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2026:HHC:38
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 663 of 2023
Reserved on: 02.12.2025
Date of Decision: 01.01.2026
Ram Sharma
...Petitioner
Versus
Pankaj Chadha
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner
:
Ms Pragti, Advocate, vice Mr Digvijay
Singh, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
None.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment
dated 22.11.2023, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at
Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide
which the judgment of conviction dated 27.02.2019 and order of
sentence dated 28.02.2019 passed by learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Kangra, District Kangra, HP (learned Trial Court) were
upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as
they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2.
2026:HHC:38
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the
accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (in short, ‘NI Act’). It was asserted
that the complainant paid ₹55,610/- through a cheque dated
23.11.2010, ₹1,00,000/- through a cheque dated 21.09.2010, and
₹1,00,000/- on 11.08.2011 to the accused. Thus, the complainant
had advanced a friendly loan of ₹2,60,000/- to the accused in the
years 2010 and 2011. The accused issued a cheque of ₹2,60,000/in
favour
of
the
complainant
to
discharge
the
existing
debt/liability. The complainant presented the cheque to the bank,
but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’.
The complainant issued a notice to the accused, which was
returned with the endorsement that the address of the accused
was incorrect. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned
Trial Court for taking action against the accused.
3.
The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence
2026:HHC:38
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
The complainant examined himself (CW1) to prove his
complaint.
5.
The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of Cr. P.C. denied the complainant’s case. He stated that the
amount was given to the firm McLeodganj Helpline. He, Pankaj
(the complainant), Ramesh and Mohinder were partners of the
firm. The cheque pertains to the business transaction of the firm.
The amount was received for purchasing the stock of the firm. The
complainant did not want to continue in the firm and wanted to
sell his share. The cheque was taken from the accused with an
understanding that it would not be presented. However, the
complainant presented the cheque within one month. The accused
had no legal liability towards the complainant. Complainant
deposed falsely to extract money from the accused. He examined
Ramesh Chand (DW1) to prove his defence.
6.
Learned Trial Court held that the accused did not
dispute the execution of the cheque. This admission would trigger
a presumption that the cheque was issued for consideration to
discharge the debt/liability. The version of the accused that the
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money was advanced for purchasing the assets of the firm was not
established. The dishonour memo established that the cheque was
dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The notice
was sent to the correct address, and it was returned with the
endorsement that the addressee was not present at home. All the
ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Hence, the learned
Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to undergo
simple imprisonment for six months, pay a compensation of
₹3,50,000/- and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for
one month.
7.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and the order passed
by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was
decided by the learned Sessions Judge Kangra at Dharmshala,
District Kangra (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court
concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court
that the admission of the signatures on the cheque would trigger a
presumption under Section 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act that the
cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the liability. The
plea taken by the accused that the money was deposited by the
complainant in the firm was not probable. The accused failed to
2026:HHC:38
rebut the presumption attached to the cheque. The cheque was
dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The
statement of Ramesh Chand (DW1) did not establish the defence
taken by the accused. The cheque was dishonoured with an
endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The notice was duly sent to the
correct address of the accused and was returned with the report
that the addressee was not available at home, which is deemed
service upon the accused. The learned Trial Court had rightly
convicted the accused. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial
Court was not excessive, and no interference was required with the
judgment
and
order
passed
by
the
learned
Trial
Court.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
8.
Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by
the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
revision asserting that the learned Courts below failed to
appreciate the material on record. There was no evidence to show
that the cheque was issued to discharge any liability. The
testimony of the complainant was not credible, and the learned
Courts below erred in relying upon it. The complainant was a
partner of McLeodganj Helpline. He did not want to continue with
the firm. The cheque was issued by the accused under pressure,
2026:HHC:38
and the complainant misused it. Therefore, it was prayed that the
present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below be set aside.
9.
I have heard Ms Pragti, Advocate, vice Mr Digvijay
Singh, Advocate for the petitioner. None appeared on behalf of the
respondent/complainant. Therefore, none could be heard on
behalf of the complainant.
10.
Ms
Pragti,
learned
counsel
representing
the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred
in appreciating the material on record. As per the complaint,
₹55,610/-, ₹1,00,000/- and ₹1,00,000/- was advanced to the
accused on different dates which is ₹2,55,610/- and not
₹2,60,000/-.
Therefore,
the
accused
had
no
liability
of
₹2,60,000/-. The cheque could not have been presented for
₹2,60,000/- without making an endorsement. The plea taken by
the accused that the amount was paid to Mcleodganj Helpline was
duly corroborated by the statement of account in which the
payment was shown to have been made to Mcleodganj Helpline
and not to the accused. Learned Courts below failed to appreciate
the significance of the statement of account. The plea taken by the
accused that the cheque was issued towards the investment in the
2026:HHC:38
firm and not a friendly loan was highly probable. Therefore, she
prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and
order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
11.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022)
3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is
not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect,
errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the
outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent
findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a
detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought
on record. The High Court in criminal revision against
conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like
the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision
is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure
Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or
himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any
finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The
object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an
error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded
error that is to be determined on the merits of individual
cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same,
the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts
and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
13.
2026:HHC:38
This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under
Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to
call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the
purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The
object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an
error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept
in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v.
Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687:
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been
considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475,
paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the
power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to
the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order
made in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.
There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not
be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,
which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful
consideration and appear to be in accordance with
law. If one looks into the various judgments of this
Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can
be invoked where the decisions under challenge are
grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no
evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These
are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative.
2026:HHC:38
Each case would have to be determined on its own
merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt
restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or
interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed properly
and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be
reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the
categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a
much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”
14.
It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC
165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine
SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate
the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any
perversity. It was observed at page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of
Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the
revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v.
Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452:
1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid
down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can
call for and examine the record of any proceedings to
satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other
words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory
jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting
a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power
2026:HHC:38
cannot be equated with the power of an appellate
court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be
appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the
evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when
the evidence has already been appreciated by the
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal,
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of
the High Court which would otherwise amount to a
gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the
impugned judgment of the High Court from the
aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in
concluding that the High Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the
respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to
and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this
Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray
Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri)
19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere
with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse
or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration
of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside
merely on the ground that another view is possible.
The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p.
135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate
is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of
any relevant material or there is palpable
misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not
justified in setting aside the order, merely because
another view is possible. The Revisional Court is
not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole
purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to
preserve the power in the court to do justice in
accordance with the principles of criminal
jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court
2026:HHC:38
under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be
equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding
of the court, whose decision is sought to be
revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in
law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly
unreasonable or where the decision is based on no
material or where the material facts are wholly
ignored or where the judicial discretion is
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts
may not interfere with the decision in exercise of
their revisional jurisdiction.”
15.
This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)
309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity,
upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional
Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.
Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is
a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court
will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court
having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the
negative.”
16.
A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity,
upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh(supra)].
This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional
Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauer-
2026:HHC:38
milch Design and Handels GMBH,(2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a
well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court
will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court
having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the
present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.
17.
The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
18.
The ingredients of the offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 2019 as under: “5.1.1. In K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana (2003) 8 SCC 300,
this Court enlisted the components, aspects and the acts,
the concatenation of which would make the offence under
Section 138 of the Act complete, to be these (i) drawing of
the cheque by a person on an account maintained by him
with a banker, for payment to another person from out of
that account for discharge in whole/in part of any debt or
liability, (ii) presentation of the cheque by the payee or the
holder in due course to the bank, (iii) returning the cheque
unpaid by the drawee bank for want of sufficient funds to
the credit of the drawer or any arrangement with the banker
to pay the sum covered by the cheque, (iv) giving notice in
writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the
receipt of information by the payee from the bank regarding
the return of the cheque as unpaid demanding payment of
the cheque amount, and (v) failure of the drawer to make
payment to the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque, of the amount covered by the cheque within 15 days
of the receipt of the notice.”
19.
2026:HHC:38
The accused admitted in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of the Cr.PC that the cheque bears his signature. He
stated that he had handed over the cheque to the complainant
under pressure, with an understanding that the cheque would not
be presented to the bank. Thus, the signatures on the cheque and
the issuance of the cheque are not in dispute. It was laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti
International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, that when the
issuance of a cheque and signature on the cheque are not disputed,
a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge
of the legal liability. It was observed: “9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and
considering the fact that the accused has admitted the
issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and
that the cheque in question was issued for the second time
after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even
according to the accused some amount was due and payable,
there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that
there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course,
such a presumption is rebuttable. However, to rebut the
presumption, the accused was required to lead evidence that
the full amount due and payable to the complainant had
been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led
by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that
the cheques were given by way of security is not believable
in the absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption,
and more particularly, the cheque in question was issued for
the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured.
Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in
not properly appreciating and considering the presumption
2026:HHC:38
in favour of the complainant that there exists a legally
enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act.
It appears that both the learned trial court as well as the
High Court have committed an error in shifting the burden
upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without
appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example
of reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of
the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the
cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in
favour of the complainant that there exists legally
enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the
accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.”
20.
A similar view was taken in N. Vijay Kumar v.
Vishwanath Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held as
under:
“6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable
instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while
Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a
cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or
liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable, meaning
they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a probable
defence.”
21.
This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED,
PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT
ARISE
15. In the present case, the cheque in question has
admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused.
This Court is of the view that once the execution of the
cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of
the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for
consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the
2026:HHC:38
NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque
in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arises
against the accused. It is pertinent to mention that
observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench in
Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC
54, have been set aside by a three-Judge Bench in
Rangappa(supra).
16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this
presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques as
a mode of payment in commercial transactions.
17. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated
under Section 139 of the NI Act is a rebuttable presumption.
However, the initial onus of proving that the cheque is not
in discharge of any debt or other liability is on the
accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singhv. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].
22.
Thus, the learned Courts below were justified in raising
the presumption that the cheque was issued in discharge of the
liability for consideration.
23.
The complainant specifically stated in paragraph 1 of
his proof affidavit (Ext.CW1/A) that he had advanced a friendly
loan of ₹2,60,000/- to the accused. He had paid ₹55,610/through a cheque on 23.11.2010, ₹ 1,00,000/- through a cheque
dated 21.09.2010 and ₹1,00,000/- to the accused on 11.08.2011. He
relied upon the statement of account (Ext.CW1/H) in support of
this plea.
24.
The statement of account (Ext.CW-1/H) shows that
₹1,00,000/- was paid on 21.09.2010 and ₹55,610/- was paid on
2026:HHC:38
23.11.2010 to Mcleodganj Help. This statement does not show any
payment to the accused Ram Sharma.
25.
The complainant admitted in his cross-examination
that he and the accused were partners in a partnership firm. He
denied that the accused had issued a cheque to cover up the loss of
the partnership firm. He stated that he had advanced the friendly
loan to the accused because of a previous acquaintance. He
specifically denied that he was a business partner with the
accused, and he had no reason to advance the friendly loan to the
accused. He volunteered to say that the partnership was never
acted upon.
26.
The admission made by the complainant in his cross-
examination that he and the accused were partners in a
partnership firm corroborates the version of the accused that the
complainant and the accused were partners in McLeodganj
Helpline. This version is also corroborated by the statement of
account in which the payment has been made to Mcleodganj
Helpline and not to the accused.
27.
Learned Trial Court did not consider the statement of
account (Ext.CW1/H) and proceeded with the presumption
attached to the cheque. Similarly, the learned Appellate Court did
2026:HHC:38
not notice that the complainant had relied upon the statement of
account (Ext.CW1/H) but stated that the suggestion of the accused
to the complainant regarding the friendly loan would corroborate
the version of the complainant. The significance of the statement
of account (Ext.CW1/H) and the fact that the amount was shown to
have been paid to Mcleodganj helpline and not to the accused was
not appreciated by the learned Appellate Court.
28.
Therefore, the version of the complainant that he had
advanced a sum of ₹2,60,000/- as a friendly loan to the accused
was falsified by the statement of account, which showed that the
payment was made to M/s Mcleodganj Helpline and not to the
accused. The complainant failed to connect the accused to M/s
Mcleodganj Helpline, and he failed to demonstrate that the
accused was liable to repay the amount taken by the M/s
Mcleodganj Helpline.
29.
Learned Courts below proceeded on the basis that even
if the cheque was issued regarding the business of the firm, it
would not absolve the accused of his liability. This conclusion
cannot be sustained. If the firm were dissolved, all the partners
would be liable and not the accused alone. Further, it was never
claimed by the complainant that he had a partnership with the
2026:HHC:38
accused, which was dissolved, and the accused paid the money to
him as his share of the partnership firm. It is trite to say that the
Court has to find the case set up by a party, and it is impermissible
to find a third case which has not been set up by any party. Since
the complainant never asserted that the partnership firm was
dissolved, it is impermissible to hold the accused liable as a
partner of the firm.
30.
Learned Courts below proceeded on the basis that the
admission of the signatures on the cheque and issuance of the
cheque would trigger a presumption under Section 118(a) and 139
of the NI Act. There can be no dispute that the admission of the
signatures and issuance of the cheque would attract a liability
under Section 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act. However, the
presumption is rebuttable, and when the evidence of the
complainant shows that the money was paid to M/s Mcleodganj
Help and not to the accused, the presumption is rebutted.
31.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1275 that the presumption applies in the absence of evidence and
disappears after the production of the evidence. It was observed:
2026:HHC:38
“38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules
of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence
states as follows:
“The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is
merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to
reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to
the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent
does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to
satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence),
the presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the
case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule’.”
32.
Therefore, the judgments and order passed by the
learned Courts below cannot be sustained and are ordered to be set
aside. The accused is acquitted of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. The fine/compensation
amount, if deposited by the petitioner/accused be refunded to him
after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no
further appeal, and in case of appeal, it shall be dealt with as per
the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court.
33.
In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in
the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the
satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for
six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave
Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave,
2026:HHC:38
the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
34.
The present petition stands disposed of, so also the
pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
35.
A copy of the judgment, along with records of the
learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.
1st January, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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