adv.
Mr. J.Das, Adv.
Mr. Raju Datta, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Date of hearing
:
Date of pronouncement
of Judgment
:
11.03.2022
01.06.2022
Whether fit for reporting:
YES
JUDGMENT
[1]
By means of filing this Criminal Petition under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Cr.P.C,
hereunder)
read
with
Section
25(2)
of
the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005,
petitioner Ramendra Kishore Bhattacharjee has sought for
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
modification of the judgment and order dated 10.02.2021
passed by this court in Criminal Revision Petition No.36 of
2020 for reducing the amount of monetary relief granted to
the petitioner from Rs.15,000/- to a reasonable sum of
money in view of the financial constraints of the petitioner.
[2]
The petitioner has sought for the following
reliefs:
(i)
For modification of the judgment and order
dated 10.02.2021 passed by this court in
Criminal Revision Petition No.36 of 2020 by
reducing the amount of monetary relief
granted to the respondent wife.
(ii)
For exempting the petitioner from paying
the arrear of maintenance.
(iii) For passing such other order/orders as the
court deems fit and proper.
[3]
Heard Mr.S.Kar Bhowmik, learned Sr. Advocate,
appearing along with Mr. J.Das, learned advocate, for the
petitioner.
Heard
Mr.
Raju
Datta,
learned
Advocate
appearing for the respondent wife.
[4]
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
The factual context of the case is as under:
The wife presented an application under Section
12 of the DV Act in the court of the Judicial Magistrate of
the First class (court No.8) at Agartala on 22.01.2016
seeking various reliefs under the DV Act wherein she
referred to several incidents of domestic violence against
her husband. It was stated by her that after solemnization
of their marriage a son was born to them on 28.05.2001.
Their relationship was normal for a period of 01 year only.
Thereafter, her husband subjected her to harassment and
torture for dowry and since she was unable to meet his
demand, she was physically assaulted by her husband on
various dates. Gradually he developed an extramarital
affair. When the wife raised protest against his conduct he
assaulted her. As a result of
continuous assault on
16.12.2015 and 17.12.2015 she became ill and received
treatment in IGM Hospital at Agartala. Unable to bear his
torture, the wife parted with his company on 17.12.2015.
In this factual background, she claimed the following reliefs
in the trial court under the DV Act:
(i)
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
A protection order under Section 18 of the
DV Act restraining her husband from
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
[5]
committing acts of domestic violence to
her.
Residence order under Section 19 of the
DV Act restraining the husband from
dispossessing her from the shared
household.
Monetary relief under Section 20 of the DV
Act @Rs.15,000/- per month along with
one time medical expenses of Rs.1 lakh.
Compensation order under Section 22 of
the DV Act against the husband for
payment of compensation and damages of
an amount of Rs.3 lakhs for the injuries
including mental torture and emotional
distress caused to her by her husband by
his acts of domestic violence.
Her application was registered in the trial court
as case no. CR 54 of 2016 and notice was issued to the
husband.
[6]
The husband filed written objection against the
complaint of his wife. In his written objection he stated that
his wife filed a false and frivolous complaint against him.
According to him, she was very arrogant and torturous right
from the beginning of their marriage. But he condoned her
conduct and wanted to continue the relationship. He noticed
no change in her behavior even after the birth of their son.
After he was transferred to the court of District and
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
Sessions Judge at Kailashahar, he had taken his wife and
child to there from where the wife used to visit her parents
at Agartala frequently without taking any care of his
convenience. Having noticed growth of abnormalities in her
conduct day by day, the husband with the consent of her
parents had taken her to various psychiatrists. He had also
taken her to Bangalore for treatment in the National
Institute of Mental Health And Neuro Science (NIMHANS) in
2012 which brought no change in her. The husband then
approached
the
State
Commission
for
Women
for
reconciliation. He also approached the State Legal Services
Authority for a settlement. His efforts yielded no result.
Ultimately, his wife filed an FIR against him and his old
parents on 18.12.2015. Since then, the husband has been
living separately along with his son who is studying in
school. Having denied the allegations of his wife, he claimed
that his wife was solely responsible for their matrimonial
discord and as such she was not entitled to any relief under
the DV Act.
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
[7]
During the trial of the case, the wife examined
herself as PW-1, her elder brother Tapan Bhattacharjee as
PW-2 and her neighbor Ranajoyti Bhattacharjee as PW-3.
[8]
The
husband on
the other hand examined
himself as DW-1, his neighbor Priya Bhusan Deb as DW-2
and Smt. Rekha Roy as DW-3.
[9]
The
learned
trial
court
on
appreciation
of
evidence granted reliefs to the wife vide paragraph 12 of his
judgment dated 23.08.2018 which is as under:
“ORDER
(12)
In the result, the application filed by the aggrieved
petitioner U.S. 12 of the Act is partly allowed and the aggrieved
petitioner is found entitled to protection order, residence order and
monetary relief. The respondents are prohibited from committing any
act of domestic violence or aiding or abetting in the commission of
acts of domestic violence upon the aggrieved petitioner. The
Respondent No.1 is further directed as part of residence order to
make payment of Rs.2000/- per month as rent for accommodation to
the aggrieved petitioner. He is further directed to make payment of
Rs.15,000/- per month as monetary relief in the form of maintenance
to the aggrieved petitioner. The payment of Rs.2000/- per month as
residence order and Rs.15,000/- per month as maintenance is to be
deposited within the 10th day of every month in the Bank account of
the aggrieved petitioner.
Supply a copy of this judgment and order free of cost to
both the parties and to the C.D.P.S’s of their respective jurisdiction of
address for doing the needful. This Judgment is passed on this 23 rd
day of August, 2018 under the seal and signature of this Court.
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
Thus, the case is disposed off on contest. Make entry in
the concerned T.R. The record shall be consigned to Record Room
after due compliance of all legal formalities.”
[10]
The husband and his mother, brother and sister
being appellants challenged the said judgment of the
learned trial court in criminal appeal no.16 of 2018 before
the learned Additional Sessions Judge [Court no.4] at
Agartala in West Tripura and the leaned Additional Sessions
Judge by the impugned judgment partly allowed the appeal
vide paragraph 8 of the impugned judgment and directed as
under:
“8. In view of the discussion made above, the
present criminal appeal partly succeeds and the
judgment and order dated 23.8.2018 passed by the Ld.
Trial Court in C.R. 54 of 2016 is partly upheld and
interfered with as stated herein below : (a) The husband-appellant No.1 is solely proved
to have committed and liable for the acts of
Domestic Violence upon his aggrieved wife and all
other appellant Nos.2, 3 and 4 are hereby
discharged from the liabilities.
(b) The protection order passed by the Ld. Trial
Court under Section 18 of the PWDV Act is upheld
with a direction that the husband-appellant No.1
strictly adhered the same.
(c) The order of monetary relief passed in the
form of maintenance under Section 20(1)(d) of
the PWDV Act for an amount of Rs.15,000/- per
month is hereby upheld, and
(d) The order of relief passed under Section 19(f)
of the PWDV Act is hereby set aside.”
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
[11]
Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment
and order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, the
petitioner husband challenged the said judgment in criminal
revision petition No.36 of 2020 before this court mainly on
the following grounds:
i) The learned courts below have not property
appreciated the evidence and materials on record
and as such their judgments are erroneous and
liable to be set aside.
ii) The learned courts below have failed to
appreciate the fact that the wife has left the son
in the custody of her husband. Thereafter, the
husband alone has been shouldering all expenses
of the son including his educational expenses.
The learned courts below without taking into
consideration
the
expenses
borne
by
the
husband directed him to provide monetary relief
to the wife @₹15,000/- per month.
iii) While providing the monetary relief to the
wife under Section 18 of the DV Act, the courts
below
did
not
also
take
into
consideration
personal expenses of the husband and expenses
borne by him for maintaining his old and ailing
mother. Moreover, the learned courts below did
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
not also consider his permanent disability and
the recurring medical expenses for his treatment.
While determining the amount of monetary relief
the
courts
below
did
not
also
take
into
consideration the order of the Family Court,
Agartala passed in Misc. Case No.463 of 2017
whereby
the
husband
was
directed
to
pay
₹ 6000/- to his wife in a proceeding under
Section 125 Cr.P.C.
iv) The trial court as well as the appellate court
issued the protection order against the husband
without any proof of commission of domestic
violence. According to the husband, evidence
adduced by him was not appreciated by the trial
court as well as the appellate court while issuing
such protection order.
[12]
On appreciation of evidence and the submissions
made on behalf of the parties to the lis, this court made the
following observations in the order impugned:
“[26] Under Section 12 of the DV Act only the
aggrieved person or a protection officer appointed
under the DV Act or any other person on behalf the
aggrieved person may present an application to the
magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act.
It would be apposite to reproduce Section 12 of the DV
Act at this juncture which is as under:
“12. Application to Magistrate.—(1) An aggrieved
person or a Protection Officer or any other person on
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
behalf of the aggrieved person may present an
application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs
under this Act:
Provided that before passing any order on such
application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration
any domestic incident report received by him from the
Protection Officer or the service provider.
(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may
include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of
compensation or damages without prejudice to the right
of such person to institute a suit for compensation or
damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic
violence committed by the respondent:
Provided that where a decree for any amount as
compensation or damages has been passed by any court
in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any,
paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by the
Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the
amount payable under such decree and the decree shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the
time being in force, be executable for the balance
amount, if any, left after such set off.
(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in
such form and contain such particulars as may be
prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.
(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing,
which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the
date of receipt of the application by the court.
(5) The Magistrate shall Endeavour to dispose of every
application made under sub-section (1) within a period of
sixty days from the date of its first hearing.”
[27] Aggrieved person has been defined under
Section 2(a) of the DV Act which reads as under:
“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,—
(a) “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has
been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and
who alleges to have been subjected to any act of
domestic violence by the respondent;
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
(b) ..........................................................................
(c) ..........................................................................
:
:
:
:
[28] A conjoined reading of Section 12 and Section
2(a) makes it abundantly clear that relief under the DV
Act can be granted only to an aggrieved person
defined under the DV Act and an aggrieved person has
been defined as a woman who is or has been in a
domestic relationship with the respondent who alleges
to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence
by the respondent. Therefore, allegation of domestic
violence is a sine qua non for pursuing a petition
under the DV Act.
[29] In this case, the wife who filed the application
under Section 12 of the DV Act in the trial court is
obviously an aggrieved person within the meaning of
the Act because she made allegations of domestic
violence against her husband and the fact that she
was in a domestic relationship with the husband as his
wife has been admitted by her respondent husband.
Now the question is whether the wife proved
commission of domestic violence against her husband
at the trial court and become entitled to a relief under
Section 12 of the DV Act.
[30] In the definition clause of the DV Act i.e. Section
2 under clause (g) states that domestic violence has
the same meaning as assigned to it in Section 3 of the
DV Act. Section 3 of the DV Act defines domestic
violence as under:
“3. Definition of domestic violence.—For the
purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or
conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic
violence in case it—
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life,
limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the
aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional
abuse and economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved
person with a view to coerce her or any other person
related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any
dowry or other property or valuable security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any
person related to her by any conduct mentioned in
clause (a) or clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or
mental, to the aggrieved person.
Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section,—
(i) “physical abuse” means any act or conduct which is of
such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger
to life, limb, or health or impair the health or
development of the aggrieved person and includes
assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force;
(ii) “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a sexual nature
that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates
the dignity of woman;
(iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes—
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or
ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a
male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in
whom the aggrieved person is interested;
(iv) “economic abuse” includes—
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources
to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law
or custom whether payable under an order of a court or
otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of
necessity including, but not limited to, house hold
necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if
any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by
the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the
shared house hold and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets
whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares,
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
securities, bonds and the like or other property in which
the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use
by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be
reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her
children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or
separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources
or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use
or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including
access to the shared household.
Explanation II.—For the purpose of determining whether any
act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent
constitutes “domestic violence” under this section, the
overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be
taken into consideration.”
[31] Apparently, domestic violence has been defined
under Section 3 of the Act in a very wider term and
with regard to proof of domestic violence, explanation
II to said Section 3 provides that for determining
whether any act, an omission, commission or conduct
of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence”
under the said Section, the overall facts and
circumstances of the case, shall be taken into
consideration.
[32] It may be recalled that in the present case, the
spouses have brought allegations and counter
allegations against each other and the learned
additional sessions Judge after examining these
allegations and the materials placed before the court
by the contesting spouses set aside the protection
order as against the mother, brother and the sister of
the husband. While affirming the protection order as
well as the monetary relief against the husband, the
residence order for payment of house rent @Rs.2000/per month to the wife under Section 19(f) was also set
aside by the learned Additional Sessions Judge by the
impugned judgment.
[33] In gist, the Additional Sessions Judge upheld the
direction of the trial court prohibiting the husband
from committing any kind of domestic violence or
aiding or abetting in the commission of any act of
domestic violence upon the wife and by means of
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
monetary relief as under Section 20 of the Act, the
order for payment of ₹ 15,000/- to the wife was also
upheld.
[34] In the instant case, during his crossexamination before the trial court the husband had
categorically admitted that his monthly salary was
₹ 49,000/- excluding all deductions. He also admitted
that he gave nothing towards maintenance of his wife
from 13.12.2015. His statement is reproduced as
under:
“At present my gross salary is 49,000/- excluding
deductions. It is true that I have not given any
maintenance to my wife since 13.12.2015.”
[35] Section 20 of the DV Act provides for payment of
monetary relief to the aggrieved person which reads
as under:
“20. Monetary reliefs.—(1) While disposing of an
application under sub-section (1) of section 12,the
Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary
relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered
by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved
person as a result of the domestic violence and such
relief may include, but not limited to,—
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or
removal of any property from the control of the
aggrieved person; and
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as
her children, if any, including an order under or in
addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any
other law for the time being in force.
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall
be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the
standard of living to which the aggrieved person is
accustomed.
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an
appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of
maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the
case may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for
monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the
parties to the application and to the in charge of the
police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction
the respondent resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted
to the aggrieved person within the period specified in the
order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to
make payment in terms of the order under sub-section
(1), the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor
of the respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved
person or to deposit with the court a portion of the
wages or salaries or debt due to or accrued to the credit
of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted
towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent.”
[36] Under Section 3 of the DV Act which defines
domestic violence, ‘economic abuse’ is a form of
domestic violence. Clause (iv) of explanation I of
Section 3 relates to ‘economic abuse’ which includes
deprivation of all or any economic financial resources
to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any
law or custom whether payable under an order of a
court or otherwise. The said clause (iv) of the
Explanation I of Section 3 of the DV Act, reads as
under:
“(iv) “economic abuse” includes—
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial
resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled
under any law or custom whether payable under an
order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved
person requires out of necessity including, but not
limited 5 to, house hold necessities for the aggrieved
person and her children, if any, stridhan, property,
jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person,
payment of rental related to the shared house hold
and maintenance;
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets
whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares,
securities, bonds and the like or other property in
which the aggrieved person has an interest or is
entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship
or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved
person or her children or her stridhan or any other
property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved
person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to
resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is
entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic
relationship
including
access
to
the
shared
household.”
[37] In the present case, obviously the wife is legally
entitled to maintenance allowance from her husband
who is a salaried government employee. She has made
out a good case justifying her separate living.
Admittedly, she is a housewife and she has no source
of earning whereas the husband draws a monthly
salary of ₹ 49,000/- excluding all deductions. In these
circumstances, denial of maintenance allowance to the
wife obviously causes ‘economic abuse’ to her within
the meaning of domestic violence as under Section 3
of the DV Act. There is, therefore, no infirmity in the
impugned judgment.
[38] In so far as the quantum of monetary relief is
concerned, it is asserted by the husband in his memo
of appeal that the Family Court, Agartala in Misc. case
No. 463 of 2017 also directed the husband to pay
monthly maintenance allowance of ₹ 6,000/- to his
wife and it has been averted by the husband that the
learned trial court as well as the appellate court
committed error in not taking into account this amount
while determining the amount of monetary relief in
the proceeding under the DV Act. The Apex Court in
case of Rajnesh vs. Neha (supra) has held that
maintenance provided in a previously instituted
proceeding can be adjusted or set off in the
subsequent proceeding. Though the husband has not
produced any document with regard to his averment
that there is an order passed by the Family Court for
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
payment of monthly maintenance allowance of
Rs.6000/- to the wife, such amount, if any, shall be
adjusted towards the said amount of ₹ 15,000/- in
view of the directions issued by the Apex Court in the
case of Rajnesh vs. Neha(supra).
[39] The husband will, therefore, pay ₹ 15,000/- to
his wife as monetary relief as directed by the
Additional Sessions Judge by the impugned judgment
w.e.f the date of filing of the petition i.e. from
01.10.2018. The said monetary relief shall be paid by
the husband by depositing the same in her savings
bank account. The learned Judge, Family Court
Agartala will determine the mode of payment of the
outstanding arrear till 31.01.2021 after issuing notice
to the parties and hearing them in person. If the
husband fails to pay the arrear, the same shall be
deducted from his salary and paid to the wife.”
[13]
Now, appearing for the petitioner husband in the
present Criminal petition, learned Sr. Advocate contends
that this court is not powerless to review or alter its
judgment passed in Criminal Revision Petition No.36 of
2020. Having relied on the decision dated 05.10.2021 of the
High Court of Delhi in Crl. Rev. P. No. 549 of 2018 [URVASHI
AGGARWAL AND ORS VS. INDERPAUL AGGARWAL], learned
counsel contends that in terms of the legislative scheme of
Section 125 and 127 Cr.P.C court does not become functus
officio after a judgment/order relating
to maintenance
allowance is passed. Court has power to review its
judgment or final order if the circumstances so required.
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
Counsel has relied on para 4 and 5 of the said judgment of
the High Court of Delhi which read as under:
“4. At the outset, this Court finds it pertinent to state
that the embargo contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C.,
which prohibits the Court from altering or reviewing
its judgement or final order disposing of the case, is
inapplicable to an Order of maintenance passed under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Saving Clause contained in
Section 362 Cr.P.C. entails that the rigour of the
provision is relaxed in two conditions, i.e. save as
otherwise provided by (i) the Code of Criminal
Procedure or (ii) any other law for the time being in
force.
5. In Sanjeev Kapoor v. Chandana Kapoor and Ors.,
(2020) 13 SCC 172, the Supreme Court had observed
that the legislature was aware that there were
situations where altering or reviewing of criminal
court judgement were contemplated in the Code itself
or any other law for the time being in force. Noting
that Section 125 Cr.P.C. was a social justice
legislation, the Supreme Court held that a closer look
at Section 125 Cr.P.C. itself indicated that the Court
after passing judgment or final order in the
proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. did not become
functus officio, and that the Section itself contains
express provisions wherein an Order passed under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. could be cancelled or altered, and
that this was noticeable from Sections 125(1), 125(5)
and 127 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the legislative scheme as
delineated by Sections 125 and 127 Cr.P.C. clearly
enumerates circumstances and incidents provided in
the Code where the Court passing a judgement or final
order disposing of the case can alter or review the
same. The embargo as contained in Section 362 is,
thus, relaxed in proceedings under Section 125
Cr.P.C.”
[14]
It is further contended by the counsel of the
petitioner that the petitioner has moved the present
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
criminal petition seeking review of the judgment of this
court in extraordinary circumstances. According to Mr.Kar
Bhowmik, learned Sr. Advocate, the petitioner who is
serving as a UDC in the court of Judicial Magistrate First
class (Court No.5) at Agartala draws a monthly salary of
Rs.63,000/- and after compulsory deductions under various
heads, he draws carry home pay of only a sum of
Rs.54,682/-. His son who is staying with him is a student of
class-XII who would be appearing in board examination.
Petitioner
incurs
a
Rs.8,000/-
towards
regular
his
monthly
tuition
fees.
expenditure
of
This
his
apart,
dependent mother is 87 years’ old who has been suffering
from various ailments. Since wife of the petitioner is not
staying with him, the petitioner has engaged a nurse to look
after his mother round the clock who is paid Rs.8,000/- per
month. This apart, petitioner also spends Rs.6,000/- per
month in purchasing medicine for his ailing mother.
Petitioner had also taken a
house building loan of Rs.10
lakhs from SBI in 2015 for which he is paying a monthly
installment of Rs.14,000/-. Counsel also contends that
petitioner has paid Rs.2,74,000/- till date to his wife as
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
arrear maintenance allowance and for paying this amount
he had
taken bank loan of a sum of Rs.3 lakhs from the
TLA House branch of SBI. According to learned counsel, the
petitioner
has
been
paying
the
additional
monthly
installment of Rs.5,800/- to SBI TLA House branch towards
repayment of such loan. Learned counsel submits that after
incurring this huge recurring expenditure, he is unable to
pay a monthly sum of Rs.15,000/- to his wife as monetary
relief. Counsel therefore, requests the court to consider the
crisis of the petitioner and provide relief to him by reducing
the amount of monetary relief payable to his wife to a
reasonable sum.
[15]
Mr. Raju Datta, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent wife on the other hand contends that the
present petition is not maintainable because this court has
become functus officio after it has passed the judgment in
Crl.Rev.P.No.36 of 2020. Counsel contends that now there
is no scope to review or alter the judgment in view of the
provision laid down under Section 362 Cr.P.C. Mr. Raju
Datta, learned counsel, contends that only arithmetical or
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
clerical errors, if any, may be removed. Counsel contends
that the questions raised by the counsel of the petitioner
with regard to the income and liabilities of the respondent
husband, have already been examined and resolved in
criminal revision petition No.36 of 2020. Now the petitioner
cannot re-agitate those issues once the judgment has been
passed. In support of his contention learned counsel has
relied on the decision of the apex court in the case of ATUL
SHUKLA
VERSUS
STATE
OF
MADHYA
PRADESH
AND
ANOTHER reported in (2019) 17 SCC 299 wherein the apex
court set aside the order of the high court whereby the high
court recalled its earlier order in exercise of power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. The apex court held that in view of the
specific power contained in Section 362, the impugned
order of the high court was unsustainable and such an
application for review or modification could not have been
entertained.
[16]
Mr. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent wife has further relied on the decision of the
Apex Court in STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH VERSUS MAN
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
SINGH reported in (2019) 10 SCC 161 wherein the Apex
Court has held that high court has no jurisdiction to review
its order either under Section 362 or under Section 482
Cr.PC after disposing a case on merit. Counsel has referred
to the observation of the apex court made in paragraph 7 of
the judgment which reads as under:
“7. It is well settled law that the High Court has no
jurisdiction to review its order either under Section
362 or under Section 482 CrPC. The inherent power
under Section 482 CrPC cannot be used by the High
Court to reopen or alter an order disposing of a
petition decided on merits. After disposing of a case on
merits, the Court becomes functus officio and Section
362 CrPC expressly bars review and specifically
provides that no Court after it has signed its judgment
shall alter or review the same except to correct a
clerical or arithmetical error. Recall of judgment would
amount to alteration or review of judgment which is
not permissible under Section 362 CrPC. It cannot be
validated by the High Court invoking its inherent
powers.”
[17]
Mr.Raju Datta, learned counsel also refers to an
earlier decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
STATE OF KERALA Versus M.M.MANIKANTAN NAIR reported in
(2001) 4 SCC 752 wherein the apex court held that Section
362 of the Act prohibits the court after it has signed its
judgment or final order disposing of a case from altering or
reviewing the said judgment or order except to correct a
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
clerical or arithmetical error. Counsel has referred to
paragraph 6 of the judgment which reads as under:
“6.The Code of Criminal Procedure does
not authorise the High Court to review its
judgment or order passed either in exercise
of its appellate, revisional or original
jurisdiction.
Section
362 of
the
Code
prohibits the court after it has signed its
judgment or final order disposing a case
from altering or reviewing the said judgment
or order except to correct a clerical or
arithmetical
error.
This
prohibition
is
complete and no criminal court can review
its own judgment or order after it is signed.
By the first order dated 31-05-2000, the High
Court rejected the prayer of the respondent
for quashing the criminal proceeding. This
order attained its finality. By the impugned
order, the High Court reversed its earlier
order and quashed the criminal proceeding
for want of proper sanction. By no stretch of
imagination it can be said that by the
impugned order the High Court only
corrected any clerical or arithmetical error.
In fact the impugned order is an order of
review, as the earlier order was reversed,
which could not have been done as there is
no such provision under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, but there is an interdict against
it.”
[18]
The issues now raised by the petitioner have
already been considered by this court while delivering the
judgment in Crl. Rev.P.No.36 of 2020. Admittedly the
respondent is the wife of the petitioner. It is not disputed
that the petitioner is a salaried employee whereas his wife
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
has no income to maintain herself. Admittedly petitioner’s
monthly salary exceeds Rs.62,000/-. When the judgment
was passed in Crl.Rev.P.No.36 of 2020, income of the
petitioner, his liabilities and the status and needs of his wife
and all other relevant factors were taken into consideration
to determine the amount of monthly monetary relief for his
wife. The learned counsel could not make out any new
ground to reconsider the same. Moreover, in view of the
judgment cited to supra this court cannot reopen the case
and review/recall its judgment for modification.
[19]
Resultantly, the petition stands dismissed.
Interim application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
Petitioner is directed to comply with the order.
Send down the LCR.
JUDGE
Saikat Sarma, PS-II
Crl.Petn. 53/2021
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